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HISTORY
OF THE
GREEK REVOLUTION

Καὶ παρῶν ἐρῶ
Κοῦδὲν παρήσω τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπος
Τι γάρ σε μαλθόσσοιμ' ἂν ὦν ἐς ὕστερον
Ψεῦσται φανούμεθ' ; ὁρθὸν ἀλήθει' ἀεί.

HISTORY

OF THE

GREEK REVOLUTION

BY
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AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF GREECE UNDER FOREIGN DOMINATION," ETC.

IN TWO VOLUMES

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
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
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HISTORY

OF THE

GREEK REVOLUTION.

BOOK FIRST.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CONDITION OF THE MODERN GREEKS.

*"Countless generations of mankind
Depart, and leave no vestige where they trod."—WORDSWORTH.*

NUMBERS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH RACES IN EUROPE—PASHALIKS INTO WHICH THE COUNTRY INHABITED BY THE GREEKS WAS DIVIDED—EFFECT OF THE TREATY OF KAINARDGI ON THE CONDITION OF THE GREEKS—DISTINCTION BETWEEN GREEK ORTHODOXY AND GREEK NATIONALITY—SOCIAL DIVISIONS OF THE GREEK RACE—GREEKS IN MOLDAVIA AND VALLACHIA—CLERGY—PRIMATES—URBAN POPULATION—RURAL—MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS—STATE OF EDUCATION—CONDITION OF THE GREEKS—LAND-TAX—HARATCH—ROMELIOTS—ARMATOLI—PRIVILEGES OF THE PROVINCE OF AGRAPHA—KLEPHTS—MOREOTS—MOREOT KLEPHTS—MANIATS—ISLANDERS.

THIS History records the events which established the independence of Greece.

As long as the literature and the taste of the ancient Greeks continue to nurture scholars and inspire artists, modern Greece must be an object of interest to cultivated minds. Nor is the history of the modern Greeks

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

unworthy of attention. The importance of the Greek race to the progress of European civilisation is not to be measured by its numerical strength, but by its social and religious influence in the East. Yet, even geographically, the Greeks occupy a wide extent of sea-coast, and the countries in which they dwell are so thinly peopled that they have ample room to multiply and form a populous nation. At present their influence extends far beyond the territories occupied by their race; for Greek priests and Greek teachers have transfused their language and their ideas into the greater part of the Christian population of European Turkey. They have thus constituted themselves the representatives of Eastern Christianity, and placed themselves in prominent opposition to their conquerors, the Othoman Turks, who invaded Europe as apostles of the religion of Mohammed. The Greeks, during their subjection to the yoke of a foreign nation and a hostile religion, never forgot that the land which they inhabited was the land of their fathers; and their antagonism to their alien and infidel masters, in the hour of their most abject servitude, presaged that their opposition must end in their destruction or deliverance.

The Greek Revolution came at last. It delivered a Christian nation from subjection to Mohammedanism, founded a new state in Europe, and extended the advantages of civil liberty to regions where despotism had for ages been indigenous. In order to unfold its causes, it is necessary to describe the condition of the Greek people and of the Othoman government during the early part of this century.

When the Greeks took up arms, the numbers of the Greek and Turkish races in Europe were in all probability nearly equal, and neither is supposed to have greatly exceeded two millions. The population of continental Greece, from Cape Tænaron to the northern-

most limit of the Greek language, was supposed to be RETROSPECT.
not much greater than a million.¹ Another million may be added for the population of Crete, the Cyclades, the Ionian Islands, Constantinople, and the Greek maritime towns. If we add to this the Greek population of Asia Minor, the islands on the Asiatic coast, Cyprus, the trans-Danubian provinces, Russia, and other countries, the whole number of the Greek race cannot be estimated at more than three millions and a half.

Two Christian races in the sultan's European dominions were more numerous: the Vallachian or Roman race was not less than four millions; the Sclavonian, including the Bulgarian, which speaks the Sclavonic language, exceeded five millions.²

The provinces in which the Greeks formed a majority of the inhabitants were divided into six pashaliks of high rank, and many smaller districts, governed immediately by inferior pashas.

1. The most important of the great pashas who ruled the Greeks was the capitan-pasha. Besides being the minister of the marine, and the commander-in-chief of all the naval forces of the empire, he was governor-general of the islands, and of part of the coast of Greece. Inferior pashas administered the affairs of Cyprus, Rhodes, and Mytilene under his superintendence.

2. The pashalik of the Morea was regarded as one of the most valuable governments in European Turkey,

¹ This is the estimate of Colonel Leake, the most accurate and observant traveller in Greece.—*An Historical Outline of the Greek Revolution* (London, 1826), p. 20.

² Little dependence can be placed on the statistical accounts of the Othoman empire. Ubicini, one of the best authorities, in *Lettres sur la Turquie* (1858, p. 49), gives 60,000 as the population of Bassora. In the same year, the official registers at Constantinople were said to give only 5000; and English officers who visited it shortly after, during the Persian war, did not suppose that it could contain a greater number. In 1820 the population was estimated at 12,000, and it has been declining ever since.

for it remitted a large surplus revenue annually to the sultan. It included the whole Peloponnesus, with the exception of Maina, which was under the jurisdiction of the capitan-pasha, and it extended beyond the Isthmus of Corinth, over the Dervenokhorion, embracing the whole of Megaris and a corner of Attica. The pasha of Naupaktos, or Lepanto, was also subordinate to the vizier of the Morea.

3. The pashalik of Egriboz included the whole island of Eubœa and the adjoining provinces of Bœotia, Locris, and Attica. Thebes, Athens, Livadea, Salona, and Talanta, formed Kazas, whose revenues were administered by voevodes appointed annually by the Sublime Porte. Athens was a provincial town belonging to the fief or avpalik of the kishlar-aga, who named its voevode, and this officer had an interest in protecting the inhabitants against the exactions of the pasha of Egriboz. In consequence of the great authority of the kishlar-aga (the chief of the black eunuchs), the Christians of Athens enjoyed a considerable degree of local liberty. Tradition says that Athens owed this happiness to the beauty of one of her daughters, who proved as great a benefactress as the empresses Eudocia and Irene.¹ An Athenian slave named Vasiliké became the favourite of Sultan Achmet I., and in order to relieve her fellow-countrymen from the tyranny of the Mussulmans of Negrepont, she obtained as a boon from her imperial lover that the revenues of Athens should be administered by the kishlar-aga. The reforms of Selim III. had, however, recently placed Athens under the jurisdiction of the Tchelebi-effendi.

4. Southern Albania formed a pashalik, which took its name from its capital, the city of Joannina. It had been long governed by Ali Pasha, who had annexed the

¹ *Greece under the Romans*, 2d edit., p. 209. *History of the Byzantine Empire*, i. 82.

greater part of Thessaly and all Western Greece, except RETROSPECT Naupaktos, to his pashalik.

5. The pashalik of Selanik, or Thessalonica, extended over the greater part of Macedonia; but in its northern part there were many semi-independent beys, who farmed the taxes and land revenues. Even in the vicinity of Thessalonica, the descendants of Evrenos, whom the Turks call Ghazi Gavrinos, retained the appanage which Murad II. had conferred on their ancestor. They still held in fief the *istira*, or monopoly of the corn annually remitted to Constantinople.¹

6. The island of Crete formed a great pashalik, divided into three inferior military governments, under subordinate pashas, who resided in the fortresses of Candia, Canea, and Retymo. The district of Sphakia, which was inhabited by Christians alone, was governed by its own primates.

The wrongs of the subject Christians in Turkey have been loudly proclaimed, and the tyranny of the Othoman government has been justly condemned; yet for two centuries after the conquest of Greece, Christian subjects were as well treated by Turkish sultans as heretical subjects were by Christian kings. Indeed, the central government of the sultan, or the Sublime Porte, as it was termed, has generally treated its Musulman subjects with as much cruelty and injustice as the conquered Christians. The sufferings of the Greeks were caused by the insolence and oppression of the ruling class, and the corruption that reigned in the Othoman administration, rather than by the direct exercise of the sultan's power. In his private affairs, a Greek had a better chance of obtaining justice from his bishop and the elders of his district than a Turk from the *cadi* or the *voevode*.

¹ Ducas calls Evrenos, Abranezes; Chalcocondyles, Brenezes, page 115 ed. Par.

The government of the sultan was the administration of a despot whose cabinet was composed of household slaves. The feudal system, which for two centuries lightened the weight of Othoman power to the Turkish population, was an inheritance of the Seljouk empire. The inherent defect of the empire founded by Othman was the absence of a judicial administration, bound to observe fixed rules of justice and a settled form of judicial procedure.

The treaty of Kainardgi, in the year 1774, made a great change in the condition of the Greeks. It afforded Russia a pretext for interfering in their favour whenever they were treated with gross injustice ; and the interference of Russia soon led to like interference on the part of the other European powers ; so that, before the end of the eighteenth century, the Christians in many parts of the sultan's dominions were beginning to acquire a recognised species of foreign protection. The pashas in large commercial cities often found it less dangerous to enrich themselves at the expense of the Turks than to venture on open exactions from the Greeks. A provincial Mussulman could rarely find an advocate at the Porte ; an oppressed Greek could either bribe a dragoman or interest a consul to awaken the meddling spirit that rarely sleeps in the breast of a diplomatist, and thereby secure the protection of some ambassador at Constantinople. But as it was evident that the whole fabric of society among the Mussulman population of the Othoman empire presented an insurmountable barrier to the introduction of just laws and an equitable dispensation of justice, so experience at last proved that no foreign protection could secure the lives and properties of the subject Christians from the tyranny of a government which paid no respect even to the lives of its Turkish and Mussulman subjects. The sultan's government, like the government of the

Roman emperors, was a monarch's household trans-^{RETROSPECT.} formed into an imperial administration, and both destroyed the resources of their subjects and depopulated the regions they governed, without making any distinction between the conquerors and the conquered. A conviction that the Othoman empire was hastening to dissolution became prevalent both among the Christian and Mussulman inhabitants of European Turkey at the commencement of the present century. *

In the year 1820 no Christian government, except that of Russia, considered itself entitled to interfere with the manner in which the sultan treated his subjects of the Greek Church. Any interference on the part of Great Britain, under the pretext that the king exercised a protectorate over the Ionian Islands, would have been treated as an unjustifiable assumption. The sultan would have considered himself as much entitled to suggest measures for governing the Mohammedans in India as the King of England to advise any changes in the treatment of the Christians in Turkey. All questions relating to the East were then beyond the domain of public opinion, and very little was known in England concerning the condition of the modern Greeks.

The testimony of travellers was singularly discordant: some represented the Greeks as suffering intolerable oppression, as living in hourly fear of their lives or of the confiscation of their property; others declared that no people in Europe was so lightly taxed, and subject to so few personal burdens. They were said to enjoy a degree of religious liberty which the Catholics of Ireland might envy; and that they had a more direct authority over their municipal affairs than was possessed by the citizens in French communes. The Greek Church was known to possess considerable wealth and great political influence over all Turkey.

BOOK I.
CHAP. I.

Greeks were known to exercise sovereign power in Valachia and Moldavia, and to profit by the corruption that existed in every branch of the Othoman administration at Constantinople. The primates of Greece collected the greater part of the sultan's revenues in Europe; and the Greek municipalities were, in many districts, allowed to exercise an almost unlimited authority. It was evident that the condition of the Greeks presented many anomalies. At Constantinople, the Greek was a crouching slave; at Bucharest and Yassy, a despotic tyrant; at Chios, a happy subject; and at Psara, and in the villages of Mount Pelion, a free citizen.

A confusion of ideas has been produced by not distinguishing clearly between Greek orthodoxy and Greek nationality. The ancient Greeks paid great attention to purity of race; the modern Greeks have transferred their care to purity of doctrine. The Mesenians preserved their manners and their dialect unchanged during centuries of exile; the Moreats have kept their orthodoxy untainted during ages of foreign domination. At present the Greeks are willing to intermarry with Vallachians, Russians, and Albanians of the Eastern Church; but to render a marriage lawful with a Catholic of the purest Hellenic descent, it would be necessary to rebaptise the spouse.

The tendency to forget everything but orthodoxy was cherished by the political privileges which the sultans had conferred on the Greek Church. Its adherents formed a great community in the Othoman empire, known to the Turks by the national designation of Roum. The immense orthodox population of European Turkey and Asia Minor, embracing many nationalities, was confounded with the small number of the Greek race. Yet these two bodies were composed of heterogeneous elements, influenced by divergent interests and feelings, and to whose political

union geography, language, and manners presented RETROSPECT.
 an almost insurmountable barrier. Even among the
 Greeks, though the people confounded orthodoxy and
 nationality, it was only the priests and the learned
 class who looked forward to a restoration of the Byzan-
 tine empire, and to the establishment of the Greeks as
 a dominant race, by rendering political power a con-
 sequence of ecclesiastical authority. They alone de-
 cluded themselves with the dream that the Albanians,
 the Servians, the Bulgarians, and the Vallachians would
 submit to be ruled by Greek sovereigns and prefects,
 because they prayed under the guidance of Greek
 patriarchs and bishops.

The sultan recognised the patriarch of Constanti-
 nople as the ecclesiastical chief of all the orthodox
 Christians in European Turkey, and supported him in
 the exercise of an extensive civil jurisdiction over
 several nations. Among these, the Greeks really occu-
 pied the position of a dominant race. To the Valla-
 chian and the Bulgarian, the Greek was in some degree
 what the Turk was to the Greek. The Greek language
 was the language of the church and the law which ruled
 the whole assemblage of nations called by the Otho-
 man administration, *Roum meleti*, or Roman nation.
 Indeed, the power and jurisdiction of the patriarch and
 synod of Constantinople, as it existed under the Otho-
 man sultans, was an institution remodelled by Moham-
 med II.; and had the Othoman government found
 either Vallachians or Bulgarians fitter instruments to
 govern the orthodox community in accordance with
 Othoman interests, the patriarchs and the members of
 the synod of Constantinople would in all probability
 have ceased to be Greeks.

The great influence of the Greek race in the East is
 not, however, entirely derived from its priestly and
 literary superiority. It rests on a wide social basis,

for it forms the majority of the middle class in many districts where the cultivators of the soil and the mass of the people are of another race. A considerable part of the trade of Turkey was in the hands of the Greeks, and their communications were more frequent between the distant parts of the country than those of the other divisions of the population. All news was generally transmitted through a Greek medium, coloured with Greek hopes and prejudices, or perverted by Greek interests.

Yet, great as the ecclesiastical, literary, and commercial influence of the Greek race really was in European Turkey, the events of the Greek Revolution showed that the influence of Greek nationality had been greatly overrated by the Greeks themselves. Even in the Greek Church, ecclesiastical interest was more powerful than national feeling. A large part of the Greek nation made but feeble efforts to aid their countrymen when struggling for independence. The literary powers of the learned created a loud echo of patriotism ; but thousands of wealthy Greeks continued to pursue their own schemes of interest and profit, under the protection of the sultan's government, during the whole period of the Greek Revolution.

The Greeks were divided into many classes, separated by social trammels as well as dispersed in distant provinces. It is not uncommon to find Constantinople spoken of as the capital of the Greek nation because it is the seat of the head of the orthodox church. This is a great error. The Greeks do not form one quarter of the population, and the agricultural population of the surrounding country consists chiefly of Bulgarians. The Turkish and Bulgarian languages are more extensively spoken than the Greek. The ancient Byzantium was a Greek colony, but the Constantinople founded by the great Constantine was a Roman city,

in which Latin long continued to be the language of the government and the principal families. Since the conquest of the city by Mohammed II., the Greek population has formed a foreign colony in a Mussulman city. Its numbers have been recruited by emigrants from every part of the Othoman empire. The phanariot families in the service of the sultan emigrated from different provinces. The merchants were generally Chiots, the shopkeepers Moreots, and the domestic servants natives of the islands of the Archipelago. The lower orders of the Christian population were recruited more extensively from the Sclavonians and Bulgarians in the northern provinces than from the Greeks. There was no permanent nucleus of a native Greek population in Constantinople as there was of a Turkish.

In Vallachia and Moldavia the Greeks formed a dominant race. They held there a position very similar to what the Turks held in Greece. The most lucrative offices were in their possession; the greater part of the ecclesiastical and national property was occupied by them under various titles and pretexts. Like the Turks in Greece, too, they were detested by the natives as fiscal extortioners and cruel oppressors; and it was only by the support they derived from the sultan's authority that they were able to maintain their position. That position was lost by the Greek Revolution.

The strength of the Greek race lay in the ancient seats of Greek liberty. In the Peloponnesus, in continental Greece, and in the Greek Islands, they not only formed the majority of the population, but they still possessed some municipal authority, and a considerable part of the landed property under cultivation. Even in Southern Epirus and in the Chacidice of Macedonia they formed the majority of the agricultural population.

The Greeks were divided into four classes — the clergy, the primates, the urban population or townsmen, and the rural population or peasants. The marked separation of these classes deserves particular attention, as forming a characteristic feature of modern Greek civilisation at the outbreak of the Revolution. This division exerted a powerful influence on society, and modified the effects of every political event. Each of these classes was connected with the sultan's government by different ties. Their religion, their language, and their hatred of Othoman domination, were their bonds of union.

From the time Sultan Mohammed II. had reorganised the Greek Church under the Patriarch Gennadius, Greek bishops had acted in their dioceses as a kind of Othoman prefects over the orthodox population. Ecclesiastical rank in the orthodox church was oftener obtained by bribing a vizier than by theological learning or Christian piety. Every diocese was loaded with debt in consequence of the simony which prevailed. The most observant traveller who visited Greece before the Revolution declares, that it is a common sentiment among the laity, that the bishops have been a great cause of the present degraded condition of the Greek nation; nor have the Greeks in general any esteem for their higher clergy, or for the monastic order from which the prelates are promoted. But Colonel Leake thinks that this is in some degree an injustice; for although the clergy were often instruments of oppression, and a bishop could hardly avoid acting like a Turk in office, the regular clergy had kept the Greek language alive, and perhaps prevented the dissolution of all national union.¹ Yet this opinion may be questioned, for in cultivating an imperfect study of a

¹ Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, iv. 281. See an anecdote in Note B to the second canto of *Childe Harold* concerning the Christian Basil.

pedantic ecclesiastical imitation of the classic language) RETROSPECT.
 they seem to have prevented the improvement of the modern dialect ; and, on the whole, the Greek nation seems to have done more to support the patriarchal and synodal church of the Othoman empire than that ecclesiastical establishment did to protect and improve the Greek nation.

At the commencement of the present century, the Greek clergy, sharing the general opinion that the Othoman empire was on the eve of its dissolution, began to expect a speedy deliverance by the advance of the armies of Russia. The priests contemplated being called upon, before the lapse of many years, to transfer their allegiance to the Czar of Muscovy ; but by them the independence of Greece was never supposed either to be possible or desirable. An orthodox emperor seated on the throne of Constantinople would of course confirm and extend all the privileges of the Greek clergy.

The primates in Greece formed a substitute for an aristocracy. The real aristocracy of the Greek nation was exterminated by the Othoman conquest. Its members were either slain by the Turks, driven into exile, or induced to embrace Mohammedanism. Several apostates of distinguished Greek families obtained high rank in the sultan's service. Mohammed II. deliberately put to death every Greek who exercised any political influence, as the simplest mode of establishing tranquillity in Greece ; and the torpid condition of Greek society for several generations attests the wisdom of his satanic policy.

The patronage of the Othoman government gradually created a Greek aristocracy of administrative agents and tax-gatherers. This aristocracy consisted of the phanariots at Constantinople and the codgashees, or primates, in Greece. The moral and politi-

cal position of this class has been well described by calling them "a kind of Christian Turks." A voevode or a bey purchased the taxes of a district as farmer-general. He then sublet the different branches of revenue to Greek primates, who again usually relet their portions in smaller shares to the local magistrates of the communities within the district. In this way the public revenues of Greece maintained three distinct classes of fiscal officers at the expense of the people.

Among the Greeks, as among every other people in the East, a broad line of distinction exists between the urban and the rural population. The citizen and the peasant occupy different grades in the scale of civilisation. Their condition in society is more strongly characterised by their place of dwelling and the nature of their occupation, than by their nationality. This distinction is an inheritance of the Roman empire which survived all the vicissitudes of the Byzantine administration, and resisted the endeavours of the crusaders to introduce feudality as an element of Greek society. The Mussulman conquest made no unfavourable change in the relative position of the citizen and the peasant ; but it must be noted, that at the time of the Turkish conquest the citizen in Eastern towns generally occupied a higher social position than the citizen of Western Europe in a corresponding occupation, but they laboured under great moral disadvantages. The servile position of the Christian subjects of the sultan, and the corruption of the Othoman administration, rendered deceit the best defence against extortion. Truth and honesty were impediments to the acquisition of wealth ; and consequently the prosperous Greek trader was very rarely a better man than his poorer countrymen. Falsehood and fraud became habitual, and were considered by strangers as national qualities rather than individual characteristics.

The Christian population in the towns of Turkey was divided into corporate bodies, according to the trades exercised by individuals, in the same way as the Mussulman population ; but the Mussulman corporations generally contrived to throw the burden of all local expenditure on the Christians. It was, therefore, only by counterfeiting poverty, or by bribing some powerful protector, that the Greek rayah could escape ruinous extortion ; and it was only by simulating some bodily infirmity or chronic disease that he could evade being condemned to forced labour at inadequate wages. RETROSPECT.

A nation's strength lies in its rural population. In Greece this class has for ages been poor and neglected, yet the Mohammedan conquest tended on the whole to better its condition, for it destroyed the predial serfdom inherited from the Byzantine empire, and enforced by the feudal principles of the Frank conquerors. It raised the peasants to the rank of free men, and converted them into the staple of Greek nationality. From their ranks the waste of city life was everywhere repaired, and the rural recruits transferred into the urban population an unadulterated supply of Greek feelings and traditions, which prevented the Othoman domination from denationalising the city traders, and reducing them to any identity of character with the dispersed Jews.

The agricultural population of Greece, as, indeed, the agricultural population throughout the East, from the Adriatic to the Bay of Bengal, was fixed in a stationary condition by fiscal laws. It was compelled to labour the land, and gather in the harvest, according to regulations framed, to protect the revenue of the sovereign, not to encourage or reward the labour of the cultivator. The sovereign was entitled to one-tenth of the fruits of the soil, and from the moment the crop began to ripen, he became a joint proprietor in the

whole. The property of the cultivator in nine-tenths of the crop was from that moment treated as a matter subsidiary to the arrangement relative to the disposal of the remaining tenth, which belonged to the sovereign. An industrious peasant could rarely make any profit by raising an early crop, or by improving the quality of his produce, for the farmer of the tenths mixed all qualities together, and was generally the principal dealer in produce in the district. No superiority of skill or increase of labour could, under such circumstances, secure a higher price where markets were distant and where no roads existed. The effects of this system of taxation on the condition of Greek agriculture may still be studied in the dominions of Sultan Abdulmeshid, or of King Otho, for they rival one another in the disastrous effects of their fiscal administration (A.D. 1859).

The municipal institutions of the Greeks under the Othoman government have been much vaunted. In reality they amounted to little more than arrangements for facilitating the collection of the tenth of the produce of the soil by the agency of the Greeks themselves, in order to prevent the extermination of the agricultural population. The Othoman sultans appear to have had a clearer insight into the effects of an intolerable land-tax than the Roman emperors before the time of Diocletian.

The communal system in Greece has been sometimes considered to be a tradition of Hellenic liberty. Human institutions are rarely so durable ; and it could not be expected that, in a land where the names of Sparta, Plataea, Olympia, and Delphi had fallen into oblivion, any relics of civil liberty had been preserved by tradition. History tells us that every trace of Hellenic institutions were swept away by the Roman empire and

the Christian church. The Greek city was supplanted by the Roman municipality. The provincial administration and the civil laws of Rome effaced every vestige of Hellenic freedom. The Christian religion and the laws of Justinian are the oldest social traditions of the modern Greeks. RETROSPECT.

Even the Roman municipal system was swept away by the centralising despotism of the Byzantine emperors, and in the ninth century it was formally abrogated by Leo the Philosopher.¹

Oriental fiscality was the essence of the municipal institutions of the modern Greeks. Each district was assessed to pay a certain amount of taxes, and the repartition of a part of the sum to be paid by the Christians was left to the clergy and the primates. In some places the persons intrusted with this power were named by the Porte; in others they were elected by the people. The authority thus created was greater in the rural districts than in the towns. And in those parts of Greece in which there were few resident Turks, a popular election gave the institution a national character. But this municipal system was too intimately connected with bad principles of taxation to become a means of training a nation to freedom and justice. Like everything in the Othoman empire, it was full of anomalies. Some communities had the privilege of maintaining armed guards or Christian troops, called *armatoli*; some enjoyed their freedom under the guarantee of written charters from the sultans; some enjoyed great local privileges; and some were relieved entirely from the land-tax.²

¹ *History of the Byzantine Empire*, i. 282.

² The Greeks have forged many written charters. Mr Tricoupi publishes one as genuine in the second volume of his *History of Greece* which carries proofs of its forgery, even though the date is omitted in Tricoupi's copy. Mr Argyropoulos, in his work on the *Municipal Administration of Greece*, *Δημοτική Διοίκησης ἐν Ἑλλάδι*, p. 25, gives a copy of the document, with the date, year of

Nothing partaking of real self-government could exist wherever the dominant class of Mohammedans dwelt, intermingled with the Greek population, in a despotism like that of the Othoman sultans, in which the power of life and death was intrusted to local governors. Municipal liberty can have no vitality, unless the local magistrates are directly elected by the people, and responsible to the law alone. If a sultan or a pasha can revoke the mandate granted by the people when the local magistrate has violated no law and neglected no duty, and replace the defender of the people by his own nominee, municipal institutions are nothing more than a convenience for assisting the central administration in ruling the people.

The slight hold which the municipal institutions of the modern Greeks had acquired in the affections of the people is demonstrated by the ease with which they were perverted by Capodistrias, and changed for a new system by the Bavarian Regency. Yet these institutions, though they did not possess the energy required for producing a national revolution, aided the Greeks in maintaining their struggle with the Othoman government, by supplying a system of local organisation, which enabled them to call the whole strength and resources of the agricultural population simultaneously into action.

It has been already stated that the position and character of the Greek clergy tended to weaken the power of the Greek Church, though ecclesiastical influence still remained the highest national authority. The next in importance was literary education, and those who dispensed it enjoyed a moral influence in

the Hegira 1036—i.e., A.D. 1626. It purports to be a ratification by Sultan Ibrahim of privileges granted by Suleiman the Magnificent to Naxos and other islands. Sultan Ibrahim ascended the throne in 1640. The document is full of historical and chronological blunders, and the part which is genuine is transcribed from a charter of a more modern date, or the blunders could not have been committed.

society second only to the clergy. More learning existed among the modern Greek laity under the Othoman rule than is generally supposed. Since the Revolution it has been more generally disseminated, but it does not appear to be deeper in those branches not immediately connected with profitable employment. The state of education explains the failure of the missionaries sent from Europe and America to improve the religious ideas of the Greeks. In theological learning these missionaries were always inferior to many of the Greek clergy; in classical knowledge they were as much inferior to many lay teachers. During the period of destitution which succeeded the cessation of hostilities with the Turks, they were welcomed as teachers of elementary schools, and they were popular for a time, because they gave both instruction and books gratis; but, in order to make their schools of any use, they were obliged to employ Greeks as teachers. Differences arose between the missionaries themselves, and between the missionaries and their schoolmasters. The clergy, taking advantage of these disputes to recover their authority, succeeded in closing the schools of all the missionaries who did not allow the Greek priesthood to control the religious instruction of the pupils. The principle that the religious instruction of the children of orthodox parents can only be directed by the orthodox, has been adopted by the government since the Revolution of 1843, and applied to missionary schools even more stringently than had been done previously. As might have been expected, religious bigotry has received a stronger impulse than religious education.

For more than three centuries after the Othoman conquest the literature of the modern Greeks was almost exclusively confined to ecclesiastical subjects; and its language was not the spoken dialect of the people, but

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a pedantic imitation of the language of the fathers of the Church. The popular language, as written by merchants and traders, was disfigured by ignorance of grammar and orthography, to such a degree as to give it the appearance of a new tongue ; but the popular songs and epistolary correspondence of this period, if written with a corrected orthography, prove their close connection with ancient Greek. Degraded as the condition of the Greeks was politically, it is ✓ probable that a larger proportion could read and write than among any other Christian race in Europe. The Greeks of every class have always set a higher value on a knowledge of letters than any other people. They have a national tendency to pedantism.

✓ At the commencement of this century the effects of the French Revolution were strongly felt in Greece. Classic history was studied ; classic names were revived ; Athenian liberty became a theme of conversation among men ; Spartan virtue was spoken of by women ; literature was cultivated with enthusiasm as a step to revolution.

On the eve of the Revolution the condition of the Greek race might be represented under two different aspects, and innumerable facts might be cited to prove that both were true ; yet, under the one, the Greeks would appear as oppressed and degraded, and, under the other, as a happy and prosperous people, enjoying many valuable privileges. A comparison might be instituted between the condition of the Greek rayahs under the sultan, and the Russian serfs under the czar. The Christians who cultivated the soil in Turkey enjoyed a larger share of the fruits of their labours than the Christian peasantry in Poland and Hungary. The Greek citizen enjoyed a greater degree of liberty of speech, and possessed as much influence on the local affairs of his township, as the citizen of the

French empire under Napoleon I. Nor were the orthodox in the East more galled by the restrictions which their religion imposed on them than the Catholics of Ireland. RETROSPECT.

The Greeks were allowed a considerable share of authority in the executive administration of the Othoman government. The patriarch of Constantinople, as I have already mentioned, was a kind of under-secretary to the grand vizier for the affairs of the orthodox Christians. The dragoman of the Porte and the dragoman of the fleet, who were Greeks, were also virtually members of the sultan's government. The Christians of the Morea had also a recognised agent at Constantinople, and other Greek communities had recognised official protectors, who controlled the fiscal oppression and the arbitrary injustice of the provincial pashas. This recognition, on the part of the Othoman government, that the Greeks required some defence against abuses of power on the part of their rulers, proves that the sultans not only perceived the evils inherent in the constitution of the Othoman empire, but they were also desirous of redressing them.

In some degree, and in several provinces of the empire, the agricultural population was always in the same condition, whether it was composed of Mussulmans or Christians. Both were oppressed by the same fiscal regulations, and both were retained in the same stationary condition. In the richest plains the peasant who cultivated the lands of a Mussulman aga or of a Christian primate, usually paid a seventh of the gross produce of the land to the sultan, and divided the remainder with his landlord. When the destruction of stock or a decline in the fertility of the soil rendered it impossible for the peasantry to perpetuate the race of cultivators on the proportion of the produce which fell to their share, they emigrated, or the race died out;

and the frequency of this event, both in Europe and Asia, was apparent to every traveller—abandoned villages and ruined mosques were met with in the richest provinces of the empire.

In addition to the land-tax paid in kind, the Othoman government compelled the cultivators of the soil to furnish a determinate quantity of grain for the supply of Constantinople. The loss incurred by this right of pre-emption was thrown on the peasantry.

The Christians regarded the haratch, or capitation tax, as the most offensive badge of their subjection. It reduced them to the condition of rayahs or ransomed subjects. Yet it was in general more galling from the manner of its collection than from the amount which each individual was obliged to pay. Its collection was made a pretext for enforcing many vexatious police regulations, and it was doubly hated because Moham-medans of the lowest class were exempted from its burden.

The haratch was frequently farmed to the worst class of a pasha's retinue; and in Greece it was often sublet in districts to the petty officers of the Albanian mercenaries. An insulting term was applied to these unpopular tax-gatherers, who were called gypsy-haratchers. The origin of the nickname was a popular opinion that gypsies were bound to pay double haratch, and the reproach conveyed was that the Albanians attempted to treat every man liable to the haratch as a gypsy.

So anomalous was the condition of different portions of the Greek population, that the inhabitants of some mountain districts in Romelia lived like a free people. Those who dwelt in Agrapha and the mountain-ranges that extend from Pelion and Olympus northward as far as the Greek language was spoken in

Macedonia, enjoyed the right of bearing arms as RETROSPECT armatoli. They elected their own primates or elders, and their local authorities collected the taxes due by the district. Their character was that of freemen, and was marked by a degree of courage and independence not to be found in other parts of Greece. Considerable numbers were engaged in commercial pursuits, which carried them into various parts of the sultan's empire, and into many ports of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Many travelled far into Austria and Russia. These wanderings enlarged their minds, and when they settled in their native towns, they became local magistrates, and displayed some signs of that active spirit that usually pervades commercial republics.

In the rude condition of Greek society and trade, the muleteers engaged in the transport of produce formed a numerous class, for everything was transported on the backs of pack-horses or mules. The number of this class was much greater than the depopulated appearance of European Turkey would have led a stranger to suppose possible. Coarse woollen cloth of different kinds, and the cloaks which imitate sheep-skins, were manufactured in the interior of the continent, and these bulky goods employed thousands of horses to convey them to the sea-coast. The cheese and butter of the mountains was transported into the plains, and the grain of the plains was carried back into the mountains. Considerable quantities of money were also constantly in movement, partly for purposes of trade, and partly as remittances to provincial officers, or to the imperial treasury. Every class considered it good policy to conciliate the agoyiates, or muleteers. Powerful pashas patronised them, wealthy merchants treated them with respect and confidence; they were favoured by Mussulman beys and Greek primates, and

they were esteemed and trusted by the peasantry ; their friendship was sought by armatoli, and their enmity was feared by klephts.

✓ The shepherds were also a numerous class in Romelia. They were as independent, though not so influential, as the muleteers.

The peasants of the mountain districts, the muleteers, and the shepherds, formed the best representatives of the Greek nation ; and it was from among them that the ranks of the armatoli were recruited.

The armatoli were a Christian local militia, which had existed in the Byzantine empire, and which had in some degree protected the Greek population against the Franks, the Servians, and the Albanians, during the anarchy that reigned in Greece and Macedonia, while the worthless race of the Paleologoi ruled at Constantinople. The Greeks in the mountain districts, fearing anarchy more than despotism, generally submitted to the sultans on the condition of being allowed to retain their local privileges. The institution of the armatoli was thus adopted into the scheme of the sultan's administration. The Greek communities of the mountains collected their own taxes, and the Greek troops guarded the great roads through the mountain passes ; but, as the sultans gradually increased the power and extended the authority of the central administration, the importance of the armatoli declined. The Dervendji-pasha, who represented the Kleisourarches of the Byzantine emperors, stationed Turkish troops to guard the principal dervends, or passes, and circumscribed the service of the armatoli as much as possible to that of rural guards. In some districts the military authority which had been vested in the Christians was entirely transferred to the Mussulmans before the end of the last century. The case of the town of Servia is an instance, which commands the

great road between Larissa and Monastir or Bitoglia (Pelagonia). The service of the armatoli was first rendered so burdensome, that the communities sought to purchase exemption from the obligation of furnishing additional armatoli. The money was employed to pay Albanian mercenaries. RETROSPECT.

The history of the armatoli, from the time of the Turkish conquest until the peace of Belgrade in 1739, has not met with the attention it deserves from the modern Greeks. The number of the armatoliks recognised by Othoman government is said to have been originally fourteen ; but no correct list appears to exist. After the peace of Belgrade, the policy of diminishing the numbers of the armatoli was steadily and successfully pursued. To destroy the power of this Christian militia, the sultans, in the year 1740, departed from the ancient practice of the Porte, not to name an Albanian bey to the rank of pasha in his native country. Suleiman of Arghyrokastron, a man of activity and daring, was appointed pasha of Joannina and dervendji-pasha, with strict orders to watch the intrigues of the Greeks, who were suspected of being employed by Russia to prepare the Christians to rebel, and to circumscribe the power of the armatoli.

Suleiman fulfilled his instructions with much ability. He worked on the mutual jealousies which are the bane of Greek society. By tolerating the feuds of the captains, and then aiding the people who suffered from their hostilities, he gradually weakened the organisation of the ancient captainliks, and introduced Albanian Mussulmans into Christian districts. The venality of some captains enabled him to purchase the chief military power in their district.

Kurd Pasha, another Albanian bey, succeeded Suleiman, and held the office of dervendji-pasha for fifteen years ; at first, in conjunction with the pashalik of

Joannina, and afterwards with that of Berat. Kurd acted under instructions similar to those given to Suleiman. His administration commenced about the time the Russians invaded the Morea; and this circumstance afforded him a reasonable pretext for diminishing the numbers of the armed Christians and reducing their pay. The severity of his measures against the armatoli, instead of being relaxed, was increased after the peace of Kainardji in 1774.

Ali of Tepelen became dervendji-pasha in the year 1787, with strict orders to pursue the same policy as Suleiman and Kurd. He destroyed the old system so completely, that the proud armatoli of earlier days were reduced to be local policemen in their native districts. Into every armatolik he introduced a number of Albanian Mussulman mercenaries. With the perfidy, cruelty, and vigour that formed his policy, he circumscribed the legal authority, and nullified the traditional privileges of the Christian militia, without openly abrogating their ancient charters. The jealousies of rival captains were encouraged and their hostilities overlooked until it served Ali's purpose to interfere. The Greek clergy and primates were prompted to make complaints against the exactions of the soldiers and the feuds of the captains. Bands of robbers (klephts) were tolerated, and even encouraged, until a case was made out which served as a popular pretext for introducing Mussulman Albanians into a Christian armatolik. During the government of Ali most of the districts, which had from time immemorial enjoyed the right of electing their captains of armatoli, were forced to waive this privilege, and request Ali to appoint their captain.

The last blow was given to the ancient system of armatoli at Agrapha by Ali. Mohammed II. is said to have confirmed the municipal independence and

the privileges of the armatolik of this district by a RETROSPECT.
written charter. When the sultans became the lords and protectors of Agrapha, it had long been engaged in hostilities with the Frank dukes of Athens and with the despots of Epirus. Its relations with the Othoman government were friendly, and its armatoli guarded the passes of Mount Pindus between Thessaly and Epirus, as they had done for ages under the Byzantine emperors. The population of Agrapha is of the Greek race, without the admixture of Bulgarian, Albanian, and Vallachian blood which pervades the neighbouring districts. It appears, indeed, to have successfully resisted the great Slavonian colonisation of Greece during the transformation of the Roman into the Byzantine empire, which implanted new geographical names on the rest of Greece. But though it resisted the social influence of the Slavonians, it could not evade the policy of Ali: he succeeded in sowing dissensions among the population of this favoured district, and then, under the pretext of an anxiety to prevent hostilities between the rival factions, he persuaded the municipal authorities to reduce the number of the armatoli to two hundred men. Shortly after he found an opportunity of sending a Mussulman derven-aga, with three hundred Albanians, to remain as a permanent garrison in Agrapha.

As the authority of the armatoli declined, the klephts, or brigands, grew up into political and social importance as a permanent class in the Greek nation. As long as the institution of the armatoli preserved its pristine energy, the klephts were repressed with a vigorous hand; but when the Porte began to reduce the numbers and curtail the privileges of the Christian militia, many discontented armatoli fled to the mountains, and lived by levying contributions on the culti-

vators of the soil. Where the government shows no respect for justice, lawless men are often supported by the lower orders of the people, as a means of securing revenge or of redressing intolerable social evils. A life of independence, even when stained with crime, has always been found to throw a spell over the minds of oppressed nations. The Greeks make Robin Hoods, or demi-heroes, of their leading klephts; they magnify the exploits of the class, and antedate its existence. The patriotic brigands of modern Greek poetry are a creation of yesterday. Even at the commencement of the present century, several of the most numerous bands in Macedonia consisted of as many Mussulmans as Christians, and Albanians were always more numerous in their ranks than Greeks.

During the government of Ali Pasha, the districts of Verria and Niausta were infested by a celebrated Mussulman klepht, named Sulu Proshova, whose band amounted to several hundred men, the majority of which was said to consist of Christians. The popular songs of the Greeks have given fame to the klephts, and the language in which the songs are written has caused scholars to exaggerate their merit as poetical compositions. The habitual cruelty of the klephts would have rendered pathos satire. Their most glorious exploits were to murder Turkish agas in mountain passes, as Lord Byron describes the scene in his "Giaour."¹

The ordinary life of the klepht was as little distinguished by mercy to the poor as it was ennobled by

¹ The Greeks suffered far more than the Turks from the klephts. Rich primates were more defenceless than wealthy agas; and robbers must have food every day. Every traveller in the East could cite proofs of this from his own experience. Two examples will suffice. Colonel Leake says: "The master of the house in which I lodge (at Kalabaka), among his other misfortunes, has left an eye with the klephts."—*Travels in Northern Greece*, iv. 262. Mr Dodwell says: "Our lodging at Livanatis was in the cottage of a poor Albanian woman, who was lamenting the loss of her husband, who had been killed by the klephts, while her infant son was taken prisoner, whom she had ransomed with the savings of several years."—*Classical Tour*, ii. 59. Livanatis is a village peopled by Christian Albanians, near Talanta.

national patriotism. There is very rarely anything to eulogise in the conduct of criminals. But the klephts, after the treaty of Belgrade, became gradually more and more confounded with the armatoli in the ideas of the urban population of Greece, from the frequency with which Ali enrolled distinguished klephts among his Christian guards, and conferred on them commands of armatoli ; while at the same time a constant desertion of discontented armatoli was recruiting the ranks of the klephts. This interchange of the members of the two corps at last created a certain community of feelings and interests. The existence of the klephts was necessary to render the services of the armatoli indispensable. Ali was often accused of neglecting to suppress the depredations of the klephts, in order to extend his power as dervendji-pasha. But when any individual klepht incurred his hatred, neither valour nor caution could elude his vengeance. The treachery with which he murdered Katziko-Jani, and the cruelty with which he inflicted the most horrible tortures on Katz-Antoni, are celebrated in Greek songs with feelings of mingled admiration and abhorrence.¹

The people furnished the true type of the Greek race in Romelia ; but in the Morea, the nation was represented by the proësti and primates. The people were of little account, for the primates were rarely elected by popular suffrage. Almost every local authority derived its power from the central administration of the pasha, and acted as fiscal agents of the sultan. Their insolence to the poorer class of Christians, and their exactions from the Greek peasantry, were only exceeded by the Mussulman Albanians who collected the haratch. In manners and dress they imitated the Turks, and they were accused of leaguings with the higher clergy to keep the people in ignorance and subjection.

¹ Flauriel, *Chants Populaires de la Grèce*, i. 170.

Before the Revolution, it was observed that education flourished more at Joannina, under the eye of the tyrant Ali, than at Patras or Tripolitza, under the care of Greek primates. Education owed its chief obligations to traders and monks.

The Greeks of all classes in the Morea lived in comparative ease and abundance, in spite of the exactions of Turks and primates. The very circumstance which made taxation arrest the progress of society, rendered its burden light on individuals. It was paid in kind at harvest-time. A part was taken from a heap. The population was thin, and no produce was raised that was not raised in abundance. At the time of harvest, therefore, the price was always low. The farmers of taxes were usually primates and large landholders; and whether they were Turks or Greeks, they had a virtual monopoly of the market. Merchants found it more advantageous to make their price with those who could furnish a whole cargo than to collect small quantities in detail, even at a lower price, but with the risk of not finding adequate means of transport to the port of embarkation, and of not being able to complete a cargo within a fixed period.

The wellbeing of the Moreot peasantry in many districts arose from a cause which was easily overlooked. They enjoyed the benefit of a large amount of capital vested in improvements in former days. Buildings, mills, watercourses, and cisterns, facilitated labour and increased profits. But every generation saw some portion of this vested capital disappear, and with it a portion of the population vanished. Plantations of olive, mulberry, fig, and other fruit-trees, and vineyards producing wine or currants, occasioned so great a demand for agricultural labour, that the condition of the day-labourer was not inferior to that of the small peasant-proprietor. Indeed, no condition of

society could be more favourable to the individual labourer. The demand for labour was limited, but wages were high, and the price of provisions was low. RETROSPECT.

The municipal organisation of the Morea was more complete than in the other parts of Greece, but it was not so free. Each village elected its own Demogeront; the demogeronts and the people of the towns elected Proësti, and the proësti elected the primate of the province. The primates resided at Tripolitza, to transact the business relating to the whole Christian population of the pashalik. The proësti and primates, with the assistance of the bishops and abbots of the principal monasteries, elected a vekil or primate, who resided at Constantinople, as the official organ of communication with the sultan's ministers, and whose duty it was to keep the dragoman of the Porte and the dragoman of the fleet accurately informed concerning the affairs of the Greeks, as far as related to their respective departments. This system invested the aristocracy of the Morea with a considerable share of political power, and rendered it a check on the authority of the pasha.

The character of the Moreots was not viewed with favour by the other Greeks. The primates were accused of retaining the intriguing, treacherous, and rancorous disposition which the imperial historian Cantacuzenos tells us characterised them in the fourteenth century.¹ Nor were either the citizens or the peasants supposed to be more imbued with the spirit of truth and justice. Their industry and intelligence were recognised; but their deficiency in candour, courage, and honesty was almost proverbial. A Moreot was supposed, as a matter of course, to be more inconsistent, envious, and ungrateful than any other Greek.

The primates generally maintained a few armed

¹ *Cantacuzeni Historia*, lib. iv. c. 13, p. 751, ed. Par.

guards, partly to enforce their authority and collect taxes, and partly to defend their property from the klephts. But no regular *armatoli* ever existed in the Morea. Even the klephts of the Morea, who were mere brigands, were not numerous until after the social disorganisation caused by the Russian invasion and the insurrectionary movements of 1770. The exploits of Zacharias and of Kolokotroni, though celebrated in unpoetic verses and in bombastical prose, were only the deeds of highwaymen and sheep-stealers. They lived habitually at the expense of the poor Christian peasants, and rarely ventured to waylay a rich Greek primate, still more rarely to plunder a Turkish aga. The song of Zacharias celebrates the destruction of Greek villages, the plunder of Greek priests, the insult of Greek women, the murder of one Greek child, and the ransom of another.¹ Dodwell mentions the readiness with which the Greek peasantry joined in hunting down the band of Kolokotroni, and with which the Greek bishops excommunicated the klephts.² Kolokotroni's own account of the events witnessed by Dodwell has been published, and it proves that nothing can have been more brutal than the life of a Moreot klepht. They were crafty and cruel, and if the trade was ever nobler, it must have been long before the days of Kolokotroni.³

The Maniats and the Tzakonians must be excepted from the general description of the Moreot character. The former were remarkable for their love of violence and plunder, but also for their frankness and independence. The latter were distinguished by their peaceful habits, their honesty, and their industry. Both were

¹ Flauriel, *Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne*, vol. i. p. 76. *Chant* xiv.

² *Classical Tour*, i. 76., ii. 371. Captain George is confounded with Kolokotroni, ii. 356.

³ *Διήγησις Συμβάντων*, pp. 20, 21. Kolokotroni speaks of burning Greek villages, when he was a klepht, as a matter of no importance—"ἐκαίᾳ τὰ χωρία," p. 14.

considered brave. The Tzakonians kept provision-shops in almost every seaport on the Egean. The Maniats carried on piracy in every gulf.¹ RETROSPECT.

The Greek inhabitants of the islands exhibited a great variety of character, for they lived under a diversity of social influences. The maritime population of Psara, Kassos, Kalymnos, and Patmos, was active, intelligent, and brave; the Sciots were industrious and honest; the inhabitants of Tinos and Syra, whether orthodox or Catholic, were timid and well-behaved—formed by nature and art to make excellent cooks and nurses. The characteristic of the islanders of the Archipelago was supposed to be timidity. The Turks who visited them only to collect tribute, and who saw them scamper off to the mountains when the tax-gatherers arrived, nicknamed them *taoshan*, or hares. Little did the Turks think that these hares were about to turn on the greyhounds and drive them back into their kennel.

¹ See the account of the condition of the Maniats in the *History of Greece under Othoman Domination*, 132, &c. Colonel Leake relates two characteristic anecdotes of Maniat manners.—*Travels in the Morea*, i. 272, 282. Kolokotroni tells us, in his Memoirs, that the Maniats forget everything when there is a question of gaining money. “Οἱ Μανιάται λησμονοῦν ὅλα διὰ τὰ γρόσια.”—*Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς ἀπὸ τὰ 1770 ἕως τὰ 1836*, ὑπαγόρευσε Θ. Κ. Κολοκοτρώνης. Ἀθηναίον, 1846.

CHAPTER II.

THE ALBANIANS.

Θεσπρωτῶν καὶ Μολαττῶν μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν, ἱστοροῦσι Φαέθοντα βασιλεῦσαι πρῶτον ἓνα τῶν μετὰ Πελάσγου παραγενομένων εἰς τὴν Ἠπειρον.—PLUTARCH.

Phaeton was the first who reigned in Albania after the Deluge, and he came into Epirus with the Pelasgians.

EXTENT OF COUNTRY OCCUPIED BY THE ALBANIAN RACE IN GREECE—ALBANIAN MUSSULMANS OF LALLA AND BARDUNIA—CHRISTIAN ALBANIANS OF THE DERVENOKHORIA, HYDRA, AND SPETZAS—CHARACTER AND CIVIL INSTITUTIONS OF THE HYDRIOTS—THE ALBANIANS FORM A DISTINCT BRANCH OF THE INDO-GERMANIC RACE—GUEGHS AND TOSKS—CHARACTER, MANNERS, AND SOCIAL CONDITION OF THE ALBANIANS—ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS—MILITARY INFLUENCE GAINED BY THE ALBANIANS DURING THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY—IN GREECE AFTER THE YEAR 1770—POLICY OF ALI PASHA OF JOANNINA—SULIOTS, THE MOST REMARKABLE TRIBE OF ORTHODOX ALBANIANS—THEIR RISE AND SOCIAL CONDITION—REPEATEDLY ATTACKED BY ALI PASHA—LAST WAR—THE PRIEST SAMUEL—TREACHERY OF SULIOTS—CAPITULATION OF SULI—FATE OF SULIOTS.

THE Albanian race occupies no inconsiderable portion of ancient Greece. In the Greek kingdom it numbers about 200,000 souls, chiefly cultivators of the soil, though a part forms the most enterprising maritime population of modern Greece.

Some Albanian colonies settled in Greece before it was conquered by the Othoman Turks; and within the greater part of the limits occupied by the Albanians at the present day, the Greeks have been as completely expelled as the Celtic race in England by the Saxon.¹

Albanian colonists now occupy all Attica and Megaris, with the exception of the towns of Athens and Megara, where they form only a portion of the popula-

¹ *Medieval Greece*, 38, 275.

tion. They possess the greater part of Boeotia and a small portion of Locris, near Talanta. The southern part of Eubœa and the northern part of Andros, the whole of Salamis, and a part of Egina, are peopled by Albanians. In the Peloponnesus they are still more numerous. They occupy the whole of Corinthia and Argolis, extending themselves into the northern part of Arcadia and the eastern part of Achaia. In Laconia they inhabit the slopes of Taygetus, called Bardunia, which extend to the plain of Helos, and, crossing the Eurotas, they occupy a large district around Monemvasia to the south of the Tzakonians, and to the north of a small Greek population which dwells near Cape Malea, in the district called Vatika. In the western part of the peninsula they occupied a considerable part of the mountains which extend from Lalla to the north-eastern corner of Messenia, south of the Neda. Besides these large settlements, there are some smaller clusters of Albanian villages to the north of Karitena, and in the mountains between the Bay of Navarin and the Gulf of Coron. The islands of Hydra and Spetzas were entirely peopled by Albanians.

The extent of country occupied by the Albanian race is more clearly displayed in a coloured map than by the most minute description. Marathon, Plataea, Leuctra, Salamis, Mantinea, Ira, and Olympia, are now inhabited by Albanians, and not by Greeks. Even in the streets of Athens, though it has been for more than a quarter of a century the capital of a Greek kingdom, the Albanian language is still heard among the children playing in the streets near the temple of Theseus and the arch of Hadrian.

Not more than a tenth of the Albanian population settled in Greece professed the Mohammedan religion. The most warlike tribes were those of Lalla, Bardunia, and Carystos, in Eubœa.

RETROSPECT.

The Albanian Mussulmans of Lalla occupied a healthy and agreeable situation in an elevated plain on Mount Phloë. Their scattered habitations formed a great village rather than a town. The principal men dwelt in towers capable of defence. Lalla contained upwards of 3000 inhabitants, and about 400 were well armed and well mounted.

The district of Bardunia took its name from a Byzantine castle, high up on the slope of Taygetus, near the sources of the river of Passava. It comprised the south-eastern declivities of the mountain, which run out into a broad ridge overlooking the lower valley of the Eurotas, and extending almost to the sea-coast near Marathonisi. For three centuries this district was possessed by Albanians, who were without any tradition concerning the period at which their ancestors had colonised the country, or embraced Mohammedanism. It may, perhaps, be inferred from this ignorance, that the Barduniots expelled the Sclavonian population, which the Byzantine writers tell us occupied this district at the time of the Turkish conquest, and that they embraced Mohammedanism to become landlords instead of peasants.

The Barduniots dwelt in fortified towers dispersed over the country, and both their situation and their valour enabled them to restrain the forays of the Maniats in the rich plains of Laconia. The exactions of the Barduniot agas were nevertheless often found to be almost as intolerable as the depredations of the Greeks of Mania. The whole population was able to arm about 2500 men. Between forty and fifty families held a superior rank in consequence of their large landed possessions.

The armatoli were not the only Christians in the Othoman empire who were authorised to bear arms. Several Albanian communities in Greece, though en-

tirely composed of Christians, received this privilege RETROSPECT. from the sultan. The inhabitants of Megaris, who occupied five large villages, called Dervenokhoria, were particularly favoured by the Porte. The care of guarding the passes over Mounts Cithæron and Geranion, which lead to the Isthmus of Corinth, was intrusted to them ; and they were relieved from several taxes, on the condition that they should furnish a body of armed men constantly on duty. The number of armed men in the five villages amounted to about 2000.

The most influential, though not the most numerous, portion of the Albanian population in Greece, consisted of the shipowners and sailors of Hydra and Spetzas, and of the boatmen of Poros, Kastri, and Kranidi.

The island of Hydra contained nearly twenty thousand inhabitants of pure Albanian race before the Greek Revolution. It is a long ridge of limestone rocks, with only a few acres of soil capable of cultivation. The town is situated near the middle of the island, on the channel which separates it from Argolis. Seen from the sea, it presents a noble aspect, forming an amphitheatre of white houses, rising one above the other round a small creek which can hardly be used as a port. The houses cling like swallows' nests to the sides of a barren mountain, which towers far above them, and whose summit is crowned by a monastery of St. Elias. The streets are narrow, crooked, unpaved lanes, but the smallest dwellings are built of stone, and near the sea some large and solidly-constructed houses give the place an imposing aspect. In these houses the wealthy primates of Hydra resided at the breaking out of the Revolution. They lived, like most Albanians, a frugal, and, it may even be said, a penurious life. In their dress, their education, and their character, indeed, there was very little difference between the primate, the captain, and the common sailor of Hydra. The

rich Hydriot usually displayed his wealth in erecting a large building near the sea, which served as a dwelling for his family and a warehouse for his goods. In some of the rooms the sails and cordage of his ships were stored ; in others he lived.¹

The Hydriots of every rank displayed the peculiar character of the Albanian race. They were proud, insolent, turbulent, and greedy of gain. The primates were jealous and exacting, the people rude and violent. But both possessed some sterling virtues ; and they were distinguished from the Greeks by their love of truth, and by the honesty with which they fulfilled their engagements. There were no traders in the Levant who paid more punctually than the merchants, and no sailors who took better care of ship and cargo than the mariners of Hydra.

The civil government, conceded by the sultan and protected by the capitan-pasha, was entirely in the hands of the shipowners and retired captains, who formed a class of capitalists. About the year 1730, when the Albanian colony established itself in the then deserted island in order to escape the exactions of the pasha of the Morea, the local administration of the small trading community was intrusted to three elders, called, in the Albanian dialect, plekjeria, who were chosen by the people. The annual tribute paid to the sultan amounted to 200 piastres, a sum at that time not equal to £30 sterling. When the islanders grew richer and more numerous, the number of elders was gradually increased, until it reached twelve. But

¹ Both Gordon (*History of the Greek Revolution*, i. 164) and Waddington (*Visit to Greece*, 102) speak of the costly marbles and splendid furniture at Hydra. The marbles were only flags from Leghorn with which the courts were paved ; and the richest furniture consisted of a few damask chairs from Marseilles. Generally, the best houses of the Hydriot primates were not so expensively furnished as those of the Moreots. The houses were built at considerable expense, but were solid, not splendid. They still stand to bear evidence of the rude social condition of the Hydriots at the period of their greatest wealth.

the new settlers never acquired the full rights of RETROSPECT.
the original colonists, and the government became an oligarchy, which indeed appears to be the type to which political society tends among the Albanians. The twelve elders were chosen by the capitalists, and formed a municipal council, divided into three sections composed of four members. Each section acted for four months, and met daily to transact business with the governor or head of the police, who was a primate of the island, named by the capitan-pasha, and commonly called the Bey.

The celebrated capitan-pasha, Kutchuk Hussein, who was a steady protector of the Hydriots and Spetziots, was the first who appointed a governor to act as the sultan's representative at Hydra. He did so at the request of the Hydriots, who found their municipal authorities unable to restrain the turbulence of rival factions, or to bring murderers to justice.

The family of Konduriottis was one of the most ancient and most distinguished in the island. It was founded by the younger son of an Albanian peasant of the dervenokhorion of Kundura, who settled as a boatman shortly after the expulsion of the Venetians from the Morea, and before Hydra received the colony which formed a regular community. Lazaros Konduriottis was the head of the family during the Greek Revolution. At his marriage his father was assassinated by the bravo of a rival family. Old Konduriottis saw Kolodemo, whom he knew to be an assassin, approaching him covertly during the ceremony. Suspecting his design, he placed a stool before his body, holding it in his hand. The murderer, however, advanced so close that old Konduriottis was forced to hold him at bay with the stool, and endeavour to push him towards the door. Kolodemo was in danger of being baffled, but by stooping down he contrived to

stab his enemy with a long knife in the belly, and to escape, leaving the weapon in the wound. This assassination caused the Hydriots to petition the sultan to send a governor with the power of life and death. Kutchuck Hussein named a Hydriot called Bulgaris as the first governor, in the year 1802. Bulgaris had served with the capitan-pasha in the Othoman fleet, as quartermaster of the Christian seamen. The authority of the Christian bey was not, however, sufficient to control the turbulence of his countrymen, and assassination was never completely suppressed.¹

Hydra paid no direct taxes to the sultan, but it was obliged to furnish a contingent of two hundred and fifty able-bodied seamen to the Othoman fleet, and to pay them from the local treasury. The expense of this contingent amounted to 16,000 dollars annually. Besides this sum, about 4000 dollars were annually expended in presents to the capitan-pasha, to the Greek dragoman of the fleet, and to several officials employed at the admiralty and dockyard at Constantinople. To raise these sums, a tax of five per cent was imposed by the local administration on the gains of every Hydriot, and some custom-duties were levied at the port.

The condition of Spetzas was very similar to that of Hydra. The population was smaller, the proportion of small capitalists was greater, and the local administration was more democratic.

✓ A considerable portion of the coasting trade in the Archipelago was in the hands of the Albanians of Poros, Kastri, and Kranidi, who possessed many decked boats. Over this maritime population the Hydriots and Spetziots exercised supremacy.

¹ Waddington (*Visit to Greece*) mentions that a band of assassins existed at Hydra during the early years of the Revolution; and many of their crimes might be cited to prove the correctness of his assertion.

Such was the position of the Albanian race in Greece, where its settlements were comparatively modern. In its native regions its political importance and moral influence had been constantly increasing during the latter half of the last century, and it had attained the acme of its power at the commencement of the Greek Revolution. In Albania a considerable proportion of the population had embraced the Mohammedan religion; but the Albanian Mussulmans were detested by Osmanlees and hated by the Greeks. Their religion was hardly a matter of conscience with the majority. They were less bigoted than the Turks, and less superstitious than the Greeks. Their avarice was, however, insatiable, and for gold an Albanian Mussulman would willingly serve a Christian master, or a Christian Albanian a Mussulman chief, even if the service was to be rendered in deeds of blood.

The Albanian forms a distinct race among the nations of Europe. They have been supposed by some to be the representatives of the Pelasgians. They call themselves *Shkipetar*. Some suppose them to have occupied the regions they now inhabit before the days of Homer, and that they are the lineal descendants of the race to which the ancient Epirots and Macedonians belonged as cognate tribes. Alexander the Great must, according to these archæologists, have spoken an ancient Albanian dialect at his riotous banquets with his Macedonian officers.

The researches of modern philology have established beyond question that the Albanian language is an early offset from the Sanscrit, and that its grammar was complete at as old a date as the oldest Greek dialect.¹ Nearly the same boundary separates the

¹ The best works on Albania and its population are—Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, 4 vols., 1835; and *Albanesische Studien*, by Dr J. G. von Hahn, 1853. For the language—1. *Researches in Greece*, by Col. Leake, 1814; 2.

Hellenic from the non-Hellenic population at the present day as in ancient times. Thucydides calls the Amphilochians who dwelt at the head of the Gulf of Arta barbarians. Strabo says that one race inhabited the whole country, from the Acroceraunian Mountains to the borders of Thessaly and to the plain of Pelagonia, under the name of Epirots or Macedonians, for both spoke the same language.¹

Ancient Epirus was filled with Greek colonies, and the Greek race is now more numerous than the Albanian in the region immediately to the north of the Gulf of Arta. But, on the other hand, one-fifth of modern Greece is at present inhabited by Albanian colonists. The inhabitants of Albania, of the Shkipetar race, consist of two distinct branches—the Gueghs, who dwell to the north of the valley of the Skumbi and the line of the Via Egnatia. That great artery of Roman life now forms a desolate line of separation between the Gueghs and the Tosks. The dialects of these two branches are said not to differ more in their grammar than the Scotch of Ayrshire and the English of Somersetshire, yet a Guegh and a Tosk are unintelligible to one another at their first meeting. Both branches are subdivided into several tribes. Among the Gueghs several Catholic tribes retain their semi-independence, and uphold the Papal supremacy alike against the Mo-

Die Sprache der Albanesen oder Schkipetaren, by Ritter von Xylander, 1835; 3. There is an excellent grammar and dictionary in the philological portion of the *Albanesische Studien* of Dr von Hahn; 4. *Pelagica*, by Dr Reinhold of the Greek Navy, published at Athens, 1856. The most important philological dissertations are—1. An essay entitled *Ist die Albanesische Sprache eine Indo-Germanische?* by Th. Stier, published in the *Allgemeine Monatsschrift für Wissenschaft und Litteratur*, Brunswick, November 1854; 2. *Ueber das Albanesische in seinen Verwandtschaftlichen Beziehungen*, von Franz Bopp, Berlin, 1855; 3. *Περὶ τῆς Ἀνδροθονίας τῶν Ἀλβανῶν ἤτοι Σκιπιδᾶρ, ἔγραψε* Ν. Γ. Νικολῆς, Göttingen, 1855; 4. *Das Albanesische Element in Griechenland*, von Dr J. Ph. Fallmerayer, Munich, 1857. Several poems in the Albanian language have been printed at Naples, and one by Dr Stier at Brunswick, in 1856.

¹ Thucydides, ii. 68. Strabo, vii. s. xiv. 326, ed. 1620.

hammedan Gueghs and their northern neighbours, RETROSPECT.
the fierce orthodox freemen of Montenegro. The Mir-
dites are considered the most warlike of the Christians.
They are all Catholics, and boast that they are the de-
scendants of the companions and soldiers of Skan-
derbeg.

The Tosks, who dwell to the south of the Skumbi,
are the neighbours of the Greeks. The Albanian colo-
nies in Greece are all composed of Tosks. This branch
is divided into three great tribes, which are again sub-
divided into many septs—the Toskides proper, the
Lyapides, and the Tchamides. The Toskides are gene-
rally Mussulmans, but among the Lyapides and the
Tchamides several septs of orthodox Christians retained
the privilege of bearing arms, even to the time of Ali
of Joannina.

The Albanian aristocracy embraced Mohammedanism
in the fifteenth century, but a considerable portion of the
people did not apostatise until the end of the seventeenth
century. Their conversion was caused by their desire to
escape the tribute of Christian children, which compelled
them to furnish recruits to the corps of janissaries and
to the slaves of the sultan's household. As among the
Greeks, apostacy was common among the higher classes
at the time of the first irruptions of the Othomans, and
a large proportion of the Albanian chiefs retained their
property by changing their religion. Some of the Al-
banian beys, however, claim descent from the Otho-
man Turks who accompanied Sultan Bayezid I. and
Murad II. in their expeditions, and there can be no
doubt that Mohammed II. made some grants of lands
and conceded high offices in Albania to several Turks.
But, in most cases, the claim to Turkish descent rests
only on a tradition that the ancestor of the present bey
received a sanjak or some military fief from one of the
sultans already mentioned ; and, in nine cases out of

ten, these grants were the rewards of apostacy, not of previous service. Like the Byzantine nobles at the time of conquest, the morality of the Albanian chiefs was such that they were not likely to become more wicked by becoming Mussulmans. Their change of religion was little more than a change of name and their marriage with three additional wives. The ties of family and tribe existed without modification, and they attest that the chieftains and the people of Albania have a common origin.

The whole of Albania, from the Gulf of Arta to the Lake of Skodra, is divided into innumerable lateral valleys by rugged mountains, which render the communications so difficult as to confine trade to a few lines of transport. The agricultural population is thinly scattered in these valleys, and, as in most parts of Turkey, those who cultivate the soil, even when they are Mussulmans, are considered as forming an inferior grade of society. But there is nothing to prevent the peasant, since he is free, from adopting a military life, and rising to wealth and power. In general, however, the soil is cultivated from generation to generation by the same families, and for centuries it has been cultivated with the same routine. From each yoke of land (*zevgari*) the landlord receives a rent paid in produce. The peculiarities of Albanian society are most marked in the manner of life among those who are the proprietors of the soil. All of this class consider that they are born to carry arms. The great landlords are captains and leaders. The peasant-proprietors are soldiers or brigands. Landlords, whether large or small, possess flocks, which supply them with milk, cheese, and wool, olive-trees which furnish them with olives and oil, and fruit-trees which enable them to vary their diet. Every landlord who was rich enough to lay up considerable supplies in his storehouses expended them in

maintaining as many armed followers as possible, and if his relations were numerous, and his phara or clan warlike, he became a chieftain of some political importance. Every Albanian who can avoid working for his livelihood goes constantly armed, so that whenever the central authority was weak bloody feuds were prevalent. And at the commencement of the present century anarchy appeared to be the normal condition of Albanian society ; Gueghs, Tosks, tribes, septs, pharas, towns, and villages, were engaged in unceasing hostilities ; open wars were waged, and extensive alliances were formed, in defiance of the power of the pashas and of the authority of the sultan. RETROSPECT.

Most of the towns were divided into clusters of houses called makhalás, generally separated from one another by ravines. Each makhala was inhabited by a phara, which was a social division resembling a clan, but usually smaller. The warlike habits of the Albanians were displayed even in their town life. Large houses stood apart, surrounded by walled enclosures flanked by small towers. Within these feeble imitations of feudal castles there was always a well-stocked magazine of provisions. Richly caparisoned steeds occupied the court during the day ; lean, muscular, and greedy-eyed soldiers, covered with embroidered dresses and ornamented arms, lounged at the gate ; and from an open gallery the proprietor watched the movements of his neighbours, smoking his long tchibouk amidst his select friends. The wealthy chieftain lived like his warlike followers. His only luxuries were more splendid arms, finer horses, and a longer pipe. His pride was in a numerous band of well-armed attendants.

The Christian population of Albania diminished from age to age. The anarchy that prevailed during the latter half of the eighteenth century drove many to

apostacy and many into exile. Colonies of Albanian Christians had emigrated to the kingdom of Naples in the fifteenth century, and these emigrants were recruited in the sixteenth by numbers who fled from the burden of severe taxation, the exaction of unpaid labour, and the terrible tribute of Christian children. So many Christians sold their property, that the sultans were alarmed at the diminution of the capitation tax, and the difficulty of finding the necessary recruits for the janissaries and the bostangees. This commenced so early, that Suleiman the Magnificent enacted that no Christian proprietor should be allowed to sell his land, if the sale tended to diminish these sources of the Othoman power. If a rayah disposed of his land or ceased to cultivate it, the spahi or timariot of the village was authorised to grant it to another family for cultivation. But no laws can arrest the progress of depopulation, as the history of the Roman empire testifies. Emigration continued, and when emigration was impossible, apostacy increased. At the commencement of the present century even the Greek clergy admitted that Mohammedanism was rapidly extending in parts of Albania which had previously adhered steadfastly to the Christian faith.

The administrative divisions of Albania have varied at different periods of Othoman history, but the positions of Skodra, Berat, and Joannina, have rendered these cities the residence of pashas, to whom the rulers of the districts of Elbassan, Dukadjin, Delvino, and Tchamuria, have generally been subordinate. These three pashaliks have been held by viziers or pashas of the highest rank. Many districts, Mohammedan, Catholic, and orthodox, enjoyed a recognised local semi-independence, protected by the sultan. Any common interest united pharas, makhalás, towns, communities, and beys in hostile array against a pasha, and even

against the authority of the sultan. But when no RETROSPECT. danger existed of any external attack on their privileges, local feuds and intestine wars revived as fiercely as ever.

The power and influence of the Albanians steadily increased in the Othoman empire. In the East, the sword alone commands popular respect and political influence. During the last century, as the turbulence of the janisseries increased and their military value declined, the Albanians rose in consideration and power. In every province of European Turkey the Othoman race seemed to decline, in courage as well as in wealth and number. The Albanians everywhere seized the military power when it escaped from the hands of the Turks. Every pasha enrolled a guard of Albanian mercenaries, in order to intimidate the ayans and Turkish landlords in his pashalik. The tendency of the Othoman government towards centralisation had already commenced, though it still remained almost imperceptible amidst the existing anarchy. The Albanian mercenaries were used as instruments to advance this centralisation; and the power they attained being more apparent than the end for which they were employed, even the Turks, who have always affected military tastes and habits, became imitators of the Albanians. At the commencement of this century, the Greeks from day to day feared the Turks less and the Albanians more.

The history of the Greek Revolution would often be obscure unless the importance of the Albanian element, which pervaded military society in the Othoman empire, is fully appreciated. A trifling but striking mark of the high position which the Albanians had gained was exhibited by the general adoption of their dress. Though a strong antipathy to the Mussulman Albanians had been always felt by the Othoman Turks, towards the end of the last century they began to

pay an involuntary homage to the warlike reputation of the Albanian mercenaries. It became then not uncommon, in Greece and Macedonia, to see the children of the proudest Osmanlees dressed in the fustinello, or white kilt of the Tosks. Subsequently, when Veli Pasha, the second son of Ali of Joannina, governed the Morea,¹ even young Greeks of rank ventured to assume this dress, particularly when travelling, as it afforded them an opportunity of wearing arms. The Greek *armatoli* and the Christians employed as police-guards, even in the Morea, also wore this dress; but it was the fame of the Albanians—for the military reputation of the *armatoli* was then on the decline and that of the *Suliots* on the ascendant—which induced the modern Greeks to adopt the Albanian kilt as their national costume. It is in consequence of this admiration of Albanianism that the court of King Otho assumes its melo-dramatic aspect, and glitters in tawdry tinsel mimicry of the rich and splendid garb which arrested the attention of Childe Harold in the galleries of the palace of Tepelin; but the calico fustinello hangs round the legs of the Greeks like a paper petticoat, while the white kilt of the Tosk, formed of a strong product of native looms, fell in the graceful folds of antique drapery.

The relations of Mussulman and Christian Albanians were much more friendly than the relations of Albanians and Turks. The Albanian, unlike the Greek, felt the bonds of nationality stronger than those of religion. The hostile feelings with which he regarded the Othomans originated in the tyranny of Turkish pashas and the avarice of Turkish voevodes, cadis, and moolahs. Against the oppression of these aliens the natives, whether Mussulmans or Christians, had for many generations acted in common.

¹ Veli was pasha of the Morea from 1807 to 1812.

On the other hand, where orthodox Albanians and Greeks dwelt together, as in a considerable portion of southern Epirus, their common lot as Christians exposed them to the same exactions, and effaced the distinction of race. The obstinacy of the Albanian and the cunning of the Greek were employed for the same object, and exhibited themselves more as individual peculiarities than as national characteristics.

The power of the Albanians in Greece was greatly increased by the employment of a large body to suppress the insurrection excited by the Russians in 1770. Large bodies of Albanian mercenaries maintained themselves for nine years in a state of merely nominal dependence on the pasha of the province, levying contributions from Turks and Greeks alike, and setting the authority of the sultan at defiance. They were at last defeated near Tripolitza by Hassan Ghazi, the great *captain*-pasha, and almost exterminated; but fresh bands of Albanians were again poured into the Morea by the sultan during the Russian war in 1787, for it was well known that the Greeks regarded these rapacious mountaineers with far greater terror than Turkish troops.

It was at this time that Ali Pasha became dervendji, and about the same period all the pashas in European Turkey greatly augmented the number of Albanian mercenaries in their service. This demand for Albanian soldiers, which had gone on increasing for at least two generations, gave a considerable impulse to population; and so many of these mercenaries returned to their native villages enriched by foreign service, that a visible improvement took place in the wellbeing of the people about the time Ali was appointed to the pashalik of Joannina.

The policy of Ali Pasha was to centralise all power in his own hands. He followed the plans of his prede-

cessors, Suleiman and Kurd, in depressing the armatoli; and he commenced a series of measures tending to weaken the influence of the Othoman Turks holding property in those parts of Greece and Macedonia subjected to his authority. His immediate object was to weaken the power of the sultan—its direct result was to improve the position of the Greek race; for much of the authority previously exercised by the Othomans in civil and fiscal business passed into the hands of the Greeks, and not into those of the Mussulman Albanians, whose military authority Ali was constantly extending.

The Turks in Greece and Macedonia were a haughty, ignorant, and lazy race; but as spahis, timariots, or janissaries, they were affiliated with the most influential classes in the Othoman empire, and Ali did not venture to attack them openly. Their pride of race, as well as their personal interests, rendered them the irreconcilable enemies of the independent authority which he desired to establish. He therefore carried on an incessant war against them; but he conducted this warfare as a series of personal affairs. He strove to conceal his general policy, but he spared no secret intrigue to gain his ends, and often resorted to assassination as the speediest and most effectual means. He usually commenced his operations against his enemies by what Bentham calls vituperative personalities; and by imputing bad designs as a proof of bad character, he generally succeeded in fomenting family quarrels, for Turks are childishly credulous. He also encouraged the Greeks to complain of acts of injustice, and then, as the representative of the sultan's despotism, he judged the accused. If no other means could be found, he accused powerful beys of treasonable conduct, pretending that they held secret communications with the rebel pashas, then proscribed by the

Porte; or with bands of klephts, who were as much a RETROSPECT. domestic institution in his pashalik as they have since been in King Otho's kingdom. In this way he rarely failed to obtain a warrant from the sultan sanctioning the execution of his enemy. By pursuing this policy steadily for more than a quarter of a century, most of the Osmanlees in Thessaly were impoverished, and several of the principal families ruined. The towns everywhere showed signs of decay; the best houses in the Turkish quarters were often tenanted by Greek or Vallach traders, or occupied by Albanian officers.

While the wealth and numbers of the Turkish race diminished, Ali took care to invest his own Albanian followers with the military authority he wrung from the hands of the Osmanlees; but the increasing influence of the Albanian race during the early part of the present century was not confined to the increase in the numbers and power of the Mussulman soldiery, nor to the augmentation of the commercial enterprise of the maritime population of Hydra and Spetzas. Several warlike Christian tribes still retained the privilege of bearing arms in Albania. In northern Albania these tribes were Catholic, but in southern Albania they were orthodox; and among the orthodox the Suliots were pre-eminent for their warlike qualities, even among the warlike population by which they were surrounded.

The Suliots were a branch of the Tchamides, one of the three great divisions of the Tosks. The constitution of their community deserves notice. The Suliots inhabited a district consisting of steep ranges of bare and precipitous mountains, overlooking the course of the Acheron; that river, uniting with the Cocytus in its lower course, forms a marshy lake, and renders the country at its mouth so unhealthy that it was considered the shortest road to the realms beyond the

grave. In the immediate vicinity of Suli the mountains afford only a scanty pasture for goats; but when they ascend, broad ridges spread out covered with oaks; and when they rise still higher, their loftier summits protrude in rocky peaks above forests of pine.

The strength of Suli lay in the difficulty of approaching it with a large body of men, and of attacking well-trained riflemen in stone buildings without artillery. The deep and dark ravine of the Acheron renders Suli inaccessible in front. The lair of the Suliots lies imbedded in a lateral valley covered by two rocky hills, where a confluent joins the black waters of the Acheron. The approach is by a gorge lower down, called Kleisura, which separates the mountain fastnesses from the fertile plains. Under the Byzantine emperors it appears that the rich and well-watered soil of the lower valleys maintained a numerous population. The district was once a bishop's see, whose cathedral church stood near the entrance of the Kleisura. At present the former population is represented by the Mussulman proprietors of Paramythia and Margariti.

When Sultan Murad II. conquered Joannina, the whole country, to the shores of the Ionian Sea, submitted to Mussulman domination. The territory afterwards occupied by the Suliots was granted as a military fief to a timariot, who resided at Joannina. Christian liberty and Suliot independence were in this district the growth of later years. For centuries the Christians paid haratch and the tribute of their children. The anarchy that prevailed during the victorious campaigns of the Venetians under Morosini, and the cession of the Morea by the treaty of Carlovitz in 1699, compelled many Christians to form armed companies for their protection against lawless

bands of brigands. As the orthodox Greeks were at that time generally as little disposed to oppose the sultan's government as they were to unite with the Catholic Venetians, the pashas of Albania and northern Greece favoured the military ardour of the orthodox communities. Some of the companies of armed Christians, which have been confounded with the ancient *armatoli*, date only from this period, and the community of the Suliots cannot be traced to an earlier origin. RETROSPECT.

In the year 1730, the number of Suliot families which enjoyed the privilege of bearing arms was estimated at one hundred. The precise year when the right was officially recognised by the pasha of Ioannina is not known. The armed Suliot were the guards of a small Christian district over which they exercised the authority of feudal superiors. Their own property was small, but they formed a military caste, and despised all labour as much as the proudest Mussulman. The soil in the richest portion of their territory was cultivated by peasants, who were of the Greek race. The name of Suliots was reserved for the Albanian warriors, who ruled and protected the agricultural population like the ancient Spartans. The peasants were distinguished by the name of the village in which they dwelt.

Anarchy prevailed in the greater part of southern Albania during the early part of the eighteenth century, and many Christians of the tribe of the Tchamides sought refuge from the Suliot community. Its protection prevented the Mussulman communities in the neighbourhood from encroaching on the rights of any Christians who acknowledged themselves its vassals. But about the middle of the century they extended this protection so far as to become involved in feuds with their Mussulman neighbours. The hostilities

which ensued induced the Suliots to recruit their force by admitting every daring and active young Christian of the tribe of the Tchamides to serve in their ranks. If any of these volunteers distinguished himself by his courage, and was fortunate enough to gain booty as well as honour, he was admitted a member of the Suli community, and allowed to marry a maiden of Suli. In this way the community increased in numbers and in power. It was favoured by the sultan's government, as a check on the lawless independence of the Mussulman communities of Paramythia and Margariti; and it was supplied with arms and ammunition, and encouraged to defend its independence, by the Venetian governors of Parga and Previsa.

Many attacks were made on Suli by the Mussulman agas of the vicinity, but they were always repulsed with such success that the Suliots gradually acquired the reputation of being the best warriors among the warlike Tosks.

The state of Suli now became an epitome of the state of Albania. The community was divided into pharas. The chiefs of the pharas formed alliances abroad in order to increase their influence at home, and the pharas were sometimes involved in civil broils. The assistance of the principal pharas was often solicited and richly remunerated by the neighbouring Mussulmans in their private feuds. The Suliot leaders, like the other Albanian chiefs of pharas, collected as many armed followers as possible; but their revenues were scanty, and the constitution of the Suli community was democratic, so that the only way to reward followers was to make successful forays on the lands of those neighbours who refused to purchase immunity from depredation. Like most highlanders who dwell on barren mountains overlooking fertile plains, they levied contributions with unsparing rapacity when-

ever they could do so with impunity. Depredation RETROSPECT. they honoured with the name of war, and war they considered to be the only honourable occupation for a true Suliote. The poverty of this territory, which the Suliots held in property, and their numbers, compared with the revenues of the district over which their protection extended, rendered it impossible for them to subsist in idleness without plundering their neighbours.

When Ali Pasha assumed the government of Joannina, in the year 1788, many complaints were made of the lawless conduct of the Suliots. Shortly before his nomination, they had pushed their forays into the plain of Joannina, and rendered themselves so unpopular that Ali deemed they were not likely to find any allies. In pursuance of his policy of centralising all power in his own hands, he resolved to destroy all the independent communities in his pashalik, whether Mussulman or Christian. Prudence required him to commence with the Christians, and circumstances appeared to favour his operations against the Suliots. But when he attacked them, all their neighbours were alarmed, recent injuries were forgiven, and new alliances were formed. Mussulman beys and the Venetian governors of Parga and Previsa supplied them secretly with aid, and the first attacks of Ali on their territory were repulsed without much difficulty.

The intrigues of Russian agents drew the attention of the sultan to the affairs of Suli in 1792, and Selim III. ordered Ali to renew his attacks on a spot which was now looked on at the Porte as a nest of treason, as well as a nursery of brigandage. Russia having abandoned her orthodox partisans at the peace of Yassi, Ali again attacked the Suliots. Their power was now so great that Suli formed a little republic. Upwards of sixty villages and hamlets, inhabited by

Christian peasants, paid tribute to the Suliots. That tribute, it is true, consisted only of a small portion of the produce of the soil. The Suliot territory at this time extended over all the mountain district on both sides of the Acheron, as far as the western bank of the Charadra. But the community of Suliots consisted of only 450 families, divided into nineteen pharas, or unions of families. The military force did not exceed 1500 men. Local disputes were violent among the chiefs of the pharas, and the inextinguishable jealousies of Albanian society had caused the Suliots to divide their habitations into four distinct villages or makhalás, called Kako Suli, Kiapha, Avariko, and Samoneva. The name of Kako Suli recalls that of Kakoilion, in the *Odyssey*. It was a name of terror in Albania, as well as of hate and evil omen.

The attack of Ali on Suli, in the year 1792, failed completely. His numbers enabled him to force the Kleisura from the south, and to gain temporary possession of Kako Suli by assault. But the troops of the pasha were unable to keep the position they had won, and their loss in the vain attempt was so severe that, in retreating from the village, they abandoned all their advanced positions in the valley. Many beys were deserted by their followers, others quitted Ali's camp, and the desertion became so general that he himself returned hastily to Joannina. His hostilities lasted only three weeks ; but the activity and daring displayed by the Suliots in the incessant skirmishing which they carried on, added greatly to their military reputation. Unfortunately, their confidence in their own powers became from this time so overweening that they pursued a more selfish policy than before. They began to fancy that their alliance was a matter of importance to the Emperor of Russia and the Republic of Venice, and they exercised their authority over the Christians in

their territory with increased severity, and plundered RETROSPECT. their Mussulman neighbours with greater rapacity.

In the mean time, the power of Ali increased steadily. He seized the wealth of many rich agas, he murdered many powerful beys, and he reduced several independent communities to subjection. In the spring of 1798 he gained possession of the territory of one of the Christian communities from which the Albanian regiments in the Neapolitan service had drawn their recruits. Ali surprised Nivitza, on the coast of Chimara, with the assistance of the French general who commanded at Corfu, in the most treacherous manner; and when he gained possession of the place, he put all the inhabitants to the sword with his usual cruelty. In the autumn of the same year he repaid the French for the criminal concessions they had made to win his favour, by obeying the sultan's orders, and driving them from their possessions in the south of Epirus. After defeating their forces at Nicopolis, he compelled them to surrender the fortresses of Previsa and Vonitza.

Ali once more turned his arms against the Suliots, whose intrigues with Russia and France had excited the indignation of the sultan and the alarm of the Mussulman population of southern Albania. He now employed secret treachery as a more effectual means of victory than open hostility. The rivalries and dissensions of the pharas enabled him to gain over several chiefs, who entered his service as mercenary soldiers. He also contrived to seize and retain several members of the Suliote families who opposed his schemes, as hostages, at Joannina. Photo Djavella, the most powerful Suliote, became his partisan; and George Botzaris, with all his phara, entered his service, and was employed to guard the lands of the Mussulman and Christian cultivators of the soil, lying between the Suliote territory and the plain of Joannina,

from the forays of their countrymen. By this defection the community lost the services of seventy families, and of about a hundred good soldiers.

Hostilities were commenced in 1799: George Botzaris commenced operations by attacking the advanced post of his countrymen at Redovuni with a body of two hundred Christian troops in Ali's service, but he was completely defeated, and died shortly after. As usual in similar cases of treachery and sudden death, report said that he was poisoned. Report, however, said that most of the deaths in the dominions of Ali Pasha at this time were caused by poison, so that if these reports deserve credit, the trade in deleterious drugs must have formed a flourishing branch of commerce in the pashalik of Joannina.

Treason is contagious, and Ali did everything in his power to propagate the contagion. He made high offers to most of the Suliot chiefs, but his faithlessness was too notorious for him to gain many partisans. At last he addressed himself to the whole community. He declared that he was resolved to repress all depredations; and as it was difficult for the Suliots to obtain the means of subsistence in their mountains, he invited them to emigrate to fertile lands which he offered to cede to them. If they refused his offer, he threatened them with implacable hatred, incessant hostilities, and inevitable extermination. To the chiefs of the pharas he made secret offers of money and pensions to those who would quit Suli. His offers were rejected, for it was evident that his object was only to sow dissension among the people, and prevent the chiefs from acting cordially together.

The experience Ali had gained by his defeat in 1792, prevented his making any attempt to storm the stronghold of the Suliots a second time. During 1799 and 1800 he confined his operations to circumscribing

the forays of the Suliots, by occupying a number of strong positions, which he fortified with care. In this way he succeeded in shutting them up within narrow limits. The Suliots at this time were unpopular, and neither the Christian cultivators of the soil, nor the Greeks in general, showed much sympathy with their cause. Indeed, many Greek captains of *armatoli* served against them in the army of Ali.

In the summer of 1801, hunger began to be severely felt at Suli, and numbers of women and children were removed to Parga, from whence they were conveyed to Corfu, which was then occupied by the Russians, by whom they were well received. To prevent further communications with Parga, which was now the only friendly spot in Epirus, the pasha strengthened his posts to the westward; and to deprive the Suliots of all hope of assistance from the orthodox, he induced the Greek clergy to declare against them. Ignatius, the metropolitan of Arta, wrote a circular to his clergy, forbidding the Christians in his diocese affording the Suliots any assistance, under pain of excommunication. Ali himself dictated a letter to the bishop of Paramythia, in the name of his superior, the metropolitan of Joannina, ordering him to employ all his spiritual influence against the Suliots as a predatory and rebellious tribe.¹

The final struggle took place in 1803. The sultan supposed, not without some reason, that Ali connived at the prolongation of the war; for it seemed impossible that the Suliots could have resisted the power of the pasha of Joannina for more than four years, if that power had been vigorously employed. Information having been transmitted to Constantinople that the Suliots had procured considerable supplies of ammunition from French ships, the Porte sent peremptory

¹ Col. Leake has published this letter: *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 513.

BOOK I.
CHAP. II.

orders to Ali to press the siege of Suli with greater activity. Hitherto the Suliots, attended by their wives, had often passed through the lines of the besieging force during the night, and plundered distant villages. The booty and provisions obtained in these expeditions were carried back by the women, who were accustomed to transport heavy burdens on their shoulders over paths impracticable to mules. New posts and additional vigilance cut off this resource.

The hero of Suli was a priest named Samuel, who had assumed the strange cognomen of "The Last Judgment." It was said that he was an Albanian from the northern part of the island of Andros; but he appears to have concealed his origin, for a hero in the East must be surrounded with a halo of mystery, though Samuel may have wished to erase from his memory everything connected with the past, in order to devote his soul to the contest with the Mussulmans, which he considered to be his chief duty on earth. He was an enthusiast in his mission; and as he was doing the work of Christ, he cared little for the excommunication of servile Greek bishops. The Suliots, who generally regarded every stranger with suspicion, received Samuel, when he first came among them as a mysterious guest, with respect and awe. At last, in the hour of peril, they elected him, though a priest and a stranger, to be their military chief. Religious fervour was the pervading impulse of his soul. His virtue as a man, his valour as a soldier, his prudence when the interest of the community was concerned, and his utter abnegation of every selfish object, caused him to be generally recognised by the soldiers of all the pharas as the common chief, without any formal election. His personal conduct remained unchanged by the rank accorded to him, and, except in the council and the field, he was still the simple priest. As he

never assumed any superiority over the chiefs of the pharas, his influence excited no jealousy. RETROSPECT.

On the 3d of September 1803, the troops of Ali gained possession of the village of Kakosuli, in consequence of the treachery of Pyllo Gousi, who admitted two hundred Mussulman Albanians into his house and barn during the night. Gousi sold his country for the paltry sum of twelve purses, then equal to about £300 sterling, which was paid to him by Veli Pasha, Ali's second son, who conducted the siege. The traitor pretended that his object was to obtain the release of his son-in-law, who was retained by Ali as a prisoner at Joannina. He considered affection to his own family an apology for treason to his country, but he took care to receive its price in money. About the same time, another Suliot, named Koutzonika, also deserted the cause of his countrymen. The defence of the Suliot territory was now hopeless.

One of the two hills which cover the approach to the ravine of Suli, called Bira, had been abandoned by the pharas of Zervas two months before the treason of Gousi. Treachery placed the besiegers in possession of Kakosuli and Avariko. The second hill, called Kughni, and the village of Kiapha, were the only strongholds left to the Suliots.

Samuel had charge of the magazines on Kughni, and the position was defended by three hundred families. The men guarded the accessible paths, posted behind low parapets of stone called meteris, and the women carried water and provisions to these intrenchments under the fire of the besiegers, who treated them as combatants. The number of women slain and wounded during the defence of Kughni was consequently proportionably great. The little garrison dug holes in the ground under the shelter of rocks, and these holes, when roofed with pine-trees, thick layers

of branches, and well-beaten earth, formed a tolerable protection from the feeble artillery of the pasha's army.

Ali was extremely anxious to secure the persons of several Suliote chiefs. The indulgence of his revenge was one of his greatest pleasures. He therefore ordered Veli to treat with Photo Djavella, determined, if he could find an opportunity of seizing any of the Suliote chiefs, to violate the treaty which his son might have concluded. A capitulation was signed on the 12th of December 1803, by which the Suliotes surrendered Kughni and Kiapha to Veli Pasha and Djavella: Drako and Zerva, with their pharas, were allowed to retire to Parga. Ali in the mean time sent orders to place an ambuscade on the road to Parga, and seize the Suliote chiefs; but the agas of Paramythia, and some of the *armatoli* in Veli's army, hearing of the movement, sent secret warning to the Suliotes, who, by a rapid march and a sudden change of route at the point of danger, baffled the treacherous designs of the pasha.

Samuel refused to trust to any capitulation with Ali or his sons, whom he knew no oath could bind. The fall of Suli seemed to terminate his mission. When the Suliotes had quitted the hill of Kughni, he retired into the powder-magazine with a lighted match, declaring that no infidel should ever employ ammunition intrusted to his care against Christians, and he perished in the explosion.

The selfish Suliotes who had concluded separate treaties with Ali Pasha—Botzaris, Koutzonika,¹ and

¹ The treachery of Botzaris and Koutzonika is mentioned in a popular song on the fall of Suli:—

“ Μπρὲ ν’αναθεμὶ σε Μπότζαρη,
Καὶ σ’ένα Κουτζονίκα·
Μὲ τὴν δουλιὰν ποῦ κάμεταν
Τοῦτο τὸ καλοκαίρι.”

Heaven's curse on you, O Botzaris!
And you too, Koutzonika!
Sad was the work you did
This summer.

Palaska—obtained nothing but disgrace by abandoning their countrymen. They had taken up their residence at Zalongo under a promise of protection, but Ali, as soon as he gained possession of Kiapha, sent a body of troops to attack them by surprise. About one hundred and fifty persons were seized and reduced to the condition of slaves. Twenty-five men were killed defending themselves, and six men and twenty two women threw themselves over a precipice behind the village, to avoid falling into the hands of their inhuman persecutor. Albanian soldiers, on returning to Joanina, declared that they saw several young women throw their children from the rock, and then spring down themselves. The bodies of four children were found below. Botzaris succeeded in collecting together about two hundred persons, and the resistance he and his companions offered to their assailants enabled this body to escape. The soldiers of Ali were not so bloody-minded as the pasha. After some skirmishing, Botzaris was allowed to retire with the women and children to Parga. But the cruelty of Ali was insatiable. He ordered Suliot families, who were living dispersed in different places, to be murdered; and he sent seventy families, who had surrendered at the commencement of hostilities, and whom he had treated with kindness until Suli capitulated, to inhabit the most unhealthy spots in his pashalik.

The Suliots who escaped to Parga passed over into the Ionian Islands, where they were hospitably received by the Russians. Many entered the Russian service; but when the treaty of Tilsit transferred the possession of the Ionian Islands to France, most of the Suliots passed from the Russian into the French service. Only a few who, like Palaskas, were unpopular for their conduct during the fall of Suli, quitted Corfu with the Russians.

RETROSPECT.

Ali Pasha constructed a strong fort at Kiapha, and converted the church of St Donatos, the patron saint of Suli, into a mosque. A few Mussulman Albanians, from the pasha's native town of Tepelin, were established as guards of the district instead of the Suliots. The Christian peasants returned to cultivate the soil, and for several years they found the agents of the pasha less exacting and rapacious masters than the proud and needy Suliots.

The only Christian communities in southern Albania which now preserved the right of bearing arms, were the inhabitants of some mountain villages amidst the barren rocks of Chimara.

Such was the position of the orthodox Christians of the Albanian race, in the pashalik of Joannina, when Ali Pasha was declared a rebel by Sultan Mahmud.

CHAPTER III.

SULTAN MAHMUD AND ALI PASHA OF JOANNINA.

"Tyranny must be,
Though to the tyrant thereby no excuse."
—*Paradise Regained*, xii. 95.

CHARACTER OF SULTAN MAHMUD—STATE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE—ALI PASHA OF JOANNINA—ALI'S CRUELTY—ANECDOTE OF EUPHROSINE—ANECDOTES OF THE BISHOP OF GREVENA, AND OF IGNATIUS, METROPOLITAN OF ARTA—DESTRUCTION OF KHORMOVO AND OF GARDHIKI—SULTAN MAHMUD ALARMED AT ALI'S POWER—ALI'S ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE ISMAEL PASHA BEY—ALI DECLARED A REBEL—PLANS AND FORCES OF ALI—SULTAN'S MEANS OF ATTACK—ALI CONVOKES A DIVAN—BOTH BELLIGERENTS APPEAL TO THE GREEKS—OPERATIONS AGAINST ALI—HE IS DESERTED BY HIS SONS—RECALL OF THE SULIOTS TO ALBANIA—THEY JOIN ALI—KHURSHID NAMED SERASKIER—CONDITION OF THE SULIOTS ON THEIR RETURN—THEIR MILITARY SYSTEM—OPERATIONS IN 1821—CONDUCT OF KHURSHID BEFORE JOANNINA—COMPARED WITH THAT OF PHILIP V. OF MACEDON—SULIOTS JOIN THE CAUSE OF THE GREEKS—MISSION OF TAHIR ABBAS TO THE GREEKS—DEATH OF ALI.

IN the year 1820, the Ottoman empire seemed to be on the eve of dissolution. Ali Pasha was in open rebellion at the head of a warlike nation, and with reasonable hope of establishing an independent throne in Albania. An insurrection of the Greeks was also awaited with some anxiety by almost every Christian in the Levant, excepting the English consuls.

Sultan Mahmud II. then ruled Turkey. He ascended the throne in the year 1808, in his twenty-fifth year, after a series of revolutions at Constantinople, caused by the attempts of his cousin, Sultan Selim III., to reform the public administration, and introduce military discipline in the corps of janissaries. Selim, who was

dethroned in 1807, had neither energy nor talent. His successor, Mustapha IV., lost his crown and life, after murdering his cousin Selim in order to retain them, by a revolution that seated his younger brother Mahmud on the throne.

Mahmud II. had reigned twelve years ; yet few of his subjects were acquainted with his personal character. The fate of his cousin and brother warned him of the danger in attempting to reform the abuses which, if they remained unreformed, would inevitably cause the dissolution of the Othoman empire at no very distant day. Mahmud revolved the condition of his empire, and the difficulties of his own position, constantly in his mind, and he persuaded himself that, in order to restore vigour to his empire, it was necessary to begin by centralising all power in his own hands. His own prudence, and the seclusion of the serai, enabled him to conceal his ambitious projects, while the iron firmness of his character enabled him to perfect the design which for years he was compelled to keep in abeyance.

The personal appearance of Mahmud may be known to many from the numerous portraits, which represent it with tolerable accuracy. His face was sallow, and his beard, naturally dark, was artificially stained of a shining black. His expression was that of sombre melancholy rather than of stern severity ; it was repellent, though not offensive. There was, however, something so artificial in his whole appearance in public, that a physiognomist might have been baffled by the unvarying mask with which Othoman etiquette clothes a sultan's countenance. He was of middle stature ; but as, like most Turks, he had short legs, he appeared tall when on horseback or when seated.

Sultan Mahmud was long deemed a cruel and blood-thirsty tyrant, and death was for many years the

lightest punishment he ever inflicted. It was said that he ordered all the females of his brother's harem to be thrown into the Bosphorus, and few travellers entered the court of the serai without seeing a head or a pile of ears and noses exposed in the niches at the gate. Dead bodies hanging from shop-fronts, or stretched across the pathway of a narrow street, were sights of daily occurrence, and proved that the sultan was indifferent to human suffering and regardless of human life. Yet he was really neither cruel nor bloodthirsty. The terrible punishments he inflicted were the result of habit and policy, not of passion. When his absolute power was firmly established, he ceased to inflict the cruel punishments which he had employed as a means of intimidation. The administration of his latter years was comparatively mild. Now, certainly, innate cruelty could not, after long indulgence, have assumed the mask of humanity; but policy may render a prince either cruel or merciful as he deems it expedient for his purpose. The fact is, that Mahmud, though he possessed little sympathy with humanity, restrained and ultimately subdued the Oriental ferocity which had from time immemorial formed a characteristic of the government of the Sublime Porte. When we count the number of lives sacrificed by public executions in the early years of his reign, it must not be forgotten that the power of life and death was then vested not only in the grand vizier and the provincial pashas, but was also intrusted to the governors of petty fortresses, and to the captains of single frigates. Sultan Mahmud was a thoughtful, stern, and obstinate man, whose strongest characteristic was an inflexible will, not violent passions. The restraint with which he long suppressed his feelings, and the patience with which he waited for opportunities of carrying his plans into execution, misled many acute observers into the belief that

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he was a weak prince. Ali Pasha of Joannina was one of those who mistook the character of his master.

Few European statesmen in 1820 believed that it was possible to arrest the decline of the Othoman empire; many expected its immediate dissolution. Yet some competent authorities asserted that the reorganisation of the sultan's administration was not an impracticable enterprise in the hands of an able and energetic sultan, and that its success would restore strength to the Othoman empire.¹ Both foreign relations and internal affairs, however, presented great difficulties to a reformer. Turkey was not comprehended in the general system of territorial guarantees established by the treaty of Vienna. This circumstance favoured the Russians in their schemes of aggrandisement, and the Greeks in their projects of revolution.

The Mussulman population of European Turkey was visibly declining both in wealth and number. This decline commenced when the Othomans ceased to recruit their ranks with tribute-children, slaves captured in war, and apostates. By some inexplicable social law, a dominant race almost invariably consumes life and riches more rapidly than it supplies them. In the wide extended empire of the sultan, the whole military service was performed by the Mussulmans, and in all foreign wars and domestic hostilities the loss always fell heaviest on the Turkish race. The prejudices of a warlike people prevented the Othomans from engaging in those occupations in which wealth is most securely accumulated; and if they were not entirely an aristocratic class, they were invariably a privileged caste of the population.

The long duration of the Othoman empire in Europe is a historical marvel. No other government ever

¹ See some observations on this subject in the *Discours Préliminaire* of the *Tableau Général de l'Empire Othoman*, par M. D'Ohsson, p. ix.

combined so much political wisdom with so great a RETROSPECT.
mass of social corruption. Taxation was always oppressive to the agricultural population, justice was corrupt, so that in these two departments the Mussulmans suffered as much from the vices of the administration as the Christians. Yet, with all its defects, the sultan's government retained hostile races and rival religions in daily intercourse without dangerous collisions, and ruled subject nations for generations without goading them to rebellion. Its peculiar feature was, that it always remained disconnected from every nation and race in its dominions. The sway of the sultan was not politically more closely identified with the supremacy of the Turkish than of the Arabic race. The theory of the government, even as late as the year 1820, was, that Sultan Mahmud was the despotic master of the empire, and that viziers and pashas exercised their authority in his name as his household slaves.

The empire seemed to be perishing from tyranny and weakness. Its tyranny had produced universal discontent, and among the Christians an eager desire to throw off its yoke. Its weakness invited ambitious pashas and lawless tribes to live in open rebellion. In some provinces the sultan's authority was lost. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, were virtually independent. Egypt had been so under the Mamelukes; and under Mohammed Ali its allegiance was still doubtful. Syria, Servia, Bosnia, and a part of Bulgaria, had been recently in a state of revolt. The Curds of Armenia and the Arabs of Mesopotamia paid the sultan only a nominal allegiance. Ali Pasha of Joannina had long acted as an independent vassal, and had been treated as a sovereign both by France and England. Many Derébeys, whose castles commanded only a single valley, claimed a kind of feudal independence, on the

ground that they held their lands from the time of the Seljuk empire, in Asia Minor, on the tenure of military service alone. The janissaries and the ulema, in Constantinople, were not more loyal than the feudal chieftains in the distant provinces. Anarchy and rebellion prognosticated the fall of the empire as inevitable to statesmen. Omens and prophecies were cited as evidence that the fall was near by the people. The Greeks revived the prophecies which their ancestors had repeated when the Belgian Baldwin became master of Constantinople, and was proclaimed Emperor of the East. Alexander I. of Russia was the *flavus Rex*, and the Turks represented the corrupted Greeks of the Byzantine empire.

The voice of nations attributed to Ali Pasha of Joannina the energy and talent which Sultan Mahmud was supposed to want. His policy had increased the power of the Albanian race, and to the careless observer it appeared to rest on the firm adherence of a warlike nation. The Greeks were thriving in his dominions, and appeared satisfied with his government. Political speculators proclaimed that his independence would soon be established by a successful rebellion.

Ali was a type of the Albanian character. With all his energy and activity he was a mere savage. He was borne forward to power by circumstances whose current he followed, but which he was unable to control or guide. As a ruler he exhibited the qualities of an astute Albanian chieftain corrupted by exercising the despotic authority of a Turkish pasha.

The ancestors of Ali were Christians, who embraced Mohammedanism in the fifteenth century; though to Osmanlees and strangers he sometimes pretended that he was descended from a Turk of Brusa who had received a *zeâmet* from Sultan Bayazid I. To his native clansmen he made no such boast. His family dwelt

at Tebelin, a small town composed of a cluster of fortified houses inhabited by wealthy Mussulman landed proprietors. The agas of Tebelin enjoyed a degree of local independence which was maintained by something like a regular municipal organisation. But the intense selfishness of the Albanian race broke out in frequent quarrels, and kept the place always on the verge of anarchy.

The great-grandfather of Ali, Mutza Yussuf,¹ raised himself to considerable power by his personal valour. From him the phara of which he was the chieftain assumed the name of Mutzochusats. In Albania, it is worthy of remark that, as in Greece in the time of Homer, no genealogy is carried by name beyond the great-grandfather of the most distinguished man. Mukhtar Bey, the son and successor of Mutza, was slain at the siege of Corfu, fighting against Schulemburg. Veli, the third son of Mukhtar, was accused of poisoning his two elder brothers to secure the chieftainship. Perhaps he poisoned himself, for, like his brothers, he died young.

Ali, the infant son of Veli, was left to the care of his mother, whose relationship to Kurd Pasha of Berat, a powerful Albanian chieftain, secured protection to the infant. The young Ali grew up in lawless habits. Sheep-stealing involved him in local feuds, and, falling into the hands of an injured neighbour, he was only saved from death by the interference of Kurd Pasha. He then entered the sultan's service, and was employed by Kurd as a guard of the dervens. He was brave and active, restless in mind and body, and utterly destitute of all moral and religious feeling : but his good-humour made him popular among his companions, and he displayed affection to the members of his family and gratitude to his friends. As he grew

¹ That is, Moses Joseph.

older and rose in power, he became, like most Albanians, habitually false ; and, regarding cunning as a proof of capacity, his conversation with strangers was usually intended to mislead the listeners. During his long and brilliant career his personal interests or passions were the sole guides of his conduct. Within the circle of Albanian life his experience was complete, for he rose gradually from the position of a petty chieftain to the rank of a powerful prince ; yet his moral and political vision seems never to have been enlarged, for at his greatest elevation selfishness obscured his intellect, and avarice neutralised his political sagacity. His ambition in some cases was the result of his physical activity.

Ali, like every Albanian or Greek who has risen to great power by his own exertions, ascribed his success solely to his own ability, and his self-conceit persuaded him that his own talents were an infallible resource in every emergency. He thought that he could deceive all men, and that nobody could deceive him ; and as usually happens with men of this frame of mind, he overlooked those impediments which did not lie directly in his path. As an Albanian, a pasha, and a Mohammedan, he was often swayed by different interests : hence his conduct was full of contradictions. At times he acted with excessive audacity ; at times with extreme timidity. By turns he was mild and cruel, tolerant and tyrannical ; but his avarice never slept, and to gratify it there was no crime which he was not constantly ready to perpetrate.

The boasted ability of Ali was displayed in subduing the Albanians, cheating the Othoman government, and ruling the Greeks. His skill as the head of the police in his dominions gave strangers a favourable opinion of his talents as a sovereign. He found knowledge ✓useful in his servants, he therefore favoured education.

His household at Joannina had all the pomp and circumstance of an Eastern court ; but it had no feature more remarkable than a number of young pages engaged in study. The children of Albanian Mussulmans might be seen in one antechamber reading the Koran with a learned Osmanlee, while in another room an equal number of young Christians might be seen studying Hellenic grammar with a Greek priest.

Under Ali's government Joannina became the literary capital of the Greek nation, for he protected laymen who rebelled against the patriarch and synod of Constantinople, as well as priests who intrigued against the sultan. Colleges, libraries, and schools flourished and enjoyed independent endowments. He ostentatiously recommended all teachers to pay great attention to the morals of their pupils, and in his conversation with Greek bishops he dwelt with a cynic simplicity on the importance of religious principles, showing that he valued them as a kind of insurance against dishonesty, and a means of diminishing financial speculation. Greek, being the literary language of southern Albania, was studied by Mussulmans as well as Christians. Poems and songs, as well as letters and accounts, were written by Mohammedans in Greek, and many were circulated in manuscript. Unfortunately no collection of Mohammedan songs and poems has been published.¹

The cruelty of Ali excited horror in civilised Europe, but it extorted admiration from his barbarous subjects.

¹ Colonel Leake has published an abstract of a curious Greek poem by a Mussulman Albanian, which is one of the most authentic sources of information for the early career of Ali. There is a copy of this poem in the library of the University of Athens, but the text is not so pure as in the copy from which Leake took his extracts. The copy at Athens has been transcribed by one logiotatos and corrected by another. The cruelty of Ali is thus vaunted :—

“Ὅσοι καὶ ἂν ἦσαν στὰ χωρὶὰ τοῦς ἔφαγαν τὰ φίδια
Τοὺς τ᾽έκτισε τὰ γόνατα καὶ πλάταις καὶ παγίδια.”

—Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 463-497.

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The greatest compliment they could pay him was to praise his cruelty to his face. Persons still living have seen him listen with complacency to flattery embodied in an enumeration of his acts of direst cruelty, and shuddered at his low demoniacal laugh when his Greek secretaries reminded him how he had hung one man, impaled another, and tortured a third. Lord Byron might well say, that

“ With a bloody hand
He ruled a nation turbulent and bold.”

One of his most wanton acts of cruelty has been much celebrated, and the circumstances which attended it deserve to be recorded, as affording a characteristic trait of Ali and of his government.

A Greek lady of Joannina excited the jealousy of Ali's daughter-in-law, the wife of his eldest son Mukhtar. Euphrosyne was the niece of Gabriel, the archbishop of Joannina, but she had neglected the study of the lives of the saints, and turned her attention to the naughty reading in the Greek classics. She possessed great beauty and singularly attractive manners. In an evil hour her classic tastes led her to revive the elegance and wickedness of the ancient *hetairai*, and for a time her graceful manners concealed her graceless conduct. Her husband visited Venice, fearing Ali's designs on his purse, and disliking the attentions of Mukhtar to his wife. During his prolonged absence the house of the fair Euphrosyne became the resort of the educated and wealthy young men of Joannina, and she received private visits and rich presents from Mukhtar Pasha without much effort to conceal the disgraceful connection. This conduct caused much scandal, and it was said that married ladies, whose husbands were not so far distant as Euphrosyne's, imitated her behaviour. A storm of indignation arose

among Christian husbands and Mussulman wives. The complaints of Mukhtar's wife were at last made a pretext for punishment, but report said that Ali sought revenge because he had been an unsuccessful lover. His vices were notorious. Childe Harold remarked,—

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“ Yon hoary lengthening beard
Ill suits the passions that belong to youth.”

Men said that the hoary beard attempted to conceal its evil passions under a veil of public duty. It was resolved to eradicate the great social evil of Joannina by some effectual measure of reform. Ali decided on a general massacre of the culprits, and never was cruelty perpetrated with more ruthless deliberation or greater barbarity.

Ali was in the habit of dining with his subjects at their own houses when he wished to confer on them an extraordinary mark of favour. He signified to Nicholas Yanko, whose wife was one of the proscribed, his intention to honour him with a visit. The men dine alone in Eastern lands. After dinner the great pasha requested that the lady of the house might present his coffee, in order to receive his thanks for the entertainment. When she approached, he addressed her in his usual style of conversation with Greek females, mixing kindness with playful sarcasm. Rising after his coffee, he ordered the attendants in waiting to invite several ladies, whose conduct, if not virtuous, had certainly not been scandalous, to visit Yanko's wife at her house.

Ali proceeded to the house of Euphrosyne, attended by a few guards, and, walking suddenly into her presence, made a motion with his hand, which served as a signal for carrying off the victim, who was conveyed to Yanko's house much more astonished than alarmed. Ali rode on to his palace and engaged in his usual employments. The ladies of the party assembled at

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Yanko's were soon discomposed by having an equal number of females of the very lowest order in Joannina thrust into the room by policemen. In a few minutes the whole party was hurried off to the church of St Nicholas, Yanko's patron saint, at the northern extremity of the lake. There the unfortunate culprits were informed that they were condemned to death by the pasha. The wealthier were at first not much frightened, for Ali's avarice was so notorious that they believed their relations would either voluntarily ransom their lives, or be compelled to do so. The worst punishment they feared was imprisonment in the convents on the islands of the lake.

Morning had dawned before the party reached the church of St Nicholas, and Mohammedan customs require that the execution of a sentence of death on females by drowning must be carried into effect while the sun is below the horizon. For twenty hours, ladies of rank and women of the lowest class remained huddled together, trembling at times with the fear of death, and at others confident with delusive hopes of life. At sunset a violent storm swept the surface of the lake, and it was midnight before they were embarked in small boats and carried to the middle of the lake. There they were thrown overboard, without being tied up in sacks according to the Mussulman formality in executing a similar sentence. Most of the victims submitted to their fate with calm resignation, sinking without an audible word, or with a short prayer ; but some resisted to the utmost with piercing shrieks, and one whose hands got loose clung to the side of the boat, and could only be plunged under water by horrid violence. When all was finished, the police guards watched silently in the boats until morning dawned ; they then hastened to inform the pasha that his orders had been faithfully executed. One of the policemen

present, who had witnessed many a horrid deed of torture, declared long after that the scene almost deprived him of his senses at the time, and that for years the voices of the dying women were constantly echoing in his ears, and their faces rising before his eyes at midnight. RETROSPECT.

Several days elapsed before all the bodies were found and buried. In this instance Ali's cruelty excited extreme loathing among the Christian population. Seventeen females had perished, and public feeling was so strong that their funerals were attended by crowds. Yet none of their relations had made an effort to save them, and the husbands of more than one were accused of being privy to the pasha's design. Ali, when he saw the violence of public indignation, thought it prudent to apologise for his severity by declaring that he would have pardoned all those who could have found an intercessor, and that he deemed his victims deserved death since no one spoke a word in their favour. This was mere hypocrisy; he knew the selfishness of his subjects.

The beautiful Euphrosyne was twenty-eight years of age. Being the niece of an archbishop, the orthodox cherished her memory with affection, as if she had been a martyr, instead of viewing her conduct with reprobation and her fate with pity. But public feeling expresses itself before public opinion is formed. The cruel fate of the elegant Euphrosyne awakened sympathy, but her sixteen fellow-sufferers died almost unpitied, though many of them were less blamable. Several songs were composed on the subject of her death, which were repeated over all Greece.¹

¹ According to the popular story, Mukhtar Pasha gave Euphrosyne an emerald ring which he had refused to his wife. She saw it on the hand of the lady at the bath, and hastened to her father-in-law, who listened to her prayer for vengeance. A Greek song says,—

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Ali's habitual exhibition of cunning and sagacity was considered as a display of political wisdom. His artifice allured the intellects of the subtle Greeks and the fancy of the enthusiastic Albanians. Colonel Leake, who was several years the diplomatic agent of the British government at his court, recounts an anecdote which proves that he was unable to lay aside his habits of deceit even when his good-nature prompted him to do an act of kindness. "Not long ago he almost frightened to death the Bishop of Grevena, a mild and timid man, by a proceeding meant to increase the bishop's authority. Being about to visit Grevena, he ordered the bishop to prepare the episcopal palace for his reception, but instead of proceeding there, went to another lodging, pretending to believe that the bishop had so ordered it. Having sent for the unfortunate holy man of Grevena, he assumed an air of extreme anger, ordered the bishop to prison, and issued a proclamation that all persons having complaints against him should make a statement of their grievances. Nobody having appeared, the vizier sent for the bishop next day, and congratulated him on the proof that he had no enemies, and that he governed his flock with kindness."¹

Another anecdote deserves notice because it illustrates the manner in which the Greek bishops in his dominions served as instruments of his avarice. Having observed that the bishops possessed more authority than his tax-gatherers, he resolved to employ them in

“ Δὲν σ' ἔλεγα Εὐφροσύνη μου,
Μὴ βάλλῃς δακτυλίδι;
“Τι τὸ μανθάνει ὁ Ἀλῆ-πασσᾶς,
Σὲ ῥίπτει μέο' εἰς τὴν λίμνην.”

I told you, Euphrosyne, dear,
The ring, oh ! do not take.
Ali the news will quickly hear—
He'll drown you in the lake.

¹ *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 407.

collecting his revenues. He began the experiment by RETROSPECT. obliging the celebrated Ignatius, metropolitan of Arta, who afterwards escaped to Italy, and resided at Pisa, to become the tax-gatherer of his diocese. The orders given to the bishop were severe, and he used little forbearance in his eagerness to win the pasha's favour. This severity caused many quarrels, without bringing an increase of revenue. Disturbances occurred, and Ali was compelled to listen to the complaints of the sufferers. As soon as the bishop had paid all the money he had collected into the pasha's treasury, Ali decided that a remission of taxation ought to be made, to the amount of £2000 sterling. The claimants compelled the bishop to refund the money, but Ali retained the fruits of his extortion.

It has been already mentioned that Ali was elevated to the rank of devendji-pasha in the year 1787. The pashalik of Thessaly was united with that office. His activity obtained for him the pashalik of Joannina, in addition to his other commands, in the following year. His instructions required him to destroy the authority still possessed by the Christian *armatoli*, whose sympathies with Russia disquieted the Porte, and Ali carried out the views of the Othoman government with zeal and vigour.

At this period, a strong feeling in favour of increasing the direct authority of the sultan in the provinces had arisen both among Mussulmans and Christians. It was thought that the central government would restrain the exactions of the local pashas, and repress the feudal anarchy of the hereditary beys. Ali took advantage of this feeling to curtail privileges of *armatoli*, *ayans*, and Mussulman and Christian communities alike. His firmness of purpose soon consolidated his authority both in Epirus and Thessaly; for at this early period of his career, justice and equity were words constantly

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on his lips, and they appeared to direct his conduct. The *armatoli* had latterly become grievous oppressors of the peasantry. The *ayans* had always been the tyrants of the Christian population. The communities were powerless, except to increase the general anarchy. Ali constituted himself the redresser of wrongs, and he succeeded in establishing a degree of order which had not previously prevailed. Under the pretext of securing equal justice to all, he compelled every district which enjoyed the right of maintaining Greek *armatoli* to receive a garrison of Mussulman Albanians; while in those districts where the Turkish landlords were all-powerful, he placed detachments of *armatoli* to protect the cultivators of the soil. His energy secured to the people a larger share of the fruits of their industry than they had previously enjoyed, so that they willingly submitted to the contributions he compelled them to pay for his protection. His exactions were chiefly directed against the rich; and as he seldom allowed his agents to plunder with impunity, he was spoken of as a hard man, but a just pasha.

The sultan supported Ali's plan of centralising all power in his own hands, as long as it was evident that he was only the sultan's viceroy. The boldest beys were drawn into hostilities, and then overwhelmed with forces prepared in secret for their destruction. The wary were assassinated or poisoned. These murders generally removed men as cruel and treacherous as Ali, who, as the destroyer of a legion of tyrants, was considered a benefactor by a suffering people.

In the year 1796 he began to exhibit the ferocity of his character in its darkest colours. Khormovo was a Christian township, situated high up in the mountains, between the rivers Aoussa and Dryno, and not far from their junction. The inhabitants were dangerous brigands; and it was said that for several generations

they waylaid travellers under the guidance of their priest. A hollow tree, in the pass near the bridge of Tebelin, was long shown to travellers as the place of concealment of this orthodox pripti,¹ from whence he uttered his oracular decisions concerning the fate of those who were plundered. If the unfortunate prisoner was a Turk, he was hung on the tree; if a Greek in the service of the pasha or the sultan, he was drowned in the river; but if an Albanian, he was generally allowed to escape on payment of a ransom.

The Christians of Khormovo maintained their lawless independence by means of a close alliance with the Mussulmans of Gardhiki, a powerful community in the mountains to the south of the Dryno. Nearly thirty years had elapsed since the mother and sister of Ali had been seized in a civil war between the people of Khormovo and Gardhiki and the phara of the Mutzachats. The ladies were treated with the grossest indignity, and they instilled into the breast of Ali their own rancorous longing for revenge. An occasion at last occurred of punishing the children for their fathers' crime. The territory of Khormovo was laid waste, the inhabitants shot down, the son of the priest was roasted alive, and a Greek poem, by a Mussulman, recounts with Oriental ferocity all the details of the tortures inflicted by Ali's soldiers on their unhappy prisoners.²

The cruelty with which a Christian community was treated made very little impression, and was soon forgotten.

After a further interval of sixteen years, a new catastrophe struck all men with amazement and horror.

¹ The Albanian word for priest.

² "Ἐμβήκε ἀπὸ τὴν μίᾳ μεριὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τὴν ἄλλῃ βγένοι

Ποδοπαταῖ τὰ κορμιὰ καὶ ἀκόμι δὲν χορταίνει.

Ἀλλ' ἡ Βελὴς βουλήθηκε ψυχὴ νὰ μὴν ἀφήσῃ

Καὶ χύθηκαν τ' ἀσκέρι τοῦ σὰ μανιωμένοι λύκοι

Τὸ σκοτινὸ τὸ χόρμωβο ἐγίνηκε βιράνι

Καὶ Τζαὺς Πρῶτης ἐγίνικε κεμπάμπι εἰς τὸ τηγάνι."

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The Mussulmans of Gardhiki were a powerful body, and their alliance with the inhabitants of Arghyro-kastro enabled them to escape Ali's vengeance for forty-five years. The cause of his anger was generally forgotten and never mentioned.

Demir Dost, the principal aga of Gardhiki, was a brave and honourable man, who had aided Ali in subduing Khormovo. Ali, having determined to deprive the communities of Arghyro-kastro and Gardhiki of the local privileges which their alliance had hitherto enabled them to maintain, marched against them in person. The peasantry declared in his favour, and Demir Dost and sixty agas of Gardhiki were admitted to conclude a capitulation which permitted them to retain their property and their territorial rights, on the condition that they should reside at Joannina until the new civil and fiscal officers of the pasha were established in the district.

After the departure of the agas, the pasha summoned the people of Gardhiki to meet him at the Khan of Valiaré, on the right bank of the Dryno, below Arghyro-kastro, which is situated on the left bank. The pasha's agents declared that he wished to enrol a strong body of Gardhikiots in his service, and no better lure could be held out to attract the Albanian Mussulmans, who scorn to cultivate their lands if they can gain their living by military service. Gardhiki, also, like most Albanian communities, had been long in the habit of sending mercenaries to every pashalik in the Othoman empire. The hope of becoming the instruments of Ali's power rendered the common people careless of the loss of a troubled independence, from which only the chieftains of the pharas derived any profit.

On the 27th of March 1812, about 670 Gardhikiots sat down to eat their mid-day meal in the Khan of Valiaré, and in the large quadrangular court adjoining.

Athanasios Vañas, a Christian high in Ali's favour, was RETROSPECT. ready with a band of soldiers, who mounted on the walls of the enclosure, occupied the towers at its angles, and closed the gates. They opened a sudden fire of musketry on their unsuspecting victims, and it is said that two hundred fell at the first volley. The soldiers then raised diabolical shouts, in order to overpower the shrieks of the wounded and the dying, and kept up a continual fire, without intermission, for an hour and a half, until not a limb moved in the quadrangle, and the Khan was enveloped in flames. The survivors, after the first volley, had vainly attempted to climb the wall and force the gates. The murderer had prepared the means of baffling every effort of despair.

Ali had not ventured to intrust many of his officers with the secret of the premeditated massacre, and the firing created some confusion among his troops; but he diverted the attention of the Mussulmans, who might have been inclined to favour the escape of the Gardhikiots, by a proclamation that the plunder of Gardhiki was granted to the soldiers. When plunder is to be gained, neither Albanians nor armatoli feel any sentiments of patriotism or humanity. All the troops whom Ali distrusted and wished to withdraw from the scene of the massacre were soon on their march up the mountain. The town of Gardhiki was sacked; the houses were plundered in regular succession, in order to insure to all a fair share of the booty; the women and children were carried off and reduced to slavery, in direct violation of the Mohammedan law; and all the fortified houses of the agas were burned to the ground. Demir Dost and the sixty agas who had retired to Joannina were murdered at the same time by Ali's order.

As soon as he had perpetrated this act of treachery and blood, Ali returned to Joannina, from whence he issued orders for the murder of every Gardhikiot who had

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escaped the massacre at the Khan and the sack of the town. But this cruelty exceeded the limits of human wickedness, and his orders were disobeyed even by his own sons, who concealed many of his intended victims.

The deliberate extermination of a Mussulman community of eight hundred families was an act of atrocity that roused the indignation of every Mohammedan; and from that day Ali was accursed in the opinion of all true believers. The deserted habitations, blackened with fire, the desecrated mosques with their ruined minarets, the Mohammedan women and children weeping in slavery, cried loudly for vengeance. Yet Ali, in his intense selfishness, thought so much of the wrongs of his mother and his sister, and so little of the sufferings of thousands of innocent individuals, that he boasted of his wickedness, and commemorated his infamy in an inscription over the gateway of the Khan of Valiaré. The entrance was walled up. The bones were left unburied in the court, and a marble tablet informed the passer-by, in both Turkish and Greek, that Ali was proud of the vengeance which he had inflicted on the enemies of his house. A curious poem in Greek, consisting of sixty-four verses, was circulated in manuscript, which was said to be an exact copy of the inscription, and to have been read over repeatedly to the pasha. It is a strange production, in the form of a conversation between the Khan and the dead bodies. The building asks for information concerning the cause of their death. The dead bodies reply, that fifty years ago they had burned Ali's house and destroyed his clan, and they add, "For this he slew us here, he razed our town, and ordered it to remain for ever desolate, for he is a just man." In conclusion, Ali speaks a few warning words in his own person: "I do not wish to do another similar act of severity, so let no man molest my house."¹

¹ Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, i. 498.

Ali's power at last alarmed Sultan Mahmud, who RETROSPECT.
was labouring night and day to circumscribe the authority of his pashas and great vassals. He had hitherto made but slow progress in establishing his system of centralising, but he had prepared the Porte for pursuing his policy with success. He availed himself of the universal indignation manifested at the murder of the Gardhikiots to diminish the power of Ali. The first step was to deprive Veli, Ali's second son, of the pashalik of the Morea, in August 1812, and send him to rule the insignificant pashalik of Larissa. Public opinion, which had favoured Ali in his plans of centralisation at the expense of beys and communes, now favoured the projects of Sultan Mahmud at the expense of Ali. The Porte could alone afford protection against local tyranny: the sultan seemed to be the only authority in the Othoman empire who had a direct interest in enforcing an equitable administration of justice; every other authority seemed to derive a profit from injustice. Ali remained insensible to the change which had taken place in public opinion since he first attained the rank of pasha. This is not wonderful, for the ambassadors of the European powers at Constantinople, and their consuls in the provinces, were as blind to the increasing power of centralisation as the Albanian pasha. The prudence of Sultan Mahmud was generally mistaken for weakness, and at the court of Joannina it was the fashion to speak of the anarchy and corruption that prevailed in the empire with great freedom, and of the dismemberment of Turkey as a probable event. The adroit flattery of Greek sycophants, the impolitic intrigues of European diplomatic agents, and the general improvement in the condition of the people under his government, induced Ali to believe that the hour had arrived when he might act as independent sovereign of

Epirus with perfect security. Yet he had reached the edge of a precipice, and the vicissitudes of a long and eventful life, rich in social and political changes, had exhibited its lessons of experience in vain. He fell pursuing the course of selfish criminal gratification, which he had often combined with the measures which raised him to power.

In the year 1819 Sultan Mahmud took advantage of the numerous complaints against the lavish expenditure and illegal extortions of Veli, to remove him from the government of Larissa to the still more insignificant pashalik of Lepanto. Ali saw clearly that the object was to circumscribe his power; but he attributed the measure to the influence of Ismael Pasho bey, his active personal enemy, and not to the deep policy of Sultan Mahmud. All his malicious passions were roused, and he resolved to strike a blow that would destroy his enemy and intimidate his sovereign.

Ismael Pasho bey was an Albanian of family and wealth, allied to Ali's house by blood. He had served the pasha of Joannina in youth with much devotion; but some cause of mutual distrust arose, and Ismael contrived to have his services transferred to Veli, when Ali's unworthy son was named pasha of the Morea in 1807. The hatred of Ali increased; but Ismael, warned in time, fled to save his life. For some years he escaped notice, but, finding that Ali's agents had discovered his place of residence, he removed to Constantinople, where he believed no assassin would venture to attack him openly. By attaching himself to the Ulema, frequenting the mosques with assiduity, and transacting the business of every Albanian who had any affair before the divan, he acquired some influence, and was named capidjee-pasha.

In the month of February 1820 three Albanians

made an attempt to assassinate Ismael Pasho bey at RETROSPECT.
noon in the streets of Constantinople. They were arrested; and, finding that their victim was only slightly wounded, they expected to save their lives by confession. They declared that they had been sent by Ali, pasha of Joannina, who had assured them that, in case of success, several members of the divan were prepared to protect them from punishment. This insinuation, that Ali possessed an overwhelming influence in the divan, offended Sultan Mahmud deeply. The assassins were immediately executed, and Ali was pronounced guilty of high treason. The traitor was summoned to present himself as a suppliant before the Sublime Porte within forty days. The pashalik of Joannina was conferred on Ismael Pasho. The period granted for repentance elapsed, and the new pasha was ordered to march against the rebel.

While Ali was pursuing his course of wickedness, he was acting as an instrument in the hands of Providence to advance the social progress of the Greeks. Indeed, the career of this celebrated man, with all his power and wickedness, would hardly have merited a place in history had circumstances not rendered him the herald of the Greek Revolution. The scenes of his eventful life produced very little direct change either in the political condition of the Othoman empire or of the Albanian nation.

When Ali received the news of his condemnation he was fully prepared to resist the sultan's authority, and his military arrangements for the defence of his pashalik were well planned. He had long revolved projects of rebellion in his mind, and the time appeared favourable for asserting his independence. The power of national feelings in upholding thrones and overthrowing dynasties was the theme of general discussion. A national revolution had just broken out in Spain, which

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was expected to produce great political changes in Europe. Ali was told by his political advisers that an appeal to the nationality of the Albanians and Greeks would induce them to unite in emancipating themselves from the Othoman domination, and expose their lives and fortunes for his cause. He was liberal, therefore, of promises. He talked of constitutions and representative assemblies with as much fluency and as little sincerity as the kings of Spain, Naples, and Sardinia. He promised rewards to his troops, who believed in nothing but payments in coined money, and he invited the Greeks to co-operate with him in resisting the sultan, little foreseeing the consequences of his encouragement.

The soldiers of Ali were habituated to mountain warfare, and were intimately acquainted with every ravine and pass in the range of Mount Pindus. Every path that afforded ingress into Southern Albania from Macedonia and Thessaly was fortified sufficiently to resist Othoman infantry. A camp was formed to support every point which could be assailed, and easy communications were insured with the central magazines at Joannina by means of the lake. In everything the army of Ali appeared far superior to any force the sultan could bring against him.

The dispositions adopted for the defence of Southern Albania were the result of a long-meditated plan of resistance. From the north, Ali's dominions were exposed to an attack by Mustaï, pasha of Skodra, at the head of the Mussulman Gueghs and Catholic Mirdits, who were as good soldiers in mountain warfare as the Tosks and the armatoli. But Mustaï was, like Ali, an Albanian, and his career had been so similar, that he was not likely to view the ruin of his fellow-pasha with favour, particularly as they had never been involved in any personal contests of importance. Ali had also

secured several friends among the chieftains in the north, and he apprehended little danger from that quarter. The task of opposing the Skodra pasha was intrusted to Ali's eldest son, Mukhtar, pasha of Berat; but the right of Mukhtar's line of defence was exposed to be turned by a Turkish army assembled at Monastir, under the command of the Romely-Valessi, which could penetrate into Albania by the pass of Devol, and thus unite with the Gueghs. Mustai was the first of Ali's assailants who took the field. He advanced as far as Durazzo without meeting any opposition; but, after he had occupied Elbassan, he was recalled to the north by some movements among his unquiet neighbours, the Montenegrins, or he made their movements a pretext for retreating, in order to paralyse the advance of the Romely-Valessi, whom he had no desire to see established in the valley of the river of Berat.

The direct line of approach for an army advancing to attack Joannina from the east is by the pass of Metzovo. Two great roads—one from Macedonia by the valley of the Indjee-kara-sou, and the other from Thessaly by the valley of the Salamvria—converge at this pass, and two powerful armies may be simultaneously prepared to force the passage, and maintained in its immediate vicinity by supplies from the fertile districts of Anaselitza, Grevena, and Trikkala.

To protect this pass, an army of 15,000 men was encamped on the eastern slopes of Paleovani, between the sources of the Viosa and the river of Arta. It was commanded by Omer Vrioni, an Albanian chieftain, who had acquired considerable reputation as a soldier, and great wealth by his military service in Egypt, during the troubled times which preceded the consolidation of Mohammed Ali's authority.¹ The

¹ The Greeks erroneously assert that Omer Vrioni derived his name from the Byzantine family of Briennios, but it is notorious that he received it from the village of Vrionti, near Berat, of which he was a native.

Albanian camp was established near the position occupied by Philip V. of Macedon after his defeat by Flamininus at the Fauces Antigonenses, or Kleisura of the Viosa, and where he lingered a few days, doubting whether he ought to march into Thessaly or fall back on Macedonia.¹

To the south of the pass of Metzovo there is another pass leading from Thessaly into the valley of the Aspropotamos, called Portais, or the gates of Trikkala; and there are several mountain paths farther south, by which light troops may march from the upper valley of the Sperchius and the head waters of the Megdova, by the valley of the Aspropotamos, into the valley of the river of Arta, and thus gain an entrance into the plain of Joannina. But the country through which these roads pass is intersected by successive ranges of high mountains and deep valleys, besides being occupied by Christian *armatoli* and by the indigenous robbers of Mount Kotziaka.

Ali committed the defence of the passes to the south of Metzovo to many local chieftains, Albanians and Greeks, Mussulmans and Christians.

The greatest danger to which he was exposed lay in the facility of landing troops on the southern coast of Epirus. Previsa was the key of his maritime defences, and he intrusted its command to Veli, his second son, who fled from Lepanto on the first approach of a Turkish force.

When the sultan proclaimed Ali a traitor, and named Ismael Pasho his successor, the imperial authority was almost nominal in many provinces of the Othoman empire, and Mahmud had no army ready to enforce his authority. The janissaries at Constantinople were as little under his control as the mercenaries of distant pashas. But no man then living had studied the con-

¹ Livy, xxxii. c. 13. Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, I. 399.

dition of the Othoman empire, or knew so well the strength and weakness of his own authority, as Sultan Mahmud. He alone understood how far he could make use of the instrumentality of rival pashas to destroy the rebel without allowing them to increase their own power. His systematic measures for strengthening the authority of the central administration, for reforming the Othoman government, and arresting the decline of the empire on the brink of destruction, were then as little suspected as the firm and daring character of the man who planned them. RETROSPECT.

The sultan intrusted the chief command of the army destined to attack Ali from the east to Ismael, the new pasha of Joannina. No person appeared likely to rally the discontented Albanians to his standard with so much certainty, and no one could be selected with whom it was more difficult for Ali to treat. Several pashas were ordered to assemble all their timariots and holders of military fiefs, and take the field with Ismael. The Othoman army was slowly collected, and it formed a motley assembly, without order and without artillery. Each pasha moved forward as he mustered his followers, with a separate commissariat and a separate military chest. The daily rations and daily pay of the soldier differed in different divisions of the army. Ismael was really only the nominal commander-in-chief. He was not a soldier, and had he been an experienced officer, he could have done little to enforce order in the forces he commanded.

Ali knew that his government was unpopular, but he acted under the usual delusion of princes who consider that they are necessary to the order of society. He considered himself the natural chief of the Tosks, and he believed that he could easily become the political head of the Greeks. He had heard so much lately of constitutions and political assemblies, that he ex-

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pected to create a strong national feeling in his favour by promising the Greeks a constitution, and convoking the Albanian chieftains in a national assembly, though he had formed no very clear idea of what was meant by a constitution, or what a national assembly really was. His Greek secretaries, however, assured him that it would be easy to raise the Greeks in arms against the sultan, and his Mussulman councillors declared that every Albanian was ready to support him as their sovereign. To make himself a national monarch, in opposition to the Oriental despotism of the sultan, he convoked a divan to consider the question of raising supplies, that being the only means of assembling Albanian agas and Greek bishops in one assembly, without violating Mussulman usages and offending Mohammedan pride.

The divan met, and Ali addressed the assembly in Greek. He condescended to explain the motives which induced him to resist the sultan's authority. He pretended that he was persecuted by the viziers of the Porte, because he supported the interests of the Albanians against the Osmanlees, and protected the Christians against ruinous exactions. He invited all present to urge their countrymen to support him and his officers in the approaching hostilities, and assured them that their interests would suffer as much as his own if the Othoman army penetrated beyond the passes.

The assembled Mussulmans were either his partisans or his creatures. They testified their approbation of his discourse with the humility of Eastern ceremony. Each bey repeated gravely in succession, with emphatic solemnity, some trite compliment, or pronounced, with the air of having made a great discovery, "Our lord, the vizier, speaks well; we are the slaves of his highness." Even Ali felt that the scene was ridiculous, for he knew that the same words

would be uttered, in the same tone, to his enemy Ismael, RETROSPECT. should he ever succeed in entering Joannina.

The Greeks remained silent. They felt no inclination to support the tyranny of Ali. It is certain that at this time the existence of an organised plan for proclaiming the Greeks an independent nation was not known to the clergy and primates of Northern Greece and Epirus. Though the *Philiké Hetairia* had made great progress in enrolling proselytes in Constantinople, the Morea, and the Ionian Islands, it had not succeeded in Joannina, and among the *armatoli*. Greek historians tell us that the terror inspired by Ali Pasha's government prevented the apostles of the *hetairia* from visiting his dominions.¹ But that is certainly not the whole truth. Many agents of the *hetairia* travelled through Epirus, but they were deterred from attempting to make proselytes, from fear of treachery on the part of their countrymen. They found that both the bishops and the primates were too closely identified with Ali's administration, and derived too great profits from acting as his political and financial agents, to feel disposed to plot against his authority. The fear of betraying the schemes of the *hetairia* to false friends was stronger than the fear of Ali's cruelty. The *hetairists* were partisans of Russia, and the *Romeliat* Greeks did not generally connect their patriotic aspirations with Russian projects. They, moreover, generally despised the class of men who travelled as apostles of the *hetairia*.

Suleiman Pasha, who had succeeded Veli in the government of Larissa, was invested by the sultan with the office of *dervendji* when Ali was proclaimed a rebel. On assuming the official direction of the *armatoli*, and publishing the firman proscribing Ali, he in-

¹ 'Απομνημονεύματα Πολεμικὰ Χριστοφόρου Περραιβοῦ, 1. Tricoupi is of the same opinion, i. 26.

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vited all the sultan's faithful subjects to take up arms against the traitor. A circular was addressed to all Mussulmans, to those Christian communities which retained the privilege of keeping armed guards, and particularly to the captains of *armatoli*, inviting them to expel the adherents of Ali Pasha from their districts. The Greek text of this circular assumed the form of a proclamation, calling on the Christians to take up arms for their own protection. It is said to have differed materially from the Turkish copy, and the pasha's Greek secretary, Anagnostes, was supposed to have availed himself of the opportunity, in order to assist the designs of the *hetairists*. Circumstances favoured the Greeks. The number of armed Christians in the mountains of Thessaly and Epirus was great, and both the belligerents felt the importance of gaining their assistance.

Several bands of Christian troops remained attached to Ali's cause. Odysseus, whom he particularly favoured, and who had been a page in his household, was intrusted with the chief command at Livadea. Stournari was stationed in Valtos, Varnakioti in Xerromero, Andreas Hyskos in Agrapha, and Zongas was sent to harass the communications of the Othoman army. But, as early as the month of June 1820, several bodies of *armatoli* had joined the sultan's forces, or had taken military possession of their *capitanliks*, and expelled the Albanian Mussulmans who remained faithful to Ali. For some time the Othoman authorities encouraged these enterprises. The armed Christians, however, knowing that they had nothing to gain by a decided victory either of the Turks or the Albanians, showed a disposition to remain neutral as soon as they had expelled the Mussulmans, and their attitude awakened the suspicion of the Porte.

The sultan was alarmed, and fearing some collusion

with the rebel, he degraded Suleiman, and soon after put him to death. Mohammed Dramali was named his successor, and ordered to occupy all the passes leading from Thessaly into Epirus. In the mean time the main body of the Othoman army, under Ismael, advanced to Kalabak. The left wing, under Pehlevan Baba, of Rutshuk, who was named pasha of Lepanto in place of Veli, descended into Greece. Pehlevan had distinguished himself as a leader of light cavalry on the banks of the Danube in the last war with Russia. He now marched at the head of the same active and disorderly troops through Thermopylæ to Livadea, from which he drove Odysseus. Veli fled from Lepanto, and Pehlevan occupied all Etolia and Acarnania without opposition, penetrated through the pass of Makrynoro, which is a western Thermopylæ, and fixed his headquarters at Arta. Ali's defences were thus turned, and the road into the plain of Joannina was open to the Othoman army.

The summer was far advanced before the grand army commenced its operations, but its first movements were crowned with great success. Instead of attempting to force the pass of Metzovo, which Omer Vrioni was prepared to defend, Ismael sent a body of Albanians to seize the portais or gates of Trikkala. This corps occupied the bridge of Koraki, took possession of the pass of Pentepegadhia, and opened communications with Pehlevan. Other detachments occupied the upper valley of the Aspropotamos and the valley of the river of Arta, where their arrival was welcomed by the native population, which consists of Zinzar Vallachs.¹ Omer Vrioni, finding that his position was turned, instead of falling back on Joannina and concentrating Ali's army in

¹ This branch of the Vallachian race makes its appearance in the history of the Byzantine empire, under its present name, in the eleventh century, and in the twelfth it was so powerful as to be independent. See *History of the Byzantine Empire*, ii. 277.

order to give battle to Ismael in the plain, treated with the Othoman commander-in-chief to obtain advancement for himself by deserting the rebel. He was promised the pashalik of Berat, then held by Ali's eldest son, Mukhtar. The army under his orders, which was encamped on Paleovani, dispersed. Many of the soldiers returned to their native villages to watch the progress of hostilities before choosing their side. Others immediately took service with Ismael.

Joannina was now besieged. Ali had barely time to burn the city in order to prevent his enemy finding cover in the houses. The citadel, which is separated from the city by a wet ditch, was well furnished with artillery, military stores, and provisions. The garrison amounted to six thousand men. Ali possessed an armed flotilla on the lake, which secured his communications with the mountains to the north. He expected to be able to cut off the supplies of the Othoman army, and compel Ismael to raise the siege before the arrival of his heavy artillery. The cowardice and treachery of his sons frustrated his plans.

A division of the Othoman fleet arrived off the Albanian coast during the summer, and as soon as Pehlevan occupied Arta, the Capitana bey besieged Previsa. Veli possessed ample means of defending the place, but he was a coward. Ismael had been his friend in youth. Veli received promises of pardon, and was ordered to treat with the Capitana bey. He opened negotiations by pleading his filial obedience as an apology for his rebellion, and offered to surrender Previsa with all its stores on being allowed to carry off his own wealth, and receiving the promise of a pashalik, to which he might retire without degradation. Ismael ratified these terms, and Veli removed with his harem on board the Othoman fleet. Both Ismael and Veli were subsequently put to death by the sultan's orders.

Mukhtar, who had abandoned Berat to fortify himself RETROSPECT. in Arghyrokaastro, soon followed his brother's example. He was not destitute of courage, but he was bribed to desert his father by a promise of the pashalik of Kuttaieh. In quitting Albania, he persuaded his youngest brother Salik to accompany him.

The surrender of Previsa, Berat, and Arghyrokaastro, enabled Ismael to obtain supplies of every kind, but the communications between his camp and the fleet were so difficult and so ill-managed, that heavy guns and ammunition were brought up very slowly. His rear was often attacked by the partisans of Ali, and, being compelled to look out for allies among the Albanians, he remembered the glorious exploits of the Suliots, and their implacable hatred to Ali. Sultan Mahmud authorised him to put them again in possession of Suli, and the Capitana bey was instructed to treat with them. The Suliots had now lived as exiles at Corfu for seventeen years, eating the bread of charity bestowed on them in turns by the Russians, the French, and the English, as each became the masters of the Ionian Islands. The proposals of the Capitana bey were soon accepted; the Suliots crossed over into Albania, and received Ismael's authority to invest the fort of Kiapha, which Ali had constructed to command Suli. The fort was garrisoned by Mussulman Albanians faithful to Ali. The numbers of the Suliots were not sufficient to blockade it closely, and the Ottoman commander-in-chief neglected to furnish them with rations. In a short time they were in a starving state, and, to obtain the means of subsistence, began to levy contributions on the Christian peasantry in the pashalik of Joannina who had submitted to the sultan. Ismael, forgetting his own neglect, was offended at their depredations in his pashalik. Personally he was a bigot, and not inclined to favour the establishment

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of an independent tribe of Christians in the vicinity of his capital. The Mussulmans of Margariti and Paramythia, who had submitted to his authority, warned him against the danger of allowing the Suliots to gain possession of the strong fort of Kiapha. He felt the force of their reasoning as much as he wished to secure the assistance of the Suliots ; and, hoping to gain time, he ordered them to join his army before Joannina, promising them both pay and rations, with which he could not easily supply them in Suli.

The starving Suliots were compelled to obey ; but as their only object in returning to Albania had been to regain possession of their native mountains, they considered themselves 'cheated by the pasha, and henceforward they regarded all Ismael's conduct with distrust. They found that they were stationed in the most exposed situation, and when Ali's forces sallied out to attack them in overwhelming numbers, the Othoman troops in the nearest quarters came slowly to their assistance. In this difficult position they owed their safety to their own vigilance and valour. They adopted every precaution to guard against a surprise either from friend or foe, and their military precautions justified the reputation they had long enjoyed of being the best soldiers in Albania.

In the month of October 1820, Ismael opened his fire on the fortress of Litharitza, which forms an acropolis to Joannina ; but the heavy guns and mortars which he had transported from Previsa were so ill-managed that the casemated batteries of the besieged suffered little ; while the guns of the fortress enfiladed the whole site of the ruined city, and impeded the approaches of the Turks against the citadel of the lake, which was the centre of Ali's strength, and from which he frequently made desperate sallies on his enemy.

The military incapacity of Ismael, and his unfitness

for the office of seraskier, became daily more apparent. RETROSPECT.
He had dispersed the fine army of Omer Vrioni, and gained possession of Previsa without difficulty ; he expected to conquer Joannina as easily. Instead, therefore, of pushing the siege with vigour, he devoted his whole attention to the measures which he considered most likely to render his pashalik profitable to himself. His care was confined to his own territory, and his general negligence enabled the partisans of Ali to attack his convoys, and permitted the cavalry of Pehlevan, and the Gueghs of Dramali, to plunder the country in every direction. The villages on the great roads in Epirus, Thessaly, and Northern Greece, were deserted by their inhabitants. Ali, well informed of all that was passing, watched the progress of the siege without alarm. He was still ignorant of the character of Sultan Mahmud, and did not suspect that he was the real antagonist who was playing the game against him.

The Suliots felt that they were treated with scorn. Their rations were bad, and they received no pay. Ismael, and many Mussulmans in Albania and Greece, entertained a suspicion that the Greeks were plotting an insurrection in concert with Russia to assist Ali, and he was so imprudent as to display his ill-will to all classes of Christians.

Ali took advantage of his rival's imprudence with his usual sagacity. Long conversations were carried on during the night between the Suliots and his Albanians. The Suliots told their grievances, the Albanians expressed sympathy, and boasted of their advantages. A formal negotiation was opened, and it terminated in the Suliots forming an alliance with Ali, whom they had long regarded as their bitterest enemy. The critical position in which both parties were placed forced them to cast a veil over the past. The Suliots

regained possession of their native rocks. Ali resigned the proudest conquest of his long career. He abandoned the policy of his government to save his life. He promised to put the Suliots in possession of his fort at Kiapha ; they engaged to join his partisans, and fall on the rear of the sultan's army. Hostages were given, for both sides were suspicious, and looked with some anxiety to the result of their strange alliance. .

About midnight on the 12th of December 1820, the Suliots suddenly quitted the seraskier's camp before Joannina, and marched rapidly towards Suli by the road to Variadhes. A week after, Murto Tshiali, Ali's faithful adherent, put them in possession of Kiapha, with all its military stores and provisions. He also paid a sum of money to each of the chiefs of pharas, in order to enable them to take the field. In January 1821 the Suliots formed a junction with a corps of fifteen hundred Mussulman Albanians under the command of three chieftains devoted to Ali, of high military reputation—Seliktar Poda (the sword-bearer), Muhurdar Besiari (the seal-bearer), and Tahir Abbas, a bey of great personal influence.

It was necessary for the Suliots to re-establish their authority over the Christian villages which had formerly paid them tribute or black-mail ; otherwise they must have remained always dependent on Ali Pasha for their subsistence. The Othoman authorities already occupied several posts in the Suliot territory. The Suliot chiefs and their Mussulman allies resolved to make these positions their first object of attack. Two months were consumed in this operation. After some severe skirmishing, Devitzana and Variadhes, which command the two roads leading from Suli to Joannina, and Lelova and Kauza, which open an issue into the plains of Arta and Previsa, were conquered.

But in the mean time Ali's position had grown much

worse. The severity of the winter had not, as he expected, forced Ismael to raise the siege, and he had himself fallen into a trap he had prepared for his enemy. Letters which he had written to the Seliktar Poda and the Suliots, concerting measures for a combined attack on the Othoman camp, fell into the hands of Omer Vrioni. They were answered as if they had arrived safely at their destination, and the garrisons both of Litharitzza and the citadel were induced to make a sortie, which led them so far into the Othoman camp that it was with great difficulty they effected their retreat, leaving half their number dead on the field. This defeat took place on the 7th of February 1821, and from that day Ali was compelled to act cautiously on the defensive.

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Sultan Mahmud saw that the conduct of the pashas before Joannina was compromising the success of the campaign. He punished the incapacity of Ismael and the insubordination of Pehlevan by removing them from their commands. Pehlevan was immediately condemned to death ; Ismael was sent to defend Arta in a subordinate position, and Khurshid Pasha of the Morea, a sagacious veteran, replaced him as seraskier before Joannina.¹ Ismael's misconduct, when Arta was attacked by the Suliots, the Albanians, and the Greek armatoli, in the month of November 1821, caused him to be exiled to Demotika, where he was decapitated. Khurshid assumed the command of the Othoman army at the beginning of the month of March 1821. The Greek Revolution broke out in the Morea shortly after, and both the fate of Ali Pasha and the fortunes of the Suliots became subordinate episodes in the military operations of Sultan Mahmud's reign.

¹ Khurshid was pasha of Egypt before Mohammed Ali, and was the first Turk who attempted to form a regular corps consisting of Negro soldiers. He failed in the attempt, which his successor resumed at a later period more successfully.—Burckhardt's *Travels in Arabia*, i. 147.

The Suliots henceforth derive their historical importance from their connection with the great national struggle of the Greeks. Their characteristics as an Albanian tribe were gradually lost after they were finally expelled from Suli by Sultan Mahmud's officers, and became dependent for their existence on their pay as Greek soldiers. But their condition when they returned from Corfu to regain possession of their native mountains deserves to be recorded, since it marks the great transition of society in Southern Albania during the first quarter of the present century.

During sixteen years of exile the Suliots were thrown into close connection with the modern Greeks. Their communal organisation remained in abeyance ; but their absence changed the condition of the Christian peasantry who had lived under their protection. Many of the cultivators of the soil found themselves better off as the tenants of Ali Pasha than they had been as the vassals of the Suliots ; and when they returned, they found the inhabitants of the villages in their former territory unwilling to become again the agricultural serfs of the Suliote confederacy. The Suliote warriors also were so reduced in number that they were compelled to seek recruits from among the Christian peasants, in order to counterbalance the strength of the Albanian Mussulmans with whom they were forced to act. It was therefore absolutely necessary to give the Suliote community a new constitution.

This was done. The subject villages sent deputies to a general council, and every soldier enrolled under a Suliote chief was admitted to the privileges of a native warrior. This circumstance was considered an event of great social importance in Albanian society. It separated the Suliots from the great family of the Tchamidhes, and overthrew the organisation of the pharas. It is not easy for strangers to understand

the change which this revolution produced. They cannot estimate the violence of the pride of class among the Albanians, nor the strength of local patriotism or prejudice among the Suliots. In the month of March 1821, when the Revolution broke out in the Morea, the Suliots knew nothing of the Philiké Hetairia, and cared nothing for the independence of the Greeks, yet Greek ideas had already produced a change in the political civilisation of this rude tribe of Albanians. The principles of civil equality and of the brotherhood of all the orthodox had been imprinted on their minds. They were made to feel that they were citizens and Christians as well as Suliots. They were drawn into the vortex of the Greek Revolution without their forming any preconceived design to aid the Greeks, just as they had been led by circumstances to aid their enemy Ali Pasha. But, once engaged in the cause, they embarked in it with their usual vehemence, and formed the van of its warriors, sacrificing their beloved Suli, and abandoning all the traditions of their race, to join the modern Greeks and assume the name of Hellenes.

The intellectual progress of the Suliots in civil affairs, under the influence of Greek ideas, contrasts strangely with their obstinate rejection of the military lessons taught them by the Russians, the French, and the English, who placed the power of discipline and science in war constantly before their eyes. The legions of Napoleon and the regiments of England showed them the secret of rendering small bodies of well-trained soldiers a match for hosts of undisciplined troops, but they refused to learn the lesson. They deliberately rejected the advantages they might have derived from discipline and tactics, because no Suliot would diminish his self-importance. The spirit of personal independence which made every individual Suliot pay only a

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limited obedience to the chief of his phara, rendered the chiefs of the pharas unwilling to obey a commander-in-chief, so that a Suliote army of 700 men was a kind of Polish diet. Unfortunately for the Greeks, the brilliant courage of the Suliots induced the unwarlike leaders of the Revolution to overrate the value of the Albanian system of warfare. The Greeks had taught the Suliots some valuable social lessons; the Suliots in return taught the Greeks to adopt the military barbarism of the Albanians, to despise the restraints of discipline, and to depreciate the value of the tactics and science of civilised nations. Their lessons entailed many calamities on Greece during the revolutionary war.

The Suliots had some reasons for adopting their system in defending their own mountains against the pashas of Joannina, which were inapplicable to the defence of Greece against the Turks. The nature of the Suliote territory, serrated with deep ravines converging at acute angles, forced the Suliots to guard several passes. Their numbers were small, so that their enemies were enabled to attack many points with overwhelming numbers. To meet this danger, it was necessary to adopt some system of defensive warfare, by which a few men could effectually check the advance of a large body. They obtained this result by selecting positions commanding those passes which their assailants could not avoid. In these passes a few men were posted in such a manner as to be concealed from the approaching enemy, but so disposed that each Suliote occupied a station overlooking the same portion of the road. A concentrated fire was thus brought to bear on the gorge of the pass. Every shot was expected to prove mortal.

The military science of the Suliote captains was displayed in the selection of these positions, and in disposing

the men who occupied them. The great art was by a sudden fire to encumber the narrowest part of the pass with the dead and wounded. It was also necessary for every man to have a second rifle ready, in order to prevent the enemy from availing himself of numbers, and rushing forward to storm the Suliot position. A perfect knowledge of the ground, the eye of an eagle, the activity of a goat, and the heart of a hero, were required to make a perfect Suliot warrior. It has often happened that a band of twenty-five Suliots has arrested several hundred men, until their countrymen could arrive in numbers sufficient to throw themselves in the rear of the enemy and capture his baggage.

When circumstances rendered retreat unavoidable, it was an important part of the tactics of the Suliots to abandon their position simultaneously, and remove unperceived into some new position equally suited for defence. In these operations each warrior watched the movements of his companions as carefully as those of the enemy; for it was as great a fault to remain too long in a position as to abandon it too soon. A wound received by unnecessary exposure was, at Suli, as disgraceful as an act of military disobedience. No soldier was entitled to compromise the public safety to win personal glory. This species of defensive warfare required great powers of endurance, and a facility of moving unperceived among stones and stunted brushwood, which could only be acquired by long habit. An active youth becomes a good regular soldier in six months, but as many years were spent in exercising a Suliot warrior, before he was admitted to take his place in a chosen band appointed to defend an important pass. Every man was there called upon to perform the part of a cautious general as well as of a daring soldier.

The system of attack practised by the Mussulman

Albanians bore great similarity to these defensive tactics. The assailants dispersed in an extended semicircle round the point of attack, and crept forward, covering themselves with every irregularity in the ground. The first object was to ascertain the exact position and the numbers of the enemy; the second to outflank him. The first approach was usually made during the night; and before the grey mist of the morning rendered objects visible to any eyes but those of Albanian marksmen, a volley was often poured on the sentinels, who looked up cautiously to examine the ground; or the two parties were already mingled together, and forced to engage hand to hand.

It has been mentioned that when the Suliots were joined by the Mussulman Albanians in Ali's interest, they were compelled to attack the Othoman posts in order to expel them from the Suliot territory. Many of their allies had fought against them in 1803, but this circumstance only increased the mutual emulation. Tahir Abbas and the Muhurdar were not men to yield the palm of valour to Botzaris and Djiavellas. Though the posts of Bogonitza, Lelova, Variadhes, and Toskesi were defended by strong bodies of Gueghs, they were stormed one after the other.

A curious story is told of the manner in which the Suliots gained possession of Variadhes.¹ That position was occupied by about a thousand Gueghs and Sclavonian Mussulmans from Macedonia. The only well was without the Turkish lines, though completely under cover of their fire. Five Suliots crept to this well during a dark night, and let down into it a dead body and a pig cut up in quarters. In spite of the silence they maintained, the Turks suspected that somebody was attempting to draw water, and wounded two Suliots with their fire. In the morning the Mussul-

¹ Perraios, 'Απομνημονεύματα Πολεμικά, i. 41.

mans discovered what their enemies had done. They reproached the Christians with carrying on war dishonourably, and of using unlawful weapons. The Suliots replied, "The well is in our country, and if you don't like the water, you can find many good springs in the territories of Ismael the seraskier." After some disputing, the Turks were compelled to accept the terms offered by the Suliots, and retreat to the camp before Joannina.

Khurshid Pasha, who replaced Ismael as seraskier, assumed the government of the Morea in the month of November 1820. The state of Greece already caused some alarm at Constantinople, but the rebellion of Ali was considered the real source of danger, and the conquest of Joannina was therefore the first object of the sultan's care. As soon as Khurshid reported that there was no immediate cause of alarm in his pashalik, he was ordered to leave a kehaya at Tripolitza, and take the command of the army before Joannina. On his arrival he found the Othoman army thoroughly disorganised, and he set to work with energy to remedy the evils created by his predecessor's misconduct. Nothing astonished him so much as the military strength which the *armatoli* had assumed in the confusion. He perceived, that though the armed Christians had generally ranged themselves under the banner of the sultan's seraskier, they were employed in strengthening their own position, not in weakening that of Ali Pasha's followers. His first business was to reorganise his troops, increase his numbers, and collect supplies of ammunition and provisions, preparatory to attacking Joannina with vigour. While thus engaged, he was astounded by the news that all the Morea, the islands, and a great part of continental Greece, had suddenly taken up arms, and that his communications with his pashalik were cut off both by land and sea. During

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the whole of the summer of 1821, his operations were completely paralysed ; but he wisely determined to keep Ali closely besieged, and to redouble his exertions to destroy the great rebel. There can be no doubt that this was the most prudent resolution he could adopt in the choice of difficulties which was offered him.

The conduct of Khurshid has been severely blamed by some military critics. They consider his torpidity while the Greeks gained possession of Acarnania and Etolia, a proof of his incapacity. But it must be remembered, that when the Greek Revolution broke out, his army did not exceed twenty thousand, and a part of his force consisted of Christian *armatoli*, on whom he could no longer depend. He was compelled to maintain the blockade of Joannina, to oppose the progress of Ali's partisans and of the Suliots in Epirus, to keep open his communications with Arta and Previsa, and to garrison the pass of Metzovo ; while he could not summon a single man to his assistance from Thessaly or Macedon, lest he should be cut off from his magazines at Larissa and Thessalonica, and from direct communication with Constantinople.

Those who depreciate Khurshid's military talents observe that his camp before Joannina was only eighteen hours' march from the pass of Makrynoros ; that Arta and Previsa were occupied by Othoman garrisons ; and that Bekir Djokador (the gambler), who was governor of Previsa, commanded the Gulf of Arta, with the flotilla under his orders. It is argued that by landing a body of troops at Karavaserai, the pass of Makrynoros might be turned, and a body of troops marched to Vrachori in nine hours. The fertile plains of Acarnania would have enabled the Othoman cavalry to render good service by confining the Greek *armatoli* to the hills, and thus communications might always have been kept open with Lepanto and Patras.

The classic student is reminded of the rapid marches of Philip V. of Macedon, and his brilliant operation in destroying Thermus, the capital of the Etolians. The ruins of Thermus are still seen towering over the central plain of Etolia, on a rocky hill about six miles east of Vrachori. Like many other classic spots, they have now a Sclavonian name. Both the ruins and the district in which they lie are called Vlokho.¹ The operations of Philip V. afford a signal proof of the wonders that may be effected by rapid movements, strict discipline, and able tactics. The Macedonian troops were landed at Limnæa (Karavaserai) in the afternoon. They marched all night, and reached the Achelous (Aspropotamos) at daybreak. The distance is twenty-five miles. Crossing the river, they pushed forward, and reached Thermus, situated about fifteen miles from the river, late in the afternoon. The city was surprised and systematically sacked. The public buildings were burned, and, as far as time permitted, the statues were broken to pieces. Next day Philip commenced his retreat. The great fatigue which his troops had undergone during the two preceding days and nights, compelled him to move leisurely, and his men were encumbered with booty. He spent three days in his retreat, before he crossed the Achelous, and regained Limnæa.²

Khurshid had perhaps more than once an opportunity of imitating the Macedonian king; but those who have written the history of the Greek Revolution have estimated the obstacles to his making the attempt too lightly. It was even difficult for him to calculate how far defection might spread among the Mussulman Albanians, if he absented himself from the Othoman camp for a single day. The Sclavonian beys and the

¹ Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*.

² Polybius, v. 5, &c.

Gueghs often behaved with great insubordination while he was present. There could be no hope of success unless he headed the expedition in person. His absence from the camp might enable Ali to raise the siege of Joannina ; the defeat of the expedition might afford him an opportunity of rousing all Southern Albania against the sultan, and of forming an alliance with the insurgent Greeks. It must not also be overlooked that, during the month of May 1821, Khurshid detached nearly ten thousand men from his army, partly to reinforce the garrisons of Patras and Tripolitza, and partly to watch the vale of Tempe and the passes over the Cambunian mountains, and to keep in check the *armatoli* of Olympus and Ossa. By his prudence, chiefly, the Greek Revolution was prevented from spreading northward, after the execution of the patriarch Gregorios on Easter Sunday (22d April).

The personal position of Khurshid was one of great delicacy. The interests of the Othoman empire, and his duty to the sultan, commanded him to prosecute the siege of Joannina, and keep Ali at bay in his last stronghold. But his own honour, and the safety of his family, called on him to march to Tripolitza, protect his harem, and save the Mohammedan population of his *pashalik*. The fate of the Othoman empire probably depended on his decision, and he chose like a patriot. It is the duty of the historian to give the just meed of praise to able and honourable conduct, whether the actor be an enemy or a friend, a Mohammedan or a Christian, a Turk or a Greek.

The Suliots did everything in their power to profit by the weakness of Khurshid's army : they attacked Previsa, and attempted to interrupt the *seraskier's* communications with Arta. Their endeavours to gain possession of Previsa depended for success on secret negotiations, not open assaults. They were frustrated

by the conduct of their Mussulman allies, who feared lest they might become independent of Ali's assistance, and abandon his cause to secure a separate arrangement with the sultan. Their operations on the Arta road also met with only temporary success. RETROSPECT.

On the 6th of August 1821, the united forces of the Mussulman Albanians and the Suliots attacked a convoy of provisions and ammunition on its way from Arta to the seraskier's camp. The Suliots had not yet united their cause with that of the Greeks, so that no common measures were concerted with the Christians who had taken up arms in Acarnania and Etolia. The Suliots still confined their views to securing the independent possession of Suli. The allied force, after plundering the Turkish convoy, attacked the troops of Khurshid stationed to guard the pass of Pentepegadhia, and stormed their position in a brilliant manner. In this exploit the Mussulman Albanians were more numerous than the Suliots. The Muhurdar had 500 men under his command, while Drakos, who led the Suliots, had only 200.¹ Had they been able to retain possession of the pass, which might probably have been done with the assistance of the Greek armatoli, Khurshid would have been compelled to raise the siege of Joannina. The seraskier saw the danger, and sent an overwhelming force to recover the lost position, and keep open his communications. This force compelled the allies to retire, and from that time the Suliots began to lose ground. Ali could no longer supply them with either rations or pay, and they began again to plunder the Christian cultivators of the soil, who sought protection from Khurshid, who gradually succeeded in extending the sultan's authority over the whole of the Suliot territory. The agas of Margariti and Paramythia also regarded them with increased animosity since

¹ Perraivos, i. 45.

the outbreak of the Greek Revolution. The Suliots now turned to the Greeks for assistance, who had already established themselves firmly in Etolia and Acarnania, and were preparing to attack Arta.

Mavrocordatos then acted as dictator in Western Greece. The captains of *armatoli* had already sent the Suliots several warnings of the danger of delivering Ali. The power of Khurshid was not feared. Indeed, the authority of Sultan Mahmud in Greece and Epirus was considered at an end. The agents of the Greek government, the friends of Mavrocordatos, and the captains of *armatoli*, all urged the Suliots to quit the cause of Ali and join that of Greece. They justly observed, that the cause at issue was that of Greece and Turkey, and that, whether Ali or Khurshid proved victorious, the victor would immediately turn all his forces against the Christians, and in the first place against the Suliots. The Suliots did not deny the truth of these observations, but they resolved not to break their plighted faith with the Mussulman Albanians, who had assisted them in their greatest difficulties. These Mussulman allies were at last persuaded that Ali's interest required the support of the Greeks.

In the month of October 1821, Khurshid gained possession of Litharitza, and Ali found himself hard pressed in the fortress on the lake. The batteries of the besiegers destroyed several magazines, and incessant showers of shells rendered the place almost untenable. The Greeks began to be alarmed lest Khurshid should immediately get possession of the immense treasures which they believed were heaped up in Joannina, and became consequently of a sudden eager to form an alliance with the Albanian Mussulmans who still adhered to Ali's cause. Several communications took place, and at last Tahir Abbas and Ago Besiari resolved to visit Mesolonghi, in order to confer with

Mavrocordatos in person, and concert measures for RETROSPECT.
assailing the rear of Khurshid's army, and opening an entrance into Ali's fortress.

Tahir Abbas was a man of experience and sagacity, whose long intercourse with the Greeks rendered him perfectly acquainted with their character, and prevented his being deceived by their wiles. On the other hand, the Greeks laid themselves open to his observation by underrating his talents. They considered him ignorant and stupid, because he spoke Greek with the rude accent and simple phraseology of the Epirot peasantry. Mavrocordatos and the Greek captains, with that overweening confidence in their intellectual superiority which makes the Greeks so often "the fools of their own thoughts," trusted to their powers of deception for using Ali's partisans as blind instruments. By feigning to see things as they wished him to see them, Tahir Abbas heard everything they ought to have concealed. He saw that many Greeks considered the Revolution a movement excited by Russia to destroy the Othoman empire, and that it would soon be openly supported by the Emperor Alexander. He perceived that the Greeks were fighting for their independence and for their religion; and, as a Mohammedan, he would have considered the contest a war of extermination, even had he not seen evidence of the fact at every step he took in his journey to Mesolonghi. Though familiarly acquainted with the captains of *armatoli*, he was astonished at the numbers of veteran soldiers he saw under their command. He was even more astonished at the spirit of independence already displayed by the *rayahs* or Christian peasantry. The Greeks committed a great error in allowing him to pass through Vrachori, where the blackened walls of Turkish palaces, the desecrated mosques and ruined minarets, could not escape his attention, and where their pride induced them to

point out also the unburied bones of murdered Mussulmans, and the unveiled faces of women who had dwelt in the harems of beys, serving as menials in Greek families. The scrutinising mind of Tahir Abbas seized the fact that a new phase had commenced in Turkish history ; that henceforward the Mussulmans in Europe would have to sustain a long war with all the Christians who had been hitherto their obsequious serfs. When he reached Mesolonghi, he observed to an Italian whom he had known at Joannina, that the Revolution was the mortal combat of two religions. Of course he felt an internal satisfaction at making this declaration. As a sincere Mohammedan, he felt assured that though God might punish for a while the vices of the Othomans, eventually the victory would rest with Islam.

It did not require the sagacity of Tahir Abbas to perceive that it was impossible to conclude a treaty of any value either with Mavrocordatos or the Greek government. The intrigues and tergiversations of those around him revealed the anarchy that prevailed in the public administration, and the dissensions that existed among the leading men. Finding that he could obtain no money in Greece to enroll a body of Mussulman Albanians, and being convinced that it would be an act of folly to co-operate with Greek troops without a force sufficient to insure respect and good faith, he returned to his countrymen, who were still acting with the Suliots, determined not to serve as an instrument of Greek policy. He found a part of the Suliots already acting with the *armatoli*.

In the mean time the conquest of Litharitzza had convinced the Albanians that it was neither prudent nor possible any longer to resist the sultan's authority. Elmas bey, who had commanded the Albanians, arrived from Tripolitza, and gave a horrible picture of the cruelty of the Greeks. Khurshid availed himself of

this favourable opportunity to open negotiations with the partisans of Ali, and Tahir Abbas having informed them that it was impossible to come to any terms with the Greeks, the negotiations were soon terminated. The Albanians separated from the Suliots, but informed them that they would not act against them in the Suliot territory. The Suliots retired to their mountains, and the Greeks were compelled to abandon their operations against Arta. RETROSPECT.

Ali was now living in a bomb-proof cellar, clothed in a bundle of dirty embroidered garments, defending the castle of the lake with a diminished and intimidated garrison. Khurshid was watching his prey with the vigilance of a lynx. The Albanian beys, who had hitherto done everything in their power to thwart the operations of the seraskier, were now so much alarmed at the progress of the Greek Revolution, that they became eager for the triumph of the sultan. At last, in the month of January 1822, partly by treachery and partly by surprise, Khurshid's troops gained an entrance into the citadel of the lake, and Ali had barely time to shut himself up in the tower which contained his treasures and his powder-magazine. From this spot he entered into negotiations with Khurshid, who readily agreed to all his demands. Khurshid promised to spare Ali's life; and the aged tyrant, who had never respected a promise or spared an enemy, flattered himself that he could escape the vengeance of Sultan Mahmud. As he was destitute of any feeling of that pride which makes life insupportable after defeat, and as he had no personal vengeance to gratify by dying in defence of his treasury, he probably considered that at the worst it was more dignified for a pasha, and an unwieldy old man of eighty-two, to die by the bow-string than to be mangled in an explosion or slaughtered in an assault. Khurshid, on the other hand, had received the express

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orders of the sultan to send Ali's head to the Sublime Porte, and his difficulties rendered it absolutely necessary for him to get possession of Ali's treasury. Both he and Ali knew that a pasha's promise is valueless against a sultan's order. Khurshid gained possession of the tower, and removed Ali's treasures, which he found by no means equal to his expectations. Ali retired to a kiosk in one of the islands of the lake.

On the 5th of February 1822 a meeting took place between Ali and Mohammed Pasha, who was appointed Khurshid's successor in the pashalik of the Morea. When Mohammed rose to depart, the two viziers, being of equal rank, moved together towards the door with all the ceremonious politeness of Othoman etiquette. As they parted, Ali bowed low to his visitor, and Mohammed, seizing the moment when the watchful eye of the old man was turned away, drew his hanjar, and plunged it in Ali's heart. He walked on calmly to the gallery, and said to the attendants, "Ali of Tebelin is dead." The capidjee of the Porte entered the hall of conference, severed the head from the body, and carried it to the citadel, where it was exhibited to the troops before being sent off to Constantinople. A tumult arose between the Albanians and the Turks, in which several persons were killed; but order was quickly re-established by the seliktar of Khurshid, who rode among the soldiers, announcing that the seraskier had given orders for the immediate payment of all the arrears due to the army, and that he would soon march into the warmer and more fertile region of Thessaly, and prepare to invade Greece, where booty and slaves would be obtained in abundance. Everywhere he was received with acclamation, and the Albanians as well as the Turks shouted, "The dog Kara Ali is dead. Long life to Sultan Mahmud and his valiant seraskier, Khurshid Pasha."

The head of Ali was exposed at the gate of the serai. RETROSPECT.
A few weeks after, four heads of pashas occupied the same niche, placed side by side. They were the heads of Ali's sons, Mukhtar, Veli, and Salik, and of his grandson Mahmud, the son of Veli. They had been allowed to live quietly in Asia Minor until the old lion of Joannina was hunted down. The heads were buried at the cemetery before the gate of Selioria, where five marble tombs, ranged in a line, still arrest the attention of the traveller. The wicked father and his worthless sons are united in death. Filial ingratitude and Othoman treachery are recorded in pompous inscriptions, teaching piety.

BOOK SECOND.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES OF THE GREEK REVOLUTION.

*Νόμος δὲ πάντων βασιλεὺς
Θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων.*

THE CAUSES PRODUCED BY THE IMPROVEMENT OF SOCIETY—SECRET SOCIETIES—
PHILIKÉ HETAIRIA—DIFFICULT POSITION IN WHICH THE TURKS WERE PLACED
—PLOTS OF THE HETAIRISTS BETRAYED—PROGRESS OF EDUCATION AND
MORAL IMPROVEMENT AMONG THE GREEKS—TURKS NATIONALLY MORE DE-
PRESSED BY THE OTHOMAN GOVERNMENT THAN GREEKS—INFLUENCE OF
ROMAN LAW ON MODERN GREEK CIVILISATION—IMPROVEMENT WHICH TOOK
PLACE AFTER THE PEACE OF KAINARDGI, IN 1774—GREEKS LIVING IN
TURKEY UNDER FOREIGN PROTECTION.

THE Greek Revolution was the natural result of general causes : its success was the consequence of peculiar circumstances. Various events afforded the Greeks under the sultan's domination opportunities of acquiring knowledge and experience, and the development of their minds rendered the tyranny of the Turks insupportable. When a nation desires independence, a revolution is probable ; but when it is spurred on by an appetite for revenge as well as by a passion for liberty, a revolution becomes inevitable.

The most striking feature in the Othoman adminis-

tration was the utter want of any judicial organisation for the dispensation of justice. The judicial administration of Turkey only contemplated revenge for acts of injustice, not the distribution of justice to those who suffered wrong. A novelist has observed that when the Turks cut the wrong man's head off, they found a consolation in the fact that after it was over it could not be helped ; the vengeance of the law was wreaked, though an additional act of injustice was perpetrated. Now, both the good and the bad qualities of the Greeks rendered them peculiarly liable to become the victims of the precipitancy of Turkish justice and of the injustice of Turkish judges. The Othoman government constantly pointed out to them the inestimable value of constitutional liberty by practical lessons, and educated them to prepare for a revolution as soon as they ceased to feel as slaves. It was not necessary for them to become acquainted with the writings of Voltaire or the theories of Rousseau. The same moral and political causes which produced the French Revolution produced the Revolution in Greece. English liberty and American independence had struck chords that vibrated wherever civilised men dwelt. The crowing of the Gallic cock did not, as M. Thiers insinuates, first discover the dawn of liberty, which it welcomed with more noise than harmony.

Education among the Greeks was the herald of liberty. Several individuals endowed schools, and sought to raise their countrymen from the degradation to which they had sunk towards the middle of the last century. The French Revolution certainly gave an unnatural degree of excitement to all political ideas. Its crimes and its grandeur fixed the attention of Europe on Paris. The Greeks were excited to proclaim their rights as members of the human race more loudly, and to urge their nationality as a reason for

throwing off the Othoman yoke more openly, when they found similar doctrines supported by powerful armies and glorious victories in other lands. It was everywhere the fashion for the discontented subjects of established governments to imitate the French. The influence of the clubs of Paris was peculiarly calculated to produce a powerful impression on the minds of the Greeks ; for it seemed to prove that great results might be effected by small assemblies, and that words, in which Greece has always been rich, might be employed as an effectual weapon to overthrow governments, and to do the work of swords. The Greeks began to form literary clubs and secret societies, with the vain hope that the Othoman empire might be destroyed by such inadequate instruments.

Two societies are supposed to have contributed directly to accelerating the epoch of the Greek Revolution, and to have aided in insuring its success. These were the Philomuse Society, founded at Athens in 1812, and the Philiké Hetairia, established at Odessa in 1814. But these societies ought rather to be considered as accessories before the fact than as causes of the Revolution. The Philomuse Society was a kind of literary club, and it contributed the funds which enabled many men who took a distinguished part in the Revolution to acquire a European education. The Philiké Hetairia was in its origin a political society, and it taught the Greeks, in every province of the Othoman empire, to expect immediate assistance from Russia as soon as they should take up arms, and thereby propagated the conviction that a contest with the Turks, far from being a desperate enterprise, was one which was sure of success.

As the Philiké Hetairia was a political society expressly established to accelerate and direct a revolution in Greece, its composition and proceedings deserve to

be noticed. The power of secret societies is very apt^{RETROSPECT.} to be overrated, and in no case has the influence of a secret political society been more unduly magnified than in the case of the Philiké Hetairia. Historians have recorded its exploits :¹ they have displayed its weakness, and revealed the ignorance and incapacity of its members. While its proceedings were veiled in mystery, they were easily magnified ; when its acts were all fully known, it was evident that its conduct deserved contempt. It had, however, many paid agents, and many political adventurers gained both influence and profit by entering its precincts. It is not wonderful, therefore, that its historians have been its panegyrists. Many of the best Hetairists were more directly under the influence of Russian orthodoxy than of Hellenic independence, and many of the best men who distinguished themselves in the Greek Revolution were not Hetairists.

The first members of the Philiké Hetairia were bankrupt merchants and intriguing adventurers, possessed of some cunning and great enthusiasm. Fanaticism was then one of the characteristics of every member of the Oriental or Orthodox Church. The Russians felt it ; the Greeks often affected it. Turkey was supposed to be on the eve of dissolution, and Russia to be on the point of gaining possession of Constantinople. The Philiké Hetairia was formed when these opinions were predominant, and by men who entertained them. It prospered. Subscriptions were easily collected ; and agents, called apostles, were sent among the orthodox population of Turkey to preach hatred to the Turks and devotion to the czar of Russia. The supreme direction of the society was, unfortunately, always in

¹ Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution*, i., Introduction, p. 41. Φιλήμων, Δοκίμιον Ἱστορικὸν περὶ τῆς Φιλικῆς Ἑταιρίας, Athens, 1834. Ἐάνθος, Ἀπομνημονεύματα περὶ τῆς Φιλικῆς Ἑταιρίας, Ἀθήνας, 1845. Φιλήμων, Δοκίμιον περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως, 2 vols., Athens, 1859.

BOOK II.
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the hands of incapable men, and the apostles were often so ill selected that the members who resided in Greece refused to intrust them with large sums of money, and feared to confide their lives and fortunes to their prudence.

When this society was founded, orthodoxy and Greek nationality were so generally confounded, that the traders of Odessa who framed its organisation called the popular class of initiated brethren by the barbarous appellation of *Vlamides*, from the Albanian word *vla-meria*, signifying brotherhood. In all probability the Philiké Hetairia would have soon expired of inanition had it not been kept alive by its members making use of the name of Alexander I., Emperor of Russia, who was generally supposed to grant it his secret protection. For several years it watched in vain for a field of action. The rebellion of Ali Pasha at last opened a chance of success. Had that rebellion not occurred, the Hetairists would have remained powerless until hostilities occurred between Russia and Turkey.

The influence of secret societies on national movements can only be powerful when their movements coincide with the general impulse to which these societies owe their own existence. But men are generally more disposed to attribute great events to anomalous causes than to trace patiently the gradual operation of natural impulsions. The schemes of the Hetairists at Odessa were wild and visionary—the object of the inhabitants of Greece was definite and patriotic. The Hetairists proposed to set fire to Constantinople, to burn the arsenal, to destroy the fleet, to assassinate the sultan, to murder his ministers, and to efface the memory of the Sicilian vespers by a general massacre of the Mussulman population in the capital of the Othoman empire. And so infatuated were they, that the advantages and disadvantages of these diabolical

projects are coolly discussed in a history of the Philiké Hetairia published at Athens in the year 1834. These counting-house Catilines of Odessa imagined that they could overthrow an empire by burning an arsenal and assassinating a prince. They overlooked the possibility of arousing the just indignation and bloody vengeance of millions of warlike Mohammedans, who would have rushed to Constantinople to defend the Turkish domination, and who, when the conspirators had destroyed the fountain-head of all the vices of the Othoman administration, might have laid the foundations of a new and more powerful Turkish empire.

The increased boldness of the Greeks in European Turkey after the commencement of hostilities with Ali Pasha did not escape the observation of the Mussulmans. The attention of the sultan and his ministers was repeatedly called to the conduct of Russian agents, and to the bold language held by many Greeks. Yet it is not surprising that the operations of the Philiké Hetairia escaped the observation of the Othoman government, though its existence was discovered by the Russian police as early as 1818, for the Turks employ no spies. Russia also, by permitting her consuls and dragomans in the Levant to act as agents and couriers for the Hetairists, both concealed their intrigues and encouraged their activity. Apathetic as the Turks were, they could not overlook the great alteration which took place in the demeanour of the Greeks during the year 1820. The attitude assumed by the Christians was often seditious. Russian agents were always ready to protect them, and the evidence of a secret understanding seemed to be so strong that all foreign merchants, except the English consuls in the Levant, considered a rising of the Greeks and a war between Russia and the Porte to be inevitable.

The position of the Othoman authorities in the pro-

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vinces where the Greeks were numerous, was one of considerable difficulty. The conduct of the Russians rendered it dangerous for any pasha to venture on taking measures for restraining the insolence of the Greeks before receiving express instructions from Constantinople. Any attempt to disarm the Greeks would have produced little effect in those provinces where it could have been carried into execution with ease, and any attempt to disarm the Christians in Romelia would have caused all the armatoli to join the cause of Ali Pasha. It would hardly have been prudent to disarm even the unwarlike Moreots without making a great addition to the Othoman forces then in the peninsula. When we reflect, therefore, on the delicate circumstances in which the Turkish officials were placed, it must be owned that they were not wanting in that combination of prudence and courage, toleration and cruelty, which has enabled three millions of Mussulmans to retain ten millions of Christians in subjection for four centuries. Yet every hour was bringing the antagonism of the Greeks and Turks nearer to a hostile collision, and it was by a general disarming of the Greeks that a revolution could alone be avoided. The fear that this measure would be considered by Russia as a declaration of war, prevented its adoption by Sultan Mahmud at a period when it was still practicable.

The existence of the Philiké Hetairia was betrayed to Ali Pasha, and communicated by him to the Porte shortly before his proscription. Several Hetairists betrayed their companions to the Turks, and several apostles were assassinated by the Greeks. An apostle named Aristides Popoff was executed at Adrianople; another, Demetrius Hypatros, was murdered by Zaphyros, the primate of Niaousta. The plan of a general insurrection of the orthodox was revealed to the Porte by a Greek named Asemaki: the papers of some of

the apostles were seized in consequence of this revelation ; and a number of letters were discovered which spoke of projects for murdering all the resident Turks in various towns on the Danube and on the shores of the Archipelago. Mr Tricoupi, the Greek historian of the Greek Revolution, who was formerly employed in the English consulate at Patras, thinks that the existence of a secret police might have saved Turkey ; and he reproaches the Othoman government with its deficiency in this branch of despotism.¹ He overlooks the fact that the vices as well as the virtues of the Turks disqualify them from being efficient spies. The secret police of the Othoman empire must therefore have been intrusted to Greeks ; and it is not probable that Greek spies would have revealed anything to the Turks sooner than Greek traitors. It was the absence of all systematic scheme of espionage that rendered the sultan's government, in the opinion of many Greeks, preferable to that of Venice, of Austria, and even of Russia. The best historian of the Greek Revolution, General Gordon, errs in saying that " the stupid Moslems never entertained the least suspicion of a plot hatched in the midst of them ;" but he adds, that " the lynx-eyed police of the Russian empire (from a different cause, doubtless) was as blind as a mole to all matters connected with the society."² The fact, however, is, that neither Sultan Mahmud nor his ministers required to be informed by traitor Hetairists that the Greeks had long been intriguing against the Othoman domination, under the direction and in concert with Russian agents. But it was fortunate that the treachery of the Hetairists did not enable the sultan to obtain

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¹ Σπυρίδωνος, Τρικούπη "Ιστορία τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως, i. 26. — "Οἱ συμμύσται ἤρχισαν νὰ ἐργάζωνται ὑπὸ τὴν ἰδίαν Ὀθωμανικὴν ἐξουσίαν τυφλώττουςαν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὥς μὴν ἔχουσιν ἀστυνομίαν πρὸς ἀνακάλυψιν των."

² *History of the Greek Revolution*, by General Gordon, F.R.S., vol. i., Introduction, p. 48. Compare Φιλῆμων, Δοκίμιον περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως, i. 121, 123.

any information concerning the grand project for his own murder, and for a general massacre, until after the outbreak had taken place. When that scheme became known the sultan could not be reproached with apathy. His anger, indeed, got the better of his policy, and he made the wickedness of the Hetairists a pretext for excessive cruelty to the Greek nation.

It must be observed that very few of the Greek officials in the Othoman service, a body of men usually called phanariots, were admitted members of the Philiké Hetairia. They were not trusted by their countrymen. Halet Effendi, Sultan Mahmud's nishandjee and favourite minister, made use of the phanariots as spies both on the orthodox clergy and on the Greek nation; and, trusting to their vigilance, he refused to believe the reports which reached the Porte that the Greeks were plotting a general insurrection. He considered it incredible that the sultan's rayahs could risk a rebellion as long as the Porte avoided a war with Russia. His influence with Sultan Mahmud rendered this opinion the guide of Othoman policy, and prevented the grand vizier from taking some measures of precaution suggested by the provincial pashas in Greece.

It may now be asked by my readers, What was the real cause of the Greek Revolution, if they are to consider the rebellion of Ali Pasha, and the machinations of the Philiké Hetairia and Russian agency only as secondary causes? The Greek Revolution was the result of the multifarious moral as well as political causes which cause a nation's intelligence to grow. The dispensations of Providence had turned many circumstances to the advantage of the Greek race. Individual virtues had been developed, and individual improvement accelerated and extended. The consequence was an increase of moral energy, a desire of action, and a

longing for a national and political existence. The ^{RETROSPECT.} fulness of time had arrived : the corruption and servility of the Greek race, which had retained it in a degraded condition from the time of its conquest by the Romans, had been expiated by ages of suffering under the Othoman yoke ; and the Greeks felt prepared to climb the rugged paths of virtue and self-sacrifice. The cause of the Greek Revolution embraces the history of the national character, and forms a section of the records of humanity not to be circumscribed by a survey of contemporary political events.

The Revolution was facilitated by the moral and physical decline of the Othoman race. That decline was in no small degree the result of the social circumstances which inevitably undermine the energy of every privileged dominant class ; but it proceeded also from the constitution of society in Mohammedan countries, and particularly from the sultan's despotism, which consumed the riches and paralysed the energy of the Osmanlees more effectually than that of the Christians. Nothing is more certain than that during a considerable period of Othoman history the Turkish population of the provinces was subjected to as much moral and political restraint as the Greek. This fact has been so generally overlooked, that it is difficult to state it plainly without having the air of advancing a paradox. The Mussulmans were a dominant class on account of their religion, but the Turkish population of Asia, whose feudal institutions were older than the Othoman empire, had always been an object of jealousy to the Othoman government at Constantinople. It is too much the habit to identify everything that is Turkish and Othoman in the sultan's empire. For ages the highest offices in the Othoman government were conferred on favourites of the sultan, and the cabinet was composed of men educated in his palace, or taken from

domestic employments in the imperial household. In that household a slave was more honoured than a free man. The ordinance of the Mosaic law was in full vigour. "The servant that is bought for money, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof" (of thy bread). "A foreigner and a hired servant shall not eat thereof." A long period elapsed before the cabinet of the sultan contained many Turks who were born subjects of the sultan, and the counsels of the sultan were generally shared, and the conduct of the grand vizier controlled, by purchased menials in the palace. With these men, the hereditary beys, agas, and timariots had no sympathy, and little political connection; nor could the slaves of the imperial household understand or support the feudal institutions of the Turkish race, of which they rarely heard, except as obstacles to their measures. A Turk might possess patriotism as well as religious zeal: an Othoman official might be a good Mohammedan and a devoted servant of the sultan, but in him palace prejudices occupied the place of national feelings.

We ought not to feel astonished, therefore, when we find that provincial Turks rose with greater difficulty to high rank in the Othoman service than Greeks, and possessed less influence in the administration of the empire. The Turkish aga was ill suited for an Othoman instrument. He was deficient both in knowledge and servility. The Greeks possessed both in a high degree. A wicked government requires unprincipled agents; and during the whole of the eighteenth century the Greeks held several important offices in the sultan's government because they were without principle.

Greek influence was both ecclesiastical and civil. The authority of the patriarch and synod of Constantinople, as an administrative agency in the Othoman

government, was very great. It formed a more efficient protection for the orthodox Greeks than the ulema did for the rights of the Mohammedan Turks. The dragoman of the Porte and the dragoman of the fleet formed a more direct representation of the Greek people in the Othoman government than the Turks of Asia Minor possessed. Roman law, which regulated the civil relations of the Greeks, was better preserved and more equitably administered than the feudal institutions of the Seljouk empire, or the ordinances of the Othoman sultans, which regulated the civil rights and protected the property of the Turks. This circumstance, that a Greek could speak of equity as something permanent, while a Turk could only regard it as arbitrary, gave the Greek population a moral superiority over the Turkish, in one of the most important elements of society. RETROSPECT.

The Romans, by imposing their jurisprudence on all the nations they conquered, conferred a great benefit on Greece. The Greeks have ever been self-willed and presumptuous. Every Greek has always been eager to enforce judgment on others, and ready to defy law whenever he could do so to his own personal advantage with a hope of impunity. The Romans forced the Greeks to acknowledge the principle that justice ought to be invariably administered according to fixed forms of judicial procedure. The attempt was made to render the law more powerful and more permanent than the government. A sense of the value of justice was transfused into the minds of the Greeks, and its basis being enlarged by the conversion to Christianity, it was never lost. This combination of law and religion, which is so interwoven into the national existence as to influence every individual mind, is the great element of the social superiority of the Greeks over the Turks.

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CHAP. II.

The sense of equity appears to be as strong in the mind of the individual Turk, and he is not so ready to gratify his selfishness by acts of injustice as a Greek is. Yet there can be no doubt that both life and property were, on the whole, more insecure among the Turkish population of the Othoman empire than among the Greek. The want of laws, judicial institutions, and legal forms of procedure, rendered the administration of justice arbitrary, and retained Turkish society in a state of barbarism. If the solution of the Eastern question require the regeneration of the Turkish power, this end cannot be attained without the introduction of a fixed legislation, and a systematic code of procedure. If the Turks persist in despising law and contemning justice, the Eastern question, instead of being solved, must be exploded. New combinations and new governments must arise, and many Eastern questions will soon become Western ones. The five great Powers of Europe cannot regulate the waters of the political inundation of which they appear neither to know the depth nor the level.

The condition of the Greek population in Turkey was, as has been already mentioned, greatly bettered by the treaty of Kainardgi in 1774. A considerable increase of its numbers in the commercial cities and maritime provinces soon became apparent. The Turkish government began also at this period to be more dependent on the state of its finances, and this circumstance increased the political power of the Greeks, who were growing richer while the Turks were growing poorer. The sultan and his ministers persisted in relieving themselves from every financial difficulty by acts of bankruptcy. In this species of dishonesty the Othoman empire surpassed the Austrian. When a demand was made on the sultan's treasury, which it was deemed necessary to discharge without delay, and

the sum in the hands of the treasurer did not amount to more than two-thirds of the sum due, the discrepancy was arranged by adding one-third more of alloy to the coinage. Two hundred thousand piastres' worth of bullion were thus converted into three hundred thousand piastres in money, and the debt was paid. By these depreciations of the coinage, which followed one another in rapid succession, Greek capitalists were very often gainers, Turkish landlords invariably losers. RETROSPECT.

While wealth was flowing into the hands of the Greeks, and ebbing from the coffers of the Turks, the ambition of the Greeks was directed to the sultan's service by a number of the highest official prizes in the Othoman administration. A slippered Greek, without stockings, a taoushan of the Archipelago, might become a sovereign prince beyond the Danube. Mavroyeni, a Greek secretary of the great capitan-pasha Hassan Ghazi, after serving as dragoman of the fleet, was appointed Prince of Vallachia.

A still more striking advantage which the provincial Greeks enjoyed over the Turks was the facility of obtaining a complete exemption from the principal evils of the Othoman administration, by placing themselves under the protection of some foreign power. A practice had grown up in the Othoman empire of granting charters of denaturalisation called *berats*, which placed the born subjects of the sultan in the situation of subjects of some friendly sovereign, to whom their allegiance was transferred. The number of Greeks who obtained this privilege was very large, and it often enabled them to transgress all the laws of the empire with impunity. The *berat*lees lived in the midst of the Turkish population, evading many of the heaviest financial burdens to which even Mohammedans were subjected, and carrying on commerce without paying the same duties or being amenable to the same laws in

BOOK II.
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their transactions. They were even protected in their persons from the gripe of the Othoman police by the ambassador or consul to whom their allegiance was virtually transferred. This class of Christians was known to share largely in the profits of debasing the coinage, defrauding the customhouse, and cheating the people by local monopolies. An instance is recounted of a Greek beratlee who realised a large fortune by forging a new coinage of more intrinsic value than the debased issue from the sultan's treasury. He had taken his measures to have his forged money ready for circulation at the same time as the government. It was not difficult, in the greater part of the empire, to persuade the people that the coinage which contained most pure metal was the lawful money.

Individuals belonging to this privileged class were the most active agents of the Greek Revolution; and many who enjoyed the protection of Russia were members of the Philiké Hetairia. The protection they enjoyed insured their escape from punishment, should their complicity be discovered. In this way a vast body of the orthodox, who retained as much of their connection with the patriarch and the ecclesiastical Greek nationality as suited their purpose, lived in the Othoman empire relieved not only from the yoke of the sultan, but almost from the restraint of every other government. It is needless to point out that such a position engendered the vices of avarice, falsehood, and dishonesty, or that these emancipated slaves, suddenly converted into privileged freemen, conducted themselves in general with extreme arrogance. The Turks were insulted whenever it was possible to insult them with impunity, and the Turks, in spite of their forming a dominant caste in the empire, had no revenge but the poor consolation that they could beat the lowest class of Christians whenever they thought fit.

Under these circumstances, the hatred of the Turks and Greeks became every day more violent. Both were justly irritated by chronic and irremediable evils in the condition of the society in which they lived. They felt what Milton tells us, "that justice is the only true sovereign and supreme majesty upon earth," but how to place themselves under the authority of the empire of justice they knew not.

RETROSPECT.

CHAPTER II.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE GREEK HETAIRISTS BEYOND THE DANUBE.

"These be good humours indeed! Shall pack-horses,
And hollow pampered jades of Asia,
Which cannot go but thirty miles a-day,
Compare with Cæsars, and with Cannibals,
And Trojan Greeks? Nay, rather damn them with
King Cerberus, and let the welkin roar."—PISTOL.

CHARACTER OF PRINCE ALEXANDER HYPHILANTES—RELATIONS BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND TURKEY—STATE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE ROUMAN
POPULATION IN MOLDAVIA AND VALLACHIA—INVASION OF MOLDAVIA—
MASSACRE OF THE TURKS AT GALATZ AND YASSI—FURY OF THE TURKS
—REVOLUTION IN VALLACHIA—GEORGAKI, SAVAS, AND VLADIMIRESCO—
HYPHILANTES AT BUCHAREST—SACRED BATTALION—PROCEEDINGS IN VAL-
LACHIA—ANATHEMA OF THE PATRIARCH—RUSSIA DISCLAIMS THE REVOLU-
TION—DECEITFUL CONDUCT OF HYPHILANTES—THE MURDER OF VLADIMIR-
ESKO—BATTLE OF DRAGASHAN—FLIGHT OF HYPHILANTES—AFFAIR OF
SKULENI—DEATH OF GEORGAKI—TERMINATION OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE
PRINCIPALITIES.

IN the year 1820 the managers of the Philiké Hetairia became sensible that they did not enjoy the confidence of the Greek nation. The ablest, the honestest, and the most influential men kept aloof from the society of the apostles, or, if they became members, expressed openly their distrust in the persons who represented the secret direction. To inspire general confidence, it was necessary that some person of character, experience, and talent, should appear as the executive chief, though the names of his councillors might remain enveloped in mystery. The revolutionary projects of the Greeks were publicly discussed; the existence of a secret so-

ciety was generally known, and the impossibility of RETROSPECT. delaying an insurrection was universally felt; yet the managers of the Hetairia were so destitute of practical capacity, that they had not prepared any depots of arms and ammunition, and had not organised a single battalion. The resources of the society had been spent by the apostles in travelling and in taverns, and the capacity of the managers exhausted in writing instructions and drawing plans remarkable only for vague patriotism and impracticable ambition. The storm was about to burst, and the magicians, who fancied they had raised it, felt themselves incapable of steering the vessel in which they were embarked with Greece and its fortunes. One man, by common consent, was deemed equal to the task of bringing Greece safe through the hurricane. That man was Count John Capodistrias. The supreme direction was offered to him, but he refused it without allowing the agents of the Hetairia to unfold their plans or explain their organisation, and it remains still a question how much of their schemes was known to him. He was certainly not ignorant of the revolutionary projects of the society and of the Greeks generally; but he distrusted the capacity of the Hetairists, and he had no confidence in the energy and perseverance of the people: he was not without patriotism, but his patriotic feelings were not stronger than his personal ambition.

Capodistrias having refused the supreme direction, it was offered to Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, who, though he knew nothing about the society previously, accepted it without hesitation, and immediately assumed an absolute command over the Hetairists, their plans and resources. Hypsilantes was the eldest son of the hospodar of Wallachia, whose deposition in 1806 had served Russia as a pretext for commencing war with Turkey. Bred at a despotic court, where the

will of the sovereign conferred all social, political, and military rank, he had lived only with men servile to those in power, and insolent to those who were their inferiors. He had risen to the rank of major-general in the Russian service, distinguished himself as an officer, and lost his right arm at the battle of Culm.

His experience of life was gained in courts and camps ; he possessed considerable abilities and many superficial accomplishments, but he was extremely ambitious, and his inordinate vanity, joined to the high value he set on the princely title which his father had obtained from the Othoman sultan, became a subject of ridicule to some of his Greek followers in the transdanubian principalities. The Greek Revolution could hardly have fallen under the direction of a man less suited to be a nation's leader than Alexander Hypsilantes. He was so ignorant of the feelings of the Greek mountaineers and seamen, that he believed the whole people ready to hail him as their monarch. Still, it may be doubted whether he would have embarked in a contest with Turkey, had he not been persuaded that the Emperor Alexander I. would support his enterprise. His education, moreover, taught him to overrate the power of Russia in the international system of Europe. He believed that it would find no serious difficulty in annexing Moldavia and Vallachia, and that to accomplish that annexation, and indemnify him for his services in creating the opportunity, a new state would be founded in Greece, of which he would be declared the sovereign.

The private character of Alexander Hypsilantes was respectable, his public conduct contemptible. He was a man of agreeable manners and a good disposition, possessing the instruction usually acquired in a well-conducted school-room, and the conversational eloquence familiar to courts. As a soldier he had displayed personal courage ; he boasted of his patriotism

as a Greek, but his visions of patriotism were blended with dreams of a principality or a throne. His personal good qualities were neutralised by great defects. Though active in words, he was sluggish in action. Though brave as a soldier, he was timid as a general ; and when placed at the head of an enterprise which could only succeed by rapid and decisive movements, he was slow and irresolute. Deficient in the art of reading men's characters, he collected round him a crowd of would-be courtiers, and disgusted his military and democratic partisans by the ill-timed princely airs he assumed. He was also ignorant of military tactics, negligent of discipline, and deficient in that sense of order which enforces obedience and replaces the want of administrative experience. Unfortunately, his character was tainted with a worse vice. He had no reverence for truth himself, nor did he appreciate its value in others. He began and ended his great enterprise with acts of deceit and falsehood.

Secret societies are usually hot-beds of internal intrigue. Men who throw off the restraint of those moral obligations which command their obedience in one case, are not likely to respect any laws that restrain their desires. It has been already mentioned that traitors were found among the Hetairists. Acts of misconduct or of treachery induced the superior direction of the society to order its apostles to be assassinated, and Hypsilantes is accused of being privy to these assassinations.¹

The relations between the Russian and Turkish governments were almost hostile. The Greeks had some reason to expect assistance from the Emperor

¹ Gordon, i. 88. Tricoupi, i. 40. Philemon, *Φιλική Έταιρία*, 250 and 267. But in a recent work of the same author, the complicity of Hypsilantes in the assassination of Kamarenos at Galatz is denied, and it is ascribed to other Hetairists. *Έλληνική Έπανάστασις*, i. προοίε. Several assassinations are enumerated by Speliades, *Άπομνημονεύματα*, i. 4, 10, 21, 23.

Alexander I., the Turks good grounds for distrusting him. The secret treaty which he had concluded with Napoleon I., after the conferences at Erfurth, for the incorporation of Moldavia and Vallachia in the Russian empire, was known to Sultan Mahmud, who saw little reason for placing any reliance in the assurances or the honour of Christian emperors after the treacherous conduct of Napoleon to the Porte on that occasion.¹ The treaty of Bucharest had indeed restored the transdanubian principalities to Turkey, but several circumstances gave the sultan reason to suspect that Russia would seek an early opportunity of reconquering them. In order to facilitate an invasion of Turkey at a future period, the Emperor Alexander, when he saw that he would be compelled to make peace, issued an inhuman order to his generals in Bulgaria to destroy the towns of Nicopolis, Sistova, Rutshuk, and Silistria, before evacuating them, and to lay waste all the country south of the Danube before retiring beyond the river.² These barbarous proceedings, and the falsehood and injustice of the Christian powers in many of their dealings with the Porte, made Sultan Mahmud extremely suspicious of the good faith of all Christian princes. The iniquitous invasion of Egypt by France in 1798 ; the unjust attempt to coerce the Porte by Great Britain in 1807 ; the violation of his engagements by Napoleon at Tilsit ; the projected dismemberment of the Othoman empire at Erfurth, and the protection granted by Austria to fraudulent employés, who, like Karadja, the fugitive hospodar of Vallachia, decamped with large sums of public money, destroyed all confidence in the honesty of Christians and the honour of sovereigns.

¹ The contents of this treaty are given by Bignon, viii. 5.

² Rizos Neroulos, *Histoire de l'Insurrection Grecque*, 210, 213, mentions these wanton and inhuman ravages. In the war of 1828 and 1829, Russia pursued the same policy, and the whole Dobrudsha was depopulated before it was restored to the sultan. The villages were all burned, and hardly a house was left standing in many towns.

On the other hand, it was impossible for Christian nations to view the treatment of their fellow-Christians in Turkey without indignation. The conduct of the officials in the Russian consulates was at variance with both justice and international law, but the conduct of the Othoman government was so unjust, that all means of protecting men from its abuses seemed equitable. Tyranny on one side and fraud on the other, had, in the year 1820, produced a degree of mutual exasperation, which rendered an outbreak both inevitable and necessary. Prince Hypsilantes believed with some ground that the Emperor Alexander would avail himself of his right to oppose the entry of Turkish troops into the transdanubian principalities, or at least that he would insist on a joint occupation; and it is not improbable that, if the prince had acted with energy and capacity, and the Greek Hetairists with more courage and honesty, the one or the other must have happened. The ambition of Alexander was, however, counteracted by the principles of the Holy Alliance, and the revolutionary movements of the Spaniards and Italians.

The government of the Greek hospodars in Vallachia and Moldavia was extremely oppressive, and the condition of the Rouman population under their power was more wretched than that of the Greeks under the Turkish pashas. The hospodars were men who had passed the best years of their lives in the dangerous but profitable offices of dragoman of the Porte or the fleet. From a position of servility they were suddenly invested with arbitrary power over a defenceless foreign population. They were aliens in the land they ruled, as the Turks were aliens in Greece. That, like Othoman pashas, they proved rapacious tyrants, was the natural consequence of their position and their education. Yet, while at Yassi and Bucharest they wasted the wealth of the provinces in the splendour of a court,

and treated their Rouman subjects as a nation of slaves, they were regarded by their master and the divan only as tax-gatherers and policemen. The only merit of a hospodar with the Othoman government, consisted in the regularity with which he remitted his tribute, and the liberality with which he bribed the sultan's favourites and the ministers of the Porte. As the fiscal agent of the sultan he was terrible to his subjects, and as an extortioner, to fill his own private treasury, he was hateful. The hospodars themselves amassed large fortunes in a few years,¹ and every new hospodar came attended by a crowd of hungry and rapacious Greeks, who usually arrived loaded with debts, but who expected, like their master, to enrich themselves during a short tenure of office. An army of Greek, Albanian, and Bulgarian policemen and soldiers alone enabled the hospodars to enforce their authority; and this force would not have sufficed without the support of the powerful suzerain at Constantinople, whose name was a shield to his vassal.

The transdanubian principalities, like all the fertile provinces of the Othoman empire, were compelled to furnish the capital with supplies of provisions. The system of ancient Rome was revived by the Othoman sultans. A contribution of wheat, called *istira*, was exacted from the fertile plains of Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thrace. Originally the cultivator of the soil received a fair indemnification for his grain, but before the commencement of the Greek Revolution, the depreciation of the Othoman coinage rendered the price paid by the *istiradgee* almost illusory. In Vallachia and Moldavia the export of almost every article of produce was monopolised by the administration for the benefit of the inhabitants of Constantinople, and the profit of

¹ Zallony, *Essai sur les Phanariotes*, p. 64, says that hospodars have carried off ten millions of francs after enjoying office for only two years.

the hospodars.¹ To fulfil this duty with exactitude, RETROSPECT.
 the hospodars were allowed a right of pre-emption for a certain quantity of grain and a fixed number of cattle, in addition to the tenth of the gross produce of the soil, which they received as the land-tax of the Othoman empire. The right of pre-emption gave rise to abuses and exactions, which formed a severe burden on the people, and a sure means of enriching the hospodars and their phanariot followers. A large extra supply was always collected under the pretext of paying the expense of transport, and covering the losses that might take place among the cattle. The hospodars themselves often became grain-merchants and cattle-dealers, and made large sums of money by evading the monopolies they rigorously enforced on others. The Othoman government sent annually to the Danube vessels capable of conveying 1,500,000 kilos of wheat to Constantinople ;² and when a greater quantity was required, the hospodars were allowed to provide for the purchase and transport of this extra quantity by a special tax on their provinces. After this notice of the principal burdens on the agricultural population of the principalities, it is needless to attempt to paint their misery. They were the wretched slaves of a race of rapacious oppressors, who were also themselves slaves.

The native race in Vallachia and Moldavia claims a descent from the Roman colonies which settled in Dacia ; but as it is found speaking the same language in eastern Hungary, in Transylvania, in Bessarabia, on Mount Pindus, and in the valley of the Aspropotamos, it may be that it represents a race that occupied the same countries before the coming of the Romans, but

¹ Wilkinson, *Description of Moldavia and Vallachia*, French translation, p. 68, says that the only articles of export exempted from monopoly were wool, yellow berries (*Rhamnus Infectoria*), and hare-skins, which were exported in foreign ships.

² Nearly 200,000 quarters. A considerable number of cattle and sheep were also conveyed to Constantinople by sea, but many were driven there by land.

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whose language had a considerable affinity with Latin, and who received the civilisation of Rome, though they had resisted that of Greece.¹ In 1821, the Rouman race numbered six millions of souls, and its lot was most unhappy. The boyards and the native nobility had been demoralised by the government of the Greek princes—they were tyrants of the peasants who cultivated the soil. The greater part of the land belonged either to large proprietors, who were like feudal lords, or to monasteries and ecclesiastical establishments. Though the cultivator was in reality a free colon, his condition was as degraded and helpless as that of a serf attached to the glebe. He was bound to work a certain number of days on a piece of land of which the whole produce belonged to the landlord. He had no prospect of ever improving his condition by his own industry, for his landlord had the power of sending him to cultivate land of an inferior quality at any time; and the landlord's steward could exercise every power belonging to the landlord. The result was, that the Roumans were a sluggish race, nor had they, like the Greeks, the consolation of meeting with any sympathy among the Christians of happier countries. During the occupation of the principalities by the Russians from 1808 to 1812, they had suffered severer exactions than the Greeks of the Peloponnesus had suffered at the same time from Veli Pasha. The subsequent extortions of Karadja and Kallimaki had prevented them from recovering from the exactions of the Russians. It is not, therefore, wonderful that the Rouman population regarded the Greeks with a deep-rooted hatred, and that the idea of Greek princes and phanariot officials coming to them as the heralds of liberty appeared to be a bitter mockery.

Alexander Hypsilantes crossed the Pruth, attended

¹ *Byzantine History*, ii. 278.

C. 1811. 11. 11.

by a few followers, on the 6th of March 1821. He A.D. 1821.
had concerted his measures with Michael Soutzos, the reigning hospodar, and the leading phanariot officials in the province who had been admitted members of the Hetairia. Hypsilantes believed that he was entering on a smooth and brilliant career; that Moldavia and Wallachia would submit to his government at his mere requisition; that the machinery of administration would move smoothly on as under the suzerainty of the sultan, with the advantage that he should be able to retain in his own hands the sultan's tribute; that a European congress would relieve him from every difficulty, and the protection of the Emperor Alexander secure either a principality on the Danube or a throne in Greece.

The first acts of Hypsilantes betrayed his utter incapacity for the post into which he had thrust himself. Instead of endeavouring to gain possession of Ibrail, which alone could have enabled him to proceed in his enterprise with any prospect of success, he took up a position at Yassy, where his presence was unnecessary. The hospodar, Michael Soutzos, and the postelnik, Rizos Neroulos, were amiable, weak-minded, and ambitious men. They shared all Hypsilantes's foolish hopes of Russian intervention; and, like him, they forgot that neither Providence nor Russia was likely to assist men who neglected their own affairs. Had Hypsilantes rendered it difficult for the Turks to enter the principalities, Russia might have refused to allow them to make the attempt. To gain the support of the people it would have been necessary to promise the Roumans liberty, and to insure them some guarantee against the oppression of the Greeks and Russians, rather than an imaginary relief from the Turkish yoke; for in the minds of the agricultural population in the principalities, Turkish tyranny was regarded

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as a phrase for expressing phanariot rapacity. But Hypsilantes as a Russian protégé, and Michael Soutzos as a phanariot tax-gatherer, had no thought of increasing the liberties or lightening the burdens of the people. Hypsilantes, therefore, as leader of the Greek Revolution, took his stand in Moldavia as the chief of a band of foreign mercenaries, striving to conquer the Rouman country in order to transfer the suzerainty from the Sultan of Constantinople to the Czar of Russia.

The invasion of the Hetairists overthrew the civil government, which derived its authority from the Porte; and Alexander Hypsilantes, as commander-in-chief of the army, issued a proclamation as supreme head of a new order of things, in which, instead of marking his confidence in himself and his army, he boasted in enigmatic phrases that Russia protected his enterprise, and that her assistance would insure his triumph.¹ His fatuity looked like a satire on revolutions. In action he was as destitute of energy as he was deficient of prudence in counsel. Instead of marching to surprise the enemy, and secure a strong military position, he trifled away his time in idle ceremonies or absolute inaction.

The treason of Michael Soutzos and several of the Moldavian ministers placed the whole financial and military resources of the province at Hypsilantes's disposal, and he was already in possession of a large sum

¹ See this document in Speliades, i. 36, and the observations on Hypsilantes's indecision in Rizos Neroulos, *Histoire de l'Insurrection Grecque*, 282. Tricoupi, i. 55, who writes in the spirit of equity and good faith, quotes the words as they are given in a short proclamation of Hypsilantes to the Moldo-Vallachians, dated 23d February (7th March) 1821, published by Photeinos, p. 33. The passage is modified in the long proclamation, dated the 24th February (8th March), printed by Speliades, which corresponds very nearly with that published by Philemon in his recent work entitled *Δοκίμιον περί της Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπανάστασεως*, ii. 79; but in this the passage is entirely omitted. A comparison with other sources, however, proves that more than one of the documents printed by Philemon have been subjected to unfair manipulation. Compare the allusion in the proclamation to the Greeks in the principalities as that document is printed by Philemon, ii. 85.

of money.¹ A considerable body of troops, consisting A. D. 1821.
of soldiers who had served in the Russian and Servian wars, might have been assembled in a few days by an energetic leader with active lieutenants. The Hetairists had already secured the support of the ablest officers in the command of the troops under arms in both principalities; and as Alexander Soutzos, the hospodar of Vallachia, died a few weeks before Hypsilantes crossed the Pruth,² the whole military force in the two principalities might have been concentrated on the banks of the Danube. The number of Greek sailors at Galatz would have enabled a man of promptitude to secure the command of the river by a fleet of gun-boats. The civil and military administration might have been more easily centred in the hands of the commander-in-chief of the army in a camp before Ibrail, than at Yassi or Bucharest. By repealing every monopoly and commercial restriction, the goodwill of the landed proprietors, as well as of the merchants and seamen, would have been gained. By rapid movements and vigorous attacks, the few Turkish troops then in the Dobrudsha might have been dispersed, and all the fortresses below Galatz taken. The whole course of the Danube from Orsova to the sea would, in all probability, have been in the possession of a daring soldier who had known how to conduct a national revolution, before the Othoman government had moved a single soldier; but Alexander Hypsilantes had neither the hand, the head, nor the heart capable of conducting a daring enterprise. He neither centralised the administration, nor concentrated the army, nor collected military stores, nor formed magazines. In short, he did

¹ Rizos Neroulos, *Insurrect. Grecque*, 295.

² Alexander Soutzos, the hospodar of Vallachia, was not of the same family as Michael Soutzos, the hospodar of Moldavia. He died suddenly on the 1st February 1821. He was accused of having revealed as much as he had discovered of the plots of the Hetairists to the Turks, and it was thought that he had been poisoned by them; but these reports have been denied.

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nothing but play the prince and leave every matter of importance to chance.

The Hetairists had prepared for vigorous action, and were looking anxiously for orders while Hypsilantes was preparing to cross the Pruth. Anarchy was the natural consequence of a band of conspirators being left without precise instructions and without any recognised chief. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first deeds of the Revolution brought dishonour on the cause. Galatz is the principal port of Moldavia; several Turkish merchants resided in the town, and some Turkish vessels lay in the port. As in the Othoman empire foreign sovereigns retain the sole civil and criminal jurisdiction over their subjects, it naturally followed that in the principalities the sultan alone possessed any authority over the resident Mussulmans: a Turkish officer was therefore stationed at Galatz with a few guards, in order to enforce obedience to the police regulations and fiscal laws of Moldavia on the part of the Turks. A Greek named Karavia commanded the Christian troops in the service of the hospodar stationed at Galatz. Like Michael Soutzos and Rizos Neroulos, he was a member of the Hetairia, and being intrusted with the secrets of the conspirators, he availed himself of the vague communications and the negligence of Hypsilantes in omitting to issue precise orders, to make an infamous attempt to enrich himself by plundering the Turks. He was an Ionian by birth, and had acquired some military experience in the Russian service, and some property in the service of Karadja, the hospodar of Vallachia.

The night before Hypsilantes quitted the Russian territory, Karavia assembled the Hetairists and his band of mercenaries (called Arnauts in the principalities, though composed of Greeks, Servians, and Bulgarians, as well as Albanians), and after informing

them that a revolution was about to take place under A. D. 1821. Russian auspices, he led them to attack the Turkish officer and his men. Some were surprised and murdered, but others succeeded in shutting themselves up in a house, which they defended for some time. Karavia then authorised his men to capture or murder the Turkish merchants in the town, and began to break open and plunder their warehouses and take possession of their ships. Turks of every rank, merchants, soldiers, and sailors, were surprised and murdered in cold blood. The native population of Galatz took no part in this infamous transaction; they neither stained their hands with blood, nor disgraced themselves by robbing their guests. Indeed, the cruelty of Karavia and the licentiousness of his Arnauts, terrified the Moldavians, who saw little prospect of enjoying either order or security under the government of the Hetairists.¹

The sanguinary and revengeful passions awakened by the assassination of the Mussulmans at Galatz spread rapidly over the whole province, in consequence of the misconduct of Hypsilantes and the timidity of Michael Soutzos. About fifty Othoman soldiers were stationed at Yassi as a guard of honour. They had no duty but to uphold the dignity of the suzerain by the mere fact of their presence at the court of the hospodar. Before Hypsilantes entered the city, the hospodar persuaded the Bash Besly aga to order his guards to lay down their arms, under a promise that their persons and property should be protected. The

¹ The most accurate account of the revolution in the transdanubian provinces is in Gordon's *History of the Greek Revolution*. He obtained a large number of original documents from one of Hypsilantes's principal officers, and he was acquainted both with the country and the leading men. Compare the account of the affair at Galatz circulated at the time, as given in a curious work published in lithography at Bucharest, with the indication. Leipsic, 1846, *Οἱ Ἄθλοι τῆς ἐν Βλαχία Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως τὸ 1821, συγγραφέντες παρὰ Ἡλίας Φωτεινῆς*, p. 29, with that of *Φιλῆμων, περὶ τῆς Ἑλλ. Ἐπαν.* i. 125, and Gordon, i. 100.

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Turks were not inclined to resist the Hetairists, for they shared the general opinion that they formed the vanguard of a Russian army. Michael Soutzos ordered the Othoman soldiers to remain in their quarters and the Turkish merchants to be imprisoned, under the pretext that this measure was necessary to insure their safety. Yet as soon as the news of the murders at Galatz reached the capital, both the Othoman soldiers and the Turkish merchants were murdered in cold blood, under the eyes of the hospodar and of Alexander Hypsilantes, the commander-in-chief, without these princes making an effort to save their lives, or uttering a word of reprobation at this disgraceful violation of a sacred promise. Hypsilantes had even the weakness and the wickedness to approve of the murders of Karavia at Galatz, and thus ratify those which he had witnessed at Yassi.

The consequence of this misconduct was that similar assassinations were committed in other places, and the Albanian and Greek soldiers considered that they were authorised to rob and murder every Mussulman whose property excited their cupidity, or whose conduct afforded a pretext for revenge. Much disorder ensued, the difficulty of enforcing discipline was increased, and every captain of a company took the liberty of acting without orders.

The treasury of the Hetairia at Yassi contained a much smaller sum than Hypsilantes had expected to find in it. His own ignorance of financial administration rendered him helpless, and his counsellors could suggest nothing better than following the example of Karavia's Arnaouts, and plundering the rich. Hypsilantes, therefore, commenced his administrative operations by seizing a wealthy banker, whom he accused of being hostile to the Revolution, and of concealing funds belonging to the Hetairia. The first accusation

was not a crime, and the second was false ; but Paul Andreas was glad to pay the prince several thousand pounds to escape out of his hands.¹ This act of extortion alarmed the native boyards and all the wealthy Roumans, who, afraid of being robbed by the Greeks, availed themselves of every opportunity of escaping into Russia and Austria.

The murders committed by Karavia, without securing any military advantage, inflicted a severe blow on the cause of the Hetairists. A panic terror seized the people in all the towns on the southern bank of the Danube, and the Turkish inhabitants and Othoman garrisons were roused from the apathy in which they were living, and the state of neglect in which they had been left by the sultan's government. As the news of the murders at Galatz and Yassi flew from one city to another, embellished with a hundred horrid exaggerations, the Mussulmans everywhere flew to arms ; and it may be truly said that the most efficient support of Othoman domination at this crisis was the cruelty of the Greeks, not the energy of Sultan Mahmud. The wickedness of the Hetairists proclaimed the Revolution at its commencement to be a war of extermination. The Mohammedans accepted the decision of their enemies with ferocious joy, for they deemed that it made their cause the cause of justice and of God. They took up arms to avenge the murder of their brethren, and to defend their race and their religion from bloodthirsty aggressors.

While the Turks were preparing with unusual promptitude for war, Hypsilantes was trifling away his time at Yassi in the silliest manner. He conferred high military titles on his followers : captains at the

¹ Gordon says 160,000 ducats, erroneously for piastres, i. 100 ; but Tricoupi reduces the sum to 60,000, about £2000 sterling at the then rate of exchange, i. 54.

head of a hundred men were made generals, and in this way acquired an opportunity of proving that they were equally unfit for both offices. Karavia was rewarded for bringing indelible disgrace on the enterprise by being named a general. The extreme folly of Hypsilantes in promoting the members of his suite was rendered more offensive by his omitting to confer any military distinction on the three ablest officers in the principalities, who were actually at the head of considerable bodies of efficient troops. These men were Theodore Vladimiresko, a Vallachian boyard; Savas, a Greek of Patmos; and Georgaki, of Olympus. They were all Hetairists, and the neglect with which they were treated inspired Vladimiresko and Savas with suspicions that Hypsilantes and his phanariot advisers wished to supersede them in their commands. So rapidly did the prince reveal the weakness of his character, that during his stay at Yassi not a single Moldavian of any rank joined his standard.¹

After allowing two months to pass unemployed, when every day ought to have been commemorated by exploits, Hypsilantes reached Bucharest on the 9th of April 1821.

The three military chiefs neglected by the commander-in-chief were the real men of action in this unfortunate revolution.

Georgaki of Olympus had been commandant of the Arnaut guard in Vallachia at the death of the hospodar Alexander Soutzos. He was a man of courage and good sense, who had acquired some military experience in the Russian service, and who was enthusiastically devoted to the cause of Greece, without having formed any precise ideas concerning the means by which her liberty could be secured. Like most of his countrymen, his predominant idea was hatred of

¹ Rizos Neroulos, *Histoire de l'Insurrection Grecque*, 292.

the Turks, and to secure a victory over his enemies he was ready to forge chains with which Russia might bind both Turks and Greeks. He was a sincere patriot, but no politician. His influence over the Greek and Albanian soldiers in the principalities was great, for he was acknowledged to be their bravest leader ; but he had no sympathy with the Rouman population, and he was not liked by the native boyards. A. D. 1821.

Savas of Patmos was a mere mercenary captain, but he was a man of cunning, courage, and ambition, who, under an able and energetic chief, might have been rendered an active and daring officer. He had been appointed commandant of the garrison of Bucharest by the regency which administered the government of Vallachia after the death of Alexander Soutzos. Savas's confidence in the cause of the Hetairists had been greatly diminished by their proceedings from the time Hypsilantes crossed the Pruth until he arrived at Bucharest. He believed he was distrusted ; and a new hospodar, Skarlatos Kalleniakes, having been appointed by the Porte, he conceived hopes of advancing his interests better by allying himself with the Phanariot hospodar, who was sure of being supported by the sultan, than with the princely adventurer, who seemed to have little chance of receiving any effectual support from Russia.

Theodore Vladimiresko was a lesser boyard, who had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the Russian service, and obtained the cross of St Vladimir, from which he took his surname. He had as deep-rooted and as patriotic an aversion to Othoman domination as any Greek ; but he had also a strong aversion to the Greeks as the agents of Turkish oppression in his country. He had joined the Philiké Hetairia because it was a society of the orthodox, which he hoped might be useful in delivering his countrymen from the state

of bondage in which they were living ; but he had no intention of becoming a passive instrument of Greek intriguers. He was ambitious, cruel, and suspicious, without either the dashing courage of Georgaki or the plausible manners of Savas. His deceitful conduct warranted the Greeks in regarding him as a traitor to their cause ; but if Vallachian historians had alone written the history of the enterprise of the Hetairists with the fixed purpose of lauding nationality as the first of political virtues, Vladimiresko would have been represented as a patriot and a hero.

Hypsilantes reached Bucharest with only two thousand troops under his immediate orders. But he was already surrounded by a court and a crowd of adventurers, seeking to advance their fortunes by crowding his antechamber, and by treating him with Oriental servility. There was no military system in his army ; and at Bucharest the conduct of his troops persuaded even the unwarlike Roumans that he was utterly unfit for the task he had undertaken. A few days after his arrival, everybody inquired with alarm how the enterprise was likely to terminate. The infatuation of Hypsilantes still led him to expect success from the interference of Russia, and not from his own exertions ; but many of his followers began to perceive that Russia, like Hercules, would in all probability be in no hurry to assist a lazy waggoner through the muddy road into which he had voluntarily plunged. In the mean time, while Hypsilantes was waiting to receive the gift of a throne, he amused himself and his mimic court by taking into his service a company of comedians, and plundering the treasury of the monastery of Maryeni to fit up a theatre.¹

The greatest disorder already reigned among the troops in both principalities. The soldiers were left

¹ Gordon, i. 106.

without pay, and at times without rations, so that they lived at free quarters among the peasantry ; and all discipline was relaxed. A numerous staff of officers, in rich and fantastic dresses, hastened to and fro in the streets of Bucharest from morning to night, apparently intent on business, but without producing any result. Secretaries transmitted arbitrary requisitions for money and provisions to every district from which anything could be extracted ; and Hypsilantes had himself the impudence to issue orders to prepare quarters for a Russian army, which he declared the emperor had placed under his command. A. D. 1821.

The only corps formed by the Hetairists, whose discipline and good conduct merits praise, was a regiment of volunteers called the Sacred Battalion. It was composed of about five hundred young men of the higher and middle ranks, full of enthusiasm for the cause of liberty. They adopted a black uniform, and placed the effigy of a death's head on their caps as a sign of their oath that they would die or conquer. Theirs, however, was no vain boast.

“ Rousing the vengeance death alone can quell,
They rushed into the fight, and, foremost fighting, fell.”

Unfortunately, many of these young men were ill fitted to encounter the hardships of a campaign, by their extreme youth and their previous habits. Yet, though they suffered severe privations on the march, they behaved with spirit and order, and were everywhere praised by the peasantry for their discipline.

Georgaki of Olympus had also an efficient body of cavalry under his orders, but its number did not exceed two hundred well-mounted troopers.

The garrison of Bucharest, under the command of Savas, amounted to a thousand men, and composed an efficient corps of veteran mercenaries.

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Vladimiresko was encamped at the monastery of Kotratzani, in the immediate vicinity of the capital, with three thousand pandours, or Vallachian light cavalry. His force was in good order, and he had adopted prudent arrangements for securing ample supplies of provisions and military stores. A good deal of intrigue was going on among all who possessed any share of civil or military power in Vallachia. Savas, as commandant of the garrison of Bucharest, had been ordered by the regency to defend the capital against Vladimiresko, who had commenced an insurrection in Little Vallachia immediately after the death of Alexander Soutzos, at the instigation of the Hetairists, in order to distract the attention of the Othoman government. But the conduct of Hypsilantes in Moldavia having convinced Vladimiresko that the prince was too incompetent to have been selected by the Russian cabinet as the leader of a revolution, he advanced towards Bucharest, in order to watch the progress of events, and preserve his own position as an independent Vallachian chief. On the 29th of March, while Hypsilantes was trifling away his time on the road between Yassi and Bucharest, Vladimiresko encamped before the Vallachian capital, and published a proclamation to the inhabitants, breathing a spirit of Rouman patriotism, declaring that he came to aid them as the champion of his native land, and inviting them to send deputies in order to discuss with him the measures to be adopted for laying before the Porte a detailed statement of the evils they suffered from the rapacity of the phanariots. It was evident that Vladimiresko had abandoned the cause of the Hetairists.

When Hypsilantes reached Bucharest, neither Vladimiresko nor Savas would acknowledge him as commander-in-chief. Both distrusted him, and both were aware of his incapacity; but as they distrusted and

hated one another, both opened communications with him, hoping to render his influence subservient to the furtherance of their own projects. A. D. 1821.

The sultan had now assembled a considerable number of Turkish troops on the southern bank of the Danube. Hypsilantes had only one chance of terminating his enterprise with honour. He might still beat up the quarters of the enemy before they could concentrate a force sufficient to overwhelm the principalities like an avalanche. Instead of taking the field, he commenced a series of intrigues with the boyard and the Patmian, in which each of the three negotiators endeavoured to cheat the other two. This wretched scene of cunning was brought to a termination by an event that would alone have sufficed to ruin the enterprise. The news arrived at Bucharest that the patriarch of Constantinople had issued an anathema against the Hetairia, and cursed Hypsilantes and his cause. The enterprise of Hypsilantes was no longer an orthodox cause, and the Roumans were eager to express their detestation of a scheme which they attributed to Greek ambition. The scandalous behaviour of persons in the prince's suite, and the want of discipline among his troops, disgusted the Vallachians, who saw that the corps of Savas and Vladimiresko behaved in an orderly manner, and respected the property of the citizens.¹

While the feelings of the Rouman population were in this state, the news arrived that Russia disclaimed all complicity with the Hetairists, and that the Emperor Alexander reprobated the conduct of Hypsilantes. A congress of European sovereigns which met at Laybach declared that the members of the Holy Alliance were hostile to all revolutionary movements; and the Russian emperor, to afford a proof of his reprobation

¹ Tricoupi, i. 61.

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of the movement in the transdanubian principalities, announced his determination to preserve peace with the sultan, and consented to the entry of Othoman troops into the country for the purpose of suppressing the troubles caused by the insane project of Hypsilantes. At the same time he dismissed Hypsilantes from the Russian service.

The anathema of the patriarch and the policy of the Russian emperor awakened open opposition to the Hetairists on the part of the clergy and the natives, and encouraged Savas and Vladimiresko to treat the assumption of supreme power by Hypsilantes as an idle pretension, which they admitted only to advance their own private interests. They both opened secret communications with the sultan's officers, though neither of them appears to have attached any importance to the fact that the sultan was, by the constitution of the orthodox church of Constantinople, the legal supporter of the patriarch's authority. Many boyards, who had hitherto believed that the enterprise of Hypsilantes would eventually receive Russian support, now fled to Austria, and, before quitting the principalities, transmitted to the Porte strong declarations of devotion to the sultan's government, and gave strict orders to their stewards to throw every obstacle in the way of the Hetairists, and afford every facility to the advance of the Othoman troops.

The decision of the Emperor Alexander was announced to the boyards of Moldavia at Yassi on the day Hypsilantes entered Bucharest; and he received the news of his own dismissal from the Russian service, and of the consent of the Russian government to the advance of the Othoman troops, a day or two later, by letters from Nesselrode and Capodistrias, written by order of the emperor. These letters upbraided him for his folly in commencing the Revolution, and for his

falsehood in making use of the emperor's name in a manner both unbecoming and untrue. He was ordered to lay down his arms immediately, as the only reparation he could make for the many evils he had created by his unreasonable ambition. From this moment it was evident that the Revolution was hopeless, and it was clearly the duty of Hypsilantes to terminate his military and political career as speedily, and with as little injury to the principalities as possible. Had he frankly communicated the contents of the documents transmitted to him by the Russian embassy at Constantinople to his principal officers, and concerted openly and honourably with Savas and Vladimiresko the measures necessary to be taken for preserving order and securing a general amnesty, he might still have saved thousands from ruin and death, and his own name from dishonour. But his vanity was so extravagant, and his incapacity so deplorable, that he persisted in his habit of deceit.

The policy of Russia was known to everybody in Bucharest a few hours after the prince had read his letters. Georgaki of Olympus and the principal officers of Hypsilantes's troops waited on him to know the precise nature of the communications he had received, in order to decide on their future operations. They were received with the ceremonial of a royal court. Hypsilantes listened to their request with an affected air of condescension and self-satisfaction, but he could not prevent an expression of pettishness revealing itself in his reply ; and he had the baseness to assure the officers that, though the Emperor Alexander deemed it necessary to disapprove of his conduct openly, to preserve peace in Europe, his imperial majesty had privately ordered Capodistrias to inform him that the Hetairists were not to lay down their arms until they were informed of the issue of proposals in favour of

the Greeks, which the Russian minister at Constantinople was instructed to lay before the Porte. He informed them also that, under the circumstances, he had no intention of attacking the Turks, and that he believed the Othoman troops at Rutshuk and Silistria would not invade the principalities. When he made these statements, he knew that every word he uttered was false.

Hypsilantes was now at the head of a small and irregular army, almost entirely destitute of artillery, but with this force he took the field. Yet even then, instead of hastening to the Danube to cover Bucharest, and gain honour at least by some brilliant exploit, he crept away towards the Austrian frontier. His proceedings induced both Savas and Vladimiresko to suspect that he was playing some secret game for his own advantage, of which they were to be the dupes. They resolved to imitate the example, and turn the troubled aspect of public affairs to their own profit at his expense. Both of them carried on active negotiations with the Othoman commander at Rutshuk. Savas expected to obtain promotion by betraying the prince into the hands of the Turks. Vladimiresko is said to have believed that, by balancing between the different parties, he might at last succeed in inducing the Porte to name him hospodar of Vallachia. If this accusation be true, he must have been a worthy rival of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes in military diplomacy.

The consent of Russia to the suppression of the Revolution by Othoman troops, made it necessary for Hypsilantes to fight immediately, or escape rapidly. He had so completely neglected military business while he was at the head of his army, that on entering on the campaign he was almost without ammunition, and to supply the want he commenced active operations by plundering the stores of Vladimiresko of six

thousand pounds of powder. The troops behaved as A. D. 1821.
ill as their leader : they plundered the baggage of the
metropolitan bishop, and of several boyards, who were
fleeing for safety to the Austrian territory.

The Turks, who had assembled considerable forces at Ibrail, Silistria, Giourgevo, and Widin, were no longer likely to encounter any serious opposition in marching to Yassi and Bucharest. On the 27th of May they reached Bucharest, and the pasha of Silistria entered it on the 29th. Savas, though in negotiation with the Turkish authorities, followed the revolutionary army in hopes of finding an opportunity of making the prince prisoner, and delivering him into the hands of the pasha of Giourgevo. Vladimiresko also followed the movements of Hypsilantes; for by recognising him as commander-in-chief, he had compromised his own position as an independent Vallachian leader. The movements of Hypsilantes indicate that his object in taking the field was to prevent the Othoman cavalry cutting off his retreat to the Austrian frontier.

Hypsilantes had formed a camp at Tergovisht, where he now threw up intrenchments, and declared that he would await the attack of the Turks. But Vladimiresko having made dispositions for marching into Little Vallachia, where he expected to maintain himself with advantage until he had brought his negotiations with the Othoman officers to a favourable termination, Hypsilantes became so alarmed that he ordered Vladimiresko to be arrested, or slain as a traitor. A conspiracy of Hetairists had been already formed among the officers in the Vallachian army, in consequence of the dissatisfaction felt at his communications with the Turks. A part of the correspondence of the Vallachian chief with the kehaya of the pasha of Giourgevo had been intercepted, and placed in Hypsilantes's hands.

The prince showed this correspondence to Georgaki, and upbraided him with having initiated Vladimiresko into the secrets of the Hetairia, telling him that it was his duty to remedy the evils produced by his imprudence, which could only be done by arresting the traitor. Georgaki, who was a brave and loyal character, undertook the task without hesitation. While at Piteshti, he was invited by a party in the Vallachian camp at Goleshti to assist them in putting an end to the authority of Vladimiresko; and on receiving this invitation, he hastened forward with a body of cavalry. A council of officers was assembled to receive a communication of the greatest importance; and when the assembly met, Georgaki boldly accused Vladimiresko of treachery, and declared that he was sent to summon him to answer for his conduct before the prince as commander-in-chief of the army. Vladimiresko, who despised Hypsilantes, and regarded Georgaki as his friend, did not consider that he exposed himself to much danger by submitting to the arrest, and returning to Hypsilantes's camp in company with Georgaki. He knew that many of his own officers were dissatisfied with his conduct, and he feared that, if he refused to justify himself voluntarily, they might have deserted his cause openly. He counted on the attachment of his soldiers, and the inferior officers of the Vallachian army, as a sufficient guarantee for his personal safety. Though cruel and selfish, he was not an adept in treachery and falsehood, and his conscience reproached him for intriguing with the Turks when he listened to the language of truth and honour, simply and frankly uttered by Georgaki, whom he had always admired and respected. He felt that he had violated his duty to his country, which probably affected him far more than any violation of his oath to the Hetairists.

Hypsilantes still lingered at Tergovisht when Vladi-

miresko was brought before him. Though himself A. D. 1821. meditating the treachery of abandoning his followers, he reproached the Vallachian chief for his treachery to the Hetairia in rude and opprobrious language. Vladimiresko retorted that he had served his country better than his accusers, and excused his correspondence with the Turks, by asserting that the intrigues of Savas had compelled him to countermine that officer. Instead of ordering Vladimiresko to be tried by a court-martial, Hypsilantes pretended to pardon him ; but two nights after he allowed some of his Greek partisans, who were the most determined enemies of Rouman nationality, to hurry the Vallachian chief out of the town, and to murder him with their swords and yataghans.¹ The incapacity of Hypsilantes prevented his deriving any advantage from this assassination, though it increased his little army by an addition of four thousand men, four pieces of artillery, a considerable supply of ammunition, and a well-filled military chest.

Savas, alarmed at finding that all his dealings with the Turks were known, quitted Hypsilantes with his whole force, and joined the Othoman troops.

The Hetairists were now in danger of being surrounded by three divisions of the Turkish army advancing from Bucharest, Giourgevo, and Widin. On the 8th of June the advanced guard from Bucharest engaged a body of Hetairists near Tergovisht, and both parties claimed the victory. Hypsilantes, however, moved off to Piteshti with such precipitation that he lost twelve waggons, laden with biscuit, and part of the baggage of his army, in the river Dimbovitza ; and one corps abandoned the line of march, and retreated to Kimpolunghi. The Othoman troops occupied Tergovisht, and the prince pursued his march northward to Rimnik. His movements were so evidently without

¹ Compare Gordon, i. 113 ; Tricoupi, i. 149 ; and Photeinos, 132.

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any military object, that his followers became persuaded that his own personal safety alone occupied his thoughts. After remaining three days at Rimnik, on the Olta, he resolved to attack a body of Turkish cavalry which had advanced from Kraïova and taken post at the village of Dragashan, about thirty miles from his camp. The force under his command amounted to four thousand infantry, twenty-five hundred cavalry, and four guns.

On the 19th of June 1821, Prince Nicolas Hypsilantes, at the head of the sacred battalion, supported by Karavias, with five hundred cavalry and four guns, took up a position before the Turkish post at Dragashan. Georgaki sent forward a strong body of Vlachian infantry to occupy the road to Kraïova, and thus cut off the retreat of the Turks. The revolutionists required rest, for they had made a long march over heavy ground wet with rain. Georgaki, who was the superior officer, resolved to attack the enemy next morning; and to prevent the Turks from escaping to Kraïova, he strengthened the Vlachian infantry with a body of horse. As soon as these arrangements were completed, he despatched an orderly to the headquarters of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, urging the commander-in-chief to hasten forward and secure the glory of the day. The envy of Karavias frustrated the prudence of Georgaki. He hated the Olympian, because in the hour of danger all men's eyes were turned on that gallant soldier, and he now resolved to rob him of what seemed to the less experienced Cephaloniat an easy victory. Karavias succeeded in persuading Nicolas Hypsilantes, who was as weak as his brother, to disobey the precise orders of their superior officer, and to advance with the sacred battalion and the artillery to attack the Turks, assuring him that, with the support of the cavalry, of which Karavia had five

hundred in advance, it would be easy to storm A. D. 1821.
Dragashan.

The Turkish force amounted to eight hundred men. Its officers were fully aware of their dangerous position, and were anxiously watching for an opportunity to escape, when they perceived the sacred battalion advance to attack them. They immediately saw that, if they could destroy it before it could receive succour, they might still succeed in effecting their retreat. The sacred battalion was composed of brave and enthusiastic youths, but their bodies were not hardened by active life, and they had not yet acquired the steady discipline of veterans. Wearied with a fatiguing march, and stiff with a short rest, they were suddenly formed, and led hurriedly forward to attack the enemy. The Turkish cavalry was drawn up, waiting an attack ; but it was carefully concealed behind the buildings of the village, which covered it from the fire of the artillery. When the moment was favourable, the Turks pounced from their concealment on the Greeks. Galloping furiously, with loud shouts, in the intervals between the companies, before the sacred battalion could form squares, they broke its order in a dozen places by a heavy fire of pistols and carbines. But though broken, the men behaved with courage ; and, true to their oath, they fell bravely fighting round their standard. Very different was the conduct of Karavias and the cavalry ; they fled without crossing sabres with the Turks, and spread terror among the troops in the rear, by the exaggerated accounts they gave of the Othoman forces, as an excuse for their cowardly behaviour.

Georgaki, after terminating all his arrangements for the morrow, was preparing to take some rest when he heard the sound of guns. Assembling a few officers, and placing himself at the head of his own veteran

troopers, he galloped to the field, and, by an impetuous charge on the dispersed Turks, recovered the standard of the sacred battalion, and recaptured two guns. The Othoman cavalry soon rallied, and, securing two of the guns they had captured, and about forty prisoners, they prepared to attack Georgaki, who was obliged to retire, after saving about one hundred men of the sacred battalion, and forming a rear-guard to protect the Greek army, which was seized with a panic. The Vallachians, on the road to Kraïova, dispersed, each man seeking his own home. This trifling engagement terminated the military career of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes. He was about nine miles in the rear when he received the first news of his defeat, and he fled without delay to Rimnik, where he was soon followed by his brother Nicolas and the other fugitives.¹

Hypsilantes now began to fear that the Hetairists, and some of those who had followed his fortunes without being allowed to enter his apartments by the "sacred staircase," which he reserved for his friends and the dignitaries of his court,² would detain him in Vallachia by force, in order to negotiate for their common safety. He had, however, resolved to make his escape with his own suite into Austria; and to effect this object, he resorted to his usual system of deceit and falsehood. It is even said that he forged letters, announcing that the Emperor of Austria had declared war with the sultan, and that the general commanding in Transylvania desired to hold a conference with Prince Hypsilantes on the frontier. It is certain that he communicated this news to those about him, and ordered public rejoicings in his camp to celebrate the event.

¹ An idea of the different accounts of the affair of Dragashan which were circulated among the Greeks, may be formed by comparing Gordon, i. 120, and Tricoupi, i. 153, with Photeinos, 153.

² Photeinos, 137, mentions the dissatisfaction which this "sacred staircase" caused among the Greek officers who were not phanariots.

He even carried his hypocrisy so far as to order a solemn service of thanksgiving to God to be celebrated in the church of Kosia, amidst repeated volleys of musketry.¹ Under cover of this trick, he escaped with his two brothers and a few of his personal friends to the Austrian territory, on the 26th of June. With his usual fatuity and presumption, he promised the troops whom he abandoned, that he would send an aide-de-camp to conduct them to the quarters assigned to them in Austria, in virtue of the arrangements he had concluded. But as soon as this wretched adventurer found himself in safety, he issued an order of the day, to which he affixed a false date, as if it had been written at Rimnik. In this document he heaps insulting accusations on the Greeks and Roumans, who had supported his cause, naming several as fools, traitors, and cowards, and speaking of his own exploits with bombastic self-gratulation.²

The flight of Hypsilantes was the last scene of the drama enacted by the Philiké Hetairia in the principalities, where its machinations succeeded, by the rash ambition of its supreme head and the utter incapacity of its members, in bringing great calamities on the people, and in laying the foundations of an anti-Greek feeling, which has ended in depriving the Greeks of all political power in those provinces.

The fate of Hypsilantes hardly deserves to be recorded. Austria treated him as a Russian deserter, and would readily have surrendered him to be tried

¹ Compare Gordon, i. 122, and Tricoupi, i. 157.

² Tricoupi, i. 158, and Philemon, *Greek Revolution*, ii. 184, give what is doubtless a correct version; but Photeinos, 160, publishes another text, which appears to have circulated in Vallachia, where he wrote. The difference, though verbally great, does not alter the sense. Philemon conceals the fact that the date is false. On the 8th (20th) June, Hypsilantes was not at Rimnik, but within the Austrian frontier. The individuals named were probably deserving of blame, but surely their leader, who abandoned his own soldiers, was not entitled to reproach them. For dates, the books of the Austrian police are a better authority than the writings of Hypsilantes.

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and shot by a Russian court-martial, had the Emperor Alexander felt the slightest wish to make a military example. But as the emperor had no wish to punish one whom he considered sufficiently punished by the disgraceful issue of his enterprise, he conveyed an intimation to the Austrian government, that the prince would be left at its disposal. Austria, always hostile to revolutions, and irritated by the reports which Hypsilantes had spread of her having declared war with the sultan, retained him as a prisoner until the year 1827. He was then released, and died at Vienna in the following year. The public career of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes offers not one single virtuous or courageous deed on which the historian can dwell with satisfaction. He was a contemptible leader, and a worthless man.

The traitor Savas was disappointed of his reward. He was invited to Bucharest by the pasha of Silistria, and when he waited to receive wealth and honour for his devotion to the sultan, he was beheaded for having connived at the treason of the Hetairists.

In Moldavia, the sultan's authority was re-established without difficulty. As soon as the boyards heard that Russia disclaimed all connection with the Hetairists, they deposed Michael Soutzos, who fled to Russia, without making an effort to uphold the cause in which he had embarked. But a Greek named Peutedekas, who had been deputed by Hypsilantes to direct the administration and forward supplies to the army, arriving at Yassi shortly after the flight of the deposed hospodar, assembled a few troops, and took possession of the government in defiance of the boyards. Prince George Cantacuzenos, who came to Moldavia from Hypsilantes's army, because he pretended to have it in his power to draw supplies of money and provisions from his estates in Bessarabia, acted as lieutenant-

general. He stationed himself near the Russian frontier, and when the Othoman troops entered Yassi on the 25th of June, he deserted his troops, and placed his own person in security by crossing the Pruth. A. D. 1821.

The only military exploits of the Greeks in the principalities, were those which were performed after the commander-in-chief had escaped into Austria, and his lieutenant-general into Russia. The officers, who had retired to Skuleni with Cantacuzenos, refused to follow him in his flight over the Pruth. They declared that they had sworn to defend the cause to the last, and that they could not abandon it without a battle, in which there was always a chance of victory for brave men. They said that it was no disgrace for civilians to retire from the dangerous position they occupied, but military honour commanded soldiers to remain. The lieutenant-general paid no attention to their observations.

About four hundred men, Greeks, Albanians, and Servians, intrenched themselves, as well as the time and their means allowed, at Skuleni, on the banks of the Pruth, where they were attacked on the 29th of June by a strong body of Othoman troops, who brought up six guns to play on their camp. Nothing could surpass the valour with which the Christians defended their position. The Turks made several attempts to storm it under cover of the fire of their artillery, but were repulsed. Their grape-shot and rifles, however, gradually thinned the numbers of their enemies. Russian officers who viewed the engagement from the left bank of the Pruth, declared that the Greeks behaved like veteran troops. At last the number of the defenders became insufficient to man the intrenchments. The Othomans redoubled their assaults, the fire of their guns was concentrated on one point, and a body of cavalry, covered by a round of grape from the artillery

and a heavy fire of musketry, charged over the earth-works into the midst of the camp. Those who were not killed on the spot plunged into the river, and many gained the Russian bank in safety. This gallant affair at Skuleni terminated the Revolution in Moldavia.

The Turks, after their victory at Dragashan, occupied all Little Vallachia, where order was easily established. Most of the Hetairists in the principality escaped over the Austrian frontier, but a few bands of irregulars retreated eastward through Vallachia, attempting to reach Moldavia, from whence they expected to gain the Russian frontier. Georgaki was one of those who refused to follow the example of Hypsilantes. Collecting a number of determined men, who resolved neither to owe their lives to Austrian protection nor to Turkish mercy, he proposed to fight his way to the Russian frontier. Once in Russia, he had no doubt that he would soon find means to transport himself and his companions to Greece, where he now learned that the battle of freedom could alone be fought. He was joined by a Macedonian captain, named Pharmaki, who was at the head of two hundred and fifty men.

The two chiefs were surrounded by the Turks long before they could gain even the Moldavian frontier, for the indiscipline and misconduct of Hypsilantes's troops, and the exactions of the Hetairists in levying contributions, had created a feeling of animosity in the breasts of the Rouman population. The consequence of this was that the Turkish officers were accurately informed by the peasantry of every movement of Georgaki and Pharmaki, while those leaders could obtain no information concerning the position and movements of the Turkish troops. After many almost incredible marches and hairbreadth escapes, the Greek chiefs were at last completely surrounded by their enemies, and blockaded in the monastery of Seko. All provisions

were cut off ; every road was barricaded, and no possibility of escape remained. The Turks offered terms of capitulation, which were rejected. Georgaki occupied a belfry, which stood at a short distance from the principal building. With a few soldiers he defended the entrance of the monastery, but the upper part of the belfry tower being of wood, was set on fire, and its garrison had no choice but to rush through a heavy fire of the enemy to gain the main building, to perish in the flames, or to surrender at discretion : what really occurred in the belfry is not known with certainty. Georgaki had repeatedly declared, as danger became more and more imminent, that he would never submit to the Turks. It is certain that he threw open the door of the belfry, and invited all who wished to escape to run as quickly as possible to the monastery. Immediately after, the powder-chest exploded. One man only escaped.¹

Pharmaki defended the monastery for a fortnight, until both his provisions and ammunition were exhausted. The Turks were extremely anxious to make a few prisoners, and after a long negotiation, they persuaded Pharmaki to surrender with about twenty men on the 4th October. Thirty-three Greeks who refused to trust the promises of the Turkish officers, that their lives would be spared, escaped on the night previous to the surrender, and gained the Austrian frontier. Whatever promises were made by the Turkish officers, were as usual disclaimed by the sultan as soon as his enemies were in his power. The soldiers were put to death as soon as an order for their execution could arrive from Bucharest. Pharmaki was sent to Constantinople, where he was tortured and then beheaded.

Thus terminated this ill-judged attempt to make a Greek revolution in foreign provinces, without offering

¹ Tricoupi, i. 166. Philemon, *Greek Revolution*, ii. 208.

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to the native population any guarantee for a better administration of justice, or any prospect of increasing the liberties of the nation. The Roumans, long oppressed by their phanariot princes, had strong reasons for detesting the enterprise, which, if successful, seemed likely to render the Greek domination in the principalities perpetual, by placing them under the powerful protection of Russia. Fortunately both for the Roumans and the Greeks, their nationalities escaped that strangulation which would have been the inevitable effect of the rapid extension of Russian power in European Turkey at this period. Unfortunately the conduct of Hyspialantes and the Hetairists sullied the national character of the Greeks with a deep stain, which was only partially effaced by the noble conduct of the troops at Skuleni and the patriotic devotion of Georgaki. It was reserved for the native land of the Hellenic race to prove that Greece could still arm heroes in her cause.

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION IN GREECE.

“ Ἐμοὶ δ’ ἀγὼν ὅδ’ οὐκ ἀφρόντιστος πάλαι
Νείκης παλαιᾶς ἦλθε, σὺν χρόνῳ γε μὴν.
Ἔστηκε δ’ ἐνθ’ ἔπαισ’ ἐπ’ ἐξειργασμένοις.
Οὕτω δ’ ἔπραξα, καὶ τὰδ’ οὐκ ἀνήσομαι
Ὡς μήτε φεύγειν μήτ’ ἀμύνεσθαι μόρον.”

Αἰσχύλου Ἀγαμέμνων, 1377-1381.

“ What I did, I did

Not with a random inconsiderate blow,
But from old hate, and well matured by time.
Here, where I struck, I take my rooted stand
Upon the finished deed. The blow so given,
Was with wise forethought so by me devised
That flight was hopeless, and defence was vain.”

Professor Blackie's Translation of Eschylus.

EXTERMINATION OF THE TURKS IN GREECE—PREPARATIONS OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT—OPERATIONS OF THE HETAIRISTS IN THE MOREA—THE ARCHIMANDRITE, GREGORIOS DIKAIOS—ATTEMPT OF PRIMATES TO DEFER THE INSURRECTION—HOSTAGES SUMMONED TO TRIPOLITZA BY THE TURKS—WARNING LETTER FORGED BY THE GREEKS—FIRST INSURRECTIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE PELOPONNESUS—TURKS AT KALAVRYTA SURRENDER, AND ARE MURDERED—CHARACTER OF PETROBEY—TAKING OF KALAMATA, AND FIRST *TE DEUM* FOR VICTORY—OUTBREAK AT PATRAS—EXTERMINATION OF THE MOHAMMEDAN POPULATION IN GREECE—CHARACTER AND BIOGRAPHY OF THEODORE KOLOKOTRONES—HIS PRAYER AT CHRYSOVITZI—REVOLUTION AT SALONA, AND CHARACTER OF PANOURIAS—SALONA AND LIVADEA TAKEN—CHARACTER OF DIAKOS—MURDER OF MOHAMMEDANS—ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS BESIEGED—REVOLUTION AT MESOLONGHI—VRACHORI TAKEN, AND TURKS AND JEWS MASSACRED—REVOLUTION IN THE ISLANDS—OLIGARCHY AND SYSTEM OF TRADE AT HYDRA—SPETZAS FIRST PROCLAIMS THE REVOLUTION—PSARA FOLLOWS—INSURRECTION AT HYDRA HEADED BY ECONOMOS—FIRST CRUISE OF THE GREEK FLEET—MURDER OF THE SHEIK-EL-ISLAM—FALL OF ECONOMOS—OTTOMAN FLEET QUITS THE DARDANELLES—GREEKS PREPARE FIRE-SHIPS—TURKISH LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS BURNED OFF MITTYLENE—KYDONIES SACKED BY THE GREEKS—SQUADRON UNDER MIAOULIS ON WESTERN COAST OF GREECE.

It would require Shakespeare's richness of language to give adequate expression to the intensity of passion with which the modern Greeks rose to destroy the power of their Othoman masters.

In the month of April 1821, a Mussulman population, amounting to upwards of twenty thousand souls, was living, dispersed in Greece, employed in agriculture. Before two months had elapsed the greater part was slain—men, women, and children were murdered without mercy or remorse. Old men still point to heaps of stones, and tell the traveller, "There stood the pyrgos (tower) of Ali Aga, and there we slew him, his harem, and his slaves;" and the old man walks calmly on to plough the fields which once belonged to Ali Aga, without a thought that any vengeful fury can attend his path. The crime was a nation's crime, and whatever perturbations it may produce must be in a nation's conscience, as the deeds by which it can be expiated must be the acts of a nation.

The feeling that a great social convulsion was at hand became general both among the Mussulman and Christian population of the Morea towards the end of 1820. The prolonged resistance of Ali Pasha persuaded every class that a revolution was inevitable, yet both Mussulmans and Christians carefully avoided every act tending to accelerate the outbreak. Each party seemed to be waiting for a signal from a distance.

The Greeks were unwarlike. The Turks were dispersed over the country in single families or in small towns, and without local leaders. Both parties habitually postponed adopting a decisive line of conduct. Procrastination is quite as characteristic of Greek bishops and primates as of Turkish pashas and agas. The Greeks expected aid from Russia—the Turks looked to the sultan for orders and for assistance. The Greeks, who were preparing for a revolution, formed no magazines of provisions, and collected no military stores. The Turks, who deemed an insurrection of the Christians inevitable, neglected to repair their for-

tresses, lay up stores of provisions, and fill the cisterns with water in the strong castles scattered over the face of the country, which were capable of being rendered impregnable to insurgents without discipline and without artillery. A. D. 1820.

During the summer of 1820, however, Sultan Mahmud was so much alarmed by the reports he received concerning the state of the Christian population in Greece, that he sent an officer to the Morea, with orders to put the principal fortresses in a state of defence. With the exception of Tripolitza, all these fortresses were situated on the sea-coast, and in all there was a Mussulman population accustomed to bear arms. They might all have been repaired and provisioned simultaneously; but the Turks considered that their fleet could bring succour at any time, and the armed Mussulmans were confident that no Christian subject of the Porte would dare to meet them in the field. The sultan's order was not carried into execution, though it is possible that he believed the contrary.

In the month of November 1820, Khurshid Pasha arrived in the Morea, with strict orders to watch the machinations of the Greeks and the intrigues of the Russian consular agents. He reported that in his pashalik there was no immediate danger of any disturbance; and the sultan, finding that Ismael was conducting the operations against Ali Pasha with great incapacity, instructed Khurshid to take the command of the army before Joannina, and leave a deputy to govern the Morea during his absence. Khurshid quitted Tripolitza in January 1821, leaving Mehemet Salik as his kaimakam, a young man of an arrogant disposition and no military experience. The garrison of Tripolitza was soon after strengthened by a reinforcement of a thousand Albanians.

The Philiké Hetairia had made more progress in the

Morea than in the other parts of Greece. Many of the higher clergy, the primates, and the men possessing local influence, had been initiated during the years 1819 and 1820; but the misconduct of some of the travelling agents, or apostles (as they were called), and the imprudence with which they admitted crowds of members, in order to receive fees, frightened the primates. Their distrust in the direction of the society was increased by an order to remit all the pecuniary contributions collected in Greece to the treasury at Constantinople. The impolicy of this order, at a time when it was a matter of the greatest urgency to collect stores in the mountains of Greece, where the Turks could hardly watch, and would be unable to control, the movements of the people, was so apparent that the Moreot Hetairists determined to establish a local treasury, and to investigate the mystery in which the direction of the society was enveloped. An active correspondence was carried on between the Hetairists in Greece and those in Constantinople and Russia, through the agency of the Russian consulate at Patras, which insured both secrecy and safety. In the autumn of 1820 the Moreots were informed that Prince Alexander Hypsilantes had assumed the supreme direction of the Hetairia, and that seven local ephors were appointed to conduct the business of the society in Greece. A local treasury was also constituted under the control of the ephors. This appears to have been the wisest measure ever adopted by the supreme direction, and it was forced on it by the common sense of the Moreot Hetairists. The conspiracy in Greece was now fully organised. Germanos, the Metropolitan Bishop of Patras, who has left memoirs of the Greek Revolution, was the most distinguished member among the ephors.¹

¹ *Ἱστορικά μνημόνια περὶ τῆς Ἐπανάστασεως τῆς Ἑλλάδος.* Ἀθήναι, 1837.

The confidence of the Greek Hetairists in the judgment of Prince Alexander Hypsilantes was soon shaken by the conduct of one of his agents. The most active apostle of the supreme direction in the Morea at this time was the Archimandrite, Gregorios Dikaïos, commonly called Pappa Phlesas, a most unclerical priest, but a bold conspirator. The licentious conduct, the carelessness of truth, and the wasteful expenditure of this man, rendered him unfit for any secret business where prudence was required. The Archbishop of Patras accuses him of shameful dishonesty, declaring in his *Memoirs* that the archimandrite sold eighty barrels of gunpowder, which were sent from Smyrna to Poros shortly before the outbreak of the Revolution.¹ Pappa Phlesas spent the money in riotous living and travelling; and wherever he went he announced that Russia would soon declare war with Turkey, and send an army to deliver Greece from the Othoman yoke. To his intimate associates he revealed the plan of the "Grand Project," which included the assassination of the sultan and the conflagration of Constantinople as a part of its programme. In the state of affairs in Greece, neither the discourses nor the financial co-operation of such an agent could do any good. Yet this man, with all his vices, proved that he possessed both patriotism and courage by his honourable death. After inflicting many deep wounds on political morality by his shameless peculations, and on the orthodox Church by his barefaced profligacy, he fell on the field of battle, fighting gallantly to arrest the progress of Ibrahim Pasha, as will be recorded in a future page.

It is difficult for those who travel from London to Constantinople in a week, to form any idea of the difficulty of obtaining information which existed in the

¹ Pp. 9, 22.

East during the first thirty years of the present century. Little could be learned with accuracy concerning the events that happened in the nearest province, and the wildest reports were circulated, and obtained credence even among men of education. Newspapers were unknown, and private correspondents had rarely access to authentic sources of information. The Hetairists, therefore, found all men ready to believe their wildest assertions. We need not therefore be surprised to find that, in the Morea, the Greeks were universally persuaded that a Russian fleet would appear in the Mediterranean in the spring of 1821, and land an army to expel the Turks from Greece. The confidence inspired by this conviction was so great, that the primates deemed it necessary to adopt some precautions to allay the popular effervescence. They felt that they were exposed to become the victims of the precautionary measures which the Othoman government habitually adopted to prevent insurrections. They feared that they should be suddenly arrested, and carried off to Tripolitza as hostages for the tranquillity of their countrymen.

The Turks heard the reports which were current, and were quite as much alarmed as the primates. They called on the kaimakam at Tripolitza to take measures for preventing an insurrection of the Christians. At this crisis the leading Hetairists in the country round Patras held a meeting at Vostitza, the ancient Ægium, in the month of February 1821, to decide on the course they ought to pursue. The assembly was a revival of the Achaian League. Many bishops and primates were present. Pappa Phlesas attended the meeting, and when urged to be more cautious in his proceedings, he ridiculed the terror of the primates, persisted in his assertion that Russian aid was at hand, and pleaded the commands of Hypsilantes as

his authority for urging on the people. The principal members of the assembly resolved to imprison him in a monastery, but no one ventured to arrest the impetuous priest. At last the meeting decided on sending two messengers to obtain accurate information concerning the projects of the supreme direction of the Hetairia, and the nature of the support it was to receive from the Russian government. One of these messengers was sent to Ignatius, the Archbishop of Aota, who was living at Pisa in Tuscany, and who was supposed to be well acquainted with the intentions of the Russian cabinet. The other was deputed to confer with Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, and ascertain the real extent of his military preparations. The agents of the supreme direction had already fixed the 6th of April as the day on which the Revolution was to break out simultaneous in every province and city of the Othoman empire in which the Greeks were numerous. The assembly of Vostitza now decided that in the Morea the outbreak should be adjourned until the ephors received answers to their communications from Ignatius and Hypsilantes.

Matters had already gone too far for the people to stop at the beck of the bishops and the primates. No fears for the personal safety of a few could now damp the general enthusiasm. The Hetairists at Vostitza did not entirely neglect to prepare for the Revolution which they wished to delay. They raised among themselves the sum of £2000 sterling by a private subscription, and they deputed several monks of Megaspelaion to collect money in order to purchase arms and ammunition. But their counsels displayed more selfishness and timidity than was justified at a moment when even prudence dictated enthusiasm and boldness as the only safe policy. Indeed, it must be recorded here, as on many future occasions, that the Greek Revolu-

tion was emphatically the work of the people. The leaders generally proved unfit for the position they occupied, but the people never wavered in the contest. From the day they took up arms they made the victory of the orthodox church and the establishment of their national independence the great objects of their existence.

As soon as the kaimakam of Khurshid had received sufficient reinforcements, he summoned the principal members of the Greek clergy and the primates to a meeting at Tripolitza. He gave as a pretext for the assembly, that he wished to concert measures for counteracting the intrigues which Ali Pasha was carrying on among the Greek population, and which threatened to endanger public tranquillity. If the Greeks obeyed his summons, he resolved to detain them as hostages ; if they disobeyed, he believed that he was now strong enough to arrest and punish them.

The bishops and primates of the Morea usually met twice a-year at Tripolitza, to receive the communications of the Othoman government from the pasha, and concert concerning measures of taxation and police. The meeting at Vostitza having decided that no movement was to take place until the return of the messengers sent to Pisa and St Petersburg, several bishops and primates obeyed the orders of the kaimakam, hoping to deceive the Turks, for whose stupidity the Greeks have a great contempt, and expecting to obtain permission to return home before any general insurrection occurred. Others, however, did not consider it prudent to trust their persons in the hands of the Turks. Germanos, the Archbishop of Patras, the Bishop of Kernitza, and the primates of Patras, Vostitza, and Kalavryta, fearing lest the Turks had procured some evidence of their conspiracy, sought

pretexts for delaying their journey. Germanos was at A. D. 1821. last compelled to set off, but he halted at Kalavryta, where he was joined by several primates, and a plan was devised to gain more time. The metropolitan and his friends forged a letter purporting to be a warning from a friendly Turk at Tripolitza; for though they were ready to consign every Mussulman in Greece and Constantinople to destruction, they thought it natural enough that a Mussulman should have some feeling of humanity towards them. This forged letter declared that the kaimakam had resolved to put several Greeks of influence to death, in order to prevent a general insurrection of the Christians, by depriving the people of their leaders. It was contrived that this letter should be delivered after the party had quitted Kalavryta. The letter was read in the presence of servants and muleteers. The clergy and the primates affected the greatest terror. A consultation was held by the roadside, and the whole party set off to the monastery of St Laura.

The general opinion in Greece is, that on reaching the monastery of St Laura they proclaimed the Revolution. But this is not correct. They sought to allay the suspicions of the Turks of Kalavryta and Vostitza, by informing them of the receipt of the forged letter, and by asking them to guarantee their personal safety at Tripolitza. In the mean time, to avoid being arrested in a body, they dispersed, and each began to collect armed men for his defence. This was not difficult, as the apostles of the Hetairia had persisted in fixing the 6th of April as the day on which the Revolution was to commence.

Various acts of brigandage were committed, in the confidence that impunity would soon be secured. The Turks discovered that several mills recently repaired by the Greeks near Dimitzana were not destined

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to grind corn, but were actively employed in manufacturing gunpowder.

The first insurrectional movements took place at the end of March 1821. On the 25th, three Turkish couriers carrying letters from the kaimakam to Khurshid, which were supposed to contain a pressing demand for additional troops, were waylaid by the Hetairists, and slain at the village of Agridha, in the valley of the Krathis. On the following day, eight Albanian Mussulmans, engaged in collecting the haratch, were murdered, by a Hetairist of some local influence, near the lake of Phonia.¹ Soliotes, so called from being a native of the village of Soli, in the valley of the Krathis, after having murdered the haratch-collectors, increased his band to three hundred, and attacked sixty Albanian Mussulmans who had just landed at the khan of Akrata, and were on their way to join the ranks of their countrymen in garrison at Tripolitza. The Albanians were attacked at Bersova, and defended themselves vigorously. Twenty were killed, and the rest were compelled to lay down their arms.

The events connected with Germanos and the pri-

¹ Mr Tricoupi's account of the commencement of the Revolution in Achaia is sometimes inaccurate. As he rarely cites his authorities, he often takes the liberty of transcribing them when they are Greek, and of translating them literally when foreign. The event mentioned in the text affords an example. The Archbishop Germanos in his *Memoirs* writes thus, p. 16:—"Συγχρόνως άλλοι Καλαβρυτινοὶ ἐφονεύσαν δύο σπαχίδες Τριπολιτσιώτας εἰς τὰ χωρία τοῦ Λιβартζιού, καὶ πάλιν ἄλλοι εἰς τὸν φονεῖν τοὺς γυφτοχαρατσίδες." This Mr Tricoupi transcribes, i. 77, "Συγχρόνως ἐφονεύθησαν καὶ δύο Σπαῖδες Τριπολιτσῶται κατὰ το Λιβάρτσι, χωρίον τῶν Καλαβρύτων, Ἐφονεύθησαν καὶ τινες γυφτοχαρατσίδες ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ τῆς Κορινθίας φονιά." The word γυφτοχαρατσίδες proves the plagiarism. The archbishop uses the term, as the Greeks generally employed it, to mark contempt and hatred for the soldiers employed in collecting the haratch from the peasantry, as is mentioned above at page 22. In a grave historian the word gypsy-haratchers becomes vituperative personality, imputing bad character to excuse murder. Mr Tricoupi calls these affairs mere acts of brigandage (ληστρικὰ), but brigands do not select detachments of sixty well-armed Albanian mercenaries, on their way to seek service, with empty purses. Phrantzes and Speliades, *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, vol. i. p. 59, give a more correct account of these events.

Soliotes became an officer of some distinction, and his friends boasted that he was the first who shed Turkish blood during the Revolution in Greece.

mates of Achaia have often been cited as the first A. D. 1821. revolutionary movements. But the truth is, that the people, at the instigation of the Hetairists, took up arms boldly while their superiors were temporising. Asimaki Zaimes, the silent primate of Kalavryta, considering that his friends were carrying their evasions too far, endeavoured to force them to take a decided course by an act of brigandage.¹ He had several armed Christians in his service, and he sent two to waylay Seid Aga of Lalla, who was transporting a considerable sum of money. Kyr Asimaki thought that an act of highway robbery of this nature would put an end to the indecision of his countrymen. Seid Aga escaped from the ambushade, and carried his treasure to Tripolitza, where his report confirmed the prevailing rumours that the Greeks had taken up arms. The Mussulman rabble rose in tumult, and would have put to death the bishops and primates who had already arrived, had not the kaimakam saved them by lodging them in the house of the Hasnadar aga.

Arnaout-oglou, the voevode of Kalavryta, was on his way to Tripolitza when he heard of the attack on Seid Aga. He immediately turned back, and gave the alarm to the Mussulman population of Kalavryta. The Turks hastily collected their families and their most valuable movables in several large houses which appeared capable of defence ; for they were convinced that the long-talked-of insurrection of the Greeks had commenced. On the 2d of April the outbreak became general over the whole of the Morea. On that day many Turks were murdered in different places, and all communication by the great roads was cut off.

¹ Kyr Asimaki, as his countrymen called him, carried his silence so far that a modern Greek historian tells us that he often remained in society smoking his pipe for hours without uttering a single word. He was a counterpart, in the Oriental style, of the Laird of Dumbiedykes, whom the Duke of Argyll had seen thrice tipsy, and only heard speak once. The attack on Seid Aga was made on the 29th of March.

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On the 3d of April 1821, the Mussulmans of Kalabryta surrendered to the Greeks on receiving a promise of security. That promise was soon violated. About three hundred fell into the hands of the Greeks; and in the month of August, Colonel Raybaud found that the greater part of the men had then been murdered, and that the women and children were dispersed as slaves or domestic servants in the houses of the Greeks.¹ Arnaout-oglou, who was the representative of one of the wealthiest Mussulman families in the Morea, and who had lived on terms of intimacy and apparent friendship with several primates, was left in a state of abject destitution, while his former friends were members of the Greek government, and were wasting the revenues of their country in unseemly extravagance. He regained his liberty at an exchange of prisoners in 1825.

More decisive operations took place at the same time in Messenia. Petrobey of Maina, Theodore Kolokotrones, and Niketas, were the actors in these events. Theodore Kolokotrones and Anagnostaras, both celebrated chiefs of klephts, had returned secretly to the Morea, in order to prepare for the general insurrection. The Othoman authorities, hearing that they were lurking in Maina, sent a message to Petros Mavromichales, the bash-bog or bey, requesting him to arrest them. As Maina was under the jurisdiction of the capitain-pasha, and the bey acted as his lieutenant, the pasha of Morea could not do more than invite Petrobey's co-operation in the measures which it was resolved to adopt for the purpose of maintaining order among the Christians. The Turks entertained no doubt of Petrobey's fidelity. His rank was supposed to insure his

¹ *Mémoires sur la Grèce pour servir à l'Histoire de la Guerre de l'Indépendance.* Par Maxime Raybaud. 2 vols. Paris, 1824. Vol. i. p. 365. This work is one of the best on the early events of the Revolution.

attachment to the authority of the sultan, from which A. D. 1821. it was derived, and it was known that one of his brothers had embraced the Mohammedan religion, and risen to be a pasha.

Petrobey had been early initiated into the Hetairia. He was a restless, vain, bold, and ambitious man—lavish in expenditure, and urged to seek change by a constant want of money. He was deficient in ability, but more prompt to form courageous resolutions than most of his countrymen in high station. His frank, joyous disposition, and his numerous family of sons, brothers, and nephews, who were active and daring men, gave him great personal influence. He sent one of his sons to Tripolitza to allay any suspicions which the kaimakam might have adopted; but he continued to protect Kolokotrones and Anagnostaras, and to assist the machinations of the Hetairists. At this time another of Petrobey's sons was at Constantinople, where he resided as a hostage for his father's fidelity, according to the custom of the Turks. Both escaped to Maina, either through the negligence, the prudence, or the humanity of their guardians. Had Petrobey been a man of capacity, he might have placed himself at the head of the Greek Revolution, and rendered himself either the president of a Greek republic or the prince of a Greek state; but his habits of self-indulgence made him always sacrifice the future for the present. He neglected to make any political use of his great personal influence, and of the official authority he held among the warlike population of Maina.

The Hetairists had sent a supply of ammunition to be concealed in the recesses of Mount Taygetus. The voevode of Kalamata, hearing that bodies of armed Greeks had assembled on the flanks of the mountain towards Messenia, and that long trains of pack-horses

returned with heavy loads from the shore of Maina to the villages in his neighbourhood, considered that the insurrection was on the eve of breaking out. He called together the resident Turks, and they resolved to retire with their families to Tripolitza. It was already too late.

Murad, a Mussulman on friendly terms with the Christians, was the first who departed with all his family. He was stopped on the road by Niketas and slain. His widow and children were driven back to Kalamata. This happened on the 2d of April, and served as a signal for a general rising of the Christians in Messenia. In a few hours many Turkish families were surprised and murdered.

About noon on the following day, Kalamata was besieged by two thousand Greeks, led by Petrobey and Murzinos, another Maniat chief, and accompanied by Anagnostaras, Kolokotrones, and Niketas. On the 4th the place capitulated. The Turks received solemn promises that their lives would be protected, but these promises were given as a lure to prevent desperate men offering an obstinate resistance. The prisoners were soon dispersed among their captors to serve as domestic slaves, and before many months elapsed the men had all been slain. Phrantzes, an ecclesiastic and a Hetairist, but one of the most candid historians of this early period of the Revolution, owns, in the proverbial expression of Greece, that the moon devoured them.¹

On the 5th of April 1821, the first solemn service of the Greek Church was performed as a thanksgiving for the success of the Greek arms. The ceremony was on the banks of the torrent that flows by Kalamata. Twenty-four priests officiated, and five thousand armed men stood round. Never was *Te Deum* celebrated

¹ "Τὸς κατέφαγε τὸ φεγγάρι."—Phrantzes, i. 335.

with greater fervour, never did hearts overflow with A. D. 1821.
 sincerer devotion to Heaven, nor with warmer gratitude to their Church and their God. Patriotic tears poured down the cheeks of rude warriors, and ruthless brigands sobbed like children. All present felt that the event formed an era in Greek history ; and when modern Greece produces historians, artists, and poets, this scene will doubtless find a niche in the temple of fame.

Two days after this memorable celebration, Petrobey, as commander-in-chief of the first Greek army in the field, published a proclamation, in conjunction with a few primates who assumed the title of the Senate of Messenia. This document was addressed to all Christian nations : it declares that the Greeks were determined to throw off the Othoman yoke, and solicits the aid of Christendom in giving liberty to suffering Christians.¹

The Albanian Mussulmans of Bardunia abandoned their towers as soon as they heard of the murder of Murad Aga by Niketas. About sixty families fled to Monemvasia ; the others retired more leisurely to Tripolitza. They passed through Mistra on their way. The unwarlike Turks of that city were thrown into a state of frantic consternation by this retreat of the warlike Barduniots. The whole Mussulman population hastened away with their co-religionists ; and as they had no time to carry off their property, they deposited their most valuable movables in the houses of their Christian friends. The night was passed by the Turks in anguish, but by the Albanians in refreshing sleep. At daybreak, the well-mounted Albanians pursued their journey. They were followed by the Turks

¹ Gordon, i. 183, gives a translation, with the correct date, 9th April (28th March) 1821. Tricoupi, i. 368, gives the original, but the date is misprinted.

of Mistra who possessed horses, or had succeeded in purchasing or in hiring them during the night. But many families, old men, women, and children, lingered behind, and were murdered on the road. The population of Laconia was estimated at 110,000 Christians and 15,000 Mussulmans. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number murdered in attempting to escape to Monemvasia and Tripolitza, or surprised before they could quit their dwellings; but it was at the time supposed to amount to two-thirds of the whole.

The outbreak of the Revolution at Patras took place on the 4th of April. Hostilities were commenced by the Turks in consequence of the arrival of some fugitives from Kalavryta, and a party of Albanians from the Castle of Lepanto. On the 6th, numerous bodies of armed Greeks arrived, under the direction of the Archbishop Germanos and several other leaders. One party carried before its leader the heads of five Turks who had been murdered at Vostitza. On the following morning, divine service was performed by the archbishop; and all the Greeks assembled took an oath to deliver their country from the Turks, or die in the attempt. Enthusiasm was not wanting, but anarchy rendered it unavailing. The primates, the city population, and the Ionians, who hastened to take part in the contest, conducted their military operations with singular awkwardness and incapacity. They were unable to form an effectual blockade of the small citadel which overlooks the town, and the insurgents who attacked the Albanian Mussulmans of Lalla so mismanaged their movements that they allowed that small but warlike tribe to effect their retreat to Patras. This addition to the garrison of the citadel saved that fortress at the commencement of the Revolution, and the Turks found means to keep possession of it during the whole war.

The Greeks soon gathered in considerable numbers A. D. 1821. on the hills round all the fortresses held by the Turks, and endeavoured to cut off their communications with the surrounding country. They were still unable to meet their enemies in the field. On the 11th of April they suffered a defeat near Karitena, and on the 15th a still more serious rout at Patras. But their determination to prosecute a mortal combat was in no way diminished by these checks.

In the mean time the Christian population had attacked and murdered the Mussulman population in every part of the peninsula. The towers and country houses of the Mussulmans were burned down, and their property was destroyed, in order to render the return of those who had escaped into fortresses hopeless. From the 26th of March until Easter Sunday, which fell, in the year 1821, on the 22d of April, it is supposed that from ten to fifteen thousand souls perished in cold blood, and that about three thousand farmhouses or Turkish dwellings were laid waste.

The fury of slaves who rend their bonds, and the fanaticism of religious hatred, have in all ages hurried men to the perpetration of execrable cruelties. Homer told his countrymen that slavery robs man of one-half of his humanity ; and three thousand years have not made men much better, though they have made Greeks a good deal worse than they were then. The extermination of the Turks by the Greeks in the rural districts was the result of a premeditated design. It proceeded more from the vindictive suggestions of Hetairists and men of letters, than from the revengeful feelings of the people, or the innate barbarity of the klephts. Most of the historians of the Greek Revolution have recoiled from recording the crimes which the people perpetrated, but a nation's cause is best served by writing its history in the spirit of Thucydides and Tacitus.

The Hetairists were generally civilians; of the apostles few became military leaders. They were men in a secondary social position; and, like men who believe that their merits have been overlooked, they were irritable and violent. Destitute of the generous courage and the warm feelings that would have enabled them to lead their countrymen to battle, they employed all their eloquence to instil the fiercest desire of vengeance in every Greek breast. It was their policy to render peace impossible by what they called baptising the Revolution in blood. They awakened implacable hostilities, and left it to others to find the means of gaining victories. In a mortal struggle, they believed that the cause of the Christians was sure of ultimate success. They inculcated the necessity of exterminating every Turk, because the Turkish population in Greece was small, and could not be renewed. They knew that the Greeks were far too numerous to be exterminated by the Turks, even should Turkey produce a Mussulman Philiké Hetairia. The slaughter of men, women, and children was therefore declared to be a necessary measure of wise policy, and popular songs spoke of the Turks as a race which ought to disappear from the face of the earth.¹

The military incapacity of the Hetairists and primates threw the conduct of the war into the hands of the chiefs of klephts. This was a sad misfortune for the nation, as it perpetuated a state of anarchy in the army of Greece during the whole of the Revolution. The military system that prevailed in the Morea will be best described by giving an account of the career of

¹ A song in everybody's mouth at this time, said—

“Τοῦρκος μὴ μέλῃ 'ς τὸν Μωρὸν
Μηδὲ 'ς τὸν κόσμον ὅλον.”

Phrantzes, ii. 377, note, mentioning that the Moreot Turks were useful to Ibrahim Pasha as guides when he invaded the Morea, remarks, “ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οἱ Ἕλληνες εἶχον δίκαιον νὰ μὴ ἀφίσωσι ζῶντα ποδάρι, ἐκ τῶν Πελοποννησίων Ὀθωμανῶν”—a strong opinion for a Christian priest.

a distinguished leader. Theodore Kolokotrones offers A. D. 1821.
 the best type of the class. He became the head of a considerable political party ; he has left memorials that throw considerable light on his personal character and conduct ; and general attention was so long fixed on his proceedings that he can already be tried before the great tribunal of public opinion.¹

Theodore Kolokotrones was fifty years old at the commencement of the Revolution. Age had somewhat tamed the violence of his passions without lessening his personal vigour, and both his physical and mental qualities fitted him to be a leader of irregular bands. A large head, a bold countenance, a steady eye, and a profusion of black hair, gave some dignity to an aspect that did not conceal looks of cunning and ferocity. His powerful frame exceeded the middle size, and his voice had the volume of sound required in mountain warfare. He possessed constitutional good health, and that self-complacency which produces habitual good-nature. His manners had a degree of roughness well suited to conceal his natural cunning ; and he had adopted an appearance of boisterous frankness as a veil for his watchful duplicity. He possessed a persuasive style of discourse, and by selecting common popular phrases he gave pointed expression to his sound sense, and rendered his speeches more effective by their contrast with the Hellenic affectation of his lettered rivals. He was orator enough to lead his audience to a desired conclusion by a well-told fable, and to misguide their passions by a cleverly-selected apophthegm. But with these good qualities he had many defects. Nurtured as a brigand, he could never distinguish very clearly right from wrong, justice from injustice ; and he had an instinctive aversion to order and law. His patriotism was selfish, and his occasional acts of magnani-

¹ Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φυλῆς ἀπὸ 1770 ἕως 1836.

mity cannot efface the memory of his egoistical ambition and sordid avarice during the period of his greatest power. He received from nature a clear intellect and a hard heart, and his education and experience in life corrupted without enlarging his feelings.

The family of Kolokotrones followed the profession of arms from the time the Othomans conquered the Morea in 1715, acting alternately as local police-guards and brigands. When the capitan-pasha Hassan Ghazi subdued the Albanians and re-established order in 1779, the father of Kolokotrones was compelled to seek refuge in Maina, where he was slain by a detachment of Turkish troops in the following year.

The young Kolokotrones was nurtured among the civil broils of the Maniats ; but at the age of fifteen he settled in the district of Sambazika, on the northern slope of Mount Taygetus, and at twenty he married the daughter of the proëstos of Leondari. For seven years he lived on his wife's property, acting generally as one of the rural guards of the district. But the peasants observed that he was a man of the musket, and not of the plough. He was frequently accused of poaching in the sheepfolds of the neighbouring villages, and at last some acts of brigandage against the Greek cultivators of Emblakika (the Stenyklerian plain) caused the pasha of the Morea to give orders for his arrest. This decided his fate. At the age of twenty-seven he became a brigand by profession.

For nine years he lived an irregular life, sometimes supporting himself by robbery, and sometimes sheltering himself from the vengeance of his enemies by taking service as a local guard with some primate or abbot of a monastery. But the Greek peasantry of the Morea were at last so tormented by the rapacity and cruelty of the klephts that they invited the Turks to assist in hunting them down, and both primates and

monasteries were obliged to abandon the brigands to their fate. Dadwell, during his travels, witnessed some of the operations by which the klephts were destroyed.¹ Several members of Kolokotrones's family were slain. The bands were all broken up, and Theodore Kolokotrones, finding that there was no safety for him even in Maina, fled to the Ionian Islands in 1806. In his *Memoirs* he complains of the suffering caused by the filth of long-worn garments as rivalling the pangs of hunger.² Those who have seen a Greek army at the end of a summer campaign with unwashed fustinellos, must feel some surprise at this declaration on the part of a brigand.

When Kolokotrones escaped to Zante, the Ionian Islands were under the joint protection of Russia and Turkey; but the Russians protected the brigand, though the enemy of their ally. During the war which broke out between Russia and Turkey soon after, Kolokotrones cruised in what he called a privateer, and others a pirate boat; but falling in with two Othoman ships, he was in danger of terminating his career at the yard-arm, when an English frigate, heaving accidentally in sight, saved him. England was then at war with Turkey, and the frigate (the Sea Horse) immediately engaged the Turks, and enabled Kolokotrones to sheer off.

In the year 1808 he performed the exploit which added most to his reputation as a military chief. Ali Pharmaki, the most powerful aga of Lalla, was attacked by Veli Pasha of the Morea. The fathers of Ali Pharmaki and of Theodore Kolokotrones had formed an alliance of brotherhood during the troubled times which preceded and followed the victory of Hassan Ghazi. Ali and Theodore had never met, but so many reciprocal services had been rendered by daring klephts and

¹ *Travels in Greece*, ii. 353, 372.

² *Διηγήσεις*, 29.

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turbulent Lalliots, that the tie of brotherhood was the strongest obligation on the honour of a klepht. The power of Veli Pasha, and still more that of his father Ali Pasha, the old lion of Joannina, intimidated the Albanian Mussulmans, and Ali Pharmaki could not find a single ally. His tower at Lalla was on the point of being besieged, and his own followers and relations were insufficient to defend it. He remembered his family alliance with Kolokotrones; and as a last resource he sent to Zante to claim the assistance due by their fathers' ties of brotherhood. Kolokotrones recognised the obligation as a sacred duty, even though urged by a Mussulman, for the partisans of orthodox Russia had not then inflated the bigotry of the Greeks to the degree of rendering religion an apology for the violation of every principle of private morality and national honour. Kolokotrones collected sixteen good soldiers among his ancient companions, and hastened to shut himself up with Ali Pharmaki in his tower at Lalla. Veli attacked the place without artillery, and was repulsed. He then wasted several weeks in blockading it, but the local chieftains and his Albanian mercenaries were more anxious to prolong the contest than to capture Ali Pharmaki, so that the besieged found opportunities of renewing their supplies of provisions and ammunition. The discontent of a powerful party in his own camp at last compelled Veli to make peace with Ali Pharmaki, who, however, insisted as a condition of his submission that Kolokotrones and all his followers should be allowed to return to Zante in safety. The honourable conduct of Kolokotrones on this occasion gained him a high reputation among the Mussulmans, as well as among the Christians in Greece.

After the Ionian Islands were ceded to France, Kolokotrones kept up his connection with the Morea, and became a dealer in cattle, which were imported in con-

siderable numbers for the use of the troops. When A. D. 1821. the English took possession of Zante in 1810, he entered their service. He was almost forty years of age, and as he had no sympathy with the English character nor with British policy, his conduct was entirely guided by his personal interests. He received high pay from England, and the improvement of his social position enabled him to carry on his intrigues in the Morea with more effect. His reason and his prejudices alike taught him to regard Russia as the only sincere ally of Greece and the only irreconcilable enemy of Turkey, which the Greeks generally are very apt to consider as one and the same thing. Kolokotrones entered the English service as a captain, and was present at the assault of Santa Maura, where the Greek regiment gained no laurels. He was subsequently promoted to the rank of major, but his military service gave him no tincture of military knowledge, and he remained ignorant of tactics and insensible of the value of discipline. After the peace, he remained two years on the staff, drawing pay and doing nothing. He was then reduced, and returned to his old profession of a cattle-dealer.

The Russians had not overlooked his talents, and he was connected with all the projects formed under Russian auspices to prepare for insurrections against the Turks. He was early initiated into the secrets of the Hetairia.

On the 15th of January 1821 he left Zante to join those who were preparing for the outbreak. Landing at Kardamyle, in Maina, he remained concealed in the house of Murzinos, one of the most powerful chieftains on the coast, waiting the signal for the general rising of the Christians. It has been mentioned that he was present at the taking of Kalamata. On the 6th of April he quitted the Maniats, in Messenia, to seek an

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independent sphere of action at Karitena. His band consisted of 300 men, but of these only thirty were under his own immediate command. He assumed, however, the chief direction; and, on his march through the plain of Leondari, he ordered all the peasants to take up arms, enforcing his orders with threats to burn the dwellings of the tardy. He passed the ruins of Megalopolis, repeating the name of Epaminondas. But he knew nothing of the personal virtues and profound tactics of that great man; nor, had he known them, would he probably have felt a wish to imitate them, though the peculiar circumstances in which Greece was placed rendered those virtues and that science the qualities best adapted to make their possessor the hero of the Revolution, and to insure its speedy success.

Karitena was soon invested by 6000 men, but on the 11th of April a corps of 500 Turkish cavalry from Tripolitza attacked and dispersed this force, which was destitute of order. Kolokotrones was compelled to escape with such precipitation that he lost his rifle, and reached Chrysovitzi alone. A small church of the Panaghia stands at the entrance of the village. He entered it, and prayed for the deliverance of Greece with a fervour that remained impressed on his mind to his dying day. In the enthusiasm of his devotion he imagined that he received a revelation announcing that his prayers were granted, and he rose reanimated, and with all his vigour restored. Kolokotrones was too brave to conceal the circumstances of his flight, and too much of a veteran to complain of a panic among young soldiers; but the facility with which he saw 6000 armed men dispersed by 500 cavalry inspired him with a great contempt for the courage of the peasantry. This contempt became very prevalent among the military classes during the Revolution,

though it was as unjust as it was impolitic. But most A. D. 1821.
of the captains and soldiers attributed the successes of the Christians, often very erroneously, to the stratagems of brigands and the valour of *armatoli*. Yet a careful study of the history of the Revolution has established the fact, that the perseverance and self-devotion of the peasantry really brought the contest to a successful termination. When the *klephts* shrank back, and the *armatoli* were defeated, the peasantry prolonged their resistance, and renewed the struggle after every defeat with indomitable obstinacy.

In the Morea, the Greeks were soon masters of all the open country, and the whole Christian population was in arms. But in continental Greece the *armatoli*, whose warlike habits and military knowledge would have insured equal success though against more formidable Turkish forces, remained for some time lukewarm. Many of their captains were interested in upholding the sultan's authority, for they were drawing high pay in his service. Many Christian soldiers were unwilling to quit Khurshid's camp until the fall of Joannina, for the *seraskier* had promised to pay all arrears due to his troops as soon as he gained possession of Ali's treasures. These circumstances, and the distrust felt in the leading *Hetairists*, rendered the *armatoli* slow to join the Revolution. But national feelings and religious antipathies could not be long repressed by personal interests.

The Albanian Christians of the *Dervenokhoria* took up arms on the 4th of April. Their primate, Hadji Meleti, who enjoyed great personal influence, was a member of the *Hetairia*. The example of Megaris induced the Albanian peasantry of Attica and Boeotia to join the cause.

Salona (Amphissa) was the first town in continental Greece of which the insurgents gained possession. As

soon as the news that the people were in arms at Kalavryta reached Galaxidhi, Panourias, who had served in Ali Pasha's troops, persuaded the primates of Salona to proclaim the independence of Greece, and summon all the Christians to throw off the Turkish yoke. The direction of a revolutionary movement could not have fallen into worse hands. Panourias had been a robber before he became a soldier, and he remained always a chief of brigands, not a leader of warriors. He had acquired some knowledge of the fiscal and military system by which Ali Pasha had extorted money and maintained his troops, and he employed this knowledge at Salona for his own profit. General Gordon has correctly described him as a type of the klephtic chiefs, whose influence proved so deeply injurious to the success of the Greek arms and to the progress of Greek liberty. These extortioners retarded the progress of the Revolution northward by their rapacity, which terrified several of the Christian communities on Pindus, Olympus, and Ossa, where there were many armed men to oppose the advance of the revolutionary forces. Gordon's words ought to be carefully weighed by those who desire to form a correct idea of the causes of the success and failure of the Greeks in their early military operations in continental Greece. He says, "Panourias was the worst of these local despots, whom some writers have elevated into heroes; he was, in fact, an ignoble robber hardened in evil. He enriched himself with the spoils of the Mohammedans of Salona and Vostitza; yet he and his retinue of brigands compelled the people to maintain them at free quarters, in idleness and luxury, exacting not only bread, meat, wine, and forage, but also sugar and coffee. Hence springs the reflection that the Greeks had cause to repent their early predilection for the klephts, who were almost all (beginning with Kolo-

kotrones) infamous for the sordid perversity of their A. D. 1821. dispositions."¹

The Turks of Salona retired into the ruins of the castle built by the Counts of Soula on the remains of the impregnable citadel of Amphissa.² They were immediately blockaded by the Christians in the country round, including the sailors from the flourishing town of Galaxidhi. After some skirmishing, the Turks were cut off from the water, though an abundant stream gushes out just below the rock on which the castle stands; and on the 22d of April they surrendered, on receiving a promise that the Greeks would spare their lives. Yet before many days elapsed they were murdered, with other Mussulmans from Loidoriki and Malandrino. A few only were spared to serve as domestic slaves.

Livadea was the principal town in Eastern Greece, on account of the wealth and social position of its Christian population, though it contained only about ten thousand inhabitants, of whom eight hundred were Mohammedans. The town was a vacouf, and the civil government was administered by a voevode, who farmed the revenues from the imperial mosques. The military command was in the hands of the dervendji-pasha, who kept an officer with a small guard generally as a garrison to guard the defiles of Phocis. During the latter part of Ali Pasha's administration, the Greek primates possessed more influence than the Othoman authorities. The resident Mussulmans were poor.

When the news reached Livadea that the Greeks had blockaded Salona, the place was occupied by a detachment of Mussulman Albanians and by a small body of armatoli. The Mohammedans, being far in-

¹ Gordon, *History of the Greek Revolution*, i. 400.

² Livy, xxxvii. 5.

ferior in numbers to the Christians, retired into the deserted castle above the town, which is said to have been built by the Catalans while they were masters of the duchy of Athens and Neopatra. They were immediately besieged by the Christian population, strengthened by the arrival of many *armatoli*, who remained in the villages on Parnassus and Helicon, unable to continue in the service of Ali Pasha, and not having been admitted into that of the *seraskier*.

Diakos became the military leader of the Christians, a man justly celebrated for his courage and patriotism. He was a native of the village of Mussonitza, on the northern slope of Mount Vardhousi (*Korax*). His baptismal name was Athanasios, and though called "the deacon," he had never received orders, nor did he wear a beard. In early youth he was placed in the monastery of Aghios Joannes, at Artotina, where he grew up a strong active lad, fonder of the mountain air than of his book, though he learned to write intelligibly, but with little attention to grammar and orthography. To avoid the infamous persecution of the *voevode* of Loidoriki, who saw him on a visit to the monastery, he quitted that sanctuary, and the *hegumenos* recommended him to the protection of a celebrated *klepht*, Skaltzodemos. Diakos soon gained the goodwill of his new companions, and his reputation for courage became so celebrated, that a few years after, when he separated from Skaltzodemos, Ali Pasha admitted him into the ranks of the *armatoli* as an officer. When the sultan proclaimed Ali a rebel, Odysseus was intrusted with the command of the *armatoli* stationed at Livadea, and it was his duty to defend the *triodos* and the roads leading to Salona by Delphi. Diakos was his lieutenant. Odysseus made no attempt to resist the advance of Pehlevan Pasha. He fled to the Ionian Islands, and Diakos, seeing the forces of Ali

dispersed, remained in privacy without seeking to enter the seraskier's service. He appears to have had some knowledge of the approaching Revolution. The moment he heard of the movement of his countrymen he joined those who were besieging the castle of Livadea. A. D. 1821.

The Mohammedans defended that place until the 25th of April, when want of provisions and water compelled them to surrender at discretion, and men, women, and children were all slain. The victors thought only of dividing the spoil ; but Diakos exerted himself with some effect to save a part of the booty for the purchase of military stores.

About this time eight hundred Mohammedans were exterminated in the district of Talanti.

The whole Christian population of Eastern Greece, Albanian and Greek, was now up in arms. The advanced spring had drawn many Turks into the country to inspect the state of the crops, to make their arrangements as spahis or farmers of the tenths, and for subletting the pasture-lands, or removing the flocks to their summer quarters. The majority were surprised and butchered. From Cape Sunium to the valley of the Sperchius, in hundreds of villages, Mussulman families were destroyed, and the bodies of men, women, and children were thrown into some outhouse, which was set on fire, because no orthodox Christian would demean himself so far as to dig a grave for the carcass of an infidel. The Turkish inhabitants of Thebes and of several villages in Bœotia and Eubœa escaped into the fortress of Negrepont.

Athens was a town of secondary importance in Greece, fallen as the other towns of Greece then were. In population it was equal to Livadea ; but one half was of the Albanian race, and both the Christian and Mussulman inhabitants were an impoverished community, consisting of torpid landed proprietors and lazy petty

traders. Yet Athens enjoyed a milder local administration than most towns in Greece. It formed a fiscal appanage of the Serail. Its ancient fame, and the existing remains of its former splendour, rendered it the resort of travellers, and the residence of foreign consuls, who were men of higher attainments than the commercial consuls in most of the ports of the Othoman empire.

The Mussulmans of Athens formed about one-fifth of the population. They were an unwarlike and inoffensive race. The voevode's guard consisted of sixty Mussulman Albanians, who were the only soldiers in the place. The Greeks were not more enterprising or courageous than the Turks.

The first reports of a general insurrection of the Christians caused the Mohammedans to transport their families and their valuable movables into the Acropolis, and to fill the empty and long-neglected cisterns with water. On the 23d of April the Turks seized eleven of the principal Christians, and carried them up to the Acropolis as hostages. This act irritated the Athenians, who sent messengers inviting the Albanian villagers of Mount Parnes to come to their assistance. On the night of the 6th of May, the people of Menidhi and Khasia, who represent the Acharnians of old, though they are Albanian colonists of a recent date, scaled the wall of the town near the site now occupied by the royal stables. About sixty Mussulmans were surprised in the town and slain. Next day the Acropolis was closely blockaded. Hunger and thirst committed great ravages among the besieged as summer advanced, but they held out obstinately, and on the 1st of August 1821 they were relieved by Omer Vrioni.

The real military strength of Greece lay in the population of Etolia and of Pindus. But for some time the

armatoli resisted the solicitations of the apostles of the Hetairia, and refused to take up arms against the sultan. A. D. 1821.

Mesolonghi was the first place in Western Greece that joined the Revolution. On the 1st of June the few Albanian soldiers in the place retired, and next day the inhabitants of Mesolonghi and of the neighbouring fishing-town of Anatolikon proclaimed themselves parts of independent Greece. The resident Mussulmans were arrested and confined as prisoners. As usual, most of them were murdered in a short time. Only the families of the higher ranks were spared. The men were crowded together in one room, the women and children in another. But even this lasted for a brief period. The men who had been spared during the first massacres were afterwards deliberately put to death, and the women and children were dispersed as slaves in the families of the wealthier Greeks. Colonel Raybaud saw a few of the men still alive in the month of August 1821, but these were all murdered shortly after.¹ Dr Millingen describes the state in which Lord Byron found the women and children at the commencement of 1824: "The wife of Hussein Aga, one of the Turkish inhabitants of Mesolonghi, imploring my pity, begged me to allow her to remain under my roof, in order to shelter her from the brutality and cruelty of the Greeks. They had murdered all her relations and two of her boys. A little girl, nine years old, remained to be the only companion of her misery."² This woman and a few more, with their children—in all, twenty-two females—then formed the sole remains of the Mussulman population of Mesolonghi. They were all sent by Lord Byron to Previsa.

Vrachori, the capital of the province of Karlili, was the most important town in Western Greece. It con-

¹ Compare Tricoupi, i. 298, with Raybaud, i. 294 and 365.

² Millingen, *Memoirs on the Affairs of Greece*, p. 99.

tained five hundred Mussulman families, among whom were several great landed proprietors whose ancestors had received grants of the estates of the Frank nobles at the time of the conquest. The town is situated in a fertile district, on the high-road between Joannina and Lepanto, and at the commencement of the Revolution it was occupied by a garrison of three hundred Albanian Mussulmans. It contained about six hundred Christian inhabitants and two hundred Jewish.

On the 9th of June, Vrachori was attacked by two thousand *armatoli*, who entered the Greek quarter, and, by burning several Turkish houses, compelled the Mussulmans to intrench themselves in some large isolated dwellings, whose courtyards were surrounded by high walls. In a few days, the arrival of Varnakiotas, Tzonga, and some other captains of *armatoli*, increased the number of the Greek troops to four thousand. The besieged were soon without provisions.

The Albanians then separated themselves from the resident Turks. Nourka, their chief, was *derven-aga* of Karlili, and on terms of intimacy with many captains of *armatoli*. The Albanians were poor and warlike—the Turks rich and defenceless. Nourka offered to retreat with his band, if the Greeks would allow him to retire unmolested with his followers, carrying away their arms and all their property. The Greek leaders consented to these terms; but Nourka and his Albanians were not satisfied with their own property, and determined to appropriate to themselves as much as they could carry off the wealth of the Turks and Jews, in order that it might not fall into the hands of the Greeks. During the night, they plundered the Turks and tortured the Jews to collect money and jewels; and having secured the connivance of some of the Greek chiefs, they passed through the blockading

force, and gained a long march before their escape was A. D. 1821. generally known in the Greek camp.

The Turks and Jews had expected to purchase the protection of the captains of *armatoli* with the riches which the Albanians had carried off. As soon as they could venture to do so, they informed the Greeks of Nourka's treachery, and laid down their arms on receiving a promise of personal safety. That promise was immediately violated. The massacre commenced with the Jews. Men, women, and children were slain in cold blood, with circumstances of atrocious cruelty. The poorer Mussulmans next shared the same fate, and only a few of the wealthiest of all the five hundred families that inhabited Vrachori escaped, through the protection of Varnakiotes and Tzonga.¹

The inhabitants of Zapandir, a small Mussulman hamlet about two miles from Vrachori, seeing that no promise could bind the Greeks, refused to listen to any terms, and defended themselves valiantly until their chief was killed. Worn out with hunger and fatigue, they at last surrendered at discretion, and were put to the sword. Only a few Albanian soldiers in the place were allowed by the *armatoli* to retire to Arta.

During the summer, the troops of Khurshid Pasha made two attempts to penetrate into Acharnanian by the passes of Makrynoros, but both were defeated. The second was repulsed on the 30th of June.

Thus, in about three months, the Christians had rendered themselves masters of the whole of Greece to the south of Thermopylæ and Actium, with the exception of the fortresses, and these were all blockaded. Had they understood the value of military discipline, they would in all probability have succeeded in ex-

¹ The author has heard a distinguished Greek chief narrate the atrocities then committed, and boast of the part he took in instigating the soldiers to commit them. It was in the presence of General Gordon, who was known to be writing a history of the Revolution.

PELLING the Turks from Greece before the end of the year, for the fortresses were inadequately supplied, both with ammunition and provisions.¹

It has been already mentioned that nationality was a secondary feature of the Greek Revolution at its commencement. The Greeks furnished the greater part of the soldiers who fought against the sultan, but Albanian ships and Albanian sailors formed two-thirds of the Greek navy.

Those who believe that revolutions are invariably produced by the material oppression of governments must be at a loss to point out the proofs of their theory at Hydra, Spetzas, Psara, and Kasos, or to trace the Revolution in those islands to its true causes. Under the sultan's government the four islands enumerated were lightly taxed, and allowed to regulate their internal affairs like independent republics. Fewer restrictions were placed on personal liberty and on commercial enterprise than in most Christian countries. The local magistrates were elective, the taxes were collected by Christians, and there were no resident Mussulmans. In few countries did the mass of the population live more at ease. Yet the Albanians and Greeks of these islands were as discontented under the sultan's government in 1821, as the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands are under the protection of Queen Victoria in 1858. Their advancing civilisation had inspired them with a longing for political independence. They believed that the possession of civil and religious liberty would render every private citizen virtuous, and every commercial speculation prosperous.

Early in the eighteenth century the sultans began to perceive that their treaties with the Christian

¹ The following fortresses remained in the hands of the Turks: In the Morea—Tripolitza, Nauplia, Corinth, Patras, with the castle of the Morea, Navarin, Modon, Coron, and Monemvasia. In continental Greece—Athens, Zeituni, Lepanto, and the castle of Romelia, and Vonitza. In Eubœa—Negrepont and Kanystos.

powers had conceded privileges to foreigners which A. D. 1821. were ruinous to the commercial interests of their own subjects. Turkish and Greek traders were liable to higher duties, both of import and export, than strangers. When the sultans became desirous of reviving native commerce, they discovered that the first thing to be done was to protect the traders against the exactions of their own officials. They attempted to do this by exempting some barren islands from the fiscal administration of the empire. Under this protection colonies of Albanian seamen settled at Hydra and Spetzas, and colonies of Greek seamen at Psara and Kasos, who built ships and formed self-governing communities. In this way a considerable commercial navy grew up under the Othoman flag almost unobserved by Christian powers; and when the Revolution broke out, these four islands were populous and flourishing. The Albanians of the two first, who were much more numerous, differed considerably in manners and character from the Greeks of the other two. The Hydriots were the most sincere; the Psarians were the most courteous.

Two rocky promontories on the continent, Tricheri on Mount Pelion, and Galaxidhi on the Gulf of Corinth, were also commercial towns, possessing ships and enjoying self-government and many privileges under the sultan's protection.

In 1821 the commercial navy of Greece, Albanian and Greek, consisted of nearly 350 brigs and schooners of from 60 to 400 tons, besides many smaller vessels, the whole manned by upwards of 12,000 sailors.¹

¹ The following appears to be an accurate account of the naval force of Greece in 1821 :—

Hydra contained 4000 families, with 115 ships exceeding 100 tons.					
Spetzas	1600	"	"	60	" "
Psara	1200	"	"	40	" "
Kasos	1500	"	"	15	" "
Tricheri	400	"	"	30	vessels of various sizes.
Galaxidhi	600	"	"	60	" "

The number of vessels between 60 and 100 tons in all Greece was supposed to amount to 200, and there were many decked boats in every island and port.

Psara was inhabited by 6000 souls. Its geographical position enabled it to watch the ocean-paths to the greatest commercial cities of the sultan's dominions. The indefatigable activity of its seamen, and the illustrious deeds of one of its sons, Konstantine Kanares, have given it an honourable position in Greek history.

“ She made herself a name—a name to live,
While wisdom, in self-government displayed,
And valour, such as only in the Free
Shall among men be honoured.”

The government of Psara was democratic ; all the citizens voted at the election of the magistrates, and among the lively and intelligent Greeks of the island the individual merits of each were recognised as titles to civic rank. Both the people and the government formed a strong contrast to those of Hydra, where wealth created a false kind of chieftainship, and the national traditions of the Albanian pharas were transmuted into feelings of party animosity. In Psara every man who possessed a house, who shared in the risks of a trading voyage, or who supported a family, though he might be only a private sailor, attended the annual assembly of the people, and gave his vote for the election of forty councillors. These councillors chose the demogeronts or magistrates, who held office for a year, and who consulted the councillors on all affairs of importance.

The government of Hydra was very different, as has been already narrated, being in the hands of rich oligarchs, and administered by twelve primates.¹

The system of trade was the same in all the islands. The captains were as ignorant of the science of navigation as the sailors, but they were experienced pilots and good seamen. When such men were intrusted with valuable ships and rich cargoes, it was necessary

¹ See Book i. chap. ii. p. 40.

that their interests should be deeply engaged in the success of the speculation, stimulated to constant watchfulness, and directly promoted by a quick voyage. But not only the captain—all on board also received a portion of the gain. The owner of the ship, the capitalist who purchased the cargo, the captain, and the sailors, were all partners in the success of each voyage, according to a settled rate. The division was made after deducting the capital invested in purchasing the cargo and the price of the ship's provisions. Then five per cent was set apart for the municipal treasury at Hydra, and one per cent for the church and monastery. The remainder was divided into a fixed number of shares; the ship received its proportion as freight, the capitalist his share as profit, and the captain and sailors their respective shares as wages. Even the cabin-boy received a half or quarter share, as the case might be. Thus everybody was interested in performing a quick and safe voyage, and reaching the port of destination with an undamaged cargo. The consequence was, that the Albanian and Greek ships performed the quickest passages and realised the largest gains of all those that navigated the Mediterranean.

This system had its inconveniences as well as its advantages. While it encouraged the crews to extraordinary exertions, it introduced a degree of equality and a habit of consulting those on board which proved an insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of naval discipline during the war with the Turks. No difficult or dangerous enterprise could be undertaken without assembling all the quartermasters and old seamen on the poop, and discussing the project. Sometimes a second council was held before the mast before the captain's orders were obeyed.

The general peace of 1815 caused a great reduction in the price of grain on the continent of Europe, and

A. D. 1821.

a fall of freights in the Mediterranean. In the year 1820 the gains of the Albanian Islands, which had the principal share in the carrying trade of grain between the Black Sea ports and those of Italy, France, and Spain, were still further reduced by an abundant harvest in Western Europe, and by the fear of a war between Russia and Turkey. Many ships remained unemployed at Hydra and Spetzas. The sailors were discontented ; and all classes began to look for relief to the revolutionary projects which had been disseminated among the people by the apostles of the Hetairia and by the agents of Ali Pasha. Towards the commencement of 1821 the revolutionary spirit had made great progress in all the naval islands.

Spetzas was the first to proclaim its independence as a part of the Greek state. Several of the primates were members of the Hetairia. Their ships were rotting in the port—the sailors were clamouring for pay. Every Christian had of late made it a part of his creed that the Othoman empire was on the eve of dissolution. Everybody declared that a Russian war was inevitable. Ali Pasha employed the whole disposable force of the sultan. The Turks were despised as much as they were hated. Enthusiasm for civil and religious liberty animated every rank of society, and a general insurrection of all the orthodox in European Turkey would, according to the assurance given by numbers of political adventurers, soon insure the success of a revolution in Greece.

A public meeting of the whole population was held at Spetzas on the 7th of April, and the flag of independent Greece, bearing the cross rising above the crescent, was hoisted on the highest mast in the port. Eight brigs were immediately fitted out to cruise off the coast of the Morea ; and these vessels, knowing that an Othoman corvette of twenty-six guns and a brig of

sixteen guns, greatly under-manned, were waiting at A. D. 1821. Milos to receive the annual contingent of sailors from the Albanian islands, sailed thither, and captured them by surprise. The Mussulmans on board were carried to Spetzas, where many were murdered in cold blood, and others were tortured with such horrid cruelty, that shame has induced the Greeks to throw a veil over this first victory of the Greek navy, in order to conceal the crimes which accompanied it.

Psara followed the example of Spetzas, but it did not join the Revolution until the 23d of April. The Psarians then commenced a series of depredations which made them a terror to all the Mussulman population on the sea-coast. The Turks were preparing an expedition in Asia Minor to relieve their countrymen in the Morea. Their preparations were rendered abortive by the destruction of a large transport laden with military stores, and by the capture of four small vessels carrying two hundred troops and a supply of provisions, destined for Nauplia. The Psarian schooners ran down the whole coast from Tenedos to Rhodes, destroying or capturing every vessel that could not gain a secure port. By paralysing the attempts of the Turks to send supplies to Greece, these operations facilitated the reduction of Monemvasia and Navarin.

While the Spetziots and Psarians were fighting the battles of liberty, the primates of Hydra were resisting the wish of the people to join the Revolution. At Hydra, as we have seen, wealth alone gave rank and power—the distinction of the different ranks of society was there strongly marked. The proportion of large ships was greater than in the other islands, and at this time the number of destitute was proportionably increased, so that the stagnation of commerce, which had put an end to speculative voyages, caused much suffering among the families of the sailors. The people

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called loudly for revolutionary measures. The primates opposed a change, which would put them to the expense of fitting out their ships for an unprofitable and dangerous service. In vain the patriots of Spetzas and Psara urged them to hoist the Greek flag. A popular insurrection terminated their opposition by setting aside their authority. On the 28th of April the people proclaimed the independence of Hydra, and its union with the Greek state.

This insurrection affords an insight into the social condition of the Albanian islanders. The captains of ships, who were not themselves shipowners, formed a middle class, whose influence was not inconsiderable, particularly when want of employment rendered their interests identical with those of the people. Antonios Economos, an unemployed captain, who was a member of the Hetairia, commenced enrolling a band of volunteers when the apostles transmitted the final signal for an outbreak. On the night of the 8th of April he assembled his followers, and at daybreak they rang the bell which was sounded to convoke public meetings. Economos attended the assembly surrounded by a body of armed men, and invited the sailors to take possession of the ships in the port, and proclaim the Revolution in Hydra.

The demogeronts for the current four months were Lazaros Conduriottes, Ghika Ghiones, Demetrios Tsamados, and Vasili Budures. The governor or bey, named by the capitan-pasha, was George Bulgares the younger. These men, instead of holding their usual meeting at the monastery and communicating directly with the people, were so intimidated by the insurrection, which they knew well was directed against their treasure-chests, that they abandoned their posts and left Economos master of the field. He immediately installed one of his own partisans, Nicolas Kokovila, as governor.

The people were emboldened by this easy victory to declare, without any circumlocution, that their first business was to obtain money. Three days were spent in the most degrading negotiations, and all parties displayed the most revolting selfishness. The wealthy primates tried to diminish the demands of the demagogues by gaining over some of the unemployed captains to act as their advocates, while the popular leaders endeavoured to impose as large payments as possible on their personal enemies. In the end the people collected and divided among themselves the sum of 30,000 dollars. On the 12th of April, these affairs of personal interest having been arranged, the people felt less animosity towards the primates; and the popular leaders, in order to retain their ascendancy, found it necessary to direct public attention to the Revolution.

Two Spetziot vessels appeared off the port, bearing the flag of Greece, and Economos seized the occasion to propose that the ships in the port of Hydra should be armed without delay, and a proclamation issued throwing off the sultan's authority, and announcing that Hydra formed a part of the Greek state. The oligarchs availed themselves with prudence of the opportunity which was thus presented of recovering their influence. They opened direct negotiations with the captains and sailors who had previously served in their ships. The pressing wants of the populace having been relieved by the distribution of the money extracted from the primates, individual interests and connections again operated, and private sympathies and party feelings came into play. Economos, who observed the reaction, made a vain attempt to deprive the shipowners of the right of selecting the captains to command their ships. He desired to form a revolutionary committee, whose members should exercise the

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whole executive government; but the character of his associates was well known, and did not inspire sufficient confidence. Fear, interest, and patriotism now combined to make both parties anxious for a reconciliation. After some concessions it was effected; concord was restored, the proclamation of independence was viewed as the ratification of a general amnesty; and on Sunday the 29th of April a solemn service was performed in the church, and the Greek flag was then hoisted on all the ships at Hydra.

Spetzas, Psara, and Hydra lost no time in concerting common operations, and a Greek fleet soon assembled under the command of Jakomaki Tombazes, a Hydriot primate of some nautical science. He was an amiable and judicious man, but he was deficient in decision, and habitually sought the advice of others, listening often to those who had less knowledge and courage than he possessed himself. He could not comprehend that an imprudent measure, executed with promptitude and vigour, is in war more effective than a wise measure feebly and slowly carried out. He was one of the few men of rank in Hydra, at the commencement of the Revolution, who treated strangers with kindness; and an English Philhellene of the highest character, whose praise was only given where it was due, said of him emphatically, that he was a worthy and honourable man.¹

The enterprise which promised the greatest success to the Greek fleet was an attack on the Othoman ships then cruising off the coast of Epirus. They were ill-manned, and so unprepared to resist, that they would in all probability have fallen into the hands of the Greeks. A naval victory in the western seas would have weakened Khurshid's army to such a degree that he would have been unable to send succours

¹ Note of Frank Abney Hastings, in the author's possession.

to Patras and Tripolitza ; it would have revived the A. D. 1821.
courage of the partisans of Ali Pasha, roused the Christians to take up arms in many districts where they remained quiet, and perhaps enabled the Greeks, with the assistance of the Suliots, to gain possession of Previsa and Arta.

Unfortunately, just as the fleet was about to sail for Epirus, Neophytos Vambas arrived at Hydra, and induced the primates to change its destination with the lure of the conquest of the rich island of Chios. Vambas was a Chiot ; he was a scholar and a patriot, but he was a pedant and a visionary. During the early period of the Revolution he obtained considerable political influence by attaching himself to Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes. Nature intended him for a professor, not a politician. His ignorance of the business of active life ; his incompetence to judge men's characters ; his persuasion that all men could be directed by general maxims ; and his own inability to appreciate the value of times and circumstances, and to seize the opportunities they afforded, rendered him an unsafe counsellor, and made his political career injurious to his country.

The first cruise of the Greek navy was productive of no important result. Many prizes were made, and the sailors gained a good deal of booty ; but no discipline was introduced into the service, and the little order that had previously existed in the ships while they were merchantmen was relaxed. Regulations for the equitable distribution of prize-money were adopted by universal suffrage before the fleet sailed, and it was decided that a proportion should be set apart for the public treasury, in order to meet the general expenditure of the war in which the nation was engaged. These regulations were disregarded by the crews which succeeded in capturing prizes ; they cheated their com-

panions, and defrauded the public. Their piratical conduct, and particularly the plunder of an Austrian vessel at Tinos, caused them to be regarded with fear by all the commercial states in the Mediterranean ; and the cabinets of Europe watched suspiciously the proceedings of a powerful naval force, in which no discipline prevailed, and which set all public and private law at defiance.

The disorderly conduct of the Greek navy, and particularly of the Hydriot ships, during this cruise, must be attributed in part to the wilful neglect of the primates. They tolerated the criminal proceedings of the sailors that they might win them over from the party of Economos. They winked at every licence for the purpose of gaining their own selfish ends. One particular capture deserves to be noticed, because it occurred under circumstances where a little firmness on the part of the officers would have saved Greece from a load of infamy, and prevented the Turks from excusing many of their subsequent cruelties with the name of vengeance.

Two Hydriot brigs, commanded by Sachuri and Pinotzi, captured a Turkish vessel with a valuable cargo, among which were some rich presents from Sultan Mahmud to Mehemet Ali, pasha of Egypt. A recently deposed Sheik-êl-Islam, or patriarch of the orthodox Mussulmans, was a passenger on board, accompanied by all his family. It was said that he was on the pilgrimage to Mecca. He was known to have belonged to the tolerant party in the Othoman government. There were other Turkish families in the ship. The Hydriots murdered all on board in cold blood ; helpless old men, ladies of rank, beautiful slaves, and infant children, were butchered on the deck like cattle. An attempt was afterwards made to extenuate this unmerciful conduct, by asserting that it was an act of

revenge. This assertion is false. Those who perpetrated these cruelties did not hear of the execution of their own orthodox patriarch until after they had murdered the orthodox patriarch of their enemies. The truth is, that both by land and sea the war commenced as a war of extermination. Fanatical pedants talked of reviving the glories and the cruelties of classic times as inseparable consequences of Greek liberty. They told how the Athenians had exterminated the inhabitants of Melos, and how the Spartans had put all their Athenian prisoners to death after their victory at Ægospotamos. A. D. 1821.

The manner in which the immense booty taken by Sachturi and Pinotzi was divided, proved as injurious to the Greek cause as the barbarous ferocity displayed in acquiring it. The crews refused to conform to the national regulations which had been adopted before going to sea. Violent dissensions arose with the crews of other ships entitled to a share of the booty, and the quarrels that ensued became so violent that several ships quitted the fleet and went off cruising on their own account. All united action became impossible; and thus the best opportunity of striking a decisive blow while the Turks were still unprepared for resistance was allowed to escape.

The wealth gained by the sailors diminished the influence of the popular faction under the leading of Economos, and afforded the oligarchs an opportunity of re-establishing their power. The demagogue had made use of the selfishness of the sailors to win authority, by offering greater allurements to their selfishness; the oligarchs now deprived him of all power. Neither party addressed themselves to the better feelings of the people, who, if they had found worthy leaders, would not in all probability have been found wanting in patriotism and honour; but, as it hap-

pened, the passions of a turbulent population were excited instead of being restrained. The ambition of the oligarchs and of the demagogue was equally unprincipled.

When the Hydriot ships returned from their first cruise, Economos saw that his only hope of maintaining himself in the position he had assumed was by placing himself at the head of a patriotic party. He therefore proposed to enforce the wise and equitable regulations voted by common consent before the fleet put to sea, and demanded that a portion of every prize should be set apart for the national service. The primates opposed this just and prudent measure because it was advocated by Economos, and supported the sailors in their unjust misappropriation of the whole booty. They paid dearly in after days for this desertion of their country's cause to gain their party objects. Economos found himself without partisans, for no one trusted his patriotism, and he learned too late that honesty is the best policy, even in politics. The band of bravos who had joined him when he excited the people to plunder the rich, now adhered to the primates, who supported the sailors in plundering the national treasury. These bravos were an institution in the community of Hydra, and they knew that the oligarchs were always sure to want their services, while the demagogues could easily dispense with them.¹

The oligarchical party made an attempt to assassinate Economos, instead of driving him from power by a public vote. The attempt failed, but a violent tumult ensued, in which the democratic party was defeated by a fire of musketry from the houses of the primates, and a few rounds of grape from the ships in the port. Economos escaped in a boat, but was

¹ See an anecdote at p. 39.

captured before he could reach the Morea. He was A. D. 1821. saved from the vengeance of the primates by the sailors, who allowed him to retire to Kranidi; but he was subsequently arrested, and imprisoned in a monastery near the lake of Phonia. From this confinement he escaped shortly after the taking of Tripolitza. On his way to Hydra, where the people, informed of his escape, were anxiously waiting for his arrival, he was assassinated at Kutzopodi, near Argos, by order of the primates.

The Samiots joined the Revolution as early as lay in their power. A Spetziot vessel anchored off Samos on the 30th of April. The people of Vathi immediately took up arms, and murdered all the Turkish families in the place. The primates of the island, however, succeeded in saving the lives of the Mussulmans who resided in Chora, with the aga and cadi. They were hurried into boats, and landed safely on the opposite shore of Asia Minor. Samos was then declared independent, and united with the Greek state. Its inhabitants lost no time in preparing to carry on the war vigorously, by making descents on the coast of Asia Minor.

The Othoman fleet quitted the Dardanelles on the 3d of June. It consisted of only two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, and three sloops of war, and was very ill manned, and altogether in bad condition. The Greek fleet had already put to sea on its second cruise. One division, under Andreas Miaoulis, a name destined to become one of the most renowned in the annals of the Revolution, consisting of twelve brigs, sailed to blockade Patras and watch the Othoman squadron on the coast of Epirus. The principal division, consisting of thirty-seven sail, under Jakomaki Tombazes, cruised in the Archipelago, to wait for the Othoman fleet.

On the 5th of June the Greeks fell in with one of the Turkish line-of-battle ships off the north of Chios. It fled, and anchored in the roads of Erissos. The Greeks who pursued it passed in succession far astern, and fired their broadsides without producing any effect. It was necessary to devise some other mode of attack, and it was resolved to make use of fire-ships.

The exposed situation of Psara, the difficulty of sustaining a contest with the large ships in the sultan's navy, and the danger of an attack from the whole Othoman fleet, had been the subject of much deliberation among the Psarians. The destruction of the Turkish fleet, at Tchesmé was naturally much spoken of, and the success obtained by the three fire-ships of the Russians inspired the Psarians with high hopes.¹ It was resolved to fit out several fire-ships at Psara; but with the usual dilatory habits of the Greeks in carrying even their wisest resolutions into execution, not one of these was ready to accompany the fleet when it sailed.

After the Turkish line-of-battle ship had been cannonaded ineffectually at her anchorage in the bay of Erissos, a council of captains was held on board Tombazes' ship. As there was some danger of the enemy putting to sea and escaping before a fire-ship arrived from Psara, various projects for his destruction were discussed. Some proposed cutting the cable during the sea-breeze, and letting the Turk drift ashore. Tombazes observed that an English naval officer, with whom he had spoken, told him that fire-ships would prove their best means of attacking the line-of-battle ships and heavy frigates of the Othoman navy. It has been erroneously supposed that Tombazes considered this as the first suggestion of the use of fire-

¹ *Greece under Othoman Domination*, p. 318.

ships by the Greeks.¹ The Psarian admiral, Apostoles, A. D. 1821.
 then said, that it was not necessary to wait for the
 arrival of the fire-ships from Psara, as there was more
 than one of his countrymen in the fleet who had
 served with the Russians at Tchesmé, and knew how to
 prepare a fire-ship. The word was passed for any
 person acquainted with the method of preparing fire-
 ships to come on board the Admiral. A teacher of
 navigation at Psara, who was serving as captain's
 secretary in one of the Psarian vessels, answered the
 summons, and undertook the task. His name was
 John of Parga, but he was generally known by the
 nickname of Patatuka, which is a term of contempt
 used by the Greek seamen to designate the northern
 merchantmen, with their heavy tops and small topsails,
 and to depreciate the nautical science of those who
 navigate with small crews. A Psarian, named John
 Theodosios, gave up his vessel to be converted into a
 fire-ship, on receiving a promise of forty thousand
 Turkish piastres, to be paid by the treasuries of the
 three naval islands ; and volunteers came forward to
 man her for a bounty of one hundred dollars each.
 This *brulotto*, or fire-ship, was soon ready, but it was
 manœuvred timidly, and burned uselessly.

On the 6th of June the cannonade was resumed, but
 at too great a distance to inflict any injury on the
 Turk, though the Greeks lost one man killed and two
 wounded. A second fire-ship was prepared, but a stiff
 breeze during the night prevented the Greeks from
 making use of it.

On the 7th one of the fire-ships fitted out at Psara
 joined the fleet, and on the morning of the 8th the
 Turk was again attacked. The second fire-ship, pre-

Tricoupi's account of this council, i. 275, has caused a good deal of dis-
 cussion in Greece, and it is corrected by Kotzias : Ἐπανόρθωσις τῶν ἐν τῇ Σ.
 Τρικούπη ἱστορίᾳ περὶ τῶν Ψαριανῶν πραγμάτων ἱστορουμένων ὑπὸ Ν. Κοτζίᾳ.

pared in the fleet by John of Parga, was commanded by a Psarian named Pappanikolo, and manned by eighteen sailors. The fire-ship which arrived from Psara failed, in consequence of the timidity of those on board, who fired the train too soon. Pappanikolo displayed greater skill and courage in his bold enterprise, and he was well supported by his crew. He ran his ship under the bows of the Turk, and did not light the train until she was firmly fixed. He then jumped into his boat and rowed off to the Greek fleet. The flames mounted into the sails of the fire-ship in an instant, for both the canvass and the rigging were saturated with turpentine, and they were driven by the wind over the bows of the line-of-battle ship, whose hull they soon enveloped in a sheet of fire. The flames and the dense clouds of smoke which rushed along the deck and poured in at the ports, rendered it impossible to make any effort to save the ship, even had the crew been in a much better state of discipline than it was. The cable was cut, and two launches full of men left the ship. Many of the sailors jumped overboard and swam ashore ; but it is supposed that between three and four hundred persons perished. About 11 A.M. the magazine exploded, and left her a complete wreck. This conflagration was the naval beacon of Greek liberty.

The remaining ships of the Othoman fleet were so terrified by the disaster of their consort, that they sought safety within the Dardanelles. The moment was favourable for a daring enterprise. The Turks were astounded and unprepared. But Tombazes was not a man of energy, and the Greek fleet was not disposed to obedience ; so this opportunity of striking a great blow was allowed to pass unemployed. Tombazes anchored at Moschonnesia, near Kydonies. He appears to have taken this injudicious step at the solici-

tation of those who wished to facilitate the escape of some wealthy Greek families. But it is possible that he shared the delusive expectations of those who believed that a million of orthodox Christians would take up arms in Asia Minor at the appearance of the Greek fleet. A. D. 1821.

Kydonies was a commercial town, which supported within itself, or in the adjoining villages, a prosperous Greek population of thirty thousand souls.¹ It had only existed for forty years, and owed its flourishing condition to the privileges conceded to it by the sultan. Its municipal authorities were elected by the people, and the local administration was controlled by the bishop and the primates. No maritime city on the coast of the Mediterranean enjoyed a higher degree of civil liberty. But after the massacre of the Turks at Galatz and Yassi was known to the Mussulmans in the neighbourhood, the zealots became eager to plunder the wealthy inhabitants of Kydonies as a profitable revenge. The pasha of Brusa, alarmed for the safety of a place which contributed largely to the revenues of his pashalik, was desirous of protecting the Greeks, and to effect this he stationed a corps of his own guards in the vicinity, with strict orders to prevent any irregular troops from entering Kydonies. But the execution of the Greek patriarch by the sultan's order was assumed by all fanatical Mohammedans to be a licence to them to plunder and murder all orthodox Christians; and the bands of Turkish militia who were marching to suppress the insurrection on the Danube, sought eagerly for an opportunity to sack a wealthy Greek town like Kydonies. The news of the destruction of the Turkish line-of-battle ship on the

¹ The Turkish name of Kydonies was Haivalee, which, like the Greek, signifies a quince. Gordon, i. 297, says it contained 3000 stone houses, several handsome churches, an episcopal palace, 40 oil-mills, 30 soap-works, two magnificent hospitals, and a celebrated college, founded in 1813.

coast of Mitylene gave them an additional incitement. To protect the place, the pasha of Brusa ordered his kehaya to take up his quarters, with a strong body of guards, in the town. The wealthy inhabitants felt that they were no longer safe. Their protectors would probably make them purchase life with the sacrifice of their property, and put some of them to death, according to the Othoman forms of justice, in order to preserve tranquillity. If the militia succeeded in entering the place, they were sure of being plundered, and, if not murdered on the spot, of being sold as slaves. They naturally looked out for any chance of escape. On the 14th of June they sent a deputation to Tombazes, begging him to assist and protect their embarkation on board the Greek fleet. On the same day the guards of the kehaya took up their quarters in the town. On the following day the embarkation commenced.

The launches of the Greek ships arrived at day-break, armed with swivels, and manned by select crews. A party of eighty Romeliot soldiers was landed on the beach to protect the families who embarked. The kehaya in the mean time made his own arrangements for preventing the escape of the wealthy citizens, whom he regarded as pledges for the tranquillity of the Christian population. He occupied some houses near the beach, and endeavoured to drive off the Romeliot and the boats of the fleet by opening on them a heavy fire. The Kydonians, fearing lest their escape should be prevented, occupied some houses in rear of the Turks, and began to skirmish with them. The swivels of the launches, the rifles of the Romeliot, and the fire of the Kydonians, soon cleared a safe line of retreat to the beach. But the firing served as a signal to the Turks to commence plundering the town. The shops in the bazaar were first emptied ; private houses were

then ransacked, and at last women and children were seized, to be sold as slaves. An unparalleled scene of confusion ensued, but the disorder enabled as many as the boats would hold to escape without difficulty. The Turks, however, in order to prevent those who lived at a distance from the sea from reaching the beach, set fire to several houses in the middle of the town. The Greeks, to stop the advance of the Turks, set fire to other houses, and fire being used as a species of intrenchment by both parties, before night arrived the greater part of Kydonies was in ashes. A. D. 1821.

On the day of this catastrophe, the Greek fleet saved about four thousand persons, and on the following day one thousand more were brought off to the ships. Tombazes behaved with great humanity. He received seven hundred persons on board his corvette, and did everything in his power to alleviate their sufferings. He had a kind heart, though he was a phlegmatic man. But his example was not followed by many of his countrymen. Wealthy families were compelled to purchase a passage to the nearest Greek island by giving up the greater part of the property they had saved. Not a few of those whose houses at Kydonies had been filled with servants, were henceforth obliged to gain their bread as menials even in Greece. Those who were unable to escape to the Greek fleet, were either murdered or enslaved. The slave-markets of Brusa, Nicomedia, Smyrna, and Constantinople, were for some months crowded with young Greeks from Kydonies ; and if mere physical wellbeing were the great object of man's existence, these slaves might be regarded as more fortunate than many of their countrymen who preserved their liberty.

On the 22d of June 1821 the Greek fleet returned home to secure its plunder and divide its gains. The sailors did not even wait until the month for which

they had received payment in advance had expired. The honours of the cruise were won by the Psarians, in consequence of the bold exploit of Captain Pappanikolo. The booty gained was very great, but unfortunately no small portion of it was extorted from the fugitives who fled from their native homes in Asia Minor.

The squadron which sailed westward under the command of Miaoulis performed no exploit of importance. At its approach, a Turkish corvette and four brigs quitted Patras, and retired under the guns of Lepanto, where the Hydriots did not venture to attack them. Cutting-out was not an exploit practised in Greek naval warfare. An attempt to destroy them with fire-ships failed. The Greek squadron passed through the Dardanelles of Lepanto into the gulf of Corinth during the night, and returned again, without suffering any loss from the formidable castles at these narrow straits. The presence of this squadron, however, roused the Etolians to take up arms.

CHAPTER IV.

THE POLICY AND CONDUCT OF SULTAN MAHMUD II.

*"Qui sequum statuerit, parte inaudita alterâ, etiam
si sequum statuerit, haud sequus fuerit."*

POLICY OF SULTAN MAHMUD—SUPPRESSIVE MEASURES AND FIRST EXECUTIONS OF GREEKS—EXECUTION OF THE PATRIARCH GREGORIOS—HIS CHARACTER—MASSACRES OF GREEKS—SULTAN RESTORES ORDER—CRUELITIES OF TURKS AND GREEKS—RUPTURE WITH RUSSIA—DIFFICULTIES OF SULTAN MAHMUD IN 1821—MEASURES ADOPTED TO SUPPRESS THE GREEK REVOLUTION—ORDER RE-ESTABLISHED IN AGRAPHIA, AMONG THE VALLACHIAN POPULATION ON MOUNT PINDUS—RAPACITY OF THE GREEK TROOPS—INSURRECTION ON MOUNT PELION SUPPRESSED—REVOLUTION IN THE FREE VILLAGES OF THE CHALCIDICE—AMONG THE MONKS OF MOUNT ATHOS—SUPPRESSED BY ABOUL-ABAD PASHA OF SALONIKI—INSURRECTION IN THE MACEDONIAN MOUNTAINS—SACK OF NIAUSTA—SUCCESS OF SULTAN MAHMUD IN MAINTAINING ORDER.

DURING the Greek Revolution, Sultan Mahmud gradually revealed to the world the full extent of his abilities, and the unshaken firmness of his character. His conduct has been justly condemned as combining Mussulman bigotry with the immemorial ferocity of the Othoman race; but experience seemed to prove that cruelty was the most effectual instrument for governing Oriental nations, and Sultan Mahmud knew how to temper his cruelty with policy. The Greeks entertained the project of exterminating the Mussulmans in European Turkey; the sultan and the Turks believed that they could paralyse the movements of the Greeks by terrific cruelty. Both parties were partially successful.

Sultan Mahmud is represented by the historians of the Greek Revolution as an inhuman monster. They have even attributed to him the project of exterminating his Christian subjects, which is said to have been discussed and rejected by two of his predecessors, the ferocious Selim I. and the vicious Ibrahim. The Greeks have given him the epithet of "the butcher." Yet his conduct was guided by political principles, which in the year 1821 were considered prudent at Constantinople, and which would not have been considered unmerciful by Louis the Great or our James II., if applied to men whom they considered rebellious heretics. The acts of Sultan Mahmud were not the result of personal fury, they were the deliberate acts of a sovereign, regulated by the laws and customs of the Othoman empire. He treated the rebellious janissaries with even greater severity than the insurgent Greeks. Some excuse also might be urged for his passion, if he allowed revenge to increase the number of his victims after he discovered "the grand project" of the hetairists to assassinate himself and his ministers, and to burn his arsenal and his capital. He then tolerated massacres of the Greek population at Constantinople and Smyrna, which he might have suppressed by a vigorous exercise of his authority. But even in these cases, it ought not to be overlooked that his position was extremely difficult. He was suspected by the janissaries of hostility to their corps, and he knew that his enemies were the persons most active in inciting the fanatics to attack the Christians. Sultan Mahmud was one of those despots (not unknown on the thrones of Christian monarchies) who believed that Heaven had invested him with a divine right to rule his subjects. He was lawgiver and sovereign, caliph and sultan. It was his duty to punish rebellion, and to avenge the blood of the innocent Mussulmans who

had been slaughtered as martyrs at Galatz, at Yassi, and in Greece. As Britons, we must remember the cry for vengeance which arose in our hearts when we heard of similar atrocities committed on our countrymen and our kindred in India. A. D. 1821.

When the plots of the hetairists were first discovered by the Turks, they were treated very lightly by Halet Effendi, the sultan's favourite counsellor. But when the news arrived that the Prince of Moldavia, one of Halet's creatures, had joined the rebels, the Othoman government was awakened to a sense of the danger of a revolution among the Greeks, and the sultan's confidence in Halet Effendi was shaken. The first measures of precaution were not violent. All Greeks who were not engaged in business were ordered to quit Constantinople, and search was made for arms in the houses of suspected persons. But when the sultan obtained some information concerning the grand project of the hetairists, he ordered all true believers to arm in defence of their religion, and summoned the patriarch and synod of Constantinople to excommunicate Alexander Hypsilantes, Michael Soutzos, and the rebels beyond the Danube, who were responsible for the murder of many helpless Mussulmans. This act of excommunication, signed with the usual formalities on the communion-table, was immediately issued as a proof of the loyalty of the orthodox church to its protector the sultan.

Any good effect which the promptitude of the clergy might have produced on the Othoman government was destroyed by the flight of Michael Soutzos's brother, and several other phanariots, who were fortunate enough to learn the news of the invasion of Moldavia before it reached the Porte. During the time which elapsed between the 12th and the 20th of March, many wealthy Greeks escaped secretly to

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Odessa, and in ships bound to different places in the Mediterranean. These departures, and a general belief that an insurrection of the orthodox population of the empire would be supported by a declaration of war by Russia, caused great alarm among the Mussulmans in European Turkey. On the 21st of March the sultan was informed of the massacres at Galatz and Yassi, and on that day the grand vizier ordered seven Greek bishops to be arrested, but at the same time to be treated with all the respect due to their high rank.

On the 26th of March the Turks in Constantinople mustered in arms, and a considerable number of irregular troops were brought over from Asia. On the 3d of April, the very day on which the Christians in the Morea commenced the general massacre of the Mussulman population, the first execution of Greeks took place at Constantinople. Several hetairists whose complicity in the grand project was inferred on what the Othoman government considered satisfactory evidence, were executed. Some days after, sixteen hetairists of inferior rank were also executed. But it was not until the sultan received reports of the murder of thousands of Mussulman families in Greece, that his vengeance fell heavy on the Christians. He then ordered the grand vizier to select a number of Greeks invested with official rank, and regarding them as hostages for the good conduct of their countrymen, he commanded that they should be publicly executed in the manner best calculated to strike terror into the hearts of their co-religionaries. The recognisances of these men were held to be forfeited, and they were sacrificed as an expiation for the blood of the slain Mohammedans. On the 16th of April the dragoman of the Porte, Murusi, was beheaded in his official dress, and during the following week several Greeks of distinction were beheaded, and others hung.

At last an execution took place which caused a A. D. 1821. thrill of horror from the centre of Constantinople to the mountains of Greece and the palaces of St Petersburg. On Easter Sunday, the 22d of April 1821, the Patriarch Gregorios was executed, or, as the orthodox say, suffered martyrdom, by order of the sultan, as an accessory to the rebellious scheme of the hetairists.

Shortly after sunset on Saturday evening, the whole quarter of the phanar was occupied by patrols of janissaries, who were stationed there to preserve order during the unseemly tumult with which the Greeks desecrate their ceremonies in commemoration of our Saviour's death and resurrection. At midnight, the Patriarch Gregorios performed the usual service in his cathedral church, surrounded by the clergy. At the earliest dawn, the new dragoman of the Porte, Aristarchos, attended by an Othoman secretary of the reis-effendi, entered the patriarchate, and invited the patriarch to a meeting in the hall of the synod, to which the leading members of the clergy, the archonts of the nation, and the heads of the Greek corporations, were already convoked. The patriarch appeared. A firman was read, declaring that Gregorios the Moreot, having acted an unworthy, an ungrateful, and a treacherous part, was degraded from his office. Orders were immediately given for electing a new patriarch, and after the rejection of one candidate, Eugenios, bishop of Pisidia, was chosen, and received his investiture at the Porte with the usual ceremonies.

While the new patriarch was assuming the insignia of his official rank, the deposed patriarch was led to execution. He was hung from the lintel of the gate of the patriarchate, with a fetwa, or sentence of condemnation, pinned to his breast. The old man met death with dignified courage and pious resignation. His conscience was at ease, for he believed that his

duty as a Christian priest required him to conceal from an infidel sovereign the existence of an orthodox conspiracy, of which he may have obtained detailed information only in the confessional. His only error may have been that of voluntarily placing himself at the head of the Greek Church by accepting the patriarchate after he knew of the existence of the schemes of the hetairists, and when his official engagements to his sovereign were in direct opposition to his patriotic sentiments, and what he considered his Christian duties.

Three of the bishops, who had been previously arrested, were also executed on Easter Sunday.

In the evening, the grand vizier, Benderli Ali, walked through the streets of the phanar, attended by a single tchaous. On reaching the gate of the patriarchate, he called for a stool, and sat down for a few minutes, looking calmly at the body hanging before him. He then rose and walked away without uttering a word. Othoman justice is deeply imbued with the principle that men in high office are hostages to the sultan for order in his dominions, and they ought to expiate crimes of the people which are attributed to their neglect. Several circumstances tended to make the Patriarch Gregorios peculiarly culpable in the eyes of Sultan Mahmud. He had allowed the family of Murusi to escape to the detested Muscovites; he had connived at the flight of Petrobey's son to join the rebellious Greeks; and a hetairist had been arrested having in his possession letters of the patriarch mixed up with letters of Hypsilantes' agents.

The body of Gregorios remained publicly exposed for three days. It was then delivered to the Jews to be dragged through the streets and cast into the sea. This odious task is rendered a source of horrid gratification to the Jewish rabble at Constantinople, by the

intense hatred which prevails between the Greeks and the Jews throughout the East. The orthodox, who regarded Gregorios as a martyr, watched the body, and at night it was taken out of the water and conveyed in an Ionian vessel to Odessa, where the Russian authorities welcomed it as a holy relic, which the waters had miraculously cast up to strengthen the faith, perhaps to animate the bigotry, of the sultan's enemies.¹ The body was interred with magnificent ecclesiastical ceremonies and much military pomp. In Christendom it was supposed that the Jews had been ordered to ill-treat the body of Gregorios, in order to inflict an additional insult on the Christian religion ; but this was a mistake. This outrage on humanity was then a part of Othoman criminal justice, and it was inflicted alike on Mussulmans and Christians. About a year after the execution of the deposed patriarch, Hassan Bairaktar, of the 21st oda of janisaries, headed a mutinous band of Mussulmans, who plundered many Christian families. He was shot resisting a patrol appointed to protect the Greeks, and on the 22d of June 1822 his body was dragged through the streets of Constantinople by the Jews, and cast into the sea.

Gregorios was a man of virtue, and his private character commanded the respect of his countrymen. His talents for conducting official business induced the Othoman government to place him three times on the patriarchal throne ; and on the last occasion he was called to his high office expressly that he might employ his acknowledged influence to preserve tranquillity among an excited population animated by the rebellion of Ali Pasha of Joannina, and by the prospect of a

¹ The funeral oration delivered at Odessa by the presbyter and economos, Konstantinus Economos, was published at St Petersburg in 1824 in Greek and German.

Russian war. Gregorios was therefore fully aware of the responsibilities and dangers of the position he assumed. He was versed in the intrigues of the divan and of the phanariots. He knew that a great conspiracy of the orthodox existed ; and there is no doubt that, like most of his countrymen, he believed that Russia would throw her shield over the rebels. He took up a false position as patriarch, which ought to have shocked his moral feelings. In executing him Sultan Mahmud acted in strict conformity with the laws of the Othoman empire. Every Mussulman regarded him as a perjured traitor. Every Greek still cherishes his memory as a holy martyr.

Various circumstances at this time made it a matter of policy with several influential classes among the Turks to encourage religious bigotry, and inflame the fury of the populace of Constantinople against the Christians. Sultan Mahmud was suspected, both by the ulema and the janissaries, of a design to curtail their wealth and diminish their privileges. They seized the opportunity now offered for embarrassing his government. They openly called on all true believers to revenge the Mussulmans whom the Christians had murdered, and they magnified the numbers of the slain. The sultan and his ministers were intimidated by the threatening aspect of the tumult which was created. A revolution seemed impending among the Turks, as an immediate result of the revolution among the Greeks. To calm the spirit of insurrection, and tranquillise the minds of the janissaries, Sultan Mahmud deemed it necessary to admit three members of the corps to permanent seats in the divan on the 5th May 1821.

Anarchy, or something very near anarchy, prevailed at Constantinople for three weeks. Bands of the lowest rabble, headed by agents of the ulema, and by

insubordinate janissaries, paraded the quarters of the capital where the Christians resided, and visited the villages on the Bosphorus, robbing and murdering the rayahs. The patriarchate was broken open, and the monks escaped by the roof, and found the means of reaching some Turkish houses in the neighbourhood. To the honour of the Mussulmans it must be recorded that they concealed the Christian ecclesiastics from the fury of the mob. A. D. 1821.

Sultan Mahmud is said to have viewed the first outbreak of Mussulman bigotry with satisfaction. He interpreted it as a proof of enthusiastic attachment to his person and government, and as a testimony of patriotic zeal for the dynasty of Othman. He distrusted both Halet Effendi, hitherto his favourite minister, and Benderli Ali, his grand vizier, whom he considered too favourable to the Greeks, and too fearful of Russia. He suspected them of advocating a policy of moderation, in order to serve their own selfish ends.

On the 15th of May, Salik Pasha succeeded Benderli Ali in the office of grand vizier, and the executions of the Greek clergy and archonts immediately recommenced. Four bishops, previously arrested, and who had hitherto been spared, were now hanged in different villages on the European side of the Bosphorus, from Arnaout-keni to Therapia. Numbers of Christians escaped daily from Constantinople in foreign vessels. The Porte adopted measures to prevent the departure of its subjects without passports. On the 20th of May the patriarch informed the orthodox subjects of the sultan, that every five families were to give mutual security for all the members of which they were composed, and that if any individual quitted the capital without a passport from the Othoman authorities, the heads of families were to be severely punished.

This was surpassing the severity even of the Russian police, and ought to have satisfied the Greek historian, Tricoupi.¹

At Smyrna greater disorder prevailed than at Constantinople. Bands of brigands and fanatics, who had taken up arms in Asia Minor under the pretext of marching against the rebellious Christians on the banks of the Danube, entered Smyrna, where they knew there was a large Christian population, and where they consequently hoped to obtain both booty and slaves without any fighting. The Greeks in the city and in the surrounding villages were attacked and plundered as if they had been a hostile population. Fathers of families were murdered; women and children were carried off and sold as slaves. Many Turks of rank attempted in vain to put a stop to these atrocities. The moolah of Smyrna and several ayans were slain, for defending the Christians, by the Mussulman mob. The strongest representations on the part of the ambassadors of the European powers could only obtain the adoption of measures tending to protect foreigners. The Christian subjects of the sultan were left exposed to the attacks of lawless brigands, and some weeks were allowed to elapse before the military officers of the sultan made any effort to restore order.

At Smyrna the massacre of the Greeks was repeated when news arrived of the cruelties committed by the Christians after the taking of Tripolitza.

Similar scenes of pillage and murder were enacted in most of the principal cities of the empire which contained a considerable Greek population. At Adrianople, a deposed patriarch, Cyril, was put to death, and his execution served as a signal for the fanatics to plunder the Greeks in that city and in the neighbouring towns and villages. At Saloniki, at Cos, at Rhodes,

¹ See page 125.

in Crete, and in Cyprus, the Greeks were plundered and murdered with impunity. For several months during the year 1821, Greece and Turkey presented a succession of scenes so atrocious that no pen could venture to narrate their horrors. The Turks have always been a bloodthirsty race, indifferent to human suffering, and they had now terrible wrongs to avenge. The Greeks had by long oppression been degraded into a kind of Christian Turks. It is impossible to form a correct estimate of the number of Greeks who were massacred by the Turks : some have considered it as great as the number of Mussulmans murdered in Greece. A. D. 1821.

The sultan could not long forget that the wealth and intelligence of the Christian rayahs contributed to fill his treasury. He had gratified his revenge, but he wished to avoid weakening his own strength. The ingratitude of the dignified clergy and wealthy phanariots on whom he had conferred high office, appeared to merit the severest punishment ; but he felt that the cruel treatment of the common people compromised the order of society, and threatened to diminish the imperial revenues. He determined to re-establish order and security of property ; and the rare energy with which he carried his measures into immediate execution, enabled him to do so most successfully. He proved to the Christians that they could live in security, and continue to gain money, under his government ; and he persuaded a considerable portion of the Greek race to separate themselves from the cause of the Revolution, and remain tranquil under his protection. While policy suggested that terror was the most effectual weapon for crushing rebellion, no monarch ever inflicted punishment with greater severity than Sultan Mahmud ; but as soon as he felt satisfied that humanity would enable him to combat the progress of the Greek

Revolution with greater efficacy in those regions into which it had not yet spread, he acted both with moderation and prudence. Unfortunately, both the Turks and Greeks in arms considered that the results of their cruelty proved the wisdom of inhumanity. By destroying the native Mussulmans in Greece, the Christians had destroyed their most dangerous enemies, and converted what might have been a civil war into a national struggle for independence. The Turks, by cutting off the heads of the leading Greeks in their power, had checked the progress of the Revolution, and retained one-half of the Greek population in subjection to the sultan.

A few examples of the manner in which the war was carried on will show the spirit of both the belligerents. The Othoman fleet, while passing near the island of Samothrace, embarked seventy of the inhabitants. They were accused of joining the Revolution, because the sailors of the Greek fleet had landed on the island, and collected a supply of provisions. Twelve of these poor islanders were hanged at Constantinople for the purpose of intimidating others. It was impossible to suppose that they had committed any crime deserving so severe a punishment.

The Greek fleet, having captured some Turkish merchant-vessels, sent one hundred and eighty prisoners to Naxos, where they were treated as slaves. For some time they were employed by the Greeks of the island as domestic servants or farm-labourers, and they were generally well treated by their masters. But one after another they were waylaid and murdered. As the Greek proverb expresses it, the moon devoured them ; and when a French man-of-war arrived to carry off the survivors, only thirty were found alive.

About forty Turks, of whom five only were men, were allowed by the Greeks of Laconia to escape to

Cerigo, where they expected to find protection under the English flag ; but they were murdered in cold blood by the Ionian peasantry, who had no wrongs inflicted by Othoman tyranny to plead as an apology for the assassination of Mussulman women and children. The indignation of the British government was roused, and five Cerigots were tried, condemned, and executed for these murders. A. D. 1821.

During the whole period of the Revolution the Greeks displayed a fiercer animosity to the Mussulmans than the Turks to the Christians. Gordon, a warm philhellene, observes, " Whatever national or individual wrong the Greeks may have endured, it is impossible to justify the ferocity of their vengeance, or to deny that a comparison instituted between them and the Othoman generals, Mehemet Aboulaboud, Omer Vrioni, and the Kehaya Bey (of Khurshid), would give to the latter the palm of humanity. Humanity, however, is a word quite out of place when applied either to them or to their opponents."¹

The Christian sovereigns who had ministers at the Porte, and especially the Emperor of Russia, who had already constituted himself the protector of the orthodox subjects of the sultan, were reproached with their callousness to the sufferings of the Greeks. Several Europeans residing at Constantinople and at Smyrna were murdered by fanatics and brigands, yet the remonstrances of the ambassadors were treated with neglect by Sultan Mahmud. Under the circumstances it was thought by many that the Christian powers ought to have withdrawn their representatives from Constantinople. But these philanthropists overlooked a fact which forced itself on the attention of the Emperor Alexander I. It was, that the conduct of the Othoman government proved that the sultan's hand

¹ *History of the Greek Revolution*, i. 313.

was heavy on the Greeks, not because they were orthodox Christians, but because they were rebels: and the policy of the Russian autocrat was quite as hostile to a democratic revolution as that of the sultan was. But the Baron Strogonoff, the Russian minister, did not allow the execution of the Patriarch Gregorios to pass without strong complaints. The Porte, however, replied, that he had been justly condemned and executed according to law; that his complicity in a conspiracy to overthrow the authority of his lawful sovereign had been proved by irrefragable evidence; and that he had been deposed from his ecclesiastical dignity with the usual forms before he had been punished for his crimes. To all this the Russian minister could offer no reply.

When the declaration published by the emperors of Russia and Austria and by the king of Prussia at Laybach on the 12th May 1821, against revolutionary principles, was made known to Sultan Mahmud, he viewed it as an engagement of these powers not to protect the Greek rebels. In this interpretation of the policy of the Christian powers he was confirmed by the assurances of several foreign ministers, and he availed himself of the opportunity which was thus afforded him of improving his position. He ordered all vessels quitting Othoman ports to be searched, in order to prevent the departure of Turkish subjects without passports. This being entirely in accordance with the principles of police adopted by Christian states, admitted of no objection on the part of Russia. But at the same time an embargo was laid on all grain ships passing the Bosphorus, and the sultan insisted on enforcing his natural jurisdiction over all his Christian subjects who pretended to a foreign nationality, by obtaining passports from foreign ambassadors while they continued to reside in Turkey. The Russian

minister objected to these measures ; and on the 18th A. D. 1821. of July 1821 he presented to the Porte an ultimatum, in which the emperor demanded that the ill-treatment of the orthodox should cease, and that the churches which the Turks had wantonly destroyed should be rebuilt at the sultan's expense. No reply was vouchsafed to this document, which exceeded the limits of international diplomacy on some points. The Russian minister then broke off his relations with the Porte, and embarked to sail for Odessa. This spirited conduct alarmed the Othoman ministers, who then sent an answer, which Baron Strogonoff declined receiving, as the Russian embassy had already quitted Constantinople. The reply to the Russian ultimatum was transmitted to St Petersburg.

In this reply the Porte argued that the Greeks, as well as all other orthodox Christians and the orthodox Church, had always been objects of the sultan's especial protection. That the Treaty of Kainardjé had not been violated by the Porte, and that rebellion must be punished by a sovereign, whether the rebels be Greeks or orthodox priests. The Emperor Alexander was reminded that his predecessor, Peter the Great, had put a patriarch to death ; and the sultan now demanded, as a proof of the emperor's disapproval of the rebellion of the Greeks and the lawless conduct of the hetairists, that his imperial majesty should deliver up the traitorous hospodar of Moldavia, Michael Soutzos, to receive the merited punishment of his ingratitude and treason. !

The Porte sought also to mollify the hostile feelings of Russia, and to avoid a war by removing the embargo on grain ships from Russian ports. Yet when Baron Strogonoff had an interview with the Emperor Alexander near Odessa, in the month of August, it was generally supposed by Russians as well as Greeks that

a declaration of war would soon take place. The policy of the Russian cabinet at this time was misunderstood in the East. The Emperor Alexander was resolved not to encourage rebellion, and he consequently persisted in avoiding war. He therefore took no further measures to coerce the sultan, and Russia did not resume her diplomatic relations with Turkey until George Canning brought the affairs of Greece before the cabinets of Europe, and succeeded in inducing Russia and France to co-operate with Great Britain in establishing peace between the Greeks and Turks.

The difficulties of Sultan Mahmud's position in 1821 would have terrified a man of a less determined character ; and when he was about to commence operations against the insurgent Greeks, prudence might have suggested that a war with so powerful an enemy as Russia was to be avoided at every risk. But the sultan saw the importance of separating the cause of the Greek Revolution from the cause of the orthodox church, and of defining clearly the political opposition which placed the principles of the Russian cabinet in hostility with those of the insurgent Greeks. He succeeded, however, more in consequence of the moderation of the Emperor Alexander than through his own sagacity or boldness. Yet for a considerable time he continued to be surrounded by other difficulties, and many persons well acquainted with the state of the Othoman empire considered these difficulties to be insurmountable. In his capital the janissaries were seditious, and the ulema discontented. The enthusiasm of the Mussulman feudatories required to be excited, and the bigotry of the Mussulman populace required to be restrained. The rebellion of Ali Pasha of Joannina still occupied a large portion of the sultan's naval and military forces. The pasha of Acre was in a state of rebellion. The Druses were in arms against the sultan's

officers. An Othoman army was occupied in Vallachia and Moldavia, and the garrisons of the fortresses on the Danube required to be increased, on account of the threatening masses of troops which Russia had collected in her southern provinces. Amidst all these troubles, the true believers were appalled by the news that the holy cities of Mecca and Medina were threatened by an army of Wachabites ; and the sultan, in this crisis, found himself obliged to declare war against the Shah of Persia, in consequence of the incursions which were made into the eastern provinces of the Othoman empire. A. D. 1821.

Yet, with all these embarrassments, and with disorder in every branch of the public administration, Sultan Mahmud never swerved from his determination of crushing the Greek Revolution by force of arms. His first care was to strengthen his authority in Thrace and Macedonia, and to extinguish the flames of rebellion from Mount Athos to Olympus. The prudent measures adopted by Khurshid had prevented many of the *armatoli* from joining their countrymen at the commencement of the Revolution, when their defection would have inflicted a severe wound on the power of the sultan. Khurshid saw immediately that, if the insurgent Greeks could succeed in engaging the Christian population of Agrapha to embark heartily in their cause, they would secure the co-operation of the whole of the *armatoli* of Pindus and Olympus, interrupt the communications of the Othoman army before Joannina, with its supplies at Larissa and Thessalonica, compel him to raise the siege of Joannina, and allow Ali Pasha to place himself at the head of a revolution of the Mussulman Albanians. The fate of the Othoman empire depended as much on the prudence of Khurshid as on the firmness of Sultan Mahmud. Any error of the *seraskier* might have thrown all European Turkey into a state of anarchy, and compelled the

Emperor Alexander to interfere for the protection of the lives of several millions of orthodox Christians of the Slavonian race.

Khurshid augmented the garrisons of Previsa and Arta, and by so doing he checked the progress of the Suliots, and kept open his communications with the Othoman fleet, and with the Ionian Islands and the Adriatic. He stationed about two thousand men at Trikkala and Larissa, under the command of Mohammed Dramali, to support the dervenagas and hold the *armatoli* of Pindus and Olympus in check. The timely arrival of reinforcements of Mussulman Albanians in these districts prevented the Greek *armatoli* from taking up arms when they heard of the execution of the patriarch Gregorios, and the massacres of their countrymen at Constantinople and Smyrna. The prudence of Khurshid, after the insurrection broke out, was as remarkable as his neglect of all precautions before its commencement.

During the year 1821, Sultan Mahmud succeeded in suppressing the revolutionary movements of the Greeks in most of the provinces in European Turkey beyond the limits of the present kingdom of Greece. The Christians took up arms in Agrapha, in the valleys of the Aspropotamos and of the river of Arta, on Mounts Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus, in the Macedonian mountains overlooking the plain of the Vardar, in the Chalcidicé of Thrace, and on Mount Athos. In all these districts the Greeks were defeated, compelled to lay down their arms, and induced to resume their ordinary occupations. The fact that they remained peaceful subjects of the sultan during the whole period of the revolutionary war, and that, when peace was established, and they obtained permission to emigrate to liberated Greece, they refused to avail themselves of the liberty of becoming subjects of King Otho, refutes the assertion

of those Greek historians who declare that cruelty and oppression were the prominent features of Sultan Mahmud's government. The cruelty which represses anarchy is never considered to be intolerable by the agricultural population, to whom it secures the peaceable enjoyment of their property. A. D. 1821.

In Agrapha the insurrection commenced at the end of June. The Mussulman Albanians in garrison at Rendina were expelled by the *armatoli*, who, in company with the peasant proprietors of the district, descended into the plain of Thessaly, where they burned Loxada and some neighbouring villages inhabited by Koniarides, a Turkish agricultural tribe, which is said to have entered Europe as allies of the usurper Cantacuzene, and to have settled in this district when he was dethroned. The Agraphiots were soon attacked by the Othoman troops in Larissa, and driven back into their mountains. The reinforcements sent by Khurshid enabled the Mussulmans to recover possession of Rendina, and to restore the state of things which existed before the outbreak. Stamati Gatsu was appointed captain of the Greek *armatoli* of the district. Though he had been one of the leaders in the foray into Thessaly, he remained faithful to the sultan. His loyalty was secured by liberal pay, and his conduct was closely watched by a *dervenaga* with a body of Mussulman Albanians.

The Vallachian villages of Syrako and Kalarites, in the valley of the river of Arta, were garrisoned by a body of Albanians under Ibrahim Premeti. The position is of great importance to those who wish to command the road from Metzovo to Joannina. The Vallachian population of this district consists of a sturdy, industrious, and wealthy race, but not of warlike habits. The people were instigated to take up arms, when they heard of the insurrection in Agrapha,

by their primates, and by John Kolettes, a citizen of Syrako, who had been physician to Mukhtar Pasha, and who acquired celebrity as one of the most influential political leaders of the Greek Revolution. The primates of the Vallachian villages summoned to their assistance a body of *armatoli*, under the command of Rhangos, and succeeded in driving out the Albanians. But Khurshid, alarmed for his communications with Thessaly, sent the Mussulmans powerful reinforcements, which enabled Ibrahim Premeti to drive back the *armatoli* of Rhangos, and to regain possession of Syrako and Kalarites. The conduct of this Albanian officer was extremely prudent, and he succeeded in restoring tranquillity and order in the district over which his authority extended.

Nearly simultaneously with the insurrection of the Vallachian population in the valley of the river of Arta, the Vallachian population in the parallel valley of the Aspropotamos took up arms. About three thousand men, under the command of Nicolas Sturnari, prepared to invade Thessaly; but the *armatoli* of Agrapha, having already made their submission to the sultan, joined a body of Mussulman Albanians, and compelled the Vlachokhoria to remain at home on the defensive. In the mean time the Turks of Trikkala guarded the passes of Klinovo and Portais, and a body of Albanians detached from Khurshid's camp, and, reinforced by a portion of Ibrahim Premeti's troops, advanced into the valley of the Aspropotamos on the 12th of August. The Turks of Thessaly forced the pass of Portais at the same time. The Aspropotamites, surrounded on all sides, made their submission, delivered up their arms, and received tickets of protection from Khurshid, who declared a general amnesty, reinstated every man in his private property, and restored to the communities the full exercise of all their privileges. Considerable credit

is due to the seraskier for his military combinations and political moderation during these operations ; but his success in re-establishing the sultan's authority over the Christian population in the range of Pindus was unquestionably greatly assisted by the rapacity of the insurgent leaders and of the Greek troops who entered these districts. They plundered friends as well as foes, and carried off the working oxen of the Christian peasantry as well as their sheep and goats.

The progress of the Greek Revolution to the north was arrested quite as much by this shameful misconduct as by the prudent measures of Sultan Mahmud and the decisive operations of Khurshid Pasha. The Christian population of Mount Pindus, whether Greek, Albanian, or Vallachian, were taught to look with aversion on the revolutionary troops, whom they designated as klephts or brigands, and not as *armatoli* or guards. At this period it was a maxim of the insurgents, that the people ought to be forced to take up arms by the destruction of their property, and they carried their maxim into practice in a revolting manner, by appropriating the property of the people to their own use in the process of destruction. Neither the civil nor military leaders of the Revolution reflected that the destruction of property must prove more injurious to the Greeks than to the Turks. The Greeks could only draw their resources from the land they occupied ; the Turks could carry on the war with supplies brought from a distance. When, therefore, a desert frontier was created, that deserted line of country, which soon extended from Makrynoros to Thermopylæ, placed an impassable barrier to the progress of the Greeks northwards, while it afforded additional security to the sultan in maintaining his authority among the Greek population beyond this line.

Zagora (Mount Pelion) was a prosperous district in-

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habited by Greeks, who enjoyed the privilege of local self-government and an elective magistracy. But about the commencement of the Greek Revolution it suffered much from the weight of taxation, and from the failure of the crops of silk and oil in the preceding year. The people were starving, and the population was dense. Twenty-four village communities on the mountain contained forty-five thousand inhabitants. Lekhonia alone contained some resident Turkish families. The town of Tricheri, situated on a rocky isthmus at the entrance of the Gulf of Volo, was inhabited by a maritime population, who owned many vessels engaged in the coasting trade between Greece, Saloniki, Smyrna, and Constantinople.¹

Anthimos Gazas, a leading member of the Hetairia, resided in Zagora as a teacher of Greek, and many of the inhabitants were initiated into the secrets of the society. When the Greek fleet arrived off the coast people immediately proclaimed their independence. On the 19th of May, a body of armed men entered Lekhonia, slew the aga, and put to death six hundred Mussulmans, murdering alike men, women, and children. But instead of marching instantly to surprise Volo, which might have been taken without difficulty, and the possession of which could alone secure the liberty of their country, they wasted their time quarrelling about the division of the property of the murdered Turks. The Greeks of Mount Pelion had been long a prey to party discord, and their municipal institutions had tended to nourish and to display violent dissensions. The slaughter of the Turks animated all their evil passions, and harmony was banished from their counsels. They succeeded, however, after losing some precious time, in constituting a government, to which they gave the name of the Thessalo-Magnesian Senate,

¹ See page 205.

and at last assembled a military force to blockade Volo. A. D. 1821.
The people, however, displayed neither enthusiasm in the cause of national liberty nor valour in defending their local independence.

The first operation of Dramali from his camp at Larissa, during the summer of 1821, was to attack the insurgents of Mount Pelion. He moved forward to relieve Volo, and the Greeks raised the blockade at his approach. About four thousand Turks then penetrated into the mountain and encamped in the principal villages, where they committed the direst cruelties, to avenge the slaughter of their countrymen murdered at Lekhonia, as well as to gratify their native ferocity. When they retired, they carried off many women and children, whom they sold in the slave-markets of Larissa and Saloniki. The men generally succeeded in concealing themselves in the ravines and forests, where the Turks did not venture to pursue them. Anthimos Gazas, and the leaders of the insurrection, escaped to Skiathos and Skopelos. Dramali allowed all the villages to make their submission, restored their local magistracies, and furnished the people with tickets of protection, for which, however, his officers often exacted sums of money. Four villages on the cape of Tricheri set his authority at defiance, fortified the isthmus, and maintained their independence. Many *armatoli* and *klephts* sought refuge within these lines at Tricheri, and made frequent forays both against the Turks of Thessaly, and against their countrymen who had received pardon and protection from Dramali. The great expedition of the Turks from Thessaly into the Morea, secured them impunity during the year 1822; and it was not until 1823 that Tricheri was subdued. The capitan-pasha then granted it an amnesty, on condition that it should surrender all its vessels and receive a Turkish garrison.

In no part of Greece were the facilities for commencing the Revolution, or for defending the national independence, greater than in the peninsula to the east of the Gulf of Thessalonica, called anciently Chalcidicé. The population was almost entirely of the Greek race, and its villages enjoyed the title of the Free Villages (Eleutherokhoria), on account of their many privileges.

A confederation of twelve villages, called Mademkhoría, or mining villages, occupied the central and mountainous portion of the peninsula, stretching northward from the isthmus that connects Mount Athos with the Chalcidicé. Silver mines were once worked on a considerable scale by the Othoman government in this district. Nizvero was the seat of the local administration, and the residence of a Turkish bey, who dwelt in the Mohammedan quarter, with a guard of twenty-five soldiers. This Mohammedan quarter was about half a mile distant from the body of the village occupied by the Christians, where the Greek magistrates of the district held their meetings, and where the bishop of Erissos, or, as he was usually called, of Aghionoros, resided.

A similar union of fifteen villages, in the more fertile region to the westward, was called the Khasikakhoria. Polygheros was the village where the deputies of this confederation held their meetings, for the repartition of taxes, and for carrying on the local administration.

The peninsula of Kassandra or Pallene formed another union of villages under the inspection of an Othoman voevode who resided at Valta.

The three peninsulas of Kassandra, Longos, and Athos, running out into the Egean Sea, form three citadels, which might easily secure, to a maritime people like the Greeks, the complete command of the whole of the Chalcidicé. Of these, the most remarkable is Mount Athos, now called Aghionoros, or the Holy Mountain.

With very little exertion it might have been rendered A. D. 1821.
 impregnable by land ; and it is almost inaccessible to
 an invader by sea.

No spot was better adapted to the operations of the Hetairists than the Holy Mountain, had the Hetairists really been men of counsel and action. But to command Basilian monks, some glow of religious enthusiasm and a sincere love of civil liberty was absolutely necessary. No counterfeits could escape detection among the ascetics ; and, unfortunately, personal egoism, political ambition, and religious indifference were marked characteristics of the chiefs of the Hetairia. They never trusted the monks, and the monks never trusted them.¹

Mount Athos is a high wooded ridge of about thirty miles in length, running out into the sea, and rising at its extremity in a bold peak, towering over the Egean to the height of six thousand three hundred and fifty feet. The isthmus that connects this rocky peninsula with the Mademkhoría is hardly a mile and a half broad ; and the remains of the canal of Xerxes, which Juvenal thought fabulous, still afford considerable facilities for defending it. It might easily have been rendered impregnable against any attack of irregular troops, by constructing a few of the redoubts used by the Greeks and Turks in their warfare. Twenty large monasteries have been built round the base of the great peak. Their walls are constructed with the solidity of fortresses, and within they contain large and well-filled magazines of provisions. Several have large courts flanked with towers, capable of defence, and communications with secluded creeks, where boats can find a shelter. The rocky coast and the sudden storms, like that which destroyed

¹ “Πρὸς τοῦτοις μὴ δόσετε πίστιν μήτε εἰς τὸν ἁγιάτατον, ἀσκητικώτατον καὶ φιλογενέστατον καλόγηρον, οὔτε εἰς τοὺς στενοὺς φίλους αὐτῶν.”—Philemon, Ἑλλ. Εὐαγγ., i. 62.

the fleet of Mardonius, render a blockade by sea extremely difficult. Some dependent monasteries and innumerable hermitages are scattered over the peninsula. A village of monks, called Karies, is situated near the centre, where the deputies of the great monasteries meet to manage the civil administration of the whole mountain community ; and an Othoman governor, with a guard of only twenty soldiers, resided there, to perform the duties of police. A weekly market was held at Karies.

When the Revolution broke out, the Holy Mountain was regarded by the orthodox of the Levant as a seat of peculiar sanctity. It was celebrated in the traditions of the Bulgarians, Vallachians, Albanians, and modern Greeks as sacred ground, hallowed by a thousand miracles of saints. In the minds of the common people in Greece it held a more revered place than the echoes of Marathon and Salamis, for it moved their daily sympathies far more than the dim visions of Hellenic history. When the Western traveller expressed his admiration of the ruins of Sunium to the Greek mariner, he was often astonished to hear his boatmen exclaim, "What would you say if you saw the stupendous monasteries on the Holy Mountain?"

Many monks had been initiated into the mysteries of the Hetairia. At the commencement of the Revolution about six thousand monks inhabited the mountain, but several hundreds were probably absent managing the farms which the monasteries possessed in the Chalcidicé and other places, or travelling about collecting alms. It is not worth while to point out in detail the measures which ought to have been adopted to secure the independence of Mount Athos, to support the Revolution in the Chalcidicé, to threaten Thessalonica, and to interrupt the communications of the Turks along the Thracian coast. The Greek popula-

tion of the Chalcidicé could have maintained eight thousand armed men. The monks might have added to these a body of two thousand enthusiastic warriors. Supplies of arms, ammunition, and provisions might have been prepared on the Holy Mountain. The Greek naval force commanded the sea, and the configuration of the peninsulas doubled the efficiency of a fleet composed of small vessels. Nothing was wanting to secure success but constancy and prudent leaders. The incapacity and presumption of the Hetairists, the selfishness of the leading primates, and the lukewarmness of the influential abbots, joined to the general aversion to military organisation which springs from the intense egoism of the Greek character, neutralised all the advantages which the insurgents might have enjoyed.

The first revolutionary movements in the Chalcidicé were mere acts of brigandage. As soon as the invasion of Moldavia by Hypsilantes was known, bands of armed Christians, sent out by the Hetairists, began to infest the roads. Mussulman travellers and Othoman couriers were plundered and murdered; but the people did not take up arms and proclaim their independence until the month of May. Yussuf Bey of Saloniki, warned by the sultan of the danger of a general insurrection, had demanded hostages from the Christian communities. Finding that his orders were disobeyed, he sent troops to enforce his demand and conduct the hostages to Saloniki. When the Turkish soldiers approached Polygheros, the primates called the people to arms, and commenced the Revolution on the 28th of May, by murdering the Turkish vevode and his guards. Yussuf revenged this act by beheading the bishop of Kytria, and by impaling three poestoi who were in durance at Saloniki. Many Christians in that city were imprisoned. The Mussulmans, and even the Jews, were invited to take up arms against the Greeks, who, it was

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said, were preaching a war of extermination against all who were not of their own religion.

The inhabitants of the Free Villages assembled an armed force, and compelled the Othoman troops to retire to Saloniki ; but they neglected to profit by their first successes, and did not even adopt any plan of defence.

In June, the Turks, having received reinforcements from the Slavonian Mussulmans in the north of Macedonia, attacked the Greek insurgents. Emmanuel Papas had assumed the title of General of Macedonia. He had no military knowledge, and was defeated by the Mussulmans, who drove the Greeks from Vasilika and Galatista. The defeated troops fled within the peninsulas of Kassandra and Athos. Yussuf attempted to force the isthmus of Kassandra, which the insurgents had fortified with intrenchments, but was repulsed with some loss. Yussuf was as ignorant of war, and carried on his military operations with as little judgment, as Emmanuel Papas. He was superseded by Aboulabad, who was appointed pasha of Saloniki.

Aboulabad was a soldier, and prepared his measures with some military skill, while he executed them with energy. Yet he was unable to assemble a force sufficient to make a decisive attack on the Greek intrenchments at Kassandra until the month of November. He then carried them by storm. Most of the soldiers escaped with their leader, Captain Diamantes, on board the vessels anchored near the Greek lines. The people were abandoned to the mercy of the pasha, who captured about ten thousand souls, chiefly fugitives from the Free Villages. Of these it is said that the Turkish troops sold four thousand women and children as slaves. Many men were massacred in cold blood, but Aboulabad exerted himself with success to save the lives of the Christian peasants. The sultan's commands were

strict, and his own interest led him to avoid as much A.D. 1821.
as possible depopulating a district which yielded a considerable revenue to his pashalik. During the whole period of his government he treated the peasantry with moderation, even in matters relating to taxation; but he indulged his cruelty, or what he called his love of justice, by torturing the chiefs of the insurgents who fell into his hands with inhuman barbarity.

The re-establishment of the sultan's authority over the religious communities of Mount Athos required to be effected by prudence rather than force. As soon as the monks joined the revolt of the Free Villages, they took into the pay of their community about seven hundred soldiers, and arms were found for about two thousand monks. Aboulabad knew that this force was sufficient to defend the isthmus against the troops he was able to bring into the field; and that, even should he succeed in forcing the isthmus, many of the large monasteries were strong enough to resist his attacks. He resolved, therefore, to try negotiation.

The leading monks had favoured the Hetairia, because they had been induced to believe that it was a society countenanced by the Russian cabinet. When they discovered that they had been grossly deceived by the apostles, they ceased to wish well to the Greek Revolution. Like most established authorities possessing exclusive privileges, they were averse to change. They could not shut their eyes to the anti-ecclesiastical opinions of the political and military chiefs of the insurgents, nor to the fact that monks were losing favour with the people through the causes which produced the Revolution. The most influential members of the monastic community, consequently, ventured to suggest that the sultan was more likely to protect the ancient privileges of the Holy Mountain than the chiefs of the Greek republic. They contrasted the anarchy that

prevailed wherever the Greeks commanded, with the order observed by the sultan's officers. Aboulabad had at this time acquired a great reputation for his clemency. Many of the Greek proprietors in the Free Villages owned that they owed their lives to his protection after the storming of Kassandra. He had subsequently granted an amnesty to the inhabitants of Longos on their delivering up their arms. He now promised an amnesty to the monks of the Holy Mountain if they would deliver up all the arms in their possession, engage to pay the sultan an annual tribute of two million five hundred thousand piastres, and admit an Othoman garrison to reside at Karies. These terms were accepted, and on the 27th of December 1821 the troops of Aboulabad took up their quarters on the Holy Mountain. This occupation put an end to the Greek Revolution in the Chalcidicé and its three adjoining peninsulas.

The submission of Mount Athos enabled Aboulabad to turn his attention to the Greek population in the mountains between the mouths of the Haliacmon and the Axios. Zaphiraki, the primate of Niausta, was the most influential Greek in this district. He was a man of considerable wealth ; he had opposed Ali Pasha in intrigue, and held his ground ; and he had assassinated an apostle of the Hetairia, Demetrios Hypatros, to make himself master of secrets which might affect his interest. Aboulabad ordered him to send his son as a hostage to Saloniki. Zaphiraki had already concerted measures for taking up arms should he be driven to extremity. He now invited Gatsos and Karatassos, the captains of *armatoli* at Vodhena and Verria, to meet him. These three chiefs proclaimed the Revolution, and, as usual, commenced their operations by murdering all the Mus-sulmans on whom they could lay hands. At Niausta, men, women, and children were butchered without

mercy. The Greek chiefs then marched out to call the Christian population to arms; but the Bulgarians, who form the great bulk of the agriculturists, showed no disposition to join the cause of the Greeks. The Revolution was therefore propagated in these mountains by burning down the houses of the Christian peasantry, and by plundering their property. A. D. 1821.

These insane proceedings were soon cut short. At the first rumour of the outbreak Aboulabad marched to Verria, and as soon as a sufficient supply of ammunition arrived, he pushed forward to attack Niausta. On the 23d of April he dispersed the troops of Karatassos after some trifling skirmishing, and he immediately summoned the town to surrender at discretion. His offers were rejected, and he carried the place by storm. Zaphiraki, Gatsos, and Karatassos were driven with ease from their ill-placed intrenchments, and fled with a few followers. Passing through Thessaly as *armatoli*, and avoiding notice, Karatassos and Gatsos succeeded in reaching Greece in safety. Zaphiraki attempted to conceal himself in the neighbourhood, but his cruelty had made him so many enemies, that few were willing to assist him, and he was tracked by the Turks and slain.

Aboulabad allowed his troops to plunder Niausta, and permitted the Mussulmans of the surrounding country to avenge the murder of their co-religionaries on the unfortunate inhabitants, who had been driven to revolt by their primate, and who had taken no part in the cruelties committed by the *armatoli*. On this occasion the Turks rivalled the atrocities committed by the Greeks after the capture of Navarin and Tripolitza. The cruelties perpetrated by Aboulabad were so horrid as to make the description sickening. The wives of Zaphiraki and Karatassos were tortured, in order to force them to become Mohammedans, with as much in-

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humanity as was ever perpetrated by the Inquisition. They resisted with unshaken firmness, and were at last murdered. The wife of Gatsos only escaped similar tortures by abjuring Christianity.

An expedition, sent by Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes from Greece to rouse the inhabitants of Mount Olympus to take up arms, arrived off the Macedonian coast a few days after the storming of Niausta. It was completely defeated by the troops of Aboulabad, who attacked the Greeks immediately after they landed.¹

Early in the year 1822, the officers of the sultan had succeeded in re-establishing his authority over the whole of the Greek population in European Turkey to the north of Joannina and Mount Pelion ; and the sultan governed the insurgent districts, which were reduced to submission, with so much moderation and firmness, that they never again showed any disposition to revolt, and during the whole course of the Greek Revolution after the year 1822, they enjoyed as much tranquillity and prosperity as they had enjoyed before the rebellion of Ali Pasha.

The difficulties which Sultan Mahmud overcame at this period of his reign were certainly very great, and his success in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman empire is really wonderful. He was himself the sole centre of adhesion to the many nations, religions, and sects that lived under his sway. Not only the Greeks, the Albanians, the Servians, and the Vallachians, but even the Arabs and the Egyptians, showed a disposition to throw off his authority. The old feudal institutions of the Turkish population had decayed. The sandjak beys and the dere beys were generally either rebels or robbers. The military organisation of

¹ Tricoupi, ii. 186, mentions, that on this occasion the wife of Captain Diamantes and several other women were escaping with infants, whose cries, they feared, might reveal to the Turks their place of concealment. In order to escape, they strangled their children.

the Othomans was utterly corrupted. The janissaries A. D. 1821. were shopkeepers, and the spahis were tax-gatherers. The ulema had rendered the administration of justice an establishment for the sale of injustice. Universal discontent rendered the Mussulmans quite as rebellious as the Christians. Sultan Mahmud seemed to be the only man in Turkey who was labouring honestly to avert the ruin of the Othoman empire. No sense of duty, no patriotic feeling, no common interests, no social ties, and no administrative bonds, united the various classes of his subjects in such a way as to secure harmonious action. He could depend on no class even of his Mohammedan subjects, and during the whole course of the Greek Revolution he was unable to dispense with the political services of those Greeks who were willing to accept employment in the Othoman government. He was compelled to make use of the Greeks in civil and financial business, to arrest the progress of their insurgent countrymen, while he employed the Turks and Albanians to oppose them with arms. And in the midst of all the passions which bigotry and mutual atrocities had awakened, he succeeded, after one short burst of passion, in protecting the wealth of his Christian subjects from the avidity of the Mussulmans.

BOOK THIRD.

THE SUCCESSES OF THE GREEKS.

CHAPTER I.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GREECE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

“ Echoes which have slept
Since Athens, Lacedæmon, were themselves,
Since men invoked, By those in Marathon,
Awake along the Egean.”

VICTORY OF THE GREEKS AT VALTETZI—CAPITULATION OF MONEMVASIA—CAPITULATION OF NAVARIN AND MASSACRE OF THE TURKS—FRAUDULENT DIVISION OF THE BOOTY—TAKING OF TRIPOLITZA AND CAPITULATION OF THE ALBANIANS—THE HEROINE BOBOLINA—SACK OF TRIPOLITZA—ANARCHY IT PRODUCED—CRUISE OF THE OTHOMAN FLEET IN 1821—VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY AT ZANTE—RETURN OF THE OTHOMAN FLEET TO CONSTANTINOPLE—KOLOKOTRONES PREVENTED FROM BESIEGING PATRAS—SURRENDER OF CORINTH—RESOURCES OF THE GREEKS FOR CARRYING ON THE WAR—ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION WHICH AROSE WITH THE REVOLUTION—ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE COMMUNAL SYSTEM EXISTING IN GREECE—A PELOPONNESIAN SENATE FORMED—ARRIVAL, CHARACTER, AND CONDUCT OF PRINCE DEMETRIUS HYPHILANTES—HE CLAIMS ABSOLUTE POWER—ARRIVAL OF ALEXANDER MAVROCORDATOS—ORGANISATION OF CONTINENTAL GREECE—THE GREEKS DEMAND A CENTRAL GOVERNMENT—HYPHILANTES CONVOKES A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY—THE ANTAGONISTIC POSITIONS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE PELOPONNESIAN SENATE—PRINCE DEMETRIUS HYPHILANTES DESERTS THE POPULAR CAUSE—THE PELOPONNESIANS MAKE THEIR SENATE INDEPENDENT—THE CONSTITUTION OF EPIDAUROS.

THE numbers of the Christians who had taken up arms in Greece, enabled them immediately to blockade all

the fortresses occupied by the Turks. And the insurgents endeavoured to gain possession of them by military operations as rude as those by which the Dorians invested the Achaian cities in the heroic ages. Strong positions were taken up in the nearest mountains, and all the defiles by which supplies could be obtained from a distance were closely watched, while, in the mean time, the country under the walls was laid waste by nocturnal forays. The improvidence of the besieged soon rendered this mode of attack effectual. Famine and sickness made terrible ravages in the ranks of the Mohammedans, crowded together without preparation and without precaution.

The first decisive victory of the insurgents was gained at Valtetzi, one of the blockading positions held by the Greeks to watch Tripolitza, but about eight miles distant from that city, and situated on the hills that overlook the south-western corner of the great Arcadian plain. The kehaya of Khurshid Pasha, Achmet Bey, had recently arrived at Tripolitza with a reinforcement of eight hundred cavalry and fifteen hundred infantry. He had marched from Patras along the southern shore of the Corinthian Gulf, penetrated through the Dervenaki to Argos, and crossed Mount Parthenius in defiance of the Greek troops. But when he reached Tripolitza he found the Turks in want of everything, and he saw that unless he could break up the blockade and open up regular communications with Messenia, the place would soon be untenable.

On the 24th of May 1821 he made a vigorous attack on the Greek post at Valtetzi, which was fortified with more than ordinary care. The Turkish force was supported by two guns, but the engagement in reality was nothing more than a severe skirmish of irregulars. The chief strength of the Turks consisted in a body of twelve hundred cavalry, and the rocky

A. D. 1821.

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eminence on which the Greeks were intrenched rendered this force useless. The Albanian infantry was not much more numerous than the Greek troops they attacked, but they attempted to mount the hill crowned by the stone walls behind which the Greeks were posted, with courage. A well-directed fire from marksmen, who fired coolly from their well-covered positions, compelled the Albanians to fall back with severe loss. The whole day was consumed in partial and desultory attacks, for the Albanians could not approach near enough to make any general attempt to carry the place by storm. The Turks were at last compelled to commence their retreat to Tripolitza. The Greeks, who had anticipated this movement, hastened to profit by it. They cut off the baggage from the cavalry, and hung on the flanks and rear of the infantry for some time.

In this affair about five thousand Turks and three thousand Greeks were engaged, and four hundred Turks and one hundred and fifty Greeks were killed. But the victory was so decidedly in favour of the Greeks that the battle of Valtetzi destroyed the military reputation of the Turks in the Morea, and broke the spirit of the garrison of Tripolitza. Soon after the Greeks followed up their success by occupying the rocky eminences called Trikorpha, which overlook Tripolitza, within rifle-shot of the western wall.

Monemvasia was the first fortress that capitulated to the Greeks. The place was to them impregnable ; but want caused dissensions among its defenders. The Turks made proposals for a capitulation, and Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes (a younger brother of the great Hetairist), who had been appointed on his arrival in the Morea commander-in-chief of the Greek army, but who persisted in acting as lieutenant-governor of Greece in the name of his brother, the unfortunate and

incapable Alexander, appointed Prince Gregorios Cantacuzenos to take possession of Monemvasia in his own name. To this order the Peloponnesian Senate objected with justice. A blockade of four months had been carried on entirely at the expense of the people. Neither Prince Alexander Hypsilantes and the Hetairists, nor Prince Demetrius and the other princes who had arrived in Greece, had assisted in reducing the place. Monemvasia consequently must be occupied in the name of the Greek government, and must be surrendered to the leaders of the blockading force conjointly with the officer deputed by Demetrius Hypsilantes. Such was the decision of the Peloponnesian Senate, and to it Hypsilantes was compelled to yield ; but he did not lay aside his viceregal pretensions and his foolish vanity. In this case his injudicious conduct caused a feeling of distrust among the leaders of the blockading force before Monemvasia, which produced very unfortunate consequences.

Monemvasia was given up to the Greeks on the 5th of August 1821. The Turks surrendered their arms, and were allowed to retain their movable property. The Greeks engaged to transport them to Asia Minor in three Spetziot vessels, which had maintained the blockade by sea. The Turks were bound to pay a fixed sum for their passage. In virtue of this capitulation, about five hundred souls were conveyed to Scalanova. But a body of Greek soldiers, principally Maniats, opposed the execution of the capitulation to the utmost of their power. They murdered several Turks who were on the point of embarking, and they plundered the property of families who had already embarked. Prince Gregorios Cantacuzenos and many officers present did everything in their power to put a stop to this violation of the first military convention concluded by the Greeks, but their interference

BOOK III. WAS VIEWED WITH JEALOUSY, AND WAS ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL.
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The surrender of Navarin followed soon after, and was attended with far greater atrocities. Hypsilantes sent a Cephaloniot civilian in his suite to act as his deputy. The Peloponnesian Senate sent Nikolas Poniropoulos. The agent of Hypsilantes was an honourable man, without ability or experience. Poniropoulos was an unprincipled intriguer—a type of the worst class of Moreot officials. He boasted some years later to General Gordon “of his address in purloining and destroying a copy of the capitulation given to the Turks, that no proof might remain of any such transaction having been concluded.”¹

Before Navarin capitulated, many Turkish families had been compelled by hunger to escape out of the place, and throw themselves on the mercy of the Greeks of the neighbourhood, with whom they had once been connected by ties of mutual kindness. Sad tales are told concerning their fate.

On the 19th of August 1821, starvation compelled those who remained in the fortress to capitulate. They gave up all the public property in the fortress, and all the money, plate, and jewels belonging to private individuals. They were allowed to retain their wearing apparel and household furniture. The Greeks engaged to transport them either to Egypt or to Tunis. When the capitulation was concluded, the agent of Hypsilantes left the Greek camp to procure vessels; Poniropoulos remained to take advantage of his absence. A Greek ship engaged in the blockade anchored in the harbour, and the money and valuable property of the Turks were carried on board. While this was going on, disputes arose concerning the manner in which the persons of females were searched for gold

¹ Gordon, i. 231, note.

and jewels. A general massacre ensued ; and, in the space of an hour, almost every man, woman, and child, who was not already on board ship, was murdered. A. D. 1821.

A Greek ecclesiastic, Phrantzes, who has left valuable memoirs of the events in the Morea during the first years of the Revolution, was present, and has given a description of the scenes he witnessed. Women, wounded with musket-balls and sabre-cuts, rushed to the sea, seeking to escape, and were deliberately shot. Mothers robbed of their clothes, with infants in their arms, plunged into the water to conceal themselves from shame, and they were then made a mark for inhuman riflemen. Greeks seized infants from their mothers' breasts and dashed them against the rocks. Children, three and four years old, were hurled living into the sea and left to drown. When the massacre was ended, the dead bodies washed ashore, or piled on the beach, threatened to cause a pestilence. Phrantzes, who records these atrocities of his countrymen with shame and indignation, himself hired men in the Greek camp, and burned the bodies of the victims with the wrecks of some vessels in the harbour, in order to save the place from the effects of so many putrid bodies remaining exposed to an autumn sun.¹

The Greeks having deliberately deceived the Turks by a treacherous treaty, immediately set to work to cheat one another out of a share in the booty. It had been stipulated that the spoil was to be divided into three equal parts ; one-third for the national treasury, one-third for the troops, and one-third for the ships employed in the blockade. Both the government and the soldiers were defrauded of their shares. Two Spetziot vessels, belonging to Botases and Kolandrutzos, as soon as they had embarked the valuables of the Turks and a few of the wealthiest families, sailed

¹ Phrantzes, vol. i. p. 400.

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off, and never gave any account of the greater part of the booty in their possession. This conduct caused much recrimination between the Greek soldiers and the Albanian sailors; but it was asserted that the Spetziots bribed the primates and the captains to abandon the cause of the national treasury and of the poor soldiers. This base conduct of their leaders damped the enthusiasm of the people of Messenia, who became so lukewarm in the cause of the Revolution, that they neglected to concert any effectual measures for blockading Modon and Coron, of which the Turks retained possession.

The surrender of Tripolitza was retarded by the measures which the chiefs of the blockading army adopted to get possession of the money and jewels of the Turks without being obliged to share the booty with the national treasury and the private soldiers. Their first speculation was to establish a trade in provisions, which they sold to the starving Turks at exorbitant prices, while they prolonged the negotiations for a capitulation. Kyriakuli Mavromichales, a brave and patriotic officer, put an end to these scandalous proceedings by bringing on a severe skirmish, and threatening to storm the walls. The soldiers also began to perceive the object of their leaders, and to clamour at their avarice.

If Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes had been present at the surrender of Tripolitza, as commander-in-chief of the Greek army, he would have gained the honour of the conquest, and his disinterestedness would, in all probability, have enabled him to protect the cause of order. He had some personal virtues which all men respected, and which would have obtained for him the support of the best Greek soldiers at this important time. But, most unfortunately for the cause of Greece, Hypsilantes allowed himself to be persuaded to quit

the camp before Tripolitza by the selfish Moreot leaders, A. D. 1821: just at the moment it became certain that the place could not hold out for many days. The object of Hypsilantes was to prevent the Turks landing within the Gulf of Corinth on the northern coast of the Morea. Most of the foreign officers in Greece accompanied him ; and as soon as he departed, Kolokotrones and the greedy chieftains commenced negotiations with the Albanians, who formed part of the garrison of Tripolitza, and struck private bargains for selling their protection to wealthy Turks.

Petrobey became nominally the commander-in-chief of the besieging army after Hypsilantes's departure, but he possessed no authority. It was now known over all Greece that the fall of Tripolitza was inevitable, and crowds of armed peasants hurried to the camp to share in the plunder of the Turks. The booty gained at Monemvasia and Navarin had demoralised the whole population. On the 27th of September, a conference was held to treat concerning a capitulation. The Greek chiefs offered to allow the Turks to retire with their families to Asia Minor on receiving forty millions of piastres, a sum then equal to £1,500,000 sterling. There was no possibility of collecting so large a sum ; and as the Greeks demanded, moreover, that the Turks should deliver up their arms, the besieged had no guarantee that they would escape the fate of their countrymen at Monemvasia and Navarin, for they could neither trust the promises of the chiefs nor the humanity of the troops. The Turks therefore made a counter-proposition. They offered to give up everything they possessed, except their arms, and a small fixed sum in money, and demanded permission to occupy the passes of Mount Parthenius, in order to secure their safe retreat to Nauplia. The Greek chiefs refused these terms, as every hour of the increasing famine within the walls

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increased their profits. The kehaya bey proposed to the garrison to cut its way through the besiegers and gain Nauplia ; but the Moreot Mussulmans had no longer horses to carry off their families, and without their knowledge of the country the other troops feared to make the attempt.

The Greeks now concluded a separate capitulation with the Albanian Mussulmans under the command of Elmas Bey. These mercenaries were fifteen hundred strong, and they had suffered so little during the blockade that they were still fit for the severest service. The Greeks regarded them as dangerous enemies. They were experienced in mountain warfare, and would have preferred fighting their way home against any odds rather than surrendering their arms, or a single gold piece from the treasure they carried in their belts. To them the misery of the Turks was a matter of indifference. The great business of their lives was to amass money abroad, and to carry it back safely to their native villages in Albania.

While the negotiations with the Albanians were going on, the Greek chiefs employed the time in concluding separate bargains with wealthy Mussulmans, who delivered to them money and jewels on receiving promises of protection, ratified by the most solemn oaths. The widow of a Spetziot shipowner, named Bobolina, gained notoriety by her conduct in these bargains. She had displayed both energy and patriotism at the commencement of the Revolution ; and a ship, of which she was the proprietor, was engaged in blockading Nauplia. She now came up to the camp before Tripolitza, to obtain a share of the booty at the surrender of the place. Petrobey and Kolokotrones allowed her to enter the city, in order to persuade the Turkish women to deliver up their money and jewels, as the only means of purchasing security for their lives

and their honour. In the mean time the Greek chiefs A. D. 1821. treated with the Mussulmans from their respective districts, and the Maniats concluded private bargains with the Barduniots.

The Greek soldiers at last became aware that their chiefs were engaged in a conspiracy to defraud them of the booty which had been held out to them as a lure to prosecute the blockade for six months without pay. A feeling of indignation spread through the camp, and it was resolved by tacit consent to put an end to the treacherous proceedings of the chiefs by entering the place either by surprise or storm. An opportunity occurred on the 5th of October 1821. A few soldiers contrived to gain an entrance at the Argos gate, and to seize one of the adjoining towers, from which they displayed the Greek flag.

In a few minutes the whole Greek army rushed to the walls, which were scaled in several places and the gates thrown open. A scene of fighting, murder, and pillage then commenced, unexampled in duration and atrocity even in the annals of this bloody warfare. Human beings can rarely have perpetrated so many deeds of cruelty on an equal number of their fellow-creatures as were perpetrated by the conquerors on this occasion. Before the Greek chiefs could enter the place, the whole city was a scene of anarchy, and the misconduct of the Greek chiefs had rendered them powerless to restore order or to arrest the diabolical passions which their own avarice and dishonourable proceedings had awakened in the breasts of their followers.

When the tumult commenced, the Albanians under Elmas Bey formed under arms in the immense courtyard of the pasha's palace. Their warlike attitude alarmed the Greek chiefs, who succeeded in preventing their falling on the dispersed Greeks, and persuaded

them to march out of the place and take up their quarters at Trikorpha, in the strong position occupied by Kolokotrones during the blockade. They were supplied with provisions, and on the 7th October they commenced their march to Vostitza, where they crossed the gulf to Lepanto, and, hastening through Etolia, reached Arta in safety.¹

The citadel of Tripolitza surrendered from want of water on the 8th of October, and Kolokotrones gained possession of all the treasure it contained. The official return of the artillery and ammunition found in the town and the citadel gives a contemptible idea of the military operations of this long siege. Of thirteen brass guns only two 6-pounders remained serviceable; and of seventeen iron guns, only three 9-pounders. There were found in the place only 855 shot of all calibres, and ten packets of grape; and the powder-magazines were entirely empty.

Colonel Raybaud, a young French officer of talent and candour, who commanded the Greek artillery during the siege, and who was the only foreigner of rank and character who was present when the Greek troops entered the place, has recounted the scenes of horror and disorder which prevailed for three days.² In a plain narrative he describes the acts of barbarity of which he was an eyewitness. Women and children were frequently tortured before they were murdered. After the Greeks had been in possession of the city for forty-eight hours, they deliberately collected together about two thousand persons of every age and sex, but principally women and children, and led them to a ravine in the nearest mountain, where they murdered every soul.³

¹ See page 114.

² *Mémoires sur la Grèce*, i. 463, 480.

³ The writer saw heaps of unburied bones bleached by the winter rains and summer suns in passing this spot two years after the catastrophe; the size of

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes returned to Tripolitza A. D. 1821.
 nine days after the capture of the place. The Turks had made no attempt to effect a landing on the northern coast of the Morea, so that his absence had been unnecessary. He was laughed at for being out of the way by those who had profited by his absence, and his troops were discontented at being deprived of all share in the booty made at Tripolitza. His authority as commander-in-chief had been destroyed by his absence, and nobody henceforward would obey his orders, unless when they themselves thought fit to do so.

General Gordon, who returned to Tripolitza with Hypsilantes, and whose familiarity with the Turkish language enabled him to converse with those who were spared, estimates the number of Mussulmans murdered during the sack of the town at eight thousand souls.¹ Many young women and girls were carried off as slaves by the volunteers who returned to their native places, but few male children were spared.

The women of Khurshid Pasha's harem, and a few Turks of rank, were spared, in expectation of a high ransom. A few of the garrison, with some Moreot Turks, availing themselves of the confusion that prevailed among the Greeks, kept together under the kehaya bey, and, cutting their way through the conquerors, gained one of the gates, and marched off to Nauplia without being pursued.

The loss of the Greeks was estimated at three hundred slain in casual encounters. Many Turks surrendered on receiving a promise that their lives should be spared, but those who were capable of bearing arms

many of which attested the early age of a part of the victims. See Raybaud, i. 483, and Gordon, i. 245. Speliades also describes these cruelties, and the murder of the Greek proëstos Soterios Kougias, who was also inhumanly tortured, i. 246.

¹ Compare Gordon, i. 244 and 289.

were sent out of the city, under the pretence of quartering them in the neighbourhood, where greater facilities existed for obtaining provisions, and they were murdered during the night. Some prisoners were spared for a short time in order to bury the bodies of their slaughtered countrymen, which were putrefying by thousands, exposed in almost every house and garden. Even this precaution was too long neglected. The air was already tainted with deadly miasma, and a terrible epidemic soon broke out among the Greeks. The disease, generated by similar causes in other towns and villages, spread over all Greece ; and, before the end of the year 1821, it is said to have carried off more Christians than fell by the hands of the Turks in the whole Othoman empire.

The circumstances which accompanied the taking of Tripolitza neutralised all the advantages which might have resulted from the conquest of the capital of the Morea. Anarchy prevailed both in the civil and military affairs of the country. All respect for superiors, and all self-respect, ceased. Hypsilantes lost his personal influence as well as his military authority. During his short absence from the army, he had witnessed the destruction of the flourishing town of Galaxidhi from his camp on the Achaian hills without being able to succour the sufferers or avenge their losses. The troops lost all confidence both in his judgment and his good fortune. Kolokotrones, who, before the exhibition he made of his avarice and dishonesty in cheating the troops of the booty at Tripolitza, had a fair chance of becoming the leader of the Revolution, lost the moral influence he had accidentally gained, and relapsed into a klephtic captain and party chief. Most of the other leaders forfeited the confidence of the soldiers by similar conduct. When they defrauded their own followers, it is not astonishing

that they were faithless to the Turks, to whom they A. D. 1821. sold promises of protection. The plunder obtained was very great, and some Moreot captains became chieftains by their success in appropriating to their own use the property of murdered Mussulmans. Mustapha Bey of Patras, and other opulent men, were known to have been murdered, after large sums had been extorted from them as a ransom for their lives.¹ The retribution for these crimes was immediate. Those who had despised every obligation of duty, morality, and religion, could no longer appeal to law and reason. Anarchy directed the future career of the Greek Revolution. The struggle which a minority of honest men and sincere patriots sustained in order to establish order, proved ineffectual; yet the mass of the people, though misguided and misgoverned, continued to defend their religious and political independence without faltering.

The Othoman fleet made a successful expedition during the summer of 1821. The Albanian islanders allowed their ships to return to Hydra and Spetzas in the month of August. This season is considered by the Turks as the most favourable for naval operations, as the winds in the archipelago are fresh without being violent. The capitan-bey, Kara Ali, sailed from the Dardanelles with three line-of-battle ships, five frigates, and about twenty corvettes and brigs, but his force was soon increased by the junction of the Egyptian and Algerine squadrons. After throwing supplies of provisions and ammunition into the fortresses of Coron and Modon, which saved them from falling into the hands of the Greeks, he reached Patras on the 18th of September. The reinforcements with which he strength-

¹ Tricoupi, ii. 139, mentions that the few Turks who were spared at the taking of Tripolitza were murdered subsequently at Argos, on suspicion of being privy to the escape of one of their number.

ened the garrison, enabled Yussuf Pasha to reduce the Lalliot to some degree of subordination, and to break up the blockade which the Greeks had formed.

On the 1st of October, Ismael Gibraltar, the commander of the Egyptian squadron, was sent into the Gulf of Corinth to destroy the vessels at Galaxidhi. It has been already mentioned that Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes witnessed this catastrophe.¹ The inhabitants of Galaxidhi were the principal shipowners on the western coast of Greece. They possessed about sixty vessels of various sizes, of which forty were brigs or schooners. At this time almost the whole Galaxidhiot navy was in port ; and, with the strange improvidence which characterised the proceedings of both Greeks and Turks in this war, no measures had been adopted to defend the town or the anchorage. The contempt which the Greeks entertained for the Turkish fleet, was not abated by the terrible disasters it inflicted on them. Their ignorance of the first elements of the art of war made them place far too much confidence in their knowledge of seamanship and naval manœuvres as a means of baffling the operations of the Othoman navy. They consequently neglected to defend their ports, and the Turks, profiting by their neglect, destroyed their fleets at Galaxidhi, Kasos, and Psara.

Ismael Gibraltar possessed sufficient naval skill to take advantage of the superiority of his artillery. He silenced the Galaxidhiot battery, and cannonaded the town without coming within the range of the Greek artillery, and his fire was on this account more than usually accurate. The soldiers whom the Galaxidhiots had hired to assist them in defending the beach, fled during the night, and the inhabitants were obliged to follow their example. The Algerines landed in the morning, plundered the houses, massacred most of those

who had remained behind, and carried off a few prisoners. The town, the boats on the beach, and the vessels which were aground, were burned. But thirty-four brigs and schooners were found ready for sea, and were carried off by the Turks. A. D. 1821.

The season was now so far advanced that Kara Ali resolved to return to Constantinople in order to enjoy his triumph and exhibit his spoil. He quitted Patras and put into Zante for news, where he learned to his dismay that a Greek fleet of thirty-five sail had put to sea under Miaoulis, to attack him on his return. He made the best arrangements in his power to prevent the Greeks retaking his Galaxidhiot prizes, and sailed with a firm determination to decline an engagement if possible.

On the 12th of October, an Algerine brig, having separated from the fleet, was surrounded by eighteen Greek brigs ; but it refused to surrender, and made such a gallant resistance that the Hydriots did not venture to run alongside and attempt to carry her by boarding. The Algerines, aware that, if their ship became unmanageable, she would be burned and they would all perish, ran her ashore near the southern cape of Zante. The fight between the gallant Algerine and his numerous assailants had been witnessed by thousands of refugee Moreots and Zantiot peasants, who, when the Mussulmans landed, began to fire on them. Two English officers, with a guard of twenty men, had been sent from the town to enforce obedience to the quarantine regulations, which were then observed with great strictness by all the Christian powers in the Mediterranean. The Greeks were ordered to retire ; but they refused, and, continuing to attack the Turks, they soon came into collision with the English. The officer commanding, hoping to intimidate the people, ordered his men to fire over the heads of the crowd.

The Zantiots immediately replied by firing on the troops. The English were compelled to retire to a neighbouring house, leaving one man dead behind. The house was besieged, and a skirmish was kept up until fresh troops arrived. The Zantiots had two killed as the soldiers were forcing their way to the house, and they mangled the body of the English soldier which fell into their hands, with frightful ferocity, to revenge this loss.

The Algerines said that they had been pursued by the Greek fleet, and that they had several men wounded after their vessel was ashore. The pursuit, however, did not prevent their landing a number of wounded men on a raft, which they constructed from spars and planks ; and the violation of neutrality on the part of the Greek fleet was a trifling matter, and would have passed unnoticed had the Ionians not fired on the Turks.

The death of the two Ionians caused great animosity between the Greeks and the English in the Ionian Islands. The Ionians pretended that the neutrality which the English observed ought to have prevented their interfering in the combat between Greeks and Turks. For several years the conduct of the English government and of the English military was systematically calumniated by what was called the Philhellenic press over the whole continent of Europe, and most of the calumnies found a ready credence. The pride of English Philhellenes prevented their replying to the false accusations brought against their country and their countrymen. But it would have been impossible for the authorities in the Ionian Islands to have preserved order among a Greek population, inflamed with national enthusiasm, eager for revolution, and ready to resist the law, unless they had punished severely the death of an English soldier in the execution of his

duty, and the wanton attack on the subjects of a friendly sovereign seeking protection on neutral territory. Martial law was proclaimed; five Zantiots were tried for firing on the English troops, convicted, and executed; a proclamation was issued by the Lord High Commissioner, forbidding the entry of either Othoman or Greek men-of-war into any Ionian port, unless driven in by stress of weather. A. D. 1821.

A day or two after the loss of the Algerine brig, the Greeks lost a brig which they were compelled to run ashore at Katakolo, and which the Turks succeeded in getting afloat and carrying off as a prize. The Turkish and Greek fleets engaged, and a great deal of ineffective cannonading ensued. Kara Ali, who would not risk losing any of his prizes, was driven back to Zante, where he embarked the survivors of the crew of the Algerine brig, and at last sailed with a favourable wind, which carried him safely through the Archipelago. He entered the port of Constantinople in triumph, towing his thirty-five Galaxidhiot prizes, and displaying thirty prisoners hanging from the yard-arm of his flag-ship. The sultan considered the results of this naval campaign as extremely satisfactory, though, when he compared the force of the capitan-bey with that under Miaoulis, he could not consider it as honourable to the Othoman navy. Kara Ali, who had hitherto only held the rank of capitan-bey, was rewarded with that of capitan-pasha.

Kolokotrones was the only man in the Morea who possessed the talent and energy to take advantage of the fall of Tripolitza for the national advantage; but his selfishness had destroyed his influence over the great body of the troops. Had his countrymen felt any confidence in his honour at this moment, he would have been raised to the chief command. Unfortunately, the trust was considered too great for his

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honesty, whatever it might be with reference to his capacity. He himself perceived that he had lost the public esteem, and he was anxious to regain his reputation. He claimed some credit for having persuaded the Albanians under Elmas Bey to desert the Turks. He asserted that he would be able to induce the Lallioti, with whom he had amicable relations, to abandon Yussuf Pasha, and perhaps to surrender the castle of Patras. He proposed, therefore, marching immediately to besiege that fortress. It is not improbable that, had Kolokotrones received proper support, his plan would have been successful, for the Lallioti were at open feud with Yussuf Pasha.

Kolokotrones marched from Tripolitza to invest Patras, which had been relieved from blockade by the arrival of the fleet under Kara Ali. His force, which consisted at first of only his personal followers, amounting to about a hundred men, was increased as he moved westward, until he mustered about two thousand in the plain of Elis. A report was spread that Patras was on the eve of capitulating to Kolokotrones, and crowds of armed men hastened to share the expected plunder. The selfishness of the primates and capitans, who had hitherto ineffectually attempted to blockade Patras, now thwarted him in all his projects. His own selfishness at Tripolitza was avenged by that of his rivals. He might have repeated the words of Macbeth—

“This even-handed justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips.”

The intrigues of Germanos, the Archbishop of Patras, and Andreas Zaimes, induced the Greek government to recall Kolokotrones, under the pretext that his services were more necessary elsewhere; and thus the

only man who could have induced the Turks in Patras A. D. 1821. to capitulate was compelled to retire, precisely because it was supposed that he had sufficient influence to cause a capitulation to be respected. The Achaians were soon punished for their selfishness. The Greek troops were defeated in an attempt to establish themselves amidst the ruined houses of the town, and the besieged were enabled to strengthen their position by completing the destruction of all the buildings in the vicinity of the castle which afford any cover to the Greeks, or could interrupt the communications of the garrison with the sea.

The fortress of Corinth capitulated on the 22d of January 1822. The Albanians of the garrison, who were only a hundred and fifty, had previously concluded a separate convention with the Greeks, which permitted them to retire from the place with their arms and baggage. They hired four vessels to transport them over the gulf, but they were plundered of their property by the Greeks, and many were murdered. The Turks who remained in the Acrocorinth gave up their arms and property to their besiegers on condition of being allowed to retain a small sum of money, and to hire neutral vessels to transport them to Asia Minor. On the 26th of January the Greek troops took possession of the Acrocorinth, and the Turks encamped at Kenchries to wait for shipping. Before neutral vessels arrived, they were attacked by the Greeks and murdered. The conquerors had expected to find a considerable treasure in the Acrocorinth. Kiamil Bey, who was the wealthiest Turkish landlord in Greece, was supposed to have laid up there a fabulous amount of money. They were disappointed. If Kiamil Bey had ever possessed any very considerable hoard of ready money, it had been expended during the sieges of Tripolitza and Corinth. The Greeks, however, would

not believe the word of the bey, and they tortured him in the cruellest manner.

The repeated examples of treachery on the part of the Greeks caused the Turks in the remaining fortresses to defend themselves with incredible fortitude. Convinced that no promises of the Christians would be kept, they determined to endure every privation rather than capitulate, and they now began to display unusual energy and sagacity in obtaining supplies of provisions.

In the Morea the Othomans still possessed the fortresses of Nauplia, Coron, Modon, and Patras, with the castle of Rhion.

The Greeks, from an insurgent populace, had now become an independent nation. They had assembled large bodies of armed men, and blockaded simultaneously a number of Othoman fortresses. The manner in which they were supplied with the resources necessary to keep a large force in the field, deserves to be described. In the first place, the improvidence of the Othoman authorities allowed an immense amount of public property to fall into the hands of the insurgents. A great part of this property was easily converted into money, and a large fund was thus placed at the disposal of those local leaders who assumed the command in different districts. In spite of the confusion that prevailed in Greece during the year 1821, the exports were considerably increased. The sums expended for military purposes escape the attention of the historian, from not being collected in a central treasury, or systematically employed on a general and preconcerted plan. Each locality collected and expended its own resources; and either from ignorance or selfishness, the local primates, proësti, and captains, took no steps to lay the foundation of an organised administration for that portion of civil, financial, and military business

which requires a central direction. It was undoubtedly A. D. 1821.
more from want of capacity and honesty in the clergy, the primates, and the military chiefs, than from any deficiency in a supply of men and money on the part of the people, that order, publicity, and responsibility were not introduced in the conduct of national business. The peasantry everywhere displayed zeal and disinterestedness in giving up all the Turkish property to be employed for the public service. Both peasants and private soldiers served for some months without pay; and both were for some time eager to see the public money collected by the civil and military leaders employed in forming a corps of regular troops, and in purchasing a train of artillery. The terrible effects of Russian discipline and Russian artillery on the Othoman armies had been witnessed by many Greeks, and was the theme of many fabulous narratives in every Greek cottage. Had any man of ability and honesty succeeded in forming a corps of regular troops before the primates and captains succeeded in appropriating the revenues of their respective districts to their own purposes, such weak and ill-provided fortresses as Patras, Lepanto, Coron, and Athens, could not have held out many weeks, and must have fallen long before the end of the year 1821.

Unfortunately, the position in which the local authorities of the Greek population was placed at the first outbreak of the Revolution, rendered them averse to the formation of a central government. They feared that the direction of any general government that could then have been established would fall into the hands of the Hetairists, and in the Hetairists they had lost all confidence. The local authorities, trusting perhaps too much both to their abilities and good principles, wished to command the armed men and administer the finances of their districts. The result was,

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that the necessities of the Revolution enabled most of them very soon to become little dictators. They either commanded the armed force themselves, or appointed its officers and directed its movements without paying much attention to the orders of the central government which was at last constituted, and they collected the public and local revenues from the people, and expended them as they thought fit, without giving any account either to the government or the nation.

The rapid success of the Greeks during the first weeks of the Revolution threw the management of much civil and financial business into the hands of the proësti and demogeronts in office. The primates, who already exercised great official authority, instantly appropriated that which had been hitherto exercised by murdered voevodes and beys. Every primate strove to make himself a little independent potentate, and every captain of a district assumed the powers of a commander-in-chief. The Revolution, before six months had passed, seemed to have peopled Greece with a host of little Ali Pashas.¹ When the primate and the captain acted in concert—supposing they were not, as sometimes happened, the same person—they collected the public revenues; administered the Turkish property, which was declared national; enrolled, paid, and provisioned as many troops as circumstances required, or as they thought fit; named officers; formed a local guard for the primate of the best soldiers in the place, who were thus often withdrawn from the public service; and organised a local police and a local treasury. This system of local self-government, constituted in a very self-willed manner, and relieved

¹ Polybius, iv. 56, § 13, gives the Greeks a bad character in money transactions; and I am afraid we must say of the primates and captains, in spite of their patriotism, what has been maliciously said of the American missionaries at Athens, in spite of their piety—

“Satan now is wiser than of yore,
And tempts by making rich, not making poor.”

from almost all responsibility, was soon established as a natural result of the Revolution over all Greece. The sultan's authority, which had been the only link that bound together Christians and Mussulmans in the Othoman administration, having ceased, every primate assumed the prerogatives of the sultan. For a few weeks this state of things was unavoidable, and to an able and honest chief or government it would have facilitated the establishment of a strong central authority; but by the vices of Greek society it was perpetuated into an organised anarchy. A. D. 1821.

In the midst of this political anarchy, the communal institutions of Greece, which the Othoman government had used as an administrative engine for financial purposes, while they supported the power of the oligarchs, contributed also to preserve order among the people. There is, perhaps, no feature more remarkable in the Greek Revolution, and none so conclusive in proving that religious, more than political feeling, impelled the people to take up arms, than the fact that, during the whole period of the war with the sultan, the administrative organisation of civil and financial business remained practically the same in free Greece as in Turkey. No improvement was made in financial arrangements, nor in the system of taxation; no measures were adopted for rendering property more secure; no attempt was made to create an equitable administration of justice; no courts of law were established; and no financial accounts were published. Governments were formed, constitutions were drawn up, national assemblies met, orators debated, and laws were passed according to the political fashion, patronised by the liberals of the day. But no effort was made to prevent the government being virtually absolute, unless it was by rendering it absolutely powerless. The constitutions were framed to

remain a dead letter. The national assemblies were nothing but conferences of parties, and the laws passed were intended to fascinate Western Europe, not to operate with effect in Greece.

The first administrative exigency of the Revolution was to supply the bodies of armed men who assembled to blockade the Turkish fortresses with regular rations and abundant stores of ammunition. The success of the Revolution would have been nearly impossible, unless an effective commissariat had arisen conjointly with the concentration of the blockading forces. This commissariat was found existing in the municipal authorities ; its magazines consisted of an abundant provision of grain and other produce which was found in the public and private storehouses of the Turks all over the country. Ammunition was obtained by selling a portion of this produce. The waste that took place under this system of commissariat was incredible and unavoidable. During the first two months of the war, thousands of rations were issued to men where the presence of troops was useless, merely because a well-filled magazine of provisions existed in the district ; and millions of cartridges were fired off at the public expense, where no Turk could hear the noise of these patriotic demonstrations.

But whatever may have been the inconveniences and abuses of the communal system, there can be no doubt that the existence of a local Christian magistracy prevented the Greeks from being at first quite helpless, and it concentrated the strength of the population in countless energetic attacks on the dispersed Mussulmans. The attachment of the inhabitants, whether of the Greek or the Albanian race, to their native district, is the element of patriotism in Greece. The associations of family and tribe are strong ; but unless orthodoxy coincides with nationality, the feel-

ings of general patriotism are weak. The connection of the individual with his municipal chiefs was strongly marked and clearly defined. The reciprocal obligations and duties were felt and performed. Under this aspect, the conduct of the population of Greece during the early period of the Revolution is worthy of admiration ; it displays great perseverance and unflinching patriotism. In the wider sphere of political and military action, the influence of the people unfortunately ceased, and we see ignorance, presumption, and selfishness in statesmen and generals rendering the energy of the people nugatory. From some circumstance which hardly admits of explanation, and which we must therefore refer reverentially to the will of God, the Greek Revolution produced no man of real greatness, no statesman of unblemished honour, no general of commanding talent. Fortunately, the people derived from the framework of their existing usages the means of continuing their desperate struggle for independence, in spite of the incapacity and dishonesty of the civil and military leaders who directed the central government. The true glory of the Greek Revolution lies in the indomitable energy and unwearyed perseverance of the mass of the people. But perseverance, unfortunately, like most popular virtues, supplies historians only with commonplace details, while readers expect the annals of revolutions to be filled with pathetic incidents, surprising events, and heroic exploits.

The active energy of the communal system, and the great authority it exercised over the people, offered an obstacle to the consolidation of any imperfect and defective scheme of governmental centralisation ; but these very circumstances would have increased the power of any central government which acquired the respect and confidence of the nation. Men of ability

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and honesty would have sought to lay the foundation of a central administration on the existing communal institutions. They would have embodied these into the fabric of the state, and would not, as Greek statesmen did, have sought to construct a powerful central authority by annihilating the influence of every communal magistracy.

Another disadvantage resulted from the communal institutions of Greece, which must, however, be attributed to the character of the Greeks who administered the system, and not to the system itself. The Greeks are ambitious, intriguing, and presumptuous, and few are restrained by any moral principle in seeking self-glory and self-advancement. No men are, consequently, less adapted to bear sudden elevation, or to be intrusted with great power. When the Revolution, therefore, suddenly invested local magistrates with extraordinary powers, many communes became a scene of waste, peculation, and oppression. Civil contests arose, and open hostilities ensued. The low morality and unbounded ambition of political adventurers from Constantinople and other cities in Turkey increased these disorders. Bishops, primates, and captains began to imitate the pride and display the injustice of cadis, voevodes, and beys. The national revenues were diverted from carrying on the war, and expended in maintaining the households or the personal followers of these oligarchs. No petty archont could walk the streets of Tripolitza without being followed by a band of armed men.

The primates and higher clergy flattered themselves that the expulsion of the Turks would constitute them the heirs of the sultan's power. Their conduct soon isolated them from popular sympathy, and they saw the military officers, whom they had expected to employ as tools, invested with the greater part of the

power they were desirous of seizing. They forgot that A. D. 1821. the Othoman empire was a military government. The people became early clamorous for a legal government. Bold demagogues and intelligent patriots called for the creation of a responsible executive. The oligarchs were forced to yield. On the 7th of June 1821 a Peloponnesian Senate was constituted, and invested with dictatorial powers, which were to continue until the taking of Tripolitza. This Senate was nothing more than a committee of the oligarchs ; it was appointed by a few of the most influential among the clergy and primates, with the co-operation of several of the most powerful military chiefs, at a meeting held in the monastery of Kaltetzi. No meeting of deputies popularly elected took place. The people who had taken up arms to conquer their independence were excluded from a share in electing their rulers. The consequence was, that the feelings of the people were deeply wounded, and the wound festered far more than politicians generally supposed. Nevertheless, even strangers who visited Greece in 1823 could observe that the central government of Greece was then generally regarded by the agricultural population as alien in sentiment, and unworthy of the nation's confidence.

The arrival of two Greeks of rank modified in some degree the consequences of the proceedings at Kaltetzi. On the 22d of June, Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes arrived at the Greek camp before Tripolitza, where he was welcomed as commander-in-chief by the whole army. Demetrius formed a favourable contrast to his brother Alexander, in his moral and military conduct ; but he was inferior to him in personal accomplishments and almost as deficient in judgment and political discrimination. His stature was small, his appearance insignificant, his voice discordant, his manner awkward, and his health weak ; yet with these physical defects he

had manly sentiments, undaunted courage, and sincere patriotism. His principles were those of an honourable man, and his feelings were those of a gentleman. Unfortunately, he had neither experience nor tact in conducting public business.

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes laid claim to the authority of a viceroy in Greece. He assumed that his brother Prince Alexander, as supreme head of the Hetairia, had been appointed Prince of Greece, and he pretended to be empowered to act as lieutenant-governor of the country for his brother. The pretension was foolish, and it was put forward in a foolish way. Nevertheless, as he was supposed, when he arrived, to be the herald of Russian aid, he received an enthusiastic reception from the people and the troops. His inexperience and incapacity prevented his availing himself of that enthusiasm, either to consolidate his own power or to benefit the cause of Greece. He might easily have employed the authority it gave him with the people to compel the soldiers to receive some elementary organisation, and the power it gave him over the soldiers to restrain the disorders of the captains. Power was conferred on him, which, if wisely used, might have rendered him the Washington of Greece. Since "vanquished Persia's despot fled," no Greek had stepped into an easier path to true glory. But like a weak despot, instead of using the authority in his hands, he demanded additional powers, of which circumstances rendered it impossible for him to make any use, and of which in no circumstances could he have made a good use. He required that the Peloponnesian Senate should be formally abolished, and that the whole executive power should be placed in his hands as lieutenant-governor until the arrival of his brother. The Senate and the primates opposed these demands, which were supported by the military.

Much intriguing ensued ; the blockade of Tripolitza A. D. 1821.
and the general interests of Greece were neglected by both parties. Men took to wrangling with so much goodwill, that they neglected the subject of the contest in the pleasures of the dispute, and the business seemed every day farther from any termination. At last, Hypsilantes made a bold move to rouse the soldiers and the people to declare that his cause was theirs, and thus put an end to all opposition. He suddenly quitted the camp before Tripolitza, declaring that all his efforts to serve Greece were useless, for they were paralysed by the ambition and the selfishness of the senators and the primates. His departure, as he had foreseen, made the soldiers take up arms. Some of the primates were in considerable personal danger, and would have been murdered had they not been protected by the captains. The Senate yielded. A deputation was sent to invite Hypsilantes to return, and he was brought back in triumph from Leondari.

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes was now in possession of all the power which could be conferred on him, but it soon became apparent that neither he nor those about him knew how to employ it. He made no attempt to give the troops any organisation even with regard to their commissariat. He did not even create a central civil administration, which would have enabled him to keep the military power he had acquired over the captains in his own hands. At this moment the formation of a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of light guns, would have enabled him to organise Greece, for he had the people and the soldiers devoted to his person, and eager to be ruled by a single chief. Everywhere he was saluted as the Apheni, or lord of the country. The supreme authority of the Hetairia still exercised a magic influence over men's minds, and he was universally regarded as

an agent of Russia ; for it was argued that, unless the Russian government wished to support the Revolution, the Russian police would never have allowed him to pass the frontiers. Both Petrobey and Kolokotrones were disposed to act under his orders, and they might easily have been rendered most efficient, and at the same time responsible, supporters of his administration. But Hypsilantes was bewildered with the power he had assumed, and Kolokotrones, who soon discovered his incapacity, could not resist the temptation of profiting by it.

The advisers of Hypsilantes were men as destitute of practical experience as he was himself. The self-government which existed among the Greeks of the Morea was at variance with what they had heard and seen of administration in France and Russia. They excited dissatisfaction by openly expressing their contempt for what they called the Turkish system. Yet they were utterly incompetent to create a central system complete enough to supplant, or powerful enough to override, this despised system.

When Hypsilantes returned to the camp before Tripolitza, he was so imprudent as to allow the Peloponnesian senators to remain at Vervena. They soon recovered their previous authority, and, with the assistance of the other primates, began to undermine the power of the prince, who, with inexplicable ignorance, left all their agents and partisans in office over the whole country, and consequently permitted them to remain practically the only central executive authority. Partly by their intrigues, and partly by his ignorance of the duties of a supreme ruler, before Hypsilantes had been six weeks at the head of the government, the camp was more than once without provisions. Hypsilantes could neither form nor execute any project to relieve himself from his difficulties. He waited for

others to perform the duties of his station. Instead of A. D. 1821.
 acting himself, he wrangled with Germanos, the archbishop of Patras, Delyiannes, and Charalambes, for infringing his authority. The military chieftains profited by his neglect. They acted in his name, and employed it to establish their own influence in different municipalities, from which they contrived to secure regular supplies to their own followers. Brigand chiefs and ignorant captains became in this way the possessors of those powers of which Hypsilantes had deprived the Senate and the primates, and which escaped from his own hands, from his incompetency to create a central administration. The original usurpation of the Peloponnesian Senate and this incapacity of Hypsilantes added strength to the causes of discord and internal anarchy which soon became a prominent feature of the Revolution. The thoughts of public men received a vicious direction, and public business was conducted in a secret and underhand manner.

An instructive comparison might be made between the prudence of Washington in his camp before Boston in 1775, and the ineptness of Hypsilantes in his camp before Tripolitza in 1821. The first requisite for military success is military discipline; and the man who cannot introduce and maintain this sufficiently to secure order, is unfit to command armies.¹ The difficulty of converting a national militia into a regular army is great; but enough has been said to show that many circumstances were favourable to the enterprise in the Morea. Washington flogged the citizens of the United States who infringed the laws of military order; Hypsilantes might have hanged primates and captains who disobeyed his orders: and had he known, like Washington, how to temper severity with justice

¹ Hypsilantes formed a small corps of regulars, but made no attempt to organise the irregulars as Capodistrias did.

and command the respect of his soldiers, he might have formed a Greek army, and saved Greece from anarchy.

Disorder and dissension were gaining ground when Alexander Mavrocordatos, then called Prince Mavrocordatos both by himself and others, arrived at the camp of Trikorphas on the 8th of August 1821. His long political career has rendered him the most celebrated statesman of the Greek Revolution. When he joined the Greeks, it required no great discrimination to observe that both Hypsilantes and the primates were acting unwisely, and advancing into false positions from which it would be difficult for them to retreat with honour. In such a complication Mavrocordatos would not act a subordinate part; and to escape from factions, whose errors he could not rectify, he obtained the political direction of the Revolution in Western Greece, and quitted the camp on the 9th of September. About the same time Theodore Negriss, an active, able, intriguing, ambitious, and unprincipled phanariot, was charged with the political organisation of Eastern Greece.

When Mavrocordatos reached Mesolonghi, he convoked a meeting of deputies from the provinces of Acarnania, Etolia, Western Locris, and that part of Epirus which had joined the Revolution. Negriss held a similar meeting of deputies from Attica, Boeotia, Megaris, Phocis, and Eastern Locris, at Salona. At Mesolonghi a senate was constituted to conduct the executive government; at Salona a corresponding assembly was called the Areopagos. Both assemblies were under the guidance and direction of civilians, who knew very little of the existing institutions and first wants of the country they attempted to organise. Instead of strengthening the municipalities and disciplining the municipal authorities, they created new

officers to represent the central power, vainly expecting to use the military chiefs as their subordinate agents. Several of the members of these senates were Greeks, educated in the universities of Western Europe ; others were phanariots, educated in the sultan's service. All placed more confidence in their own scientific maxims than in the practical experience of the local magistrates and captains. They were fond of talking, fond of writing, stiff in their opinions, and dilatory in their actions. Both demogeronts and captains soon perceived that they were eloquent in ignorance, that they carried on a mass of unnecessary and unintelligible correspondence, and that, when once they went wrong, they could never be set right. A. D. 1821.

In so far, however, as these assemblies were steps towards national union, and to the formation of a central government, they were useful. But their immediate tendency was to weaken the authority of any general government ; for in both the constitutions which they adopted, provisions were inserted, encroaching on its necessary powers. Nor was this done on any systematic plan by which Greece might have been formed into a federal state. In the constitution of Western Greece, Mavrocordatos attempted to conceal his ambition, by an article which declared in vague terms that the Senate, and the administrative arrangements it created, should cease as soon as a permanent general government was established. But in Eastern Greece the constitution boldly circumscribed the authority of the Greek government even in military matters. Both these constitutions were crude scholastic productions, ill suited to the temper of the people, to the actual state of civilisation, to the existing institutions, and to the exigencies of the time. The enemies of Mavrocordatos and Negris justly blamed their legislation as a phanariot manœuvre to gain political power, and as

positively injurious to the liberties of the people, in so far as it elevated barriers between the municipal institutions of the country and the central executive.

In Western Greece the prudence of Mavrocordatos gained him many personal friends, and created a political party in his favour; but in Eastern Greece the restless ambition of Negris caused him to lose the support of his political associates. The invasion of the Turks also threw absolute power into the hands of unprincipled and rapacious military chiefs, like Panouria and Odysseus, and reduced the Areopagos to perform the duties of paymaster and commissary.

The four great divisions of liberated Greece—the Morea, the islands, the eastern and the western provinces of the continent—were compelled to meet the first demands of the Revolution by local arrangements. But the events of the year 1821 convinced all alike of the necessity of establishing a central government. The conquest of Tripolitza was the term fixed for the dissolution of the Peloponnesian Senate. But the weakness of Hypsilantes, the ambition of the primates and captains, and a general spirit of party, perpetuated the evils which had been fostered by the senators. The administration of the public revenues remained in the same hands, and they were diverted from carrying on the war against the Turks. Large bodies of men were kept under arms, but these men were engaged in supporting local governors and tax-gatherers.

In autumn, however, the Greeks demanded that a national assembly should be convoked, in a tone that enforced attention. Party intrigues absorbed the whole activity of the oligarchs, who were beginning to enjoy the fruits of partial success in the midst of serious danger. Germanos, the archbishop of Patras, made himself conspicuous by his luxury and pride. He strove to form a league of Moreot primates, who ex-

pected to rule the Peloponnesus by means of its own A. D. 1821.
provincial administration.

Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, seeing himself forsaken by the military chiefs, as well as opposed by the primates, now for the first time recognised the right of the people to a voice in the formation of their own government and laws. He supposed that the popular enthusiasm with which he had been welcomed, still existed. He forgot all that he had done to forfeit the people's confidence. In virtue of the supreme authority he possessed, he issued a proclamation summoning a national assembly to meet at Tripolitza in November. But even in performing this popular act, he neutralised the favourable impression it might have produced, by signing the document as the lieutenant-general of his brother Alexander, instead of issuing it as the elected chief of the Greek nation. The military misconduct and the disgraceful flight of his brother were already the theme of universal reprobation. But in spite of the strange perverseness of Demetrius Hypsilantes, the object of his proclamation coincided so completely with the wishes of the nation, that deputies were everywhere elected. Tripolitza was infested by the fearful epidemic which has been already mentioned. The meeting of the national assembly was transferred to Argos, where it took place in December 1821. But Argos was soon so crowded by the armed bands who followed the Peloponnesian oligarchs, that it was deemed an unfit place for a national assembly, which was transferred again to Piada, a small town about three miles west of the site of Epidaurus. In consequence of the fashion adopted by the modern Greeks, of acting history with great names, instead of making it by noble deeds, this first national assembly is called the assembly of Epidaurus.

The primates and captains of the Morea were re-

solved to yield as little of the power they enjoyed to a central government as possible. They took their measures with promptitude, and carried them into effect with decision. Before the national assembly published the constitution of Greece, and elected an executive government, the oligarchs of the Morea reconstituted the Peloponnesian Senate, and enacted a local constitution, which invested it with a direct control over the financial and military resources of the Peloponnesus. They took a lesson from the proceedings of Mavrocordatos and Negris, who had created political influence by means of provincial constitutions; but their superior knowledge of the administrative machinery then in action, enabled them to draw up a more practical constitution, and establish a more efficient senate. Among other unconstitutional powers with which this senate was invested, it was authorised to name the deputies who were to represent the people of the Peloponnesus in the national assembly. It deserves to be noticed that the members from the rest of Greece did not protest against this violation of the principles of popular freedom.

It may, however, be doubted, whether the Peloponnesian oligarchs would have succeeded in this illegal proceeding had Demetrius Hypsilantes not deserted the popular cause. His jealousy of Mavrocordatos at this time appears completely to have obscured the small portion of judgment he ever possessed, and to have concealed from him the iniquity of coalescing with men whom, in a public proclamation, he had recently accused of being eager to oppress the Greek people and to govern as Turkish officials. His conduct strengthened the Moreot primates and captains, but it entirely destroyed his own political influence, and greatly injured his personal reputation.

The organisation of the Peloponnesian Senate forms

an important and interesting feature in the history of A. D. 1821. the Greek Revolution. It was the principal cause of the failure of the constitution of Epidaurus, and of the nullity of the executive government of Greece which that constitution created. The members of this Senate were really self-elected, and it circumscribed the legal powers of the central government under cover of arrangements to protect local liberties. The provincial constitution of the Peloponnesus pretended to create a subordinate provincial administration, but it really organised an independent executive government. It assumed an absolute control over the municipalities, and rendered all local authorities responsible for their financial and fiscal acts to the Peloponnesian Senate, not to the Greek government. This Senate was allowed to arrogate to itself the right of judging traitors, dismissing officials, ratifying the election of captains of the militia, whom the people were allowed to elect, and of appointing generals to command the troops of the Peloponnesus. With the concurrence of the captains and general thus named, it claimed the right of naming an archistrategos or commander-in-chief of the whole Peloponnesian forces, which in this way were kept as a distinct army, separated from the Romeliat armatoli, who formed the real military strength of liberated Greece. The ambition of Kolokotrones appears to have suggested this most unmilitary arrangement. It contributed, with other causes, to prevent the Peloponnesian armed bands from bearing almost any share in the warlike operations in continental Greece. The Senate also fixed the pay of the soldiers and officers of the Peloponnesian army, thus securing their obedience. It is true that the constitution required the nomination of the archistrategos to be submitted to the approval of the legislative assembly, but the consent of a legislative assembly to the appointment could only be re-

garded as a formal ratification. It could never be refused without the risk of a civil war.

Many of the objectionable provisions of the constitution of the Peloponnesian Senate were verbally transcribed from the constitution which Mavrocordatos had introduced in Western Greece, but the oligarchs of the Morea carried them into effect in a different spirit from that in which they had been drawn up. In Western Greece, it was expressly stipulated that they were to cease when a central government was established ; in the Peloponnesus, on the contrary, they were to operate as a check on the authority of the central government.¹

The worst feature of these local constitutions was common to all. They all authorised provincial authorities to maintain armed bands to enforce their orders and defend their power. This provision perpetuated and legalised a state of anarchy. The Peloponnesian Senate carried this abuse to the greatest extent. It was empowered to keep up a guard of a thousand men at a moment when every man in Greece capable of bearing arms ought to have been sent to the banks of the Sperchius, or the passes of Makrynoros.²

It is not necessary to enter into further details to explain how the Moreots paralysed the national assembly at Piada, and rendered the constitution of Epidaurus and the executive government of Greece ineffectual. The primates and military chiefs, by their coalition with Demetrius Hypsilantes, were enabled to retain a complete command over the fiscal resources of the Morea, which then formed the great bulk of the national revenues. The executive government was comparatively powerless. Men of sagacity must have

¹ The laws and constitutions of Greece during the Revolution have been published by Mr Mamouka, Under-Secretary of State, in eleven volumes. For the constitution of the Peloponnesus, see vol. i. p. 107 ; of Western Greece, i. 21.

² Mamouka, i. 117.

seen that the constitution of Epidaurus was a dead letter as long as the constitution of the Peloponnesus existed ; yet Mavrocordatos and other men of talent allowed their ambition to blind them to the evil effects of promulgating a political constitution merely to witness its violation, and of acting as an executive body without exercising the powers of a national government. If they feared to make an appeal to the people in favour of representative institutions, lest the appeal should prove a signal for commencing a civil war, it was their duty to lay aside their ambitious schemes, to convert the Peloponnesian Senate into a national executive, by compelling it to undertake the conduct of the central executive of all Greece, and thus concentrate public attention on its proceedings. By taking a different course, they created two antagonistic administrations of nearly equal force. A. D. 1821.

Accidental circumstances diminished the personal influence of Mavrocordatos at the first assembly of the deputies of Greece, by bringing him on the scene under disadvantageous circumstances. He had just made himself ridiculous by an attempt to play the general. On quitting Mesolonghi to attend the national assembly, he crossed the gulf to the Greek camp before Patras. He arrived with a good deal of military parade, bringing with him some pieces of artillery and fifteen hundred stand of small-arms. He was attended by another phanariot, Prince Constantine Caradja. The Achaians had already been successful in several skirmishes with the garrison of Patras, but Mavrocordatos, who knew nothing of military matters, did not know how to profit by these successes. The consequence was, that they rendered both him and the besiegers extremely negligent, and by alarming the Turks rendered them extremely vigilant. Suddenly, while Mavrocordatos was pluming himself on the

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favourable effect which his success in Western Greece had produced on the Moreots, the garrison of Patras made a general attack on the positions of the besiegers. The whole blockading army fled, and Mavrocordatos fled with it, leaving the artillery and arms which he had brought over from Mesolonghi, and the whole personal baggage of himself and his suite, in the hands of the Turks. He arrived at Argos in such a state of destitution as gave point to the sneers of his enemies, who attributed his disaster to his misplaced vanity in attempting to rival the military reputation of Hypsilantes.

The constitution of Epidaurus was proclaimed on the 13th of January 1822, the new year's day of Eastern Christians. It was the work of Mavrocordatos and Negris, who were assisted by an Italian refugee, named Gallina. It must be looked upon rather as a statement of the political principles, ratified by national consent, than as a practical organic law of the new Greek state. Its provisions are excellent, but they are the enunciation of vague maxims. It does nothing to connect the existing institutions of the country with the central administration it created. Those who framed it probably thought more of its effect in Western Europe than of its operation in Greece. For practical government they trusted, with their national self-confidence, to their own talents. It has, however, the merit of proclaiming religious liberty, of abolishing slavery, and declaring that judicial torture was illegal. But it adopted no arrangements for enforcing financial responsibility on the municipal authorities who fingered public money, nor for restraining the fiscal rapacity of the proësti and the military exactions of the captains. No attempt was made to improve the morality of the rulers of the country, by furnishing the people with some information concerning the enormous amount of

Turkish property which had become national, nor A. D. 1821. concerning the manner in which it was expended or administered.

The central government of Greece, established by the constitution of Epidaurus, consisted of a legislative assembly and an executive body. The names of several distinguished men appear neither in the one nor the other; there can be no doubt, therefore, that this National Assembly was employed to throw the power of which it could dispose into the hands of a party.

The executive body consisted of five members. Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos, after acting as president of the National Assembly, was named President of Greece. The executive was authorised to appoint eight ministers. The power of naming officials to civil, military, and financial employments was vaguely expressed in order to avoid a conflict of competency with the provincial senates and the government of the naval islands. A good deal was done by the Greeks at Epidaurus to deceive Europe; very little to organise Greece.

CHAPTER II.

THE PRESIDENCY OF MAVROCORDATOS.

“Τὸ δὲ παθεῖν εὖ, πρῶτον ἄλλων
Ἐδ’ ὁ ἀκουεῖν δευτέρα μοῖρ’.
Ἄμφοτέροισι δ’ ἀνὴρ
Ὅς ἂν ἐγκύρσῃ, καὶ ἔλῃ
Στέφανον ὕψιστον δέδεκται.”—PINDAR.

Man's highest good is virtue to achieve ;
His next, the fortune to obtain renown.
Who in one wreath this double prize can weave,
Hath set upon his brow life's brightest crown.

THE CHARACTER AND POLITICAL POSITION OF ALEXANDER MAVROCORDATOS—
AFFAIRS OF EUBOEÆ, AND DEATH OF ELIAS MAVROMICHALES—CONDUCT OF
ODYSSEUS AT KARYSTOS—AFFAIRS OF CHIOS, AND INVASION OF THE ISLAND
BY THE SAMIOTS—PROMPT MEASURES OF THE SULTAN—MASSACRES OF THE
CHIOTS—GREEK FLEET PUTS TO SEA—CONSTANTINE KANARIS BURNS THE
FLAG-SHIP OF THE CAPITAN-PASHA—DEVASTATION OF CHIOS—THE PRESIDENT
MAVROCORDATOS ASSUMES THE CHIEF COMMAND IN WESTERN GREECE—
TREACHERY OF GOGOS—DEFEAT AT PETTA—EFFECTS OF THIS DEFEAT—
DEATH OF KYRIAKULES MAVROMICHALES—CAPITULATION OF SULIOTS—
AFFAIRS OF ACARNANIA—SIEGE OF MESOLONGHI—DEFEAT OF THE TURKS.

A VAULTING ambition prompted Alexander Mavrocordatos to assume the supreme authority in Greece, when circumstances demanded greater abilities and a firmer character than he possessed, in order to execute the duties of the office with honour to the leader and advantage to the country. He has perhaps a better claim to be considered a statesman than any other actor in the Revolution ; but even his claim to that high rank is very dubious. Such as he was, history exhibits plainly in his conduct, and his conduct reveals

his character. He was himself always making a mystery A. D. 1822.
of public business, and a parade of administrative trifles ;
but nations have no secrets in their proceedings, and
the mists of adulation which once surrounded the first
president of Greece have long vanished. Of him it can
be said with great truth, *Major privato visus, dum
privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi
imperasset.*

The superiority of Mavrocordatos over the rest of
his countrymen must have been really great ; for, in
his long political career, he has been five times called
from an inferior or a private station to occupy the
highest rank in the administration of Greece. In
every case he made shipwreck of his own reputation,
and left public affairs in as bad a position as he found
them, if not in a worse.

It is, however, no inconsiderable honour to have
been elected the first president of liberated Greece by
the voice of a free people, and to have so comported
himself that even when he forfeited the nation's confi-
dence he retained a place in the people's esteem. His
presidency was a period of misfortune to himself and
to the central government, and the misfortune was
caused by misconduct and wilful errors. Yet the year
1822 was a period of glory to Greece ; and had he
known how to perform the duties of the presidency,
some part of that glory would have been reflected on
him and on the government of which he was the head.
Partly from causes over which he had no control, his
administration opened with disaster, and in conse-
quence of his perverse and mistaken ambition, it ter-
minated in calamity. The sad catastrophe of Chios
cast a dark shade over the dawn of his government.
The defeat of Petta brought disgrace on his personal
administration. The first was an unavoidable misfor-
tune, as far as Mavrocordatos was concerned, but for

the second he was solely and entirely responsible. He deserted his duty, as President of Greece, to act as governor-general of its western provinces, and he assumed the command of an army to make political capital of military success, without possessing one single quality that fitted him for a soldier.

The first misfortune which happened to the Greeks in 1822 was the death of Elias Mavromichales, the eldest son of Petrobey. He was invited by the provincial government of Eastern Greece to take the command of the troops engaged in blockading the Acropolis of Athens ; but when he arrived at the Athenian camp, he was persuaded to accept the chief command of an army which was destined to besiege Karystos. Elias preferred active operations in Eubœa to the dull routine of watching the starving Turks at Athens. He marched to Kalamos, and crossed the channel to Kastelli, accompanied by his uncle Kyriakoules and six hundred Maniats.

Before his arrival at the camp of the Eubœans, the people of Kumi had elected Vasos to be their captain, a native of Montenegro, who, after passing his life in menial occupations, or as an ordinary klepht, had quitted Smyrna to join the Revolution and push his way as a soldier. Vasos was a man of a fine athletic figure, well suited to distinguish himself in personal brawls ; but he was ignorant of military affairs, and never acquired any military experience beyond that which is required for a brigand chief. Elias Mavromichales displayed on this occasion far more generosity and patriotism than Hypsilantes and Mavrocordatos in similar circumstances. Without seeking to make his rank as a general appointed by the central government, and his invitation by a provincial committee of Eubœa, a ground for insisting on receiving the chief command, he removed all cause of dissension by allow-

ing Vasos, though a stranger and an untried soldier, A. D. 1822.
to share his authority.

At the solicitation of the people of Eubœa it was resolved to attack a body of Turks posted in the village of Stura without waiting for reinforcements, though they were hourly expected. The allurements of avarice prevailed over the suggestions of prudence. The Turks had collected considerable quantities of grain at Stura, which was occupied by only about a hundred men.

To insure success in this attack, it was necessary for the Greeks to occupy the pass over Mount Diakophti. This would have prevented Omer Bey of Karystos, an active and enterprising officer, from bringing assistance to the small garrison in Stura. The Greeks were fully aware of the importance of seizing this position ; yet, in consequence of the utter want of military discipline, and the divided command, added to their natural habit of wasting the time for action in debate, the occupation of the pass was put off for a day. One body of troops marched to attack Stura, and another to occupy the pass of Diakophti.

Omer Bey had not lost time like the Greeks. The moment he heard that a body of Greek troops had crossed the channel, he hastened to secure the pass, and the Greeks found him already intrenched in a strong position. After routing the troops opposed to him, he hastened forward to defend his magazines at Stura.

In the mean time Elias Mavromichales had entered Stura, but the Turks in garrison had shut themselves up in the stone houses round the magazines, and made a determined resistance. While the skirmishing was going on the advanced guard of the troops from Karystos arrived, and the Greeks were driven out of the place. Elias, with a few men, kept possession of

an old windmill, which he defended valiantly, expecting that his uncle and his colleague, Vasos, would be able to rally the fugitives and return to engage the Turks. In an hour or two, perceiving that the defeat was decisive, he attempted to cut his way through the enemy sword in hand, but was shot in the attempt. Two only of his followers escaped. This affair occurred on the 24th of January 1822.

The death of Elias Mavromichales was generally lamented. He had shown some military talent, as well as brilliant courage, which was a characteristic of many members of his house. No chief was more beloved by the soldiers, for no other was so attentive to their welfare and so disinterested in his personal conduct. He was strongly imbued with that youthful enthusiasm which seeks glory rather than power.

Shortly after the death of Elias Mavromichales, the fugitives were reinforced by the arrival of Odysseus from Attica with seven hundred men, many of whom were *armatoli*. The Greek army rallied under this new leader, and advanced to Stura, which was abandoned by the Turks. But the Greeks found the magazines empty ; for Omer Bey, instead of pursuing his enemy, had prudently employed his time in conveying the grain at Stura within the fortress of Karystos.

The siege of Karystos was now formed, and the besiegers cut off the water which is conveyed into the town by an aqueduct. The Greek army was three thousand strong, and great expectations were entertained that Omer Bey would be compelled to capitulate. But about the middle of February, Odysseus, who had not been able to obtain the sole command, suddenly abandoned his position, and marched away without giving any previous notice of his movement to the other chiefs of the blockading army. He pretended that he was compelled to move because his

troops were left without provisions ; but the want of provisions certainly did not oblige him to keep his movements a secret. His desertion alarmed the remainder of the army, and the Greeks retired from before Karystos. The army of Eubœa was soon after broken up. The Turks of Negrepont and Karystos, finding no troops in the field to oppose them, sallied out of these fortresses, and levied taxes and contributions over the greater part of the island during the year 1822. A. D. 1822.

The conduct of Odysseus was supposed to be the result of treasonable arrangements with Omer Bey. Like some other captains of *armatoli*, Odysseus felt doubts of the ultimate success of the Revolution, and had no enthusiasm for liberty. His feelings were those of an Albanian mercenary soldier, and he had no confidence in the talents of the Greek civilians who took the lead in public affairs. He entertained a settled conviction that the Revolution would terminate in some compromise ; and as Ali of Joannina was his model of a hero, he pursued his own interest, like that chieftain, without submitting to any restraint from duty, morality, or religion. His character was a compound of the worst vices of the Greeks and Albanians. He was false as the most deceitful Greek, and vindictive as the most bloodthirsty Albanian. To these vices he added excessive avarice, universal distrust, and ferocious cruelty. The most probable explanation of his conduct at Karystos seems to be, that, on one hand, he was jealous of the chiefs with whom he was acting, and that, on the other, he suspected some manœuvre of his enemy Kolettes, who was then acting as minister at war at Corinth. He knew that Mavrocordatos was seeking to increase the power of the central government, and that the members of the Areopagos of Eastern Greece, which still continued to exist, were

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labouring to prevent his gaining a predominant influence in Attica. Odysseus had already formed the project of acquiring an independent provincial command in Eastern Greece corresponding to that once exercised, or supposed to have been exercised, by captains of *armatoli*. And he was inclined to leave it to the chapter of accidents whether he was to exercise this power as a general of Greece, or as an officer of the sultan. In spite of the military anarchy that reigned in Greece, public opinion was strong enough to derange his plans.

No calamity during the Greek Revolution awakened the sympathy and compassion of the civilised world more deservedly than the devastation of Chios. The industrious and peaceable inhabitants of that happy island were mildly governed, and they were averse to join the Revolution, in which, from their unwarlike habits, they were disqualified from taking an active part. By an insurrection against the sultan they had everything to lose, and nothing to gain. In both cases their local privileges would be diminished, if not entirely lost. Their municipal administration was already in their own hands; their taxes were light, and they were collected by themselves. The Chiois justly feared that the central government of Greece would increase the burden of taxation, and that *Hydriots*, *Maniats*, or *Romeliat armatoli*, would prove severer tax-gatherers than village magistrates. Even at the first outbreak of orthodox enthusiasm, when Russian aid was universally expected, the people of the island refused to take up arms. Admiral Tom-bazes appeared off Chios with the Greek fleet during its first cruise, and vainly invited the inhabitants to throw off the Othoman yoke, and avenge the martyrdom of the patriarch Gregorios.

This attempt of the Greek fleet to excite an insur-

rection alarmed Sultan Mahmud, and the Othoman A. D. 1822 government deemed it necessary to disarm the orthodox, and to strengthen the Turkish garrison in the citadel, where the archbishop and seventy of the principal Greeks were ordered to reside as hostages for the tranquillity of the island. The fortifications were repaired, provisions and military stores were collected, and the citadel was put in a state of defence. Prudence now forbade the Greeks to invade Chios, unless they had previously secured the command of the sea; for it was impossible to take the citadel without a regular siege, since the vicinity of the continent rendered a blockade impossible even during the winter, when the Turkish fleet remained within the Dardanelles.

Unfortunately for the Chiots, their wealth excited the cupidity of many of the ruling men in Greece, and stimulated adventurers to undertake the conquest of the island. The inhabitants were stigmatised for their treachery to the national cause, and in an unlucky hour Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes authorised a Chiot merchant named, like very many other Chiot merchants, Ralli, to undertake an expedition to Chios in conjunction with Lykourgos, a man who had obtained considerable influence at Samos. Lykourgos, who had practised medicine at Smyrna, was a bold adventurer. Availing himself adroitly of the general ignorance of political and military affairs among his countrymen, he persuaded them to place the chief direction of public business at Samos in his hands. On the 2d of January 1822, Hypsilantes, foreseeing that the presidency of Greece was about to pass into the hands of his rival Mavrocordatos, and perhaps deeming that the central government would be unable to support the expedition to Chios with sufficient energy, wrote a suggestion that it might be prudent to defer the enterprise. He only covered his own responsibility, without counter-

manding the expedition. To this suggestion in favour of delay, Lykourgos replied on the 1st of February, that he had put off the attack, but that he prayed fervently for a favourable opportunity for making the attempt, as he considered the conquest of Chios to be a sacred duty. The project was opposed, not only by the leading Chiots, but by the most intelligent Psarians.

Lykourgos had only delayed his enterprise because his preparations were incomplete. In order to deceive the Psarians and the Chiots, he gave out that he was going to attack Scalanova. The Turks, however, divined his object. Scalanova was secure, for it was occupied by a strong garrison. Fresh troops were therefore transported into the island of Chios, and Vehid Pasha found great difficulty in maintaining order among these bands, which were principally composed of volunteers, and who came, filled with Mussulman enthusiasm, to combat infidels, and, what was more pleasant, to plunder them. Vehid Pasha behaved with great prudence in his difficult position. He persuaded the Greeks to raise a monthly contribution of thirty-four thousand piastres, and he employed this sum in providing regular pay and liberal rations for the troops, and particularly for the volunteers. The Porte in the mean time ordered the pasha to send the three principal hostages to Constantinople, and to keep strict guard over the others.

As soon as Lykourgos had completed his preparations, he waited neither for the orders of Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, the lieutenant-governor of the supreme chief of the Hetairia, nor of Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos, the President of Greece. On the 22d of March 1822, he landed at Koutari with about twenty-five hundred men. After a trifling skirmish the invaders entered the town of Chios, where they

burned the custom-house, destroyed two mosques, and behaved more like a band of pirates than a body of national troops. Their military dispositions consisted in occupying the houses nearest the citadel with riflemen, and beginning to form a battery on the commanding position of Truloti. A. D. 1822.

The time for invading Chios was extremely ill chosen. The Turkish fleet had already quitted Constantinople. Lykourgos and his followers were nevertheless sure of gaining considerable booty by their expedition, though that booty could only be won by plundering the sultan's Christian subjects. They hoped that accident would enable them to get possession of the citadel of Chios, and in case they should be compelled to retreat, they trusted to their own ability and to the stupidity of the Turks for effecting their escape. The contempt with which the Greeks viewed the Turks at this period seems hardly credible to those who calmly look back at the events of the contest.

The siege of the citadel of Chios was commenced in form. Batteries were constructed not only on Truloti, but also on the beach of the port. They were, however, too distant to produce any effect, and the troops would not work at the trenches with sufficient regularity to make any progress with the attack. In the mean time the peasants crowded into the town from the villages in the mountains, and Lykourgos found himself at the head of a large force. But of that force he knew not how to make any use. Instead of devoting all his energy to the conquest of the citadel, he began to play the prince, and to organise a government. Taking up his quarters in the bishop's palace, he deposed the demogerontes, and appointed a revolutionary committee of seven ephors. Lykourgos did nothing, the ephors had nothing to do, and the camp became a scene of anarchy.

It was soon evident that a more competent commander and a more powerful force was required to enable the Greeks to take the citadel. A deputation was therefore sent by the inhabitants to Corinth to solicit aid from Mavrocordatos. Mr Glarakes, a man who had received his education in Germany, was at the head of this deputation.¹ The Greek government furnished the Chiots with a few heavy guns and some artillerymen. Several Philhellenes also accompanied these supplies, to assist in directing the operations of the siege. But no Greek fleet was sent to prevent Turkish troops from crossing over from the Asiatic coast. The ephors had only succeeded in hiring six small Psarian vessels to cruise in the channel, and watch the Turkish boats at Tchesme. The disorderly conduct of the troops under Lykourgios compelled many of the wealthy Chiots to quit the island with their families. To prevent these desertions, as they were called, the officers imprisoned many wealthy individuals, threatened them with ill usage on the part of the soldiers, and made them pay large sums of money, as a bribe to purchase protection from the ill usage with which they were threatened at the instigation of these very officers.

The attack on Chios excited more indignation than alarm at Constantinople. The sultan felt it as a personal insult which he was bound to avenge. The ladies of the harem called for the extermination of the rebels who were plundering their mastic gardens. The divan was incensed at the boldness of the enterprise, and resolved to spare no exertions to preserve so valuable an appanage of the court as Chios then formed. The Porte suddenly became a scene of activity,

¹ Glarakes would have been a valuable citizen in peaceful times. He was patriotic and honest, but misplaced in his career by the Revolution, yet he held the office of Secretary of State for a long time during the Revolution, and he was more than once a minister under King Otho.

which contrasted strongly with the apathetic indifference of the Greek government at Corinth. Sultan Mahmud commenced his operations in the true Othoman spirit, by ordering three of the Chiot hostages to be hanged, and a number of the wealthiest Chiot merchants in Constantinople to be thrown into prison. A. D. 1822.

The Othoman fleet put to sea. The pashas on the coast of Asia Minor were ordered to hold the best troops they could assemble ready for embarkation, and the ports nearest to Chios were instructed to pass over boat-loads of troops and provisions to the citadel at every risk as long as the Greeks remained in the island. Though the ordinary commands of a despotic government are frequently neglected, the extraordinary and express orders of a despotic master are promptly obeyed. The ports of Asia Minor were soon crowded with troops, and the citadel was maintained in a good state of defence.

The capitan-pasha, Kara Ali, arrived in the northern channel of Chios on the 11th April 1822. As he entered, a Turkish felucca belonging to his squadron got on shore, and was captured by the Greeks, who immediately put to death every soul on board. This act of barbarity was not sustained by the desperate courage which can alone excuse such a system of warfare. Next day, the capitan-pasha landed a body of seven thousand men to the south of the city. The Greeks made little exertion to prevent his landing, and fled from their intrenchments at the first approach of the Turkish troops. The victors plundered the town of whatever the lawless bands of Lykourgos had left, and a body of fanatic Mussulman volunteers, who had joined the expedition as a holy war against infidels, paraded the streets, murdering every Christian who fell into their hands.

Lykourgos showed as little courage in irregular

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warfare in the field as he had displayed military capacity in the camp. After a feeble attempt to defend the village of St George to which he had retreated, he and his followers fled to the coast, and embarked in some Psarian vessels, abandoning the unfortunate Chiots whom they had goaded into rebellion, to the fury of the exasperated Turks. This fury, it must be mentioned, was increased by the deliberate murder of nearly all their prisoners by the Greeks during the whole period of the expedition.

Lykourgos returned to Samos. The failure of the expedition was attributed to his incapacity and cowardice, which perhaps only rendered an inevitable failure a disgraceful defeat. But no one appears to have upbraided him with his cruelty and extortion, which inflicted so many calamities on the unfortunate inhabitants of Chios. The Samiots deprived him of all authority, and drove him into exile. At a later period of the Revolution, however, he was reinstated in his authority, being appointed governor of Samos by the primates of Hydra, who found it impossible to levy an assessment of three hundred thousand piastres which had been imposed on the Samiots as a contribution towards the maintenance of the Greek fleet. The local knowledge of Lykourgos, and his influence over the democratic party among his countrymen, pointed him out as the fittest man to bring about a peaceful arrangement; and as the defence of Samos was necessary for the safety of Greece, and the Greek fleet could alone save Samos from the fate of Chios, his nomination was a prudent measure. He appears to have benefited by experience, for his conduct was firm and moderate.

The vengeance of the Turks fell heavy on Chios. The unfortunate inhabitants of the island were generally unarmed, but they were all treated as rebels, and rendered responsible for the deeds of the Greeks who

had fled. In the city the wealthier class often succeeded in obtaining protection from Turks in authority, which they purchased by paying large sums of money. In the mean time the poor were exposed to the vengeance of the soldiers and the fanatics. The bloodshed, however, soon ceased in the town, for even the fanatic volunteers began to combine profit with vengeance. They collected as many of the Chiots as they thought would bring a good price in the slave-markets of Asia Minor, and crossed over to the continent with their booty. Many Chiot families also found time to escape to different ports in the island, and succeeded in embarking in the Psarian vessels, which hastened to the island as soon as it was known that the capitan-pasha had sailed past Psara. A. D. 1822.

Three thousand Chiots retired to the monastery of Aghias Mynas, which lies five miles to the southward of the city, on the ridge of hills which bounds the rich plain. The Turks surrounded the building and summoned them to surrender. The men had little hope of escaping death. The women and children were sure of being sold as slaves. Though they had no military leader, and were unable to take effectual measures for defending the monastery, they refused to lay down their arms. The Turks carried the building by storm, and put all within to the sword.

Two thousand persons had also sought an asylum in the fine old monastery of Nea-Mone, which is about six miles from the city, secluded in the mountains towards the west. This monastery was built by Constantine IX. (Monomachos); and some curious mosaics, now almost entirely destroyed, still form valuable and interesting monuments of that flourishing period of Byzantine art.¹ The Turks stormed this monastery as they had done that of Aghias Mynas. A number of the

helpless inmates had shut themselves up in the church. The doors were forced open, and the Turks, after slaughtering even the women on their knees at prayer, set fire to the screen of paintings in the church, and to the wood-work and roofs of the other buildings in the monastery, and left the Christians who were not already slain to perish in the conflagration.

Kara Ali did everything in his power to save the island from being laid waste and depopulated. He was anxious to protect the peasantry, for he knew that his merit in having defeated the Greeks would be greatly increased in the eyes of the sultan if he could prevent any diminution in the amount of taxation. He would fain have confined the pillage of the fanatic volunteers to the city, where he could watch their proceedings, and deprive them of the slaves they might carry off when they quitted the island. On the 17th of April he invited the foreign consuls who remained in the city to announce an amnesty to the inhabitants, and on the 22d the French and Austrian consuls conducted the primates of the mastic villages to the city. The primates delivered up the arms possessed by the Christians as a proof of submission, and Elez Aga, the voevode, engaged to prevent any of the irregular bands of volunteers from entering his district. By these arrangements the mastic villages, whose fate particularly interested the sultan's court, were saved from plunder. But in the rest of the island the power of the capitan-pasha not being sustained by a well-organised body of soldiers like that under the orders of Elez Aga, proved often insufficient to protect the people.

As soon as Sultan Mahmud heard of the success of his admiral, he ordered the Chiot hostages to be executed as an expiation for the insurrection. Four hostages and several merchants were hung at Constantinople, and the archbishop and seventy-five persons

were executed at Chios by express orders from the Porte. This cruelty on the part of the sovereign proves that the avarice of the Turkish soldiers, and not their humanity, saved the Christian women and children of Chios from the sad fate of the Mussulman women and children at Tripolitza. A. D. 1822.

The president Mavrocordatos, the Greek government, and the Albanian primates of Hydra, were accused of both incapacity and neglect in not sending the Greek fleet to oppose the entrance of the capitan-pasha into the channel between Chios and the main. No spot could have been found more favourable to the operations of the light vessels of the Albanians and the Greeks, or for the use of fire-ships. At all events, the passage of irregular troops and constant supplies of provisions from the continent in small vessels would have been completely cut off.

It was only on the 10th of May that the Greek fleet put to sea. It consisted of fifty-six sail. The squadron of each of the naval islands had its own admiral, but the chief command over the whole fleet was conceded by common consent to Andreas Miaoulis, who, though he had not yet performed any remarkable exploit, had given such proofs of sound sense and prudent firmness that his character secured him universal respect; while the manner in which he displayed these qualifications, in combination with experience in seamanship, gave him a marked superiority over all the other captains in the motley assemblage of vessels called the Greek navy. Miaoulis deserved the place he obtained, and it reflects honour on the navy of Greece that the place was voluntarily conceded to him, and that he was steadily supported in it during all the vicissitudes of the war. But in the force under his command there was very little order and no discipline. Many of the captains performed their part as indivi-

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duals bravely and honourably, but their ideas of their duty were founded on their experience as merchant adventurers, not as national officers. Captains and often crews frequently assumed the right of acting independently when the admiral required their co-operation, or of violating his commands when they ought to have paid implicit obedience to his orders.

The capitan-pasha passed the rhamazan at Chios. On the 31st of May Miaoulis appeared off the north channel ; and the Othoman fleet weighing anchor, an engagement took place at the entrance of the Gulf of Smyrna. The Greeks made use of fire-ships, but one which they directed against a Turkish line-of-battle ship was consumed ineffectually, and the battle terminated in an idle cannonade, which was renewed at intervals on the two subsequent days, without causing any damage to either party. The Greeks returned dispirited to Psara, and the capitan-pasha to his anchorage at Chios.

On the 18th of June, the last day of rhamazan in the year 1822, a number of the principal officers of the Othoman fleet assembled on board the ship of the capitan-pasha to celebrate the feast of Bairam. The night was dark, but the whole Turkish fleet was illuminated for the festival. Two Greek ships, which had been hugging the land during the day, as if baffled by the wind in endeavouring to enter the Gulf of Smyrna, changed their course at dusk, when their movements could be no longer observed, and bore down into the midst of the Othoman fleet. One steered for the 80-gun ship of the capitan-pasha, the other for the 74 of the Reala bey. Both these ships were conspicuous in the dark night by the variegated lamps at their masts and yards. The two Greeks were fire-ships. One was commanded by Constantine Kanaris, the hero of the Greek Revolution. It is superfluous to say that such a

man directed his ship with skill and courage. Calmly A. D. 1822. estimating every circumstance of the moment, he ran the bowsprit into an open port, and fixed his ship alongside the capitan-pasha, as near the bows as possible so as to bring the flames to windward of his enemy. He then lighted the train with his own hand, stepped into his boat, where all the crew were ready at their oars, and pushed off as the flames mounted from the deck. The sails and rigging, steeped in turpentine and pitch, immediately blazed up, and the Turkish crews were far too much astonished at the sudden conflagration to pay any attention to a solitary boat which rowed rapidly into the shade. The flames driven by the wind rushed through the open ports of the lower and upper decks, and filled the great ship with fire roaring like a furnace.

The other fire-ship was commanded by a Hydriot. This Albanian was less fortunate or less daring than his Greek colleague. His vessel was not so skilfully and coolly directed, or the train was fired with too much precipitation. Instead of holding fast to the line-of-battle ship against which she was directed, she drifted to leeward and burned harmlessly to the water's edge.

On board the capitan-pasha's ship the scene was terrible. A quantity of tents piled up on the lower deck, near the ports where the fire first entered, took fire so quickly, and the flames rushed up so furiously through the hatches, that all communication between the different parts of the ship was cut off. No effort could be made to arrest the conflagration, or to sink the ship. Those on board could only save their lives by jumping into the sea. The awning catching fire rendered it impossible to work even on the quarter-deck. The few boats which were alongside, or which could be lowered, were sunk by the crowds that en-

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tered them. The crews of the nearest ships were engaged in hauling off, and the progress of the flames was so rapid that when boats arrived they feared to approach. Fire was already rushing out of every port below, and blocks were beginning to fall from the rigging. The ship was crowded with prisoners; and the shrieks of those who could make no effort to escape struck all with horror who heard their cries. Kara Ali jumped into one of the boats that was brought alongside to receive him; but before he could quit the side of his ship, he was struck by a falling spar and carried dying to the shore.

The capitan-bey who succeeded to the command of the fleet, not thinking it safe to remain at Chios, and considering the naval operations terminated by the expulsion of the Greeks from the island, sailed for the Dardanelles. Though he was pursued by the Greek fleet he stopped at Erisso, and visited Kydonies without sustaining any loss. On the 2d of July he brought the Othoman fleet to anchor within the castles of the Dardanelles.

The prudence of Miaoulis, and the skill with which he contrived to introduce some degree of order into the fleet under his command during this cruise, afforded hope of further improvements in the Greek navy which were never realised. The skill of the captains in handling their ships received well-merited praise from all naval officers of every nation who witnessed their manœuvres. But their ignorance of military science, and their awkwardness in the use of their imperfect artillery, did not allow them to derive any very decided advantage from their superior seamanship. The necessity of effecting a complete change in the naval system of the Greeks made a strong impression on an English officer who served as a volunteer at this time, and who made several proposals to attain

the desired end by introducing steam-ships.¹ His name A. D. 1822. was Frank Abney Hastings.

The cruelties of the Turks at Chios were renewed after the destruction of the capitan-pasha's ship. The mastic villages which had hitherto escaped invasion were now laid waste. For many months the slave-markets of the Othoman empire, from Algiers to Trebizond, were supplied with women and children from Chios. Fortunately for the wretched sufferers, their known character for honesty and docility secured a high price, and insured their purchase by wealthy families, where they generally met with better treatment than slaves often receive from Christian masters.

It is supposed that forty thousand persons were murdered or enslaved in the island of Chios during the year 1822, but this number must be exaggerated. About five thousand Chiots were absent from the island when it was invaded by the Samians. About fifteen thousand escaped before the arrival of the capitan-pasha. In the month of February 1822 Chios was said to contain nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants; in the month of August it was supposed that it did not contain more than thirty thousand.² Most of

¹ General Gordon says, i. 364, "It was then that Frank Hastings commenced that course of honourable service which must ever connect his name with the emancipation of Greece." See also page 370, where it is mentioned that Hastings saved a vessel. He did so by going out on the bowsprit under a heavy fire of musketry.—Vol. ii. 441. Gordon adds, "If ever there was a disinterested and really useful Philhellene it was Hastings: he received no pay, and had expended most of his slender fortune in keeping the *Karteria* afloat for the last six months. . . . His ship, too, was the only one in the Greek navy where regular discipline was maintained." The sum expended by Hastings in the cause of Greece eventually exceeded £7000.

² The accounts of the massacres at Chios differ chiefly in the numbers of those who are reported to have fallen victims to the cruelty of the Turks. Gordon says that fifteen thousand persons remained in the mastic villages. Tricoupi pretends that only eighteen hundred souls remained, which is a manifest error. It is always difficult, even when no feeling leads to exaggeration, to obtain accurate information concerning numbers. In 1853 the author was assured by persons at Chios who had access to the best means of information, that the population of the island did not then exceed forty-three thousand souls; but others of equal authority said the number was sixty-six thousand, and that ten thousand more were absent gaining their livelihood abroad.

the Greek islands were filled with fugitives from Chios ; and many families who had lived in prosperous homes dragged out the remainder of their lives in abject poverty. Some who had succeeded in carrying off from their houses a few valuables, family jewels, and sums of money, were robbed by the Christian boatmen, who subsequently made a boast of having saved them from the Turks, and claimed rewards and gratitude from Greece.

The massacres of Chios excited just indignation in all Christian countries. It also opened the eyes of statesmen to the fact that the struggle between the Turks and Greeks was a war of extermination, which, if it continued long, would compel the governments of Christian Europe to interfere. Many impartial and enlightened persons already deemed it impossible for Mussulmans and Christians to live together any longer in peace under the Othoman government. Their mutual hatred was supposed to have produced irreconcilable hostility. The immediate effect, therefore, of the sultan's cruelties in this case was to interest the feelings of all liberal men and of all sincere Christians in favour of the independence of Greece, as the only means of establishing peace in the Levant. Greek committees were formed to aid the arms of Greece, and subscriptions were collected to assist the suffering Chioti. No charity could be more deserved, for no sufferers were ever more guiltless of causing the calamities which had overwhelmed them. For generations the unfortunate inhabitants of Chios had been the peaceable and obedient subjects of the sultan. As a community they had been remarkable for order and patriotism. In their families they were distinguished by mutual affection, and as private individuals they were considered the most virtuous of the modern Greeks. Never, perhaps, had a better regulated society

existed among so large a population, and never was a happy people suddenly struck with a more terrible catastrophe. A. D. 1822.

Soon after Mavrocordatos heard of the calamity which had laid Chios waste, he left the direction of the Greek government to any man who might succeed in assuming it; or, to speak more correctly, he left the Greek government without any direction, and set off on an ill-judged military expedition into Western Greece. As long as he retained the office of President of Greece, it was his duty to remain at the seat of government, and perform the business of a sovereign. If he considered that he could be more useful as a general on the frontier, it was his duty to resign his civil office, and support the administration of his successor with his military influence. Of all the blunders committed by Mavrocordatos in his long political career, this was the greatest and the most reprehensible. It was absurd to think of directing the administration of a country, without roads or posts, from a corner of the territory; and it was an unworthy and phanariot ambition which induced him to retain possession of a high office merely in order to exclude a rival for the post, without taking into account the serious injury he inflicted on the cause of order and good government. Even had Mavrocordatos been an able general, his error must have produced bad consequences in Greece; but as he was destitute of every quality necessary to make a good soldier, his conduct brought disgrace on himself and calamity on the Greek government.

It was absolutely necessary for the Greek government to make every exertion to carry on the war vigorously in Western Greece. The death of Ali Pasha, and the suppression of the Revolution in Agrapha, in the chain of Pindus, in Thessaly, and in Macedonia, exposed Greece to be invaded by the whole of the

Othoman troops under the command of the seraskier of Romelia. It became known early in the spring that the sultan was assembling two powerful armies, in order to invade Eastern and Western Greece simultaneously. To direct these operations, Khurshid Pasha fixed his headquarters at Larissa, where he summoned all the ayans and timariots of Romelia to join his standard. An army composed in great part of Albanians, under the command of Omer Vrioni, was intrusted with the attack on Western Greece.

The first object of the Greek government was to support the Suliots, in order to enable them to keep possession of their native mountains, and thus retain a strong force on the flank of any Turkish army that might advance to force the pass of Makrynoros, or attempt to cross the Ambracian gulf. After much precious time had been wasted, it was at last resolved to send large reinforcements to the Suliots, and to make a powerful diversion in their favour by invading Epirus. What was most wanted to give efficiency to the operations of the Greeks was order. Instead of endeavouring to introduce order, Mavrocordatos increased the disorder by assuming the command of the army—if indeed it is permissible to designate the undisciplined assemblage of armed men under a number of independent chiefs by the name of an army.

When Mavrocordatos assumed the chief command in Western Greece, he was anxious to render his force efficient; but he was so ignorant of the first elements of military organisation, that he neither knew what he ought to do nor what he ought to leave undone, so that his military operations were generally determined by accident. Before he quitted Corinth, which was then the seat of government, a decree of the legislative assembly invested him with extraordinary powers as governor-general and commander-in-chief in Western

Greece, but limited his absence from the seat of government to two months. A. D. 1822.

Mavrocordatos quitted Corinth in high spirits, attended by a band of enthusiastic volunteers, ready to dare every danger. About one hundred foreign officers had arrived in Greece to offer their services; but in consequence of the neglect of military discipline on the part of the executive body, and indeed of the Greeks generally, they were allowed to remain unemployed. Not wishing to quit the country at the commencement of a campaign, they now offered to serve as simple soldiers, in order to teach the Greeks by experience the value of military discipline, and let them see what a small body of regular soldiers could perform. This noble offer was accepted without a due sense of its almost unexampled generosity. Mavrocordatos, who had as insatiable a rapacity for honours, or rather titles, as Kolokotrones for coined money, made himself colonel of this gallant band, which was called the corps of Philhellenes. The first Greek regiment, six hundred strong, under Colonel Tarella,¹ a body of Ionian volunteers, and a band of Suliots under Marco Botzares, also accompanied the president, who was joined at Mesolonghi by three hundred Moreots under the command of Geneas Kolokotrones, the second son of the old klepht, and by seven hundred Maniats. Kyriakoules Mavromichales had already been sent forward to open a communication with the Suliots by sea.

Mavrocordatos marched from Mesolonghi with little more than two thousand men, and with only two light guns. His high-sounding titles and his dictatorial

¹ Prince Demetrios Hypsilantes, with all his inactivity, formed the first regiment of regular troops in Greece. He found in Balestos an able officer to discipline and command it. Had Balestos been properly supported, a good body of regular troops might have been formed, but unfortunately everything in Greece was made a question of personal jealousy or party passion.

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powers alarmed the captains of *armatoli*, who viewed his presence with jealousy, and showed no disposition to aid his enterprise. Some were already beginning to balance in their own minds the advantages to be gained by joining the cause of the sultan. Local interests directed the conduct of others. It was the season of harvest, and many soldiers and petty officers were obliged to watch the collection of the tenths and the rents of national property, in order to prevent the officers of the government, the primates, or the captains of *armatoli*, from cheating them of their pay. In a considerable part of *Etolia* and *Acarnania*, some of the best soldiers in Greece were prevented from joining *Mavrocordatos* by the necessity of providing for their own subsistence.

The avowed object of *Mavrocordatos* was to assist the *Suliots*; and it must be remembered that, though this was wise policy, the cause of the *Suliots* was not then regarded by the people of Western Greece with any enthusiasm. That fierce Albanian tribe had not yet identified its cause with that of the independence of Greece.

The Greek troops advanced to the neighbourhood of *Arta*, and *Mavrocordatos* established his headquarters at *Kombotti*. *Gogos*, the most influential chieftain in this district, had distinguished himself the year before, when the Turks were repulsed in their attempts to force the pass of *Makrynoros*. He now occupied the advanced position of *Petta*, on the left bank of the river of *Arta*, with about a thousand men. A blood feud had existed between *Gogos* and *Marco Botzares*; for *Gogos* was the cause of the death, if he was not the actual murderer, of *Botzares's* father. But now a reconciliation was effected by the prudence of *Mavrocordatos* and the patriotism of *Botzares*. *Gogos*, who was seventy years of age, was a brave soldier and an

able captain of armatoli ; but he was full of the pas- A. D. 1822.
sions nourished by a life spent in a tyrant's service, and, like most of the chiefs who had served Ali Pasha, he cared little for humanity, nationality, and liberty. He was also strongly imbued with Oriental prejudices. He hated all Franks, and disliked Mavrocordatos because he lived much in the society of European officers, wore the Frank dress, and made a show of introducing military discipline. He was acute enough to observe that the principles of centralisation which Mavrocordatos put forward (often very unnecessarily in theory, when it was out of his power to introduce them in practice) would ultimately diminish the authority and the profits of the chiefs of armatoli. Gogos likewise distrusted the success of the Revolution ; and this, added to his excessive selfishness, had induced him to open communications with the Turks of Arta, so that he was already engaged in negotiations with the agents of Omer Vrioni before Mavrocordatos arrived at Kombotti. Mavrocordatos purchased the apparent submission of Gogos to his authority as governor-general of Western Greece, by tolerating a dangerous degree of independent action on the part of the veteran chieftain, and overlooking the secret correspondence which it was known that he carried on with the enemy.

The Turks made an attack on the Greeks in their position at Kombotti with a strong body of cavalry, but they were repulsed in a brilliant manner by the regular troops. Shortly after, General Normann, who acted as chief of the staff to Mavrocordatos, advanced with the regular troops, and occupied the position of Petta, while the commander-in-chief himself retired to the rear, and fixed his headquarters at Langada, about fifteen miles from the main body of his army. Only a hundred men remained to guard Kombotti, though that place protected his line of com-

munication. While the Greeks were changing their position, they beheld the first disastrous event of this campaign. As they marched along the hills, they saw three Turkish gunboats from Previsa destroy the small Greek flotilla in the gulf.

The occupation of Petta was one of those ill-judged movements which incapable generals frequently adopt when they feel that their position requires immediate action, and yet are incapable of forming any definite plan. It rendered a battle inevitable, and yet no preparations were made for the engagement. Gogos seemed inclined to wait for the result of this battle to determine his future conduct. Until it was lost, he was therefore, to a certain degree, a supporter of the cause of Greece.

The Turks had assembled a large force at Arta, and Petta is only about two miles from the bridge over the river which flows under the walls of that city. A victory in such a position was not likely to bring any decided advantage to the Greeks; a defeat must inevitably insure the destruction of their army. The Turks had six hundred well-mounted cavalry to cover their retreat, and guns to defend the passage of the bridge. The Greeks had thrown forward the whole regular force into the advanced position of Petta, apparently with the intention of pushing forward to the relief of Suli. Yet when that project was abandoned, the regular troops, who formed the main body of the Greek army, were left as its advanced-guard, without being covered by a screen of irregulars.

General Normann, who commanded at Petta in consequence of the absence of the commander-in-chief, though persuaded that the position of the troops was very injudicious, would not order the regular troops to quit their position without an express order from Mavrocordatos. But as the position was exposed to

be attacked hourly, he wished at least to construct some fieldworks for his defence. A small supply of tools was obtained with some difficulty, but it could hardly be expected that the corps of Philhellene officers should work at the spade under the burning sun of Greece in July, when the Greeks themselves seemed little disposed either to work or to fight. At this crisis the presence of Mavrocordatos at Petta might have smoothed every difficulty. He might have paid peasants, or, by his example, induced the Greek troops to labour; while the foreign officers, under such circumstances, would willingly have set an example to the regular regiment and the Ionian volunteers. The presence of Mavrocordatos was absolutely necessary in order to render Petta defensible, and Mavrocordatos was not present.

The regular troops remained idle in their exposed and dangerous quarters. The news reached the camp that the Suliots were reduced to extremity. Marco Botzares determined to make a desperate attempt to cut his way through the Turkish posts at the head of his own little band, and encourage his countrymen to prolong their resistance until a decisive engagement should decide the movements of the Greek army. Botzares obtained the consent of Mavrocordatos to his rash scheme, and he counted on receiving vigorous support from Varnakiottes, who had eight hundred *armatoli* under his orders. Varnakiottes, however, gave Marco Botzares no assistance, and Gogos informed the Turks of his projected expedition; for Gogos hated the Suliots almost as much as he hated the Franks. The result was, that the attempt to penetrate through the Turkish lines was defeated, and the troops who had accompanied Botzares were compelled to return. He commenced his retreat from Plaka on the 12th of July.

This failure determined Gogos to draw closer his re-

lations with the Albanians in Arta. His first overt act of treachery was a plot for separating the Philhellenes from the rest of the regular troops. The headlong courage and the well-managed rifles of these volunteers made them a redoubtable enemy ; and in case of their absence from Petta, the Turks expected to carry the Greek position by storm without difficulty.

Colonel Dania, an experienced but rash officer, commanded the corps of Philhellenes as lieutenant-colonel. He would only take his orders directly from Mavrocordatos, and when he had no precise orders from the commander-in-chief, he assumed the liberty of acting on his own responsibility. He resolved to support the movement of Marco Botzares, and neither the advice nor the commands of General Normann could prevent his listening to the persuasion of Gogos, who urged him to go off in pursuit of a body of Albanian troops, in order to prevent these Mussulmans from attacking the Suliots, who had advanced from the Greek camp. The Ionian battalion followed Dania's example. The Albanians were overtaken at Vrontza, on the road from Arta to Joannina ; but the guides sent forward by Gogos gave sufficient warning to the enemy, by firing off their muskets, to allow them to decamp. Dania's troops, worn out by fatigue, and unable to obtain provisions, were now compelled to return, and they fortunately decided on effecting their retreat so promptly, and executed it with such celerity, that they forestalled all interruption. Their unexpected return to Petta rendered part of the treacherous scheme of Gogos abortive.

Geneas Kolokotrones chose this conjuncture to quit the headquarters of Mavrocordatos at Langada. His desertion at this momentous crisis was not authorised by any orders from the central government. He abandoned the Greek army before the Turks, in order

to serve the personal and party intrigues of his father in the Morea. The power of Mavrocordatos, as President of Greece, Governor-General of Western Greece, and Commander-in-Chief of the Greek forces in Epirus, was so completely nominal, that he could not prevent this petty chieftain from deserting the army on the eve of a battle. A. D. 1822.

Though a decisive engagement was now inevitable, it was evident that victory would bring little but glory to the Greek arms. The want of provisions rendered it impossible to advance to the relief of Suli, and the want of artillery rendered it impossible to attack Arta. On the other hand, defeat was sure to cause the total destruction of all the regular troops in the Greek service, who were imprudently thrown out in advance of the main body of the army. Prudence demanded that the Greeks should immediately fall back on the pass of Makrynoros. A retreat, however, could only be ordered by Mavrocordatos, and he was already far in the rear.

The Turks in Arta were at this time commanded by Mehemet Reshid Pasha, well known to the Greeks during the war by the name of Kiutayhé.¹ On the 16th of July he marched out of the town at the head of five thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry to attack the Greek army, which did not exceed three thousand men. The whole force of the pasha was directed against the advanced position of the Greek regulars at Petta. General Normann, from a misplaced sense of honour, persisted in occupying the first line, in opposition to the opinion of several experienced European officers, who were supported by the advice of Marco Botzares. It was argued that, if the Greek irregulars retarded the advance of the Turks by skirmishing in the usual way in front of the regulars, a favourable moment might be selected for a decisive

¹ Reshid held a command at Kutaya (Cotyæium) before coming into Epirus.

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attack on those who advanced as assailants. This plan was rejected, and the corps of Philhellenes, the Greek regiment, and the Ionian volunteers, remained in their advanced position, supported only by two guns. The irregulars occupied a ridge of hills rising behind Petta, of which Gogos held the key by occupying an elevation on the extreme right.

The Turks made their dispositions leisurely, and drew out their whole force in the plain, in order to attack the position occupied by General Normann on three sides at the same time. Their first assault was made with some vigour, but it was repulsed without the regulars suffering any loss. The assault was renewed in a series of desultory attacks for about two hours. During this time, Reshid Pasha was marching a large body of Albanians to turn the Greek position from the north. As the movement of these troops, though concealed from General Normann at Petta by intervening hills, was perfectly visible from the heights occupied by Gogos, this operation could only have been rendered successful by the treachery of that chieftain. A height visible from every part of the Greek position must have been left purposely unoccupied. This height was scaled by the Mussulmans, who planted the Othoman standard on its summit. As soon as they received an answer to their signal from the troops in the plain, they descended, to throw themselves on the rear of the regulars with loud shouts. The troops of Gogos, instead of attacking these Albanians on their flank, fled in the most shameful manner, and their flight spread a panic through the whole body of the Greek armatoli, who abandoned their positions in the wildest confusion. The small body of Albanians was thus allowed to pass directly over the ground which had been occupied by the Greek irregulars, and to fall upon Petta in the rear.

On the other side, Reshid Pasha, as soon as he saw

his Albanians in possession of the key of the Greek position, pushed forward strong bodies of infantry to attack Petta in front, and supported the assault by a brilliant charge of cavalry, which he led in person. The two field-pieces of the Greeks were taken; the Philhellenes were surrounded, and most of them were immediately shot down; but a few defended themselves for a short time, and twenty-five forced their way through the Turks with fixed bayonets. The rest fell gallantly. The Greek regiment under Tarella, and the Ionians under Panas, were both broken by the heavy fire of the infantry, followed up by charges of cavalry. More than half of their men lay dead on the field, and none allowed themselves to be taken prisoners. On this disastrous day four hundred of the best soldiers in Greece perished.¹

The defeat at Petta was a severe blow to the progress of order in the Greek Revolution. It destroyed all confidence in political organisation as represented by Prince Alexander Mavrocordatos, and in military discipline as represented by the corps of Philhellenes. Mavrocordatos made shipwreck of his political authority; art and science were banished from military operations, and the practices of brigandage regulated the tactics of the armies of Greece. The power of the central government ceased with the destruction of the regular troops. From this time until the arrival of Count Capodistrias, the whole public administration in liberated Greece was a scene of anarchy. The place of a central government was nominally held by the faction which could obtain possession of the largest share of the national revenues.

¹ The best account of the battle is by Raybaud, and his map is better than that of Gordon. Tarella was slain at the side of Dr Treiber, whose escape from the hospital is mentioned by Gordon. Treiber now holds the rank of chief of the medical staff of the Greek army, and enjoys the esteem of all who know him (1860).

The fate of the regular troops had also the misfortune to lead the Greeks generally to form a false estimate of the value of discipline in military operations. They did not observe the fact, which was, that two thousand Albanian infantry, supported by six hundred well-mounted cavalry, by gaining a dominant position, were enabled to destroy three corps of regular troops, which, when united, did not exceed eight hundred men, and that this success was entirely due to the circumstance of five hundred infantry being unexpectedly brought to attack the rear of a position which was intrusted to the defence of two thousand Greek irregulars. But the enemies of political order, the Romeliat captains of *armatoli* and the Moreot primates and chiefs of *klephts*, availed themselves of the blunders of Mavrocordatos as a general, and of the misfortune of the regulars at Petta, to persuade the Greeks generally that military science was inapplicable to Greek warfare. The adoption of the bayonet and the tactics of a battalion were supposed to be sure means of devoting Greek soldiers to slaughter. This false doctrine found a responsive echo in the breasts of many who were sincerely devoted to their country's cause. Mavrocordatos, without any military knowledge, supposed that he was a heaven-created general; others, who had studied philology and medicine, were satisfied that, though they knew nothing of the duties of a soldier, they were fit persons to be captains of irregulars. The Greek character is naturally averse to the restraints of discipline. Thus the rude military system of the Albanian race was imposed on the Greeks during their revolutionary war. The captains of *armatoli* reared by Ali Pasha, and the *klephts* of the Morea, men without any military rearing but that of robbers, became the virtual rulers of Greece. The Turks were allowed to precede the Greeks in reforming their military system, and their adoption of

regular troops contributed to turn the tide of success A. D. 1822.
in favour of Mohammedanism.

After their victory, the Turks occupied Kombotti, but did not immediately advance to seize the pass of Makrynoros. Gogos attempted to conceal his treacherous conduct, and joined Mavrocordatos with the other fugitive captains of *armatoli* at Langada. But when the governor-general fled towards Mesolonghi, he openly deserted to the Turks, who confirmed him in his authority as captain of *armatoli* in the district of Arta.

Kyriakules Mavromichales, who had landed at Splanga, on the coast of Epirus, found it impossible to communicate with the Suliots. On the same day on which Reshid Pasha attacked the Greeks at Petta, Omer Vrioni ordered Achmet Bey and several other Albanian chiefs to attack the position of the Maniats. The day was marked as a fortunate one in the Turkish calendar. Kyriakules and Achmet Bey were both killed at the commencement of the engagement. The Greeks immediately abandoned their position, and, embarking the body of their leader, sailed to Mesolonghi, where the remains of Kyriakules Mavromichales were interred with due honour.¹

The defeats at Petta and Splanga, followed by the defection of Gogos, rendered the position of the Suliots desperate. They had wasted the immense magazines of provisions and military stores which Ali Pasha had deposited in the impregnable castle of Kiapha. Fortunately for them, Omer Vrioni, who was now pasha of Joannina, was so anxious to get quit of such dangerous neighbours that he granted them favourable terms of capitulation. The treaty was negotiated, and its faithful execution guaranteed by the British consul at

¹ General Gordon, who was personally acquainted with Kyriakules, says, "Greece lost in him one of her most skilful and dauntless warriors, and, by a singular coincidence, his old antagonist at Valtetzi, Achmet Kehaya, was killed in the same skirmish."—Vol. i. p. 393.

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Previsa ; for the Suliots had heard so much of the violation of the treaties by the Greeks in the Peloponnesus, that they were afraid to trust the Turks. On the 16th of September 1822 the Suliots bade a final adieu to their native mountains. They received from the Turks the sum of two hundred thousand piastres, and retired with their families to the Ionian Islands, where they remained quietly for some time without taking part in the Greek Revolution. A few only departed secretly from Cephalonia, and joined Marco Botzares and other Suliots already serving in Western Greece.

According to the plan of operations formed at the Porte, Reshid Pasha ought to have been able to co-operate with the Othoman fleet which visited Patras in July, to take on board Mehemet, who had been appointed to succeed Kara Ali as capitan-pasha. But the pasha of Arta had not been able to pass Makrynoros ; and it was not until the middle of August that he ventured to transport his little army over the Ambracian gulf, and occupy Lutraki. Very little skill and activity on the part of the Greeks would have frustrated this undertaking. A few gunboats would have insured to the Greeks the complete command of the Gulf of Arta, and the boats might have been manned by hardy fishermen from Mesolonghi. But there was no directing mind in Western Greece to employ the interval of inaction that followed the battle of Petta, while Omer Vrioni was forced to watch the Suliots, and Reshid was unable to act without his assistance.

The people of Acarnania, seeing that no preparations were made for their defence, fled to the Ionian Islands for protection. Thousands of families crossed over into the island of Kalamos, which the British authorities set apart as a place of refuge for the unarmed peasantry, who were allowed to enter it without being subjected to the expense and the embarrassments caused by the

quarantine regulations, which were then enforced with A. D. 1822.
great strictness in the Mediterranean. At a later period,

when the devastations of the Albanians and the armatoli had rendered Acarnania almost a desert, and deprived its agricultural population of the means of subsistence, the British Government distributed many thousand rations daily to the starving Greeks, and many soldiers as well as peasants owed their lives to the benevolence of the English at Corfu.

In the mean time, while Reshid Pasha was preparing to invade Greece, the captains and primates, instead of uniting to oppose the Turks, quarrelled among themselves for their shares of the national revenues. The district of Agrapha, or rather that portion which still adhered to the cause of the Revolution, was laid waste by the civil broils of Rhangos and Karaiskaki; the province of Vlochos was the scene of a struggle for power between Staikos and Vlachopoulos; Kravari was pillaged alternately by Pillalas and Kanavos. Treachery also spread among the captains of armatoli. Varnakiottes, the captain of Xerromeros, Andreas Iskos, the captain of Valtos, Rhangos, and a primate called George Valtinos, all deserted to the Turks, and made their submission to Omer Vrioni. Mavrocordatos and Tricoupi were cognisant of the dealings of Varnakiottes, which they authorised with the vain hope of profiting by a semblance of treachery. They were foiled at this dishonourable game. While they were flattering themselves that they were making use of Varnakiottes to cheat Omer Vrioni, that astute Albanian purchased the services of their agent, and showed himself an abler diplomatist than the wily phanariot or the selfish Mesolonghiot.

Omer Vrioni, having at last finished his business with the Suliots, marched southward at the head of six thousand men. He occupied the pass of Makry-

noros, which he found unguarded, and was joined by Kiutayhé, who had now four thousand men under his command. The Othoman army reached the plain of Mesolonghi without meeting with any opposition ; but as the greater part of the country was without supplies, the Turks were dependent for their provisions on their magazines in Arta and Previsa until they could open communications with Patras, and from thence with the Ionian Islands.

The siege of Mesolonghi was commenced on the 6th of November 1822. The aspect of affairs was extremely unfavourable to the Greeks. Gogos, Varnakiottes, Iskos, Rhangos, and Valtinos, had deserted their countrymen, and were serving the Turks. The people, however, everywhere remained true to the Revolution, and Mavrocordatos redeemed his previous errors by resolving to encourage them in defending Mesolonghi with his presence. When other civilians quitted the place on the eve of the siege, he declared that he would remain in the town as long as a man could be found to fight against the Turks. There were only about six hundred soldiers in the place, but the boatmen worked the guns in the batteries, and the people laboured to complete a line of fortifications. Mesolonghi was then protected by a low mud wall, with a ditch little more than six feet deep and about sixteen feet wide. Heavy rain had rendered the bottom of the ditch a soft mass of tenacious clay, which made it impassable to a man on foot. Fourteen guns were mounted on the ramparts ; but the flanking defences were very imperfect, and to an unmilitary eye it seemed easy for the besiegers to carry the place by storm. It is not impossible that this would have happened had the Turks attacked the place immediately on their arrival, for it would have been easy to fill up the ditch with fascines. They delayed the assault, and, by skirmishing before the wall,

revealed to the Greeks the great advantage they derived from their low rampart of mud. A. D. 1822.

Mavrocordatos was accompanied by several officers who were able to teach the Mesolonghiots how to avail themselves of the peculiar advantages which their defensive works afforded, and how to place their guns in the best positions. The houses in the town were too low to suffer from a cannonade, and the shells of the enemy generally sank harmless in the mud of the unpaved streets and courts. Not a single person was killed by their explosion.

The traitor chiefs who accompanied Omer Vrioni persuaded him that many Greeks in Mesolonghi were disposed to follow their example. Reshid Pasha in vain urged him to try an assault, but the Albanian pasha preferred negotiation. The Greeks profited by his delay. While they treated with him, they opened negotiations at the same time with Yussuf Pasha of Patras, who had sent over some vessels to blockade Mesolonghi by sea.

On the 20th of November, the arrival of seven Hydriot brigs compelled the Turkish vessels to retire to Patras, and, three days after, one thousand men crossed over from the Morea under the command of Petrobey, Zaimes, Deliyani, and other leaders. The defenders of Mesolonghi then broke off their negotiations with the Turks, and sent Omer Vrioni a message, that if he really wished to become master of Mesolonghi, he might come and take it. He determined to make the attempt. The garrison was now increased to two thousand five hundred men, who were amply supplied with ammunition recently sent from Leghorn.

The Turkish army did not now amount to eight thousand men. The Greeks of Acarnania and Etolia had assembled in their rear, and were beginning to attack and plunder their convoys. Provisions and

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military stores were becoming scarce in their camp. Omer Vrioni, convinced of the impossibility of continuing the siege through the winter, at last resolved to make an attempt to carry the place by storm, and in case of failure to raise the siege.

The assault was made on Greek Christmas day (6th January 1823), at the earliest dawn. The storming party expected to surprise the Christians at their church ceremonies, but the besieged, warned by a Greek fisherman in the pasha's service, were ready to receive their assailants. Two thousand two hundred well-armed men were either posted under cover on the ramparts, or concealed in the nearest houses to act as a reserve. The storming party consisted of eight hundred Albanian volunteers. One division of the assailants attempted to scale the wall on its eastern flank, while another endeavoured to penetrate into the town by wading through the shallow lagoon round the eastern extremity of the wall. The assault was masked by a heavy fire of musketry along the whole of the Turkish lines. The besieged cautiously watched the approach of the storming columns, which were allowed to advance within pistol-shot; they then poured a deadly volley into their ranks. The effect of this fire was decisive. The storming parties, which had expected to surprise the Greeks, were themselves surprised; they broke, and fled in confusion. Desultory attempts were made by the Turks to renew the attack, and for some hours there was an incredible waste of ammunition on both sides. The loss of the Turks in the assault was said to have exceeded two hundred men. Most of those who were wounded in the lagoon perished in the water. The Greeks lost only four men killed.

Six days after this defeat, Omer Vrioni broke up his camp and retired to Vrachori, from whence, after a short rest, he marched to Karvasera unmolested by the

armatoli. Indeed, in his retreat from Mesolonghi, he A. D. 1822. met with no obstacle except the swollen torrent of the Achelous. In the camp he abandoned the Greeks found ten guns, four mortars, and a small quantity of balls and empty shells, but he carried off all his powder.

Varnakiottes, distrusted both by the Turks and Greeks, fled to Kalamos, where he remained for some time under English protection. The other traitors, Iskos, Rhangos, and Valtinos, soon deserted Omer Vrioni, and again joined their countrymen.

CHAPTER III.

FALL OF ATHENS — DEFEAT OF DRAMALI — FALL OF NAUPLIA.

"The strong warrant of an oath
Marked with a blot, damned in the book of Heaven."

—Richard II.

PREPARATIONS OF SULTAN MAHMUD FOR RECONQUERING GREECE—DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF THE GREEKS—THEIR QUARRELS AND INTRIGUES—ODYSSEUS MURDERS NOUTZAS AND PALASKAS—CAPITULATION OF ATHENS—MASSACRE OF MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN—EXPEDITION OF DRAMALI—CORINTH RETAKEN—TURKISH PLANS OF CAMPAIGN—FIRST CAPITULATION OF NAUPLIA—FLIGHT OF GREEKS FROM ARGOS—THEY DEFEND THE LARISSA—PATRIOTIC CONDUCT OF PRINCE DEMETRIUS HYPsilANTES—NUMBERS OF THE GREEK FORCES IN THE FIELD—DEFEAT OF DRAMALI—GREEKS RETAIN POSSESSION OF THE BURDJEE—OPERATIONS OF THE HOSTILE FLEETS—SECOND CAPITULATION OF NAUPLIA—TURKISH POPULATION OF NAUPLIA SAVED BY CAPTAIN HAMILTON OF THE CAMBRIAN—KANARIS AGAIN DESTROYS A TURKISH LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIP—STATE OF THE NAVAL WARFARE BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND TURKS—STATE OF AFFAIRS AT ATHENS—ODYSSEUS GAINS POSSESSION OF ATHENS—CONCLUDES AN ARMISTICE WITH THE TURKS.

THE state of his relations with Russia, and the destruction of Ali Pasha's power, enabled Sultan Mahmud, in 1822, to make his first great effort for reconquering Greece. The success of his measures in suppressing the revolutionary movements over Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, persuaded him that the task would not be difficult. The plan of campaign which he adopted was well devised.

The Greeks were blockading Nauplia, the strongest fortress in the Morea. Its relief was to be the first object of the campaign. A large army was assembled

at Larissa, under the venerable Khurshid, seraskier of A. D. 1822. Romelia. A second army under Omer Vrioni, the pasha of Joannina, was instructed to co-operate with the movements of the principal force. We have already seen that Omer Vrioni was entirely occupied during the whole year by the Suliots and the affairs of Acarnania. The army of Khurshid was ordered to force the Isthmus of Corinth and advance to Nauplia, where it was to be joined by the Othoman fleet. After receiving the necessary supplies of provisions and military stores, it was to march on to Tripolitza, and establish its headquarters in the great Arcadian plain. It was supposed that, the fleet having thrown reinforcements into the fortresses of Coron, Modon, and Patras, the army would find no difficulty in establishing communications between these positions and the central camp; and the Morea being thus cut up into several sections, and the population deprived of reciprocal support, would have been reduced to lay down their arms before winter arrived. The sultan overlooked the insuperable difficulties which the corruption of the Othoman administration presented to the execution of any plan which required activity and honesty on the part of many officials. The self-interest of each pasha suggested some modification in the execution of his instructions, and the subordinate officers sought to evade the performance of their duties, unless it was in their power to render the execution a means of gain.

As soon as the horses of the Othoman cavalry had eaten green barley in spring, according to the immemorial custom of the Turkish timariots, the seraskier ordered Dramali to advance into the valley of the Sperchius, and review the army. Before this was effected, the Greeks made an attempt to destroy the Turkish troops in Zeituni.

The Areopagus of Eastern Greece acted as a kind

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of executive committee of the central government. In the month of April 1822, it collected considerable supplies of provisions and ammunition, assembled about eight thousand men near Thermopylæ, and hired thirty small vessels to act as transports in the Gulf of Zeituni. Odysseus was appointed commander-in-chief, and all the local chiliarchs and captains of municipal contingents either joined the army or held themselves ready to act as a reserve.

The central government at Corinth decreed that three thousand Peloponnesians should march to reinforce the Romeliot troops. But the central government made no arrangements for carrying its decree into execution; for the attention of Mavrocordatos was then absorbed by the preparations necessary for his own campaign as commander-in-chief in Western Greece. Only about seven hundred Moreots, under the command of Niketas, marched to join Odysseus.

The Greek army in Eastern Greece was divided into two bodies. The first division, under Odysseus and Niketas, embarked at Paleochori, on the shore at the foot of Mount Knemis, and, crossing the gulf, occupied the villages of Stelida and Aghia Marina. Instead of pushing rapidly forward to attack the Turks, they wasted their time in idleness, without even throwing up proper fieldworks at Stelida. The Turks were more active: they marched down from Zeituni to attack their enemies, and compelled the Greeks to abandon Stelida, and concentrate their whole force at Aghia, where they constructed an earthen redoubt, and remained inactive behind its mud walls for a fortnight.

The second division marched by land to Patradjik (Hypata), but only gained possession of about one half of the town, and from this they were expelled by reinforcements from Zeituni.

Odysseus, finding that he could not venture to advance beyond his lines at Aghia Marina, proposed to abandon that position. Niketas approved of his resolution, but the members of the Areopagus who accompanied the expedition opposed the evacuation of this useless post. An unseemly public discussion between Drosos Mansolas, a patriotic pedant, who knew nothing of military matters, and Odysseus, who, though he had no patriotism, had a good deal of military experience, took place on the deck of one of the transports. But the imprudence and the inutility of keeping a considerable force in the lagoons at Aghia Marina were so manifest that the Areopagus was compelled to yield. It had persisted, however, so long as to destroy its authority in the army. The soldiers asserted that it wished to abandon them to be attacked by the whole Othoman army, and they were eager to punish those who wished them to win the glory and the immortality of Leonidas. The members of the Areopagus saved themselves, and the troops were relanded on the coast of Locris.

When the supplies of provisions collected by the Areopagus were exhausted, the soldiers ceased to receive either pay or rations, and the army rapidly melted away. A few of the military chieftains who commanded as captains of districts, according to the system of *armatoliks* as it had existed in the Othoman empire, alone kept their contingents together, and took up their stations on the line of mountains which runs from Mount Ceta along the channel of Euboea.

The members of the Areopagus attempted to remove Odysseus from his command in Eastern Greece. He immediately resigned his commission as *chiliarch* in the army, and remained at the head of his troops as an independent chieftain. The central government sent officers to supersede him, but he took no notice

A. D. 1822.

of its proceedings, and maintained his men by compelling the ephors of districts and the demogeronts of villages to supply him with rations and money from the national revenues and public taxes.¹

Mavrocordatos and his partisans were guilty of a very mean intrigue, which brought discredit on their counsels, while it roused just animosities among their rivals. They elected Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes president of the legislative body. He possessed not one single qualification for the office, and he felt that the object was not to honour him, but to render him either useless or ridiculous. The prince was a brave soldier, and his rival was evidently desirous to exclude him from military employment, where it was certain he would not lose honour, and where he might recover power. Hypsilantes quitted the proffered office, and joined the army in Eastern Greece as a volunteer. On his way he acted with his usual imprudence, displaying the standard of the Hetairia, and not the flag of the Greek state adopted by the national assembly of Epidaurus. He also issued orders in his own name, as if he still arrogated power to himself from being the lieutenant-general of the Hetairia, in defiance of the executive government of Greece. These pretensions involved him in quarrels with the central authorities, and induced him to contract alliances with Odysseus, Niketas, and other military chiefs. Hypsilantes was a man of a very dull mind, and extremely slow in penetrating men's characters; he never could persuade himself that the Hetairia was already a vision of the past; nor could he believe that the Russian

¹ Speliades, in his *Memoirs*, represents Eastern Greece at this time as a scene of innumerable selfish intrigues. He reports that almost every political and military chief was engaged in a plot to supplant or to assassinate some rival. He enjoyed better opportunities of acquiring accurate information on these topics than Tricoupi or Gordon. Compare *Ἀπομνημονεύματα*, i. 307, 314, 315, 346, 349, 350.

government was not on the eve of assisting the Greeks, and of assuming the direction of the Greek Revolution. A. D. 1822.

It is difficult to trace the mazes of the intrigues carried on by the principal men in Greece at this time. There were many actors ; every actor had many projects, and each actor modified his plans and his conduct as circumstances and his personal views changed. Mavrocordatos, Hypsilantes, Kolokotrones, and Odysseus were pursuing adverse schemes. Every subaltern officer and secondary politician had his own ends to gain. No one in office seemed to watch the storm that was gathering in Thessaly ; nor did any one appear to take any measures to ward off the blow which the Turks were about to strike at the independence of Greece.

Mavrocordatos chose this ill-timed moment to make efforts to extend the arbitrary power of the central government, and his efforts were so ill-judged that the contests he awakened were contests of persons, and not of principles. John Kolettes was acting as minister of war, and he employed in that office the lessons he had learned at Ali Pasha's court, working with imperturbable gravity and cunning to form a party which would require his assistance. His gravity and his portly figure gave him the appearance of a sagacious and honest man. To Mavrocordatos and his colleagues in the public administration he pointed out the evils of the Albanian military system, with which no man was better acquainted. To the captains and military chieftains with whom he transacted business as minister of war, he made himself appear as a personal friend and defender. Negris, who was chief secretary of state, concealed the slow action of Kolettes by thrusting himself forward as the champion of the central power.

To destroy the authority of Odysseus in Eastern Greece was the first object of the executive body.

Alexis Noutzas and Christos Palaskas were sent to supersede him in the chief command, which he continued to exercise. These men were the friends of Kolettes, and were nominated by his influence. Noutzas was a man of considerable talent, and having been secretary of Ali Pasha, exercised some authority over many Greeks who had served at Joannina. Palaskas was the Suliot whose defection has been mentioned,¹ and who had subsequently served both England and Russia. In the English service he attained the rank of captain; and when the Greek light infantry was disbanded in 1818, he settled at Joannina. Alexis Noutzas was now named civil governor of Eastern Greece by the central executive, and intrusted with the control over the finances and commissariat. Palaskas was destined to replace Odysseus in his military command. These appointments were kept secret, but Odysseus was perfectly informed of the intentions of government to remove him from his command, and his suspicious nature persuaded him that Mavrocordatos and Kolettes had resolved to assassinate him. Noutzas and Palaskas, who were versed in the policy of Ali Pasha, seemed fit agents for this design. The two commissioners arrived at the camp of Odysseus at Drakospelia when they believed that chief was absent at Dadi. He had been duly informed of their movements, and he met them with polished hypocrisy, assuring them of a hearty welcome. After a banquet, they retired to sleep in a small chapel. The next morning was fixed for holding a conference at the headquarters of Odysseus. During the night Noutzas and Palaskas were both murdered. The assassins and their patron were well known. The crime spread alarm over all Greece. The report that Odysseus was about to join the Turks was generally believed. The members

¹ Page 63.

of the Areopagus sought refuge at Solona, where the spirit of the Galaxidhiots placed a check on the tyranny of Panouria. Hypsilantes was summoned by the government to return to the Peloponnesus, and obeyed the order. A. D. 1822.

Public attention was diverted from the crimes of Odysseus, and the anarchy which these crimes produced in Eastern Greece, by the conquest of Athens. The capitulation of the Acropolis was an event of great moral and military importance to the Greek cause at this moment. The name of Athens magnified the success throughout the whole civilised world, and the possession of a fortress on the flank of the Turks, who might venture to invade the Peloponnesus, would enable the Greeks to embarrass their enemies.

Omer Vrioni had relieved the Acropolis in the autumn of 1821. Before leaving Attica he supplied the garrison with provisions and military stores. But the besieged neglected to take proper precautions for securing a supply of water. They did not clean out their cisterns during the winter, and they trusted to the imperfect enclosure of the Serpendjee for the defence of the only good well they possessed.¹ The winter proved extremely dry. The Greeks drove the Turks from the Serpendjee; so that when the supply of water in the cisterns was exhausted, the garrison was forced to capitulate.

The capitulation was signed on the 21st of June 1822. The Turks surrendered their arms, and the Greeks engaged to convey them to Asia Minor in neutral ships. The Turks by the treaty were allowed to retain one-half of their money and jewels, and a portion of their movable property. The bishop of Athens, a man of worth and character, who was presi-

¹ The Serpendjee is the enclosure indicated in Colonel Leake's plan, lying between the rock of the Acropolis, the Odeon of Herodes Atticus, and the theatre of Bacchus.

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dent of the Areopagus, compelled all the Greek civil and military authorities to swear by the sacred mysteries of the Oriental Church that they would observe strictly the articles of the capitulation, and redeem the good faith of the nation stained by the violation of so many previous treaties.

The Mussulmans in the Acropolis consisted of 1150 souls, of whom only 180 were men capable of bearing arms, so obstinately had they defended the place. After the surrender of the fortress, the Mussulman families were lodged in extensive buildings within the ruins of the Stoa of Hadrian, formerly occupied by the voevode. Three days after the Greeks had sworn to observe the capitulation, they commenced murdering their helpless prisoners. Two ephors, Andreas Kalamogdartes of Patras and Alexander Axiottes of Corfu, had been ordered by the Greek government to hasten the departure of the Turks. They neglected their duty. The Austrian and French consuls, Mr Gropius and M. Fauvel, on the other hand, did everything in their power to save the prisoners. They wrote to Syra during the negotiations to request that the first European man-of-war which touched at that port should hasten to the Piræus. Unfortunately, before any ship of war arrived, the news reached Athens that the Othoman army had forced the pass of Thermopylæ. Lekkas, an Attic peasant, whose courage had raised him to the rank of captain, but who remained a rude Albanian boor, excited the Athenian populace to murder their Turkish prisoners, as a proof of their patriotic determination never to lay down their arms. The most disgraceful part of the transaction was, that neither the ephors nor the demogeronts made an effort to prevent the massacre. They perhaps feared the fate of the moolah of Smyrna.¹ A scene of

¹ Page 234.

horror ensued, over which history may draw a veil, A. D. 1822. while truth obliges the historian to record the fact. The streets of Athens were stained with the blood of four hundred men, women, and children. From sunrise to sunset, during a long summer day, the shrieks of tortured women and children were heard without intermission. Many families were saved by finding shelter in the houses of the European consuls. But the consuls had some difficulty in protecting the fugitives ; their flags and their persons were exposed to insult ; and the Greeks were threatening to renew the massacre, when two French vessels, a corvette and a schooner, entered the Piræus and saved the survivors.

Three hundred and twenty-five persons who had found an asylum in the French consulate were escorted to the Piræus by a party of marines with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets. The party was surrounded by Greek soldiers on quitting the town, who brandished their arms and uttered vain menaces against the women and children whom the French protected, while crowds of Athenian citizens followed the soldiers shouting like demoniacs. When this party of prisoners was safely embarked and the French vessels sailed, the Greeks appeared suddenly to become sensible of the baseness of their conduct. Shame operated, and all the Turks who remained in the Austrian and Dutch consulates were allowed to depart unmolested. England, being only represented by a Greek, was helpless on this occasion. Lekkas, who was the first to urge this massacre, was taken prisoner by the Turks visiting Attica as a spy, after the capitulation of the Acropolis in 1827, and was impaled at Negrepont.

Sultan Mahmud invested Dramali with the command of the army destined to invade Greece, and to increase his authority he created him seraskier. This promotion displeased the veteran Khurshid, who de-

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sired to retain the supreme direction of the whole Othoman force as the only commander-in-chief, and from the moment that Dramali was elevated to an equal rank and held an independent command, he became indifferent to the fate of his rival. Khurshid has been reproached with not giving the army of the Morea sufficient support; but we must remember that Dramali marched from Thessaly at the head of a force amply sufficient for all the objects of the campaign. All Eastern Greece submitted to his authority, and he had it in his power to take proper measures for keeping open his communications with Zeituni and Larissa. The envy of Khurshid did not cause the negligence of Dramali.

The Othoman army, when it mustered on the banks of the Sperchius, amounted to more than twenty thousand men. Of these about eight thousand were cavalry, composed chiefly of feudal militia, under the command of five pashas and several Sclavonian Mussulman beys of Macedonia and Thrace. A considerable portion of the infantry had served at the siege of Joannina. Abundant supplies of provisions and military stores were collected at Zeituni, and ample means of transport were provided. A member of the great feudal house of Kara Osman Oglou was appointed to superintend the commissariat.

The army moved from Zeituni in the beginning of July 1822; and since the day when Ali Kumurgee crossed the Sperchius to reconquer the Morea from the Venetians in 1715, Greece had not witnessed so brilliant a display of military pomp. But in the century which had elapsed the strength of the Othoman empire appeared to have melted away. Ali Kumurgee was attended by a corps of military engineers, who opened roads for his artillery, and who constructed bridges for his ammunition-waggons. Dramali moved only

with such baggage as could be transported over rugged limestone paths on the backs of mules and camels. A. D. 1822. Ali Kumurgee enforced the strictest discipline ;¹ Dramali could not prevent every Albanian buloukbash from laying waste the country.

The ill-timed disputes of the central government with Odysseus left Eastern Greece without defence. Even the troops sent to guard the passes over Mount Geranion fell back and fled from the great derven before the Turks arrived. The defence of the Acrocorinth had been intrusted to a priest named Achilles Theodorides, because he belonged to the faction of the Notaras family, not because he had the slightest knowledge of military matters. He murdered the Turkish prisoners in his hands, and abandoned the impregnable fortress of which he was the commandant, though it was amply supplied with provisions. On the 17th of July, Dramali took up his quarters in Corinth, where he was joined by Yussuf Pasha from Patras.

The Turkish leaders held a council of war to decide on their future operations. The seraskier was a man of a sanguine disposition and haughty character, ignorant of mountain warfare, and full of contempt for the Greeks. The ease with which he had marched through Eastern Greece and the flight of the garrison of Corinth increased his confidence. The terror which his presence seemed to have inspired, the facility with which he had obtained forage for his cavalry, and the certainty, as he supposed, of being joined by the Othoman fleet at Nauplia, induced him to believe that he was destined to overrun the Morea with as much ease as Ali Kumurgee. He proposed, therefore, to march with his whole army to Nauplia. The pashas under his immediate orders, who looked to him for promotion, warmly supported his opinion. The beys who

¹ *Greece under Othoman Domination*, p. 269.

BOOK III. commanded the feudal cavalry agreed to this plan, as
CHAP. III. it promised a speedy termination of the campaign.

Two men alone maintained a different opinion. Yussuf Pasha, and Ali Pasha, a great landlord of Argos, both knew the country and the enemy. They proposed making Corinth the headquarters of the Othoman army, and forming large magazines of provisions and military stores under the protection of its impregnable citadel. A Turkish squadron already commanded the Gulf of Lepanto; by fortifying Kenchries a second squadron might be maintained in the Saronic Gulf. The insurgents in the Morea would then be cut off from all communication with the armatoli in Romelia. They then recommended dividing the Othoman army into two divisions. The main body under the seraskier would be amply sufficient to relieve Nauplia and recover possession of Tripolitza. The second division would march along the Gulf of Lepanto, supported by the Turkish ships which had brought Yussuf to Corinth. It would compel the inhabitants of Achaia to submit to the sultan, and secure for the Turks all the profits of the currant crop, and of the custom-duties on the exportation of Greek produce. These divisions of the army, when established firmly at Tripolitza and Patras, could then concert their ulterior movements in co-operation with the garrisons of Coron and Modon, and with the Turkish fleet. This judicious plan was rejected, and the seraskier advanced without even waiting to form magazines at Corinth.

The direct road from Corinth to Nauplia and Argos passes through a narrow defile called the Dervenaki (anciently Tretos), but there is another difficult road parallel to this at a short distance to the east. There are also two other roads,—one making a circuit to the west by Nemea and the village of St George, and the other passing considerably to the east by Aghionoros

and the pass of Kleisura. Dramali passed the defile of the Dervenaki without encountering opposition; and with inconceivable rashness and stupidity he left no guard to keep possession of the pass, and neglected to occupy the villages of St George and Aghionoros, to secure his flanks, and prevent his communications with Corinth from being interrupted. He established his headquarters in the town of Argos on the 24th of July, having sent forward Ali Pasha, attended by 500 cavalry, to assume the command of the garrison of Nauplia, immediately on entering the plain. A. D. 1822.

Had the Greeks acted with good faith, they would have gained possession of Nauplia before Dramali reached Argos. At the end of June, the garrison was reduced to such extremities by hunger, that they signed a capitulation, saying that it was better to be quickly massacred than to die slowly. This capitulation stipulated that the Turks should surrender the fortress, and deliver up their arms and two-thirds of their movable property, on condition that the Greeks should allow them to hire neutral vessels to transport them to Asia Minor, and supply them with provisions until the arrival of these vessels. Hostages were given by both sides for the exact fulfilment of the treaty, and the Greeks were put in possession of the small insular fort that commands the port called the Burdje.

The Greek government immediately sent secretaries into Nauplia to register the property of the Turks, and these officials were accused of behaving like Bobolina and the agents of Kolokotrones at Tripolitza. Both parties soon considered it for their advantage to retard the execution of the capitulation. The members of the Greek government contrived to make large sums of money by secretly purchasing the property of the Turks, by selling them provisions, and promising to

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aid them in escaping with their families. After Mavrocordatos had abandoned the presidency of Greece to play the general in Epirus, the members of the executive body and the Greek ministers enjoyed little confidence. When they pretended that no money could be raised to pay the freight of the neutral vessels necessary for transporting the Turks in Nauplia to Asia Minor, the allegation was considered a mere pretext for enabling their secretaries in the fortress to make larger profits by their bargains with the wealthy families in the place. It was well known that, when the Turks signed the capitulation, they were so anxious to escape that they would have deposited the sum necessary to pay the freight of neutral vessels within twenty-four hours. But when they obtained regular rations from the Greek government, and succeeded in purchasing supplies of every necessary from private persons, they endeavoured to prolong their stay until the arrival of Dramali's army, which was known to be on its march to relieve them. They also expected that the place would be revictualled by the Othoman fleet.

Things were in this state when Ali of Argos entered Nauplia to assume the command. His first care was to secure all the hostages, and arrest the secretaries sent into the place by the Greek government. He asserted that the Greek government had repudiated the treaty by neglecting to fulfil its conditions, and he retained the hostages as pledges for the safety of the Turkish hostages in the hands of the Greeks. In this case, self-interest induced both parties to listen to the voice of humanity. Ali's next object was to prepare for a long defence, but Dramali had conducted his operations with such improvidence that he could obtain only scanty supplies from the Othoman commissariat. The fate of Nauplia depended on the fleet, and

all hopes of immediate assistance from that quarter A. D. 1822. were destroyed by the news that it had passed round the Morea, in order to take on board Mehemet, the new capitan-pasha, who was then at Patras. The convoy destined for Nauplia, which it was escorting, could not be expected for some weeks.

This proceeding of the Othoman fleet entailed ruin on the expedition of Dramali. Common prudence required him to remain at Corinth until he was informed that the fleet had landed supplies for his army in Nauplia. When he found himself at Argos without provisions, it was so evident that he could not advance farther into the Morea that he ought immediately to have fallen back on Corinth, and sent to Patras for a few transports to proceed up the gulf and replenish his magazines. He could throw no supplies of provisions into Nauplia, yet he wasted his time uselessly at Argos, ashamed to admit that he would have done well to have listened to the counsels of Yussuf Pasha.

The conduct of the Greek government was not wiser than that of the seraskier. Some of its political leaders, particularly the Zinzar Vallachian, Kolettes, and the Ionian exile Metaxas, were men whose names in future years were connected with the worst party proceedings that stained the Revolution. They now showed themselves utterly unfit for their high station. Greece at this conjuncture was saved by the constancy and patriotism of the people, not by the energy of the government or the valour of the captains. The members of the government fled from Argos as the advanced-guard of Dramali issued from the Dervenaki. In their hurried flight, the ministers abandoned the national archives and a large quantity of plate which had just been collected from churches and monasteries for the public service. The military followers of ministers and generals, who had swarmed into Argos to share

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the plunder of Nauplia, took advantage of this moment of confusion to plunder their countrymen.

The reign of anarchy was established. During the night, cries of alarm were raised, and firearms were discharged in the quarter of Argos near the road that leads into the town from Corinth. Men shouted that the Turks were entering the place. Thousands of the inhabitants, particularly the refugees from Smyrna, Kydonies, and Chios, rendered more timid than others by the calamities they had witnessed, rushed from their houses in frantic terror, leaving all their property behind. The roads to Lerna and Tripolitza exhibited scenes of confusion and of misery which would fill a volume. Crowds pressed blindly forward without knowing what direction they had taken ; family followed family for hours in sad procession ; men hurried along carrying bundles snatched up at the moment of flight, or bending under the weight of sick parents ; women and children, suddenly roused from sleep and half clad, strove to keep up with the crowd of fugitives, but many sank exhausted by the roadside, weeping, praying, and awaiting death at the hands of their imaginary pursuers.

In the mean time the houses they quitted were plundered with remorseless rapacity. Horses, mules, and working oxen were carried off from the stables of the peasants, and laden with booty at the houses of the citizens. The residence of the executive body, the property of the members of the legislative assembly, and most of the private dwellings in the town, were sacked by bands of Greek klephts before the Turks entered it. The small but choice library of Theodore Negriz, the secretary of state, was carried off on a stolen horse by a Maniat soldier. The horse fell lame ; the Maniat then sold it for two dollars to an officer who bought it to carry water to his soldiers, who were posted on the

hill above Lerna ; to his surprise he found himself in possession of a library. Some days after, the books came into the possession of Captain Hastings, who informed Negris of the fate of his library ; but that restless politician never expressed a wish to repossess them, perhaps never afterwards had a place where he thought them safe. A. D. 1822.

Amidst these disorders, some of the local magistrates of the Albanian population of Argolis took prompt and prudent measures for defending their country. Before they retreated, they burned all the grain and forage which they could not carry off, and filled up some of the wells. Nikolas Stamatepoulos, the brother of Niketas, who had commanded the principal body of troops employed in the long blockade of Nauplia, distinguished himself as much by his judgment at this period as he had previously done by his personal valour. He retired to the eastward, and took up his post in the plain of Iri.

When Dramali established his headquarters in Argos, he had about ten thousand men under his immediate orders, and nearly one-half of this force consisted of cavalry. While the ministers, senators, and the chieftains of Greece were escaping on board the vessels anchored at Lerna, and their followers were plundering the town, a body of volunteers threw themselves into the ruined castle on the Larissa, where the ancient acropolis of Argos stood. The patriotic conduct of these men during the general panic was so meritorious that the name of every one ought to be handed down to the gratitude of Greece. They defended the exposed position they occupied with great firmness, and their success revived the courage of the troops who had posted themselves at Lerna, and emboldened them to return and occupy the line of the Erasinus.

On this occasion Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes re-

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gained the esteem of his countrymen by displaying unwonted activity in addition to his usual courage. The members of the legislative body, from mean jealousy, summoned him to take his place on board the ship in which they had sought refuge, and act as their president. He despised the summons of the cowards, and remained among the people, where they ought to have been. Though he had personal reasons for being dissatisfied with the conduct of Kolokotrones, who had treated him with rudeness and insolence after the taking of Tripolitza, he now hastened to confer with that influential chieftain, in order to urge him to immediate action. The energy and patriotism of Hypsilantes electrified everybody he addressed. Petrobey, the nominal commander-in-chief in the Peloponnesus, and Krevatas, a primate of Mistra, caught something of his enthusiasm. The Peloponnesian Senate stepped forward and assumed the duties of government, which the executive body had abandoned. The people had flown to arms without waiting for the call of their official leaders. Captains and primates were carried along by the general impulse. The patriotism of Greece was completely roused.

Hypsilantes returned to the mills of Lerna, where, finding that the body of volunteers in the Larissa was hard pressed, he boldly threw himself into the castle, accompanied by several young chiefs. The force in the Larissa was now increased to one thousand men, but it was scantily supplied with provisions and water. The Turks kept the place closely invested, and defeated two attempts of the Greeks at Lerna to throw in additional supplies. But the object of the volunteers who first occupied the place was gained. The progress of the Othoman army had been arrested until the delay had given time to a Greek force to assemble strong enough to meet it in the field. Hypsilantes and the greater

part of the garrison of the Larissa withdrew, therefore, A. D. 1822.
in the night, but a few of the original band of its defenders determined to keep possession of the place until they had finished their last loaf. Their escape then became extremely difficult, but on the night of the 1st of August they succeeded in forcing their way through the Turkish line of blockade. A Maniat officer, Athanasios Karayianni, boasted of being the first to enter the place, and the last who quitted it.

The position of the Greeks was now improving rapidly, while that of the Othoman army was becoming untenable. Upwards of five thousand troops were assembled at the mills of Lerna. The position was fortified by low walls, and flanked by the artillery of several Greek vessels. The Erasinus, which issues in a large stream from a cavern about two miles from Argos, confines the road leading to Lerna and Tripolitza between a rocky precipice and several dilapidated artificial channels formed to conduct the water to turn mills, or to irrigate plantations of maize and cotton. Lower down, towards the sea, the plain is intersected with ditches and planted with vineyards. The line of the Erasinus consequently offered ground well suited to the operations of the irregular infantry of the Greeks, and almost impracticable for the Turkish cavalry. On this line numerous skirmishes took place, and the Greeks at last gained a decided superiority.

Other strong bodies of Greeks assembled on all the mountains which overlook the plain of Argos. The season was singularly dry. The Turkish horsemen found great difficulty in procuring forage, and they were often obliged to skirmish with their enemy while watering their horses. Provisions grew scarce, and the soldiers dispersed in the vineyards, and devoured grapes and unripe melons. Disease soon weakened the army,

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and before Dramali had occupied Argos a fortnight, he found himself compelled to fall back on Corinth.

On the 6th of August he sent forward the first division of his army to occupy the passes. The Greek force in the field now exceeded the Othoman army in number. About eight thousand men, nominally under the command of Kolokotrones, who had been elected generalissimo or archistrategos, but really under the immediate orders of a legion of chiefs, occupied the hills from Lerna to the Dervenaki. Another corps of two thousand men had established itself at Aghionoros under Niketas, the archimandrite Dikaïos, and Demetrius Hypsilantes; and a third body of about two thousand sturdy Albanians from Kranidi, Kastri, and Poros, had joined the troops of Nikolas Stamatopoulos, and advanced to watch Nauplia. The want of system which reigned wherever Kolokotrones commanded, or pretended to command, prevented the Greeks from occupying permanent stations and erecting redoubts, which would have compelled the army in Argos to submit to any conditions the Greeks might have thought fit to impose. Had Kolokotrones possessed any military capacity, he might have cut off Dramali's retreat, and secured the immediate surrender of Nauplia. Every hour added to the numbers of the Greeks. Almost every village sent a contingent of armed men to the spot which some local chief considered the best position for cutting off a portion of the seraskier's baggage.

The advanced-guard of the Othoman army consisted of one thousand Albanians. These men, who had studied the country as they advanced with the instinct of warlike mountaineers, took the western road by the plain of Nemea, and kept so good a look-out that they contrived to pass the troops of Kolokotrones, stationed at St George, without even a skirmish. It is difficult

to ascertain whether the Moreots mistook these Albanians for a body of Greek troops on account of the similarity of their dress, or whether they avoided an encounter with veteran warriors, and allowed them purposely to pass unmolested. A. D. 1822.

A body of Dramali's cavalry, sent forward about the same time to occupy the Dervenaki, found the Greeks intrenched in the pass. The first division of the Turks, therefore, took the road by Aghio-Sosti. The leading horsemen had almost gained the open valley below the village of St Basili, when Niketas, who had hastened to meet them from Aghionoros, fell on their flank, and threw himself into the valley before them. Niketas seized a position commanding the junction of the road of Aghio-Sosti with that issuing from the Dervenaki. The rest of the Greek troops who followed Niketas, under Dikaïos and Hypsilantes, attacked the right flank of the Turks. The Othoman cavalry charged boldly to the front, but recoiled under the steady fire of the select body of marksmen on the low eminence occupied by Niketas. The little hill overlooked a ravine, through which the Turks were forced to pass. A fierce struggle took place at this spot. The Delhis attempted to force their way onward with desperate valour, but the Greeks encumbered the passage through the ravine by shooting a number of horses, and then heaping over them the bodies of their riders. The attack was renewed several times, and at last such numbers pressed forward from behind that retreat became impossible. A desperate body of well-mounted horsemen then dashed past the Greeks, and, gaining the open ground in the plain of Kortessa, reached Corinth without further opposition. Above the ravine the scene of slaughter was terrible. Confusion spread along the whole Turkish line. The Greeks who attacked it in flank covered the road with

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dead and wounded. Their principal object was to cut off the baggage, shoot baggage-mules, and secure the booty. The Turks fled in every direction, leaving their baggage to arrest the pursuit of their enemy. Few could make much progress up the side of a rugged mountain, and armed men seemed to spring up out of every bush to attack them. Many abandoned their horses, and succeeded in finding their way to Corinth during the night. Long trains of baggage-mules and camels, and a number of richly-caparisoned horses, were captured. The booty gained was immense.

The conduct of Niketas on this occasion received well-merited praise. He executed a judicious manœuvre with rapidity and courage. He also gained the prize of personal valour in the combat, by rushing sword in hand on a body of Turkish infantry which was endeavouring to form a mass in order to attack his position. His soldiers gave him the name of Turkophagos (the Turk-eater), as the legionaries of Rome saluted their general Imperator; and the title was adopted by all the Greeks. Kanaris, Miaoulis, Marco Botzares, and Niketas, were men whose valour and patriotism raised them above envy.

This defeat stupefied Dramali: he remained a whole day inactive. But as it was impossible to continue in the plain of Argos, he moved forward on the 8th of August by the road of Aghionoros. This road was guarded by the archimandrite Dikaïos. As the Turks slowly wound their way up the steep ascent of the Kleisura, the archimandrite opposed them in front, and Niketas and Hypsilantes, who had marched to support him from Aghio-Sosti and Aghio-Basili, assailed them on their left flank. The Turks were soon thrown into confusion. The Greeks on this occasion directed their attention exclusively to gaining possession of the baggage; and while they were occupied in

cutting it off from the line of retreat, a chosen troop A. D. 1822. of Delhis succeeded by a brilliant charge in clearing the front, and enabled Dramali, with the main body of the cavalry, to escape to Corinth. But the seraskier purchased his personal safety by abandoning his military chest and the whole baggage of his army to the Greeks.

Had the Greeks combined their movements with skill, not a man of the Turkish army could have escaped. The seraskier's retreat was foreseen several days before it commenced, and each leader took measures for securing to himself and his followers as large a share of booty as possible ; but no general measures were adopted for destroying the Turkish army, and no information was transmitted of the enemy's movements from one corps to another. The honours of victory are often obtained by those who have little share in the fight. In the present case, though the troops under the immediate orders of Kolokotrones had no share in the glories of the two days' combat, they gained a considerable share of the booty, and Kolokotrones, because he was generalissimo, was supposed to be the conqueror of Dramali. Thousands of Moreots returned to their native villages enriched with the spoil they had gained, who attributed their good fortune to the generalship of Kolokotrones. The imaginary tactics of the old klepht were said by his ignorant partisans to have caused the destruction of a mighty army of thirty thousand men. History, which is too often the record of party passions and national prejudices, has repeated the fable.

The great success of the Greeks on this occasion, like the great disaster at Petta, increased the popular aversion to military discipline, and strengthened the general conviction that patriotism could conduct military operations as well as science. Tactics were sup-

posed to be useless against the Turks, whom the orthodox believed God had delivered into their hands.

The remains of Dramali's army melted away at Corinth. The seraskier himself died in December 1822.

Nauplia had now nothing to rely on but the Othoman fleet. The Greeks retained possession of the small insular fort called the Burdjee, while Dramali's army occupied Argos, and after his departure they made some efforts to gain possession of the fortress. A French officer, Colonel Jourdain, offered to burn all the houses in the town with incendiary balls fired from the guns in the Burdjee. The destruction of the houses in which the wealthy Turks had accumulated considerable stores of provisions during the armistice, would have compelled the garrison to surrender in a short time. There were, however, still some officers and soldiers in the Greek army who opposed this measure, because they thought it would diminish their share of the long-expected plunder to be obtained when the fortress surrendered.

When Ali of Argos entered Nauplia and assumed the command of the garrison, there were only about twenty Albanians of Kranidi in the Burdjee, and their captain was a boatman, ignorant of the very elements of gunnery. Colonel Jourdain was ordered by the Greek government to enter the place and put his plan into execution. He contrived to excuse himself from remaining in it, but Captain Hastings, assisted by two young artillery officers—Hane, an Englishman, and Animet, a Dane—volunteered to make the attempt to burn Nauplia with the colonel's combustible balls. A noisy cannonade was kept up between the batteries of Nauplia and this little insular fort, which was situated under the guns of the fortress, and ought to have been knocked into a heap of broken stones and mortar

in six hours. The firing on both sides continued for several days without inflicting much loss on either party. Jourdain's balls, when thrown into the town, made a vast deal of smoke, but set nothing on fire. The Turkish shot generally flew past the Burdjee without hitting it. But what with the stray shots that did not miss, and the concussion of the artillery in the place, the walls were so shaken that it became dangerous to fire the heaviest guns, which were alone of any effect against Nauplia. Fortunately, just as things reached this state, the retreat of Dramali's army induced the garrison of Nauplia to stop their fire. The Kranidiots then intimated to Hastings and his companions that their presence was no longer necessary ; that they could not expect a share of the booty in Nauplia ; and that no rations would in future be supplied to them. Hastings was not a man to remain in a place where there was no danger, when his presence was considered unnecessary.

On the 20th September, the Othoman fleet, consisting of eighty sail, including transports, was descried from the beacon of Hydra, and on the following morning the capitan-pasha stood in towards the island of Spetzas with a fair wind, and the gulf of Nauplia open before him. The Greek fleet, consisting of sixty sail, chiefly brigs of from eight to fourteen guns, stood out to engage the Turks. A distant cannonade ensued ; but it was in the power of the capitan-pasha to have sent on his transports to Nauplia under the escort of his corvettes and brigs, while with his heavy ships he opposed the Greeks. The weather was fine, the wind very light, and the capitan-pasha both fool and coward. The Christians acted with timidity as well as the Turks, and the firing was carried on at such a distance that neither party sustained any damage. In the evening the wind died away.

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For three days the Othoman fleet remained manoeuvring idly off Spetzas. The capitan-pasha did not venture to approach near enough to the Christians to use his heavy guns with effect. The Albanians of Hydra and Spetzas showed neither skill nor daring in the employment of their fire-ships. Kanaris was not present. On the night of the 23d the wind blew into the gulf, a circumstance rather rare at this season of the year; but the capitan-pasha, instead of pressing all sail, hove to during the night. At the time there was not a single Greek ship near enough to prevent the transports from reaching Nauplia. The cowardice of the capitan-pasha prevented him from profiting by this favourable opportunity. On the morning of the 24th the Othoman fleet proceeded up the gulf with a light breeze.

The Greek fleet was then nine miles distant, hugging the island of Spetzas. Twenty-three men-of-war and five fire-ships were in advance. The breeze freshened, and had the Turks done their duty, Nauplia would have been relieved without difficulty or danger. But the capitan-pasha sent forward only an Austrian merchantman, without the escort of a single man-of-war. He appears to have trusted to the protection of the Austrian flag. A Greek vessel detached near the head of the gulf issued from her place of concealment and captured this hired transport. After this abortive attempt the capitan-pasha made no further effort to throw supplies into Nauplia. He quitted the gulf, and sailed for Suda on the 26th of September.

The series of naval skirmishes in the Gulf of Nauplia was disgraceful to the Turks, and by no means honourable to the Greek navy. The Albanian seamen of Hydra and Spetzas showed very little enterprise on this trying occasion. Their exertions were probably paralysed by their ignorance of naval tactics, and by

their fear to move far from their own islands, which A. D. 1822.
they had neglected to put in a proper state of defence. The captains of a few ships displayed some boldness, but in general the crews were neither steady nor obedient. In spite of the incapacity of the Turks, the only serious loss sustained by the Othoman fleet was the result of accident. An Algerine frigate bore down on a Greek fire-ship, mistaking it for a brig of war. The crew set fire to the train before taking to their boats, and the flames burst out as the Algerine ran alongside to board it. The sails of the frigate caught fire, and fifty men perished before the flames could be extinguished and the fire-ship set adrift.

The approach of the capitan-pasha so terrified the Kranidiot garrison in the Burdjee that the fort was abandoned, and for nearly forty-eight hours that fort was only occupied by a Hydriot who had served in the French artillery, by a Spetziot sailor, and by Hane, the young English artillery officer, who had returned a few days before. After this interval, twenty Ionians arrived to replace the Kranidiots, and shortly after the garrison was reinforced by a party of Albanian Christians from the Chimariot mountains, under the command of an officer who had served in the Albanian regiment of Naples. On the 24th of September, when the Turks in Nauplia felt sure of immediate relief from the capitan-pasha, they opened a heavy fire on the Burdjee from every gun which could be brought to bear on it; but when the Othoman fleet retired, their fire ceased, and was never again renewed.

The defence of Nauplia was now prolonged only from fear of treachery on the part of the Greeks. In the beginning of December children were frequently found dead in the streets; women were seen wandering about searching for the most disgusting nourishment, and even the soldiers were so weak from starva-

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tion that few were fit for duty. The fortress on the high rock of Palamedes, which towers above the town, was abandoned by its garrison. No one could carry up provisions. The soldiers descended to obtain food, and were too weak to remount the long ascent. The Greeks, hearing of their retreat, entered the place before daybreak on the 12th December 1822.

The conquest of the Palamedes was announced to the Greek troops, who guarded the passes towards Corinth, by volleys of the whole artillery of the place. Kolokotrones soon arrived; other captains quickly followed. A negotiation was opened with the Turks in the town, and a capitulation was at last concluded.

The Greeks engaged to transport all the Mussulmans in Nauplia to Asia Minor, and to allow them to retain a single suit of clothes, a quilt for bedding, and a carpet for prayer. Kolokotrones and the captains hindered all soldiers, except their own personal followers, from entering the place. To the mass of the soldiers who clamoured for admittance, they pleaded the orders of the Greek government, and the necessity of preventing a repetition of the massacres of Monemvasia, Navarin, Tripolitza, and Athens. The soldiers replied that Kolokotrones paid no attention to the orders of government unless when it suited his purpose; that the previous massacres had been caused by the faithlessness and avarice of the captains who cheated the troops; and they declared that they would not allow Kolokotrones and his confederates to appropriate to themselves everything valuable in Nauplia. Large bodies of soldiers assembled before the land-gate, and threatened to storm the place, murder the Turks, and sack the town. The avarice and faithlessness of Kolokotrones and the military chiefs had done more to make the Greek army a mere rabble than the absence of all military discipline.

On this occasion Greece was saved from dishonour A. D. 1822. by the arrival of an English frigate on the 24th of December. The Cambrian was commanded by Captain Hamilton, who was already personally known to several of the Greek chiefs then present. His frank and decided conduct won the confidence of all parties. He held a conference with Kolokotrones and the Moreot chieftains, whose Russian prejudices induced them to view the interference of an English officer with great jealousy. He was obliged to tell them in strong language, that if, on this occasion, they failed to take effectual measures for the honourable execution of the capitulation, they would render the Greek name despicable in civilised Europe, and perhaps ruin the cause of Greece. The chiefs respected Hamilton's character; the wild soldiers admired his martial bearing and the frankness with which he spoke the whole truth. He took advantage of the feeling he had created in his favour to act with energy. He insisted on the Greek government immediately chartering vessels to embark the Turks, and to facilitate their departure he took five hundred on board the Cambrian.¹ He thus saved the Greeks from the dishonour of again violating their plighted faith, but he inflicted a great sacrifice on England. Sixty-seven of the Turks embarked on board the Cambrian died before reaching Smyrna. The typhus fever, which they brought on board, spread among the crew, and several fell victims to the disease. Captain Hamilton was the first public advocate of the Greek cause among Englishmen in an influential position, and he deserves to be ranked among the greatest benefactors of Greece.

Ali of Argos and Selim were the two pashas who commanded in Nauplia, and as both refused to sign

¹ Nine hundred were embarked in the Greek transports.

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the capitulation, they were detained as prisoners by the Greeks.

Public opinion among the Greeks at this time was not generally favourable to Captain Hamilton's conduct, though the contrary has been subsequently asserted. The journal of a Philhellene who was at Tripolitza observes that the Greeks were in great choler against the English for having insisted on the immediate embarkation of the Turks. Captain Hastings confirms this also in his journal.¹

The capitan-pasha, after remaining a short time at Suda, sailed through the Archipelago unmolested, and anchored between Tenedos and the Troad. The contingents of the Greek fleet from the Albanian islands remained inactive in the ports of Hydra and Spetzas, and neglected to take advantage of the well-known inactivity and cowardice of Mehemet Pasha. But another brilliant exploit of Kanaris threw a veil over their shortcomings. By his persuasion, the community of Psara fitted out two fire-ships.

On the 10th of November 1822 the Othoman fleet was riding at anchor without a suspicion of danger. At daybreak, Kanaris and his companion approached without exciting any attention. Two line-of-battle ships were anchored to windward of the rest of the fleet. Kanaris undertook the more difficult task of burning the leeward ship. The breeze which brought up the Greek fire-ships had hardly reached the Turks, who, under the influence of the current of the Hellespont flowing through the channel of Tenedos, were not swinging head to wind. Kanaris, with his cool

¹ Hastings went on board the *Cambrian* on the 5th January 1823, and saw five hundred Turks embarked. He adds: "Much difference of opinion exists among the Greeks on the conduct of Captain Hamilton; but I feel convinced that he saved the lives of the Turks by his prompt measures, and thus did a great service to Greece." A few days after, at Hydra, he writes: "I found here, as at Nauplia, various opinions concerning Captain Hamilton's conduct, but respectable people here were in his favour."

sagacity, observed this circumstance, and ran his enemy aboard abaft the fore-chains on the larboard side. The fire-ship was to windward, the sails nailed to the masts, the yards were secured aloft by chains, and everything was saturated with turpentine, so that in an instant the flames blazed up higher than the main-top of the seventy-four, and enveloped her deck in a whirlwind of fire. There was no time for the crew to escape. Those who leaped into the sea perished before they could reach the distant shore. The ships at anchor cut their cables and made sail. The loss of the Turks is said to have reached eight hundred men.

The flag-ship of the capitan-pasha, which Kanaris had left as a sure prey to his companion, escaped. It was already swinging to the breeze when the Greek ran his fire-ship under its bowsprit. In consequence of this ill-judged position, the fire-ship fell off and drifted away to leeward. The employment of fire-ships seems to have required the cool judgment and unflinching determination of Kanaris to insure success. The Othoman fleet, which dispersed in its first access of terror, soon reassembled at the Dardanelles; but one corvette went on shore on Tenedos, and another was abandoned by its crew, and found floating a complete wreck in the Archipelago. Constantine Kanaris and the crews of the two fire-ships returned safely to Psara in their boats. The hero was received by his countrymen with universal enthusiasm. Envy for once was speechless in Greece. By the hand of one man, the sultan had lost two line-of-battle ships and nearly two thousand men during the year 1822. Yet the naval operations of the year revealed to a scientific observer like Frank Hastings that the Greek navy, in its actual state, was unable to continue a prolonged contest with the Othoman fleet.

The sultan could not send to sea a more incapable

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officer than Mehemet Pasha ; nor was it likely that worse manned ships would ever quit the port of Constantinople than those he commanded. Yet, under these disadvantages, the Othoman fleet had thrown supplies into the fortresses of Coron, Modon, Patras, and Lepanto, and had twice navigated the Archipelago, without sustaining any loss which could not be easily repaired. Sultan Mahmud had obtained the conviction, that all the skill and enterprise of the Greeks could not secure for their light vessels any decided advantage over the inert masses of the Turkish ships. A prolonged naval war must therefore exhaust the resources of Greece, while it would be sure to improve the efficiency of the Turkish seamen. Some modification in the naval forces of the Greeks was evidently necessary to give them a decided victory. Hastings urged them to adopt the use of steam, and heavy artillery and shells fired horizontally, in order to confound their enemy with new engines and new tactics. His advice was rejected by the men of influence among the Greeks, who believed that their own fire-ships would secure them the victory. But this could only have happened if every Greek fire-ship had found a Kanaris to command it, and if every Othoman fleet should be sent to sea with a capitan-pasha as incapable as Mehemet.¹

The greatest losses inflicted on the Turks this year were by the desultory expeditions of the Psarians and Kasiots. The Psarians cruised incessantly along the coast of Asia Minor, from the Dardanelles to Rhodes. The Kasiots infested the coasts of Karamania, Syria, and Egypt. Hardly a single Turkish coaster could pass from one part to another. On one occasion all the vessels in the port of Damietta were plundered, and three ships laden with rice, which were on the

¹ See the Memorandum by Captain Hastings, in Appendix.

eve of sailing to supply the pasha's fleet at Alexandria, A. D. 1822. were carried off to Kasos. These daring exploits, however, only enriched the captains and crews of the privateers engaged, and they weakened the Greek navy, by alluring some of the best ships and sailors to seek their private gain instead of serving the public cause.

The misconduct of the central government and the crimes of Odysseus left Eastern Greece in a state of anarchy during the summer of 1822. Even at Athens order was not established, though the social condition of the inhabitants afforded peculiar facilities for organising a regular administration. There were no primates in Attica who exercised an influence like Turkish beys or Christian Turks—no men who, like Zaimes and Londos in Achaia, could waste the national revenues in maintaining bands of armed followers far from the scene of actual hostilities; nor was there any military influence powerful enough to reduce the province to the condition of an *armatolik*. The Greek population of the city of Athens was unwarlike. The Albanian population of Attica served in several bands under local captains of no great distinction. Many of the native soldiers, both citizens and peasants, were small landed proprietors, who had a direct interest in opposing the introduction of the irregular military system, to which Greece was rapidly tending. They united with the local magistrates and the well-disposed civilians in striving to organise a local militia capable of preserving order. Power was very much divided, and administrative talent utterly wanting. Every man who possessed a little influence aspired at command, and was indifferent to the means by which he might acquire it. Athens, consequently, became a hotbed of intrigue; but it would be a waste of time to characterise the intriguers and to describe their intrigues. Something must nevertheless be told, in

order to explain the result of their folly and selfishness.

An Athenian citizen employed by the central government to collect the public revenues was murdered by the soldiery, who wished to seize the national resources, and make Attica a capitanlik of armatoli. An Athenian captain gained possession of the Acropolis, and displayed more insolence and tyranny than had been recently exhibited by any Turkish disdar. He was driven from power by another Athenian ; but against the authority of his successor constant intrigues were carried on. The shopkeepers of the city at last imagined that, like the Turkish janissaries at Constantinople, they could unite the occupations of hucksters and soldiers, and under this delusion they undertook to garrison the Acropolis themselves, instead of forming a corps of regular troops. As might have been foreseen, each man did what seemed good in his own eyes, anarchy prevailed, and the persons possessing anything to lose sent a deputation to Prince Demetrius Hypsilantes, inviting him to come and take the command of the Acropolis. He arrived at Megara, but the soldiery in the Acropolis refused to receive him as their leader, and in order to secure a powerful patron, they elected Odysseus as their general, and offered to put him in possession of the fortress. He hastened to seize the prize, and hurrying to Athens with only a hundred and fifty men, was admitted into the Acropolis on the 2d of September 1822. The authority of Odysseus was recognised by the Athenians as the speediest way of putting an end to a threatening state of anarchy.

Attica was thus lost to those who, from their opinions and interests, were anxious to employ its resources in consolidating civil order and a regular central administration, and was thrown into the scale

of the Albanian military system, which soon extended A. D. 1822. its power over all liberated Greece.

As soon as Odysseus found himself firmly established as captain of Attica, he persuaded the people of Eastern Greece to form a provincial assembly at Athens, where he held the members under his control. This assembly dissolved the Areopagus, and appointed Odysseus commander-in-chief in Eastern Greece. Without waiting for his confirmation by the central executive, he assumed the administration of the revenues of Attica, and compelled the municipality of Athens to sell the undivided booty surrendered by the Turks at the taking of the Acropolis. This money he employed in paying his followers, and in laying up stores of provisions and ammunition in the Acropolis, which all parties had hitherto neglected. He subsequently added a strong angular wall to the Acropolis, in order to enclose a well situated below the northern wing of the Propylæa.

But while he was making these prudent arrangements, he also gratified his malicious disposition by a cruel as well as a vigorous use of his power. Three persons were brought before him accused of treasonable correspondence with the Turks. The truth was, that they favoured the government party; but the accusation afforded Odysseus a pretext for revenging private opposition. He remembered the lessons of his old patron, Ali of Joannina. Two of the accused were hung, and the third, who was a priest, was built up in a square pillar of stone and mortar. As the mason constructed the wall which was to suffocate him, the unfortunate man solemnly invoked God to witness that he was innocent of the crime laid to his charge.

The defeat of Dramali did not cause Khurshid Pasha to relax his efforts for reconquering Greece, but

the disasters of the Othoman army in the Morea produced so much discontent in Macedonia, that he could only send forward about eight thousand to occupy Zeituni and secure the line of the Sperchius. A portion of this force advanced to Salona by the road of Gravia without encountering any serious resistance from Panouria. Mehemet Pasha, who commanded the Turks, after burning a part of Salona fell back to Gravia, in order to form a junction with a body of Albanians which had endeavoured to penetrate to Salona by Daulis and Delphi.

A skirmish took place between the Greeks and Turks near Gravia on the 13th of November, which ended in the defeat of the Greeks. Odysseus lost several officers, and was in danger of falling into the hands of the Albanians in the Othoman army. The season was fortunately too far advanced for Mehemet Pasha to profit by his victory. The country between Gravia and Thebes had been laid waste, and was abandoned by the inhabitants. The Greek troops, however, who knew the places to which the people had retired with their cattle, would have hung on the flanks of the Turks, and cut off their communications with Zeituni. Odysseus was nevertheless terrified lest Mehemet Pasha should push boldly forward into Attica, trusting to obtain supplies of provisions from Negrepont. Such a movement might have induced the garrison of the Acropolis to join with the citizens in electing a new commander-in-chief.

From this difficulty Odysseus extricated himself with his usual perfidy. He sent his secretary to Mehemet Pasha to propose an armistice, offering to make his submission to the sultan on condition that he should be recognised as captain of *armatoli*, and he engaged to persuade the other captains in Eastern Greece to submit on the same conditions. Mehemet had as

little intention of executing these conditions as Odys- A. D. 1822.
seus, but he accepted them, because they afforded him
a pretext for returning to Larissa, where the death of
Khurshid rendered his presence necessary.

The long and not inglorious career of Khurshid Pasha had been suddenly terminated by a sentence of death, and his honourable service could not save him from falling a victim to Sultan Mahmud's determination to sweep away every man of influence who adhered to the traditional system and supported the administrative organisation, which he was resolved to destroy.


At the end of November 1822 the Turks withdrew all their troops from Eastern Greece, south of Thermopylæ, and took up their winter quarters in Zeituni. The peasantry commenced sowing their fields, with the expectation of reaping their crops before their enemy could return. The armistice concluded by Odysseus saved them from ruin ; and, as they knew nothing of its conditions, they approved highly of his proceedings, and became generally attached to his party.

It is curious to observe by what accidents two men so depraved and morally worthless as Kolokotrones and Odysseus became the objects of hero-worship to the Greeks. The temple of fame is not always "a palace for the crowned truth to dwell in."

ERRATUM.

Page 335, line 25, *for* "Tricoupi" *read* "John Tricoupi."





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